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Since 2011, a series of events – including popular upheavals, civil wars, the 
empowerment of non-state actors, economic volatility and increased geopolitical 
confrontation between states – hinted at the beginning of a transformative period 
for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Notwithstanding the region’s 
modern history has provided several instances of treacherous conjunctures, 
seldom like in the aftermath of 2011 so many different challenges of different 
types have risen simultaneously on a regional and domestic scale. As this 
transformative wave spread towards the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), challenging the existing balance of power, the local regimes’ 
security perceptions were profoundly impacted. Arguably, these became so 
substantially divergent at the level of each state that, in the span of only six years, 
the GCC was hit by two of the gravest internal political crises in its history. Hence, 
new questions emerged regarding the existence of a shared prioritization of 
threats and the interaction of endogenous and exogenous dangers when they 
materialize simultaneously, that don’t seem to find answers in the existing body 
of scholarship yet. Focusing on the post-2011 environment and the issues 
emerged as crucial amid the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises, this thesis aims to 
provide new analytical tools for addressing such questions and enhancing the 
understanding of evolving security perceptions. In order to do so, drawing from 
the literatures of security studies and area studies, an original theoretical 
framework is elaborated, which introduces a distinction between threats and risks 
and a categorization system addressing the emergence of multidimensional, 
‘intermestic’ threats. The framework is subsequently applied to perform an 
analysis of threat perceptions in each of the six GCC states. Finally, the author 
will attempt to draw conclusions on threat prioritization in the region and the status 
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1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION. 
 
1.1 Emerging threats and polarization in the Gulf. 
The year 2011 signaled the beginning of a transformative period for the 
geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, posing daunting 
challenges, simultaneously, to countries of the region. Popular political turmoil, 
economic instability, major geopolitical shifts and asymmetric military challenges 
rose in just few years as to create a perfect storm putting at risk the status quo 
crafted over decades in the region. Even the monarchies of the Arabian 
Peninsula, considered islands of stability, were heavily affected by such 
combination of game-changing events, that substantially put into question their 
existing perceptions of security and power dynamics in the region.  
In January and February 2011 popular uprisings started in North Africa, triggering 
the most widespread revolutionary wave in the modern history of the MENA 
region, known as Arab Spring.1 In little over a month protesters toppled the 
regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Muhammad Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt, both in power since the 1980s. These events had substantial 
reverberations in the entire region as they demonstrated that popular revolts 
might take down regimes historically considered bastions of stability. In Libya, 
aided by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission, protests ousted 
the decades-old regime of Mu’ammar Qaddafi, hostile to the GCC. Further away, 
in Yemen, popular protests created the conditions to oust, in April 2011, the 
regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power since 1990, as a rebel group known as 
Houthis, inimical of Riyadh and allegedly supported by Tehran, engaged in a 
campaign leading them to take the capital Sanaa in 2014.2 Between 2011 and 
2012, a full-fledged civil war reached the shores of Syria, after the Alawi regime 
of Bashar al-Assad took arms against predominantly Sunni protesters, and the 
international community chose not to intervene, neglecting pressures from the 
																																								 																				
1 Fawaz Gerges, (ed.) The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2013. 
2 Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts. "The war in Yemen." Survival 58.6 (2016): 
pp.157-186. 
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GCC countries.3 As a result, the military intervention of Russia and Iran, a 
staunch ally of the al-Assad regime, advanced non-Arab influence in the Levant.4 
In the context of the Arabian Peninsula, these events inspired significant 
opposition rallies in Oman, Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province and above all 
Bahrain, where in March 2011 the Sunni ruling family of al-Khalifa cracked down 
major protests by large groups within the Shi’a-majority population.5 The 
Bahraini, Egyptian and Syrian cases had a long-term significance. The decision 
of the American administration not to stand by the Saudi and US allied Egyptian 
regime, to half-heartedly support the Bahraini regime and not to intervene in 
Syria, put into question in unprecedented ways the reliability of the United States 
as a partner to its regional allies, including those in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).6 Driven by this perception of a US retrenchment, some GCC countries 
resorted to an uncommon assertiveness and unilateralism.7  
Saudi Arabia and Qatar resorted to unilateral moves to support conflicting anti-
Assad forces.8 In Egypt and Libya, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
joined forces to support anti-Islamist factions opposing the Muslim Brotherhood-
aligned factions propped up by Qatar.9 Fundamental intra-GCC disagreements 
escalated into the two gravest internal political crises in the GCC’s history, in 
2014 and 2017, featuring Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain breaking relations 
with Qatar.10 In 2015, as he ascended to the royal palace, Deputy Crown Prince 
of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman, launched a military campaign against 
the Houthis with the United Arab Emirates as his main ally. That same year the 
P5+1 signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions (JCPOA) with Iran, an 
																																								 																				
3 Christopher Phillips. The battle for Syria: international rivalry in the new Middle East. 
(Yale: Yale University Press), 2016. 
4 Ibid., pp. 147 - 170. 
5 Sean Yom and Gregory Gause. "Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang 
on." Journal of Democracy 23.4 (2012): pp. 74-88. 
6 Tim Niblock and Steve Hook, (eds), The United States and the Gulf. Shifting 
Pressures, Strategies and Alignments, (Berlin: Gerlach Press), 2015. 
7 Rory Miller. Desert kingdoms to global powers: The rise of the Arab Gulf. Yale 
University Press, 2016. 
8 Christopher Phillips "Eyes Bigger than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 
Syria." Middle East Policy, 1.24 (2017): pp. 36-47. 
9 Mehran Kamrava. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution." Orbis 56.1 
(2012): pp. 96-104. 
10 Cinzia Bianco and Gareth Stansfield. "The intra-GCC crises: mapping GCC 
fragmentation after 2011." International Affairs 94.3 (2018): pp. 613-635; Rory Miller, 
"Managing Regional Conflict: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Embargo of 
Qatar." Global Policy 10 (2019): pp. 36-45. 
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agreement that aimed to pave the way for the normalization of Tehran’s position 
in the international community for the first time after the revolution that 
empowered the Islamic regime in 1979.11 Quite interestingly, the agreement was 
reached thanks to the key mediating role of a GCC member, the Sultanate of 
Oman. Yet the agreement further brought to light the divergent positions on Iran 
within the GCC as in 2016 Saudi Arabia broke all relations with Iran following to 
the assaults of the Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad that took 
place after Riyadh executed the Shi’a cleric Nimr al-Nimr, leader of the 2011 
protests against the Saudi regime in the Eastern Province, pushing all other GCC 
countries, except Oman, to take similar actions. 12 
In this context, the strategic chaos in Syria and Iraq allowed the rise between 
2014 and 2015 of a new jihadist group, Daesh13, that over few months managed 
to proclaim a new “Caliphate” in large sways of territory between the two 
countries, publicly declaring the annulment of the borders between them as 
drawn in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Daesh’s rhetoric soon exposed its deep 
hostility and plans of destabilization for the Arabian Peninsula testified by a string 
of terrorist attacks in Eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 2015 and 2016.14  
Meanwhile, since an historic peak on June 2014, when the Brent crude was sold 
at USD 115.19 per barrel, the oil price fell to below USD 30 in January 2016, a 
twelve-years nadir.15 These prices put considerable pressure on the budgets of 
most GCC countries, where oil revenues account for between 80 and 90 percent 
																																								 																				
11 The JCPOA s an international agreement on the nuclear program of Iran reached in 
Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the UN Security Council's five permanent 
members (namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 
plus Germany (P5 +1), ending a decades-long international controversy between the 
USA and Iran. Its political implications in the region are analysed well in: Riham Bahi. 
"Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus 
Engagement." The International Spectator 52.2 (2017): pp. 89-101. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Daesh is the Arab acronym for ISIS, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, currently the 
most active international jihadist organization in the Arab region. On its rise, see: 
Fawaz Gerges Isis: A History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2017. 
14 Eman Ragab. "The Gulf Cooperation Council countries and countering ISIS: threats, 
policies and challenges." Contemporary Arab Affairs 9.4 (2016): pp. 577-595. 
15 Jillian Ambrose, “Oil prices may have ‘bottomed out’, says IEA”, The Telegraph, 11 
March 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/03/11/iea-oil-prices-may-have-
bottomed-out/ (accessed 20 April 2017) 
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of total government revenues.16 In order to respond to the fall of energy prices, 
all GCC governments have promoted economic policies that try to break away 
from the dependence on energy revenues, with inevitable impacts on their 
political economic “rentier” model: i.e. the idea that the state reallocates the 
externally-driven oil-and-gas-related rents it receives through government-
granted privileges such as tax exemption, a very generous welfare and subsidy 
system and the assurance of getting a job in the public sector in exchange for 
unquestioned loyalty to the regimes.17 As one end of this ruling bargain is put into 
question, the other may be threatened, too.  
 
1.2 Aims of the thesis, research questions and structure. 
Each of the events described above, and the global shifts in which they took 
place, have major security implications for the Arab monarchies of the Gulf. In 
fact, they have generated a securitization of the political discourse and domestic 
and external policies and stimulated more robust defence doctrines. In doing so, 
the GCC leaders have attempted an unprecedented step: to go from being 
security consumers to security producers.18 The changing status of regional 
politics and the new course of the GCC states call upon the studies on regional 
security to evolve and keep the pace with the disruptive developments of the 
post-2011 environment. Given how the decision-making and policy-making 
processes in the Gulf monarchies is largely limited to a tight number of 
individuals, unpacking their leaderships’ perceptions can be instrumental to 
decode an increasingly impactful policy behavior.19 In this perspective, this thesis 
																																								 																				
16 “Oil and the Gulf States: After the Party,” The Economist, 26 March 2016; “Total 
Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP),” The World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS, (accessed 20 April 2017) 
17 The “rentier state system” is a political-economic system whose relative theory was 
expressed first in Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Hazem 
Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), The Rentier State: Nation, State and the 
Integration of the Arab World, (London: Croom Helm), 1987. For a comprehensive 
review of the new economic policies see Kristian Ulrichsen, “The Politics of Economic 
Reform in Arab Gulf States”, Center for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker 
Institute for Public Policy, June 2016. 
18 Jean-Marc Rickli. “New alliances dynamics in the Gulf and their impact on the small 
GCC states”, Third World Thematics, 1:1, pp. 132-150. 
19 A comprehensive description of the process of policy-making in the Arab Gulf 
monarchies and the centrality of the leaders appears in Gregory Gause, 
"Understanding the Gulf States." Democracy, 36 (2015). 
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addresses the questions of how the policy-makers’ definition of threats in the 
region has changed, what are the factors shaping their perceptions and 
prioritization, and how to use this information in analysing the short and medium 
term impacts on the security agenda of the regimes of the Arabian Peninsula. In 
doing so, it attempts to provide tools for enhancing the understanding of afore-
mentioned, and other, security and political trends in the wider MENA region as 
well.  
The main research question will be: how has the interpretation of the notion of 
threat evolved after 2011 at the level of each of the GCC regimes? In the process 
of answering this question, other issues will spontaneously arise. Is there still a 
shared understanding of the idea of Gulf security and a shared prioritization of 
threats among the GCC regimes? Did new threats emerge in addition, 
substitution or modification to traditional ones? How do endogenous and 
exogenous threats interact when they materialize contemporarily at the global, 
regional and domestic levels? How can threats be categorized when so many 
emerge from different sources? What is the impact of these evolutions on the 
GCC countries’ relations among themselves and with other regional actors?  
In the attempt to find answers to these questions, the author will first develop an 
original theoretical framework that, building on the relevant literature on security 
studies and area studies, and with an holistic approach, would serve as a 
fundamental instrument to interpret and systematize the contemporary security 
thinking in the Gulf region today. The subsequent chapter will introduce the case 
studies selected for this study. These will be the two intra-GCC crises of 2014 
and 2017, unprecedented instances of intra-GCC divergences escalating into full-
blown existential spats for the body. Generally speaking, when studying the 
notions of threats and security, the GCC is arguably one of the most relevant 
object of analysis. Indeed such notions are so central to this region that, the 
general consensus goes, the GCC itself was formed as a body for collective self-
defence against common threats.20 As a result, academics specialising in area 
studies often look at the security of the bloc of six Gulf monarchies as inextricably 
																																								 																				
20 Matteo Legrenzi. The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, 
Security and Economy Coordination in a Changing Middle East. Vol. 44. (London: IB 
Tauris, 2011), Abdul Khaleq Abdulla. "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature Origin, and 
Process." In Michael Hudson (ed), Middle East dilemma: The politics and economics of 
Arab integration (London: Bloomsbury Publishing), 1999. 
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interdependent, almost a unitary good named ‘Gulf security’.21 Over the years, 
scholars have acknowledged some of the limits that prevent the GCC from 
becoming an effective organism for collective security.22 However, in spite of the 
recurrent skirmishes, the existence of a common perception and prioritization of 
threats among the six monarchies has rarely been questioned. The two intra-
GCC crises have shattered this narrative and exposed, via leaked official 
documents known as “Riyadh Agreements”, a unique window into an official 
recognition of the issues identified as threats by the signatory governments. For 
this reason, the issues at the centre of these Agreements – namely, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, jihadi organizations and Iran-supported Shi’a groups – have been 
identified as suitable case studies to investigate divergent perceptions across the 
GCC. In the six chapters of this study’s empirical part, the leaderships’ 
perceptions of the three mentioned issues will be measured and systematized 
through the thesis’ theoretical framework in each of the six GCC countries. While 
the research’s methodology is largely examined in the next chapter, it seems 
appropriate to anticipate that security perceptions have been deducted by the 
researcher through a combination of the analysis of these countries’ foreign and 
domestic policies in an historical perspective, a speech analysis of their political 
and media discourse, and an extensive fieldwork conducted in the region, 
including to gather interviews from relevant interlocutors. In all six empirical 
chapters, the first paragraph will be dedicated to measuring the impact of the so-
called Arab Spring on the leadership’s security perceptions, as a central 
argument of this thesis is that during and after the uprisings the fragmentation of 
the security calculus across the GCC regimes has crystallised. The three 
following paragraphs will analyse security perceptions vis-à-vis the three case 
study issues. The last paragraph will instead highlighting which issue has been 
perceived as a priority in each country in the period 2011-2017, and why. In the 
																																								 																				
21 Christian Koch, "The GCC as a Regional Security Organization." Konrad Adenaur 
Stiftung, KAS International Reports (2010): pp. 24-35; Thomas Naff, Gulf security and 
the Iran-Iraq war. National Defense University, (Washignton, 1985); Steven M. 
Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf security: The foundations of the war on 
terror. Vol. 12. (London: Garnet & Ithaca Press), 2007. 
22 Neil, Partrick, “The GCC: Gulf State Integration or Leadership Cooperation?” Kuwait 
Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, 
Research Paper No. 19: London: London School of Economics, 2011; John Peterson, 
"Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States: Settling the Peripheries" in Mehran 
Kamrava (ed.) International Politics of the Persian Gulf. (New York: Syracuse University 
Press), 2011, p. 21. 
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final chapter of the thesis, the researcher will summarize the findings of the thesis, 
attempting to highlight drivers of security perceptions across the Arab monarchies 
of the Gulf and highlighting the core elements shaping their process of 
prioritization, while evaluating the original theoretical notions and paradigms 
introduced. 
This study therefore inscribes itself in the modern area studies literature looking 
at the realm of security: in particular, that dedicated to investigate the security 
calculus of the Arab monarchies of the Gulf since the formation of the GCC. In 
this sense, it might also be relevant to the literature on the international relations 
of the GCC countries: the connection with security studies is indeed strong and 
long-standing, as the GCC countries’ international relations have long been 
interpreted as based upon needs of security and threat deterrence.23 Hence, the 
literature relevant to this thesis is extensive and diverse and, therefore, it seems 
helpful to try and systematize it into categories, or waves, drawing similarities and 
patterns. 
 
1.3 Literature review. 
Studies pertaining to the described strand of scholarly literature produced since 
the early 1980s can be, loosely, categorized into three waves, not necessarily by 
chronological criteria but rather as per the different definition and prioritization of 
threats offered. In this categorization, first wave studies tend to prioritize 
exogenous and conventional hard security threats, second wave studies instead 
focus on endogenous, soft security threats and third wave studies often blur the 
distinction between exogenous and endogenous threats and give added weight 
to the ideological factors. A number of studies can be defined as transitional, and 
serve as a bridge between the different categories. From a theoretical 
perspective, while first wave studies tend to employ exclusively realist lenses, in 
several variations, other studies increasingly adopt mixed theoretical 
																																								 																				
23 Ken Matthews. The Gulf Conflict and International Relations. (London: Routledge), 
1993; Paul Sullivan. “The Gulf War, Economic and Financial Linkages, and Arab 
Economic Development:  Iraq – The Pivot?” in Tareq Y. Ismael, ed., The International 
Relations of the Middle East in the 21st Century (Aldershot:  Ashgate, 2000); Kamrava, 
International Politics of the Persian Gulf.  
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approaches, from structural realism to constructivism, due to the tendency of the 
more contemporary literature to favour a comprehensive and holistic perspective.  
First-wave studies focus on state entities as unitary actors and their effort to 
protect their strategic interests, mainly with a realist or neo-realist approach. The 
priority of these analyses is to detect actual and potential security challenges, 
usually defined as conventional military threats from external powers. First-wave 
studies are epitomized by Anthony Cordesman’s comprehensive study on The 
Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability.24 The study is heavily based on realist 
assumption on power metrics - size, population, resources, military capabilities - 
and geographic features, such as the proximity to a threatening big power. 
Cordesman has followed up his studies with a periodical assessment of the 
military resources of the GCC countries in comparison with that of Iran, stressing 
consistently how Iran was achieving defence self-sufficiency while the GCC 
countries remained dependent from the assistance of an outside power, the 
United States.25 A similar perspective is embraced by Joseph Kostiner’s analysis 
of the campaign to construct a GCC collective defence arrangement in the 
aftermath of the 1990–1991 war.26 Kostiner focuses as well on conventional 
threats and realist considerations arguing how longstanding intra-GCC tensions 
over territorial boundaries pushed smaller states, such Kuwait and Bahrain, to 
prefer bilateral defence agreements with the United States and Britain instead of 
looking towards closer cooperation within the GCC. Subsequently, David Priess 
offers a modification of first-wave arguments, as explanations for the formation of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council.27 Building on Stephen Walt’s The Origins of 
Alliances, Priess argues that states react to increases in the level of threat that 
they face rather than to changes in the power of external actors: the policy driver 
shifts from balance-of-power to balance-of-threat.28 He defines threats as 
																																								 																				
24 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability. (Boulder, 
CO:Westview,1984).  
25 Anthony H.Cordesman, and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. Gulf military forces in an era of 
asymmetric wars. (London: Greenwood Publishing Group), 2007. 
26 Joseph Kostiner, “The Search for Gulf Security: The Politics of Collective Defense”, 
Middle East Contemporary Survey, 16 (1992). A similar perspective is also in John 
Duke Anthony, “The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: The Arab Side 
of the Gulf”, in Hossein Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf (London: 
Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 174–175. 
27 David Priess, “Balance-of-Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council”, Security Studies, 5 (Summer 1996) 
28 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)  
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determined by aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive power, and 
aggressive intentions, thus broadening the traditional interpretation of threat 
including subversion, terrorism, espionage, and even political propaganda in the 
semantic camp of offensive power capabilities.29 For this reason, Priess argues, 
in early 1981, the six smaller Arab monarchies of the Gulf put aside their rivalries 
with one another and set up the GCC in order to face a revisionist Iran which had 
begun to encourage or sponsor subversive movements throughout the region, 
and therefore posed a direct and proximate threat to their continued existence. 
By adopting such perspectives, however, it would be impossible to explain the 
centrality increasingly attributed by GCC states to actors not necessarily handled 
by states, such as Islamist and jihadist groups.30 
Somehow in between the first and second waves, area studies have moved to 
explore the processes of internationalization and their impacts on the security 
calculus of the GCC countries. A large part of them have focused on the role of 
the external powers in the regional security balance, a role that has been central 
to the security calculus of the GCC countries since the times of British 
protectorates. The majority of scholars in these regards point to a benign role of 
the United Kingdom first and the United States later, as off-shore balancers of 
Gulf security. Despite the role of the United States in the region has historically 
began as an instrument for the American government to contrast its Cold War 
rival, the Soviet Union, and has retained a hegemonic character to this day, it 
was largely perceived as a congenial defence bulwark by the GCC regimes.31 
Most studies argue, for example, that the strong involvement of the United States 
in the regional security calculus beside the GCC countries has traditionally served 
as a powerful deterrent to the expansionist ambitions of the two big powers of the 
region.32 At the same time, other scholars have pointed to the fact that this US-
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GCC security alliance triggers a significant “security dilemma”, in particular in 
Saudi Arabia: while representing an effective deterrent, the presence of US 
military on Saudi soil, where the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina are located, 
has generated considerable domestic criticism of the regime.33 Indeed, 
depending on the United States highlights the failure of local regimes to protect 
their citizens and is particularly problematic because criticism of US policy in the 
Middle East has traditionally been strong in the Arab public opinion. All these 
factors fuelled the anti-regime rhetoric of non-state jihadist groups such as al-
Qa’ida.34 However, the dependence of the GCC countries on military assistance 
from an outside power has also been analysed as a by-product of a specific policy 
choice of the regime to keep their own armed forces fragmented. The policy of 
fragmentation, dubbed by the literature “coup-proofing”, has been explained by 
Steffen Hertog as the choice of regime elites to build up an ‘army to watch the 
army’ to reduce the risks of a military takeover - likely as a reaction to a number 
of coups planned in the 1960s and 1970s - as well as an instrument of patronage, 
whereby different security institutions are created to balance the ambitions of 
different factions within the ruling families.35 The afore-mentioned elements factor 
in the GCC regimes calculus to rather cope with the security dilemma engendered 
by the presence of US bases on their soil. Most recently, Geoffrey Gresh has put 
forward a policy interpretation for such dilemma, arguing that host nations’ 
leaders facing significant external threats - i.e., the threat of invasion from an 
outside aggressor or rivalry over contested territory - are more likely to accept US 
bases, while host nations’ leaders pressed by extensive internal security threats 
- i.e., social upheaval, violent opposition movements, or mounting economic 
grievances against the ruling regime - are more likely to reject US bases.36 His 
research incorporates the principle of the conflation “regime security” with 
“national security” as a feature of policy-making in the Gulf, overwhelmingly 
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accepted by the contemporary area literature and in this study.37 As for global 
actors, while still crucial in the security equation of the region, they will not be the 
focus of this thesis, whose primary interest is for regional perspectives on regional 
issues. 
Second-wave studies enlarged the focus and the perspective, and started to look 
at the long term consequences of integrating the GCC into the globalized market 
and international community, where the loci of power are more diffused than 
ever.38 These studies broaden the notions of threat to incorporate a wide range 
of economic, societal, environmental, demographic challenges that were largely 
neglected in first-wave accounts, as threatening societal and therefore political 
stability. Indeed, second-wave studies thoroughly debated the question of 
“security for whom”. This literature expanded the answer to include individuals’ 
and communities’ security, however rather as a by-product of security policies, 
really aimed at preserving political stability and putting regime survival as the 
referent object of security. In this sense, second-wave studies introduced a wide 
variety of dynamics that could jeopardize the stability of regimes in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and widened the perspective dedicating growing attention to non-state 
actors and internal dynamics. These include domestic political challenges, such 
as the demands for greater popular participation voiced in most of the Arab Gulf 
states in the 1990s39, the challenge of pushing liberalization without 
democratization40; the economic difficulties that accompanied the stagnation of 
world oil prices after the Gulf war41; the structural imbalances in the political 
economy of resources distribution and in the labour market42; demographic 
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trends43, in particular where indigenous nationals are a staggering minority of the 
total population; the long-term impacts of climate change;44 the growing shortage 
of fresh water throughout the region.45 Several scholars, interpreting the Arab 
Spring as uprisings that overthrew regimes through protests related primarily to 
socio-economic grievances, highlight the events of 2011 as a demonstration of 
the fundamental argument presented by this wave of literature.46 Insecure Gulf, 
by Kristian Ulrichsen, embodies well this literature.47 Adopting a constructivist 
approach, Ulrichsen argues that Gulf security is evolving as internal political and 
socioeconomic changes in the Gulf states interact with the processes of 
globalization, and that stability in the GCC countries is threatened not only by the 
conventional “hard security” threats but also by so-called “soft security” 
challenges to human security. These, in fact, risk eroding the internal consensus 
and thus the ruling bargain that binds ruler and ruled in the region. In the context 
of the future depletion of energy resources, Ulrichsen reflects upon the fact that 
ruling elites won’t be able to rely on oil rents as insulation from internal problems 
and demands caused by social inequalities. For this reason, “soft security” 
challenges represent as much of a stability threat as “hard security” challenges. 
However, this perspective also leaves some questions unanswered. For 
instance, the reason why in the midst of a spectacular collapse of energy prices 
in 2014 – 2016, Saudi Arabia refused to cut its oil production, driving the prices 
further down.48 Finally, Kristian Ulrichsen effectively describes that internal and 
external security have become inextricably linked as domestic structural 
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imbalances weaken the state’s capability to react cohesively to external threats, 
a perspective that is also adopted in this study. 
Third-wave studies largely undertake a cognitive, discursive approach. Looking 
at how and by whom threats are constructed, these studies postulate that 
competing ideologies of statual organization can come to constitute security 
threats. Such trans-border threats, flourish in the Arab world because sovereignty 
remains a contested concept and because, as Gregory Gause effectively 
described in his The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, the region 
includes a multitude of trans-border identities – ethnic, sectarian, tribal, 
ideological – that connect people from different countries and can be easily 
exploited to spread any given ideology.49 In this sense the capacity of an external 
power to influence politics in other countries can be based not only upon material 
resources but also, as per constructivist theories, upon ideological power. One 
notable example is the work of Michael Barnett, who centred his arguments on 
ideologies and identity politics. 50 Barnett wrote that frequently the threat posed 
to Arab states was the successful portrayal of a rival model of statual institutions 
and organising ideologies that potentially undermined the state's basis of 
existence. Ideologies like pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, especially when 
implying political unification as a way to safeguard the common Arab or Muslim 
interests, undermined the GCC states’ sovereignty. For instance, Saudi Arabia 
was notoriously suspicious of Egyptian president Gamal ’Abd al-Nasser, who, 
brandishing pan-Arab rhetoric, had inspired the formation between the 1950s and 
the 1960s of a constellation of nationalist movements responsible for sustained 
instability in the Arabian Peninsula.51 Ideological threats based on identity politics 
were discussed much in the post-Arab Spring context, as popular uprisings have 
developed across ideological and identitarian fault lines: Shi’a vs. Sunni, 
secularism vs. Islamism. Matteo Legrenzi has in this context argued that, bearing 
in mind the disequilibrium of societies in Middle Eastern states, the Arab Spring 
has brought to the surface an identity split between states and their regime and 
an absolute divergence of interests between regime and society with the latter 
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becoming a threat to the former.52 He further argues that while after 2011 the 
traditional identity dichotomy between pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism has 
dissolved, the politicization of sectarian ties has created a new dichotomy and a 
new security dilemma in the Arabian Peninsula. If Sunni GCC regimes balance 
against their Shi’a population, perceived as the “fifth column” of Iran, this in turn 
increase the societal fragmentation that feeds ideological and identitarian threats. 
This is the perspective adopted by several scholars dealing with the post-Arab 
Spring GCC, who additionally point at the cynical manipulation of identity politics 
by regimes as a tool to advance their domestic and foreign policy interests. 53 
Going beyond the idea of sectarianism as an unending, primordial conflict 
between Sunni and Shi’a, scholars point to the multiple crosscutting divisions, 
alliances and overlapping identities within the Sunni and Shi’a camps – Iran’s 
alliance with Hamas being the primary example – and to the role of agency and 
exclusivist polity. 54 Gregory Gause explains sectarianism as a tool of power 
politics that Gulf regimes employ to balance against both domestic and foreign 
threats: a part of a game for regional influence that he calls the Middle East New 
Cold War, rather than a centuries-long inevitable religious dispute.55 Anti-Shi’a 
mobilization is thus viewed as an effective way of rallying the support of domestic 
populations around, respectively, an anti-Iranian or anti-Saudi foreign policy and 
anti-dissidents at the national level. Arguably, this useful perspective could be 
further strengthened by analyzing the reasons why, within the GCC, some 
leaders perceived their countries as significantly more vulnerable than others to 
the type of ideological threats described by third-wave studies. 
 
1.4 Contribution to the field. 
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Generally speaking, the presented theories have in common that, while they 
remain valid and applicable to the present, no single one of them seems 
exhaustive enough to provide a comprehensive analysis of the phase started in 
2011 in the GCC security thinking. This thesis intends to build upon the afore-
mentioned literature, measuring it against the most recent developments in the 
region while widening theoretical perspectives and, at the same time, enhancing 
dynamism in terms of definitions. The researcher’s position within this broad 
range of arguments, further detailed in the chapter building the thesis’ conceptual 
framework, is devoted to three efforts primarily.  
The first effort undertaken is the definition of the concepts of threats and security 
as perceived by GCC policy-makers. After reviewing existing theories, the author 
chooses to build on Barry Buzan’s ideas about the comprehensiveness of the 
concept of security and his approach mixing, loosely, neorealism and 
constructivism.56 This thesis will also embrace the overlapping of the referent 
object and subject of security at the level of the GCC regimes’ perceptions, i.e. 
the conflation of ‘regime security’ with ‘national security’.57 Different from Buzan’s 
approach, however, this thesis embraces the idea of security as a matter of 
degree and theorises a differentiation between threats and risks. In fact a 
shortcoming of the existing literature seems to be the uncritical and too frequent 
use of the term ‘threat’ to indicate dangers of various intensity. This research will 
employ the term ‘threat’ specifically to define risks that become acute enough to 
take on overtly political dimensions, i.e. dangers perceived as having intent and 
capability to hinder state boundaries, state institutions, regime stability or 
sovereignty. This choice, far from being a normative one, is driven by - and 
explained through - region-specific realities stemming from the GCC countries’ 
own historical background.58 In fact an issue securitised into a threat by one 
regime may be perceived as a risk by others. 
The second effort will be to unearth structural vulnerabilities that are pre-existing 
in the context of the referent object and explore their role vis-à-vis decision-
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makers perceptions in operationalising the differentiation between threats and 
risks.59 The study describes vulnerabilities, borrowing the definition from Fabien 
Nathan’s environmental studies, as conditions thought to determine the 
incapacity of the state to contain, cope with, adapt to and recover from a 
damaging phenomenon and that thus raise the susceptibility of decision-makers 
to the impact of said phenomenon.60 In particular, the focus will be on socio-
political and socio-economic vulnerabilities, defining the former as an 
institutionalised low level of socio-political cohesiveness, determining a deficit of 
ruling legitimacy, and the latter as large inequalities, imbalances or failures in the 
national economy. In analysing those vulnerabilities, the researcher will rely on 
the literature on the security of developing states, including the work of scholars 
such as Azar and Moon,61 and rentier states, including by Steffen Hertog.62 
However these vulnerabilities may inform rather than determine the perceptions 
of policy-makers that, as the literature on sociology and psychology has 
validated, are also impacted by collective memory, symbolic events or actors, 
and human cognitive factors, particularly relevant in the GCC context, where 
policy-making is highly centralised and personalised.63  
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The third effort would be to propose a system to categorise such perceived 
threats in their dimensions and types. I will argue that, while the relevant literature 
has provided us with clear descriptive categories, there has been little attention 
to the increasing multi-dimensionality of threats and their intersections, 
particularly those emerging after 2011. In the contemporary context indeed, 
rather than arguing that threats can be categorised only as external or internal, it 
seems more fitting to speak of three types of threats: external threats, or threats 
originated from external sources that affect the international interests of the 
country; internal threats, or threats that have endogenous roots and affect the 
internal stability of the country; ‘intermestic’ threats, or threats that have a mixed 
external and internal nature, such as those moved by exogenous motives but 
having domestic implications or vice versa. As far as prioritization of threats is 
concerned, this thesis investigates the hypothesis that ‘intermestic’ threats might 
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD. 
 
The purpose of this section is to build up a theoretical framework instrumental for 
carrying on, in the next sections, an empirical, in-depth analysis of threats 
perceptions by the GCC regimes in the post-2011 context. In this chapter it will 
also be explained what method is going to be used in applying the framework to 
the subsequent analysis. In order to construct this framework, it is fundamental 
to first shed light on the main intellectual concepts that will be employed in the 
same.  
In fact, the first subsection is devoted to providing a definition for the core 
concepts employed throughout the thesis, such as ‘security’, ‘threat’ and ‘risk’, in 
a way that satisfactorily applies to the area and timeline studied. In particular, the 
definitions will be heavily localized from the perspective of the monarchies of the 
Arabian Peninsula, taking stock of the many historical and systemic specificities 
that impact these concepts’ rationalization in the region. 
In the following section, the research addresses and explains the choice to focus 
on security perceptions treated here as pivotal in the operationalization of the 
defined threats and the main factors informing the behaviour of policy-makers. 
The thesis will then address the role of objective socio-political and socio-
economic vulnerabilities as identified by the researcher in the formation of said 
perceptions.   
Subsequently, the researcher presents a framework that will be employed to 
categorise such threats in their dimensions and types. It will be argued that, while 
the relevant literature has provided sufficient descriptive categories to define the 
diverse types of threats that are most common to the GCC regimes, and their 
diachronic evolution, there has been little attention to the increasing multi-
dimensionality of threats, their intersections, and how to coherently but 
comprehensively schematise them.  
Afterwards, the thesis will put forward an hypothesis for threats prioritization, 
looking at what instruments can be used to verify it. The final section of this 
chapter will then be dedicated to describing the method and structure of the entire 
study. 
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Two preliminary considerations, that have emerged trough a recollection of the 
main developments in the conceptual scholarship on security studies, seem 
helpful in the process of building up the necessary theoretical background, First, 
that the field has been liberated by epistemological assumptions thus allowing 
researchers to broaden their theoretical perspective and indulge in a form of 
eclecticism while elaborating original theories. Secondly, that there is a growing 
appreciation of the cultural and historical specificities and the observation of the 
temporally contingent empirical reality, that serves well the intention of this thesis.  
 
2.1 Defining the terms: security, threats, risks.  
 2.1.1 The debate on security   
All definitions of the concept of ‘threat’ are, of course, inextricably linked to that 
of security. The conceptual analysis of security has gone from an uncontested 
unidimensional definition in the pre-Cold War period, when the field was known 
as ‘strategic studies’, to a more recent dynamic phase of a diverse academic 
debate on the very fundamental characteristics of the concept.65 In 1991, Barry 
Buzan, a theoretical point of reference in this thesis, described security as ‘an 
underdeveloped concept’, ambiguous, ‘essentially contested’, elastic in its 
meaning.66 Richard Ullman and others went as far as to declare that ‘we may not 
realize what it [security] is ... until we are threatened with losing it’.67 In refuting 
Ullman’s idea, this thesis argues that, although the meaning of security has been 
subject to a very broad and perhaps confusing debate, security has to be defined 
- at least implicitly - on a daily basis, for pragmatic reasons such as, for example, 
in the context of policy-making. Indeed by taking the perspective of relating 
conceptual analysis to operationalization, this thesis aims at offering a - flexible - 
interpretation of the concept of security. The purpose of this discussion is, 
however, not to settle the rather comprehensive dispute on defining security, but 
only to offer an interpretation that is relevant to the context studied. In fact, this 
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study embraces the idea that while objective, abstract factors are instrumental in 
a security calculus, they are not sufficient: subjective factors inevitably weigh in 
As Alexander Wendt argued, ‘security is what actors make of it’.68  
The traditional succinct definition of security as ‘freedom from threats’ has 
opened up questions such as: security for what, from which threats, by whom, 
and by what means. Across the different answers to these questions, the debate 
among the different schools of thoughts unfolded. From a realist perspective, 
objective security is achieved when the dangers posed by threats are out 
powered by individuals, societal groups, the state or regional or global 
international organization.69 For realists, the only way for states to be free from 
threats is to show power: security becomes a derivative, sometimes almost a 
synonym, of power. This interpretation, that was relevant during the period of the 
World Wars, where states were in a constant struggle for power, was fiercely 
criticised later on. Still, before and during the Cold War, security studies was 
composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was 
relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; otherwise, that issue was 
consigned to the category of politics. However, there have been several attempts 
to redefine this idea after the end of the Cold War and, since the 1990s, new 
debates have emerged with contributions from - inter alia - constructivism, critical 
security studies, post-structuralism, feminism, the Copenhagen School. For 
instance, from a social constructivist approach, security is achieved once the 
perception and fears of security threats are allayed and overcome.70 Security is, 
as such, conceived as an outcome of a process of social and political interaction 
where social values and norms, collective identities and cultural traditions are 
essential to form perceptions. This idea, although relevant, developed into 
substantial contradictions with regards to defining the referent object of security. 
While some scholars continued to speak primarily of national security, taking the 
state as the major referent, many others started to speak more often of human 
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security, with individuals or humankind as the referent.71 Further on, the idea of 
security has been subjected to a reconceptualization by the process of 
globalization, becoming even more multifaceted and complex. To the extent that, 
in the Western contemporary debate, as the perspective of conventional military 
threats faded away in Europe and the United States, often security has been 
related to the prevention and protection against uncertainties, more similar to 
societal crises rather than manifest or latent dangers.72 This perspective won’t be 
embraced by this thesis: indeed it seems too deeply framed into the context of 
human- and socio-centric security which doesn’t seem applicable in the region 
most hit by wars in contemporary times. Instead, this thesis will build extensively 
on Barry Buzan’s ideas about the comprehensiveness of the concept of security. 
An excellent interpreter of the eclectic post-Cold War debate, from the 
Copenhagen School, his analysis can be considered to be a loose mix of 
neorealism and constructivism, favouring the latter.  
 
  2.1.2 This thesis’ approach to the lexicon of security.   
In his book, People, States and Fear, Barry Buzan points out that the concept of 
security was ‘too narrowly founded’ and his goal was to, therefore, offer a ‘broader 
framework of security’.73 Buzan explicitly suggests that to attempt formulating a 
precise definition of security would be to disregards the set of ‘contradictions 
latent within the concept itself’, in particular as the state's pursuit of security for 
itself may conflict with the pursuit of individuals or international security.74 
Nonetheless the soundness of the claim, in terms of operationalization, this 
remains one of the trickiest spots of Buzan’s theory. Indeed, in the context of the 
crafting of a security agenda, contradictions are daily occurrences that, rather 
than preventing the definition of security, call for an even more detailed definition 
- in terms of degrees - and a constant effort of establishing prioritization.  
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Similarly to Buzan, this thesis also embraces a state- and regime-centric 
definition of security and threats. Far from being a normative choice, this 
perspective has a purely pragmatic driver: for the purpose of this research, 
interested in looking at the formation of security agendas in the GCC countries, 
policy-makers and decision-makers, and their perceptions, retain a central place. 
The decision-making process in the Arab monarchies of the Gulf is largely limited 
to the ruler and his closest family, who are also members of the ruling elites. A 
direct consequence of this over-centralization of the decision-making process in 
the GCC, as well as the unique role played by the ruling families in the GCC 
countries’ foundational myths, has been the complete conflation of ‘regime 
security’ with ‘national security’, a point that has been examined extensively and 
validated often in the area literature. 75 Even those scholars who call for the 
necessity to prioritise human security in the region, often do so by arguing that a 
lack of attention towards public grievances is most likely to generate regime 
instability, thus implicitly reinforcing the regime-centric perspective.76 Keeping in 
mind these context-specific characteristics, security - as perceived by the GCC 
regimes- is taken to be about the ability of regimes to maintain their independent 
identity, their functional integrity and sovereignty against forces of change, which 
they see as hostile. This is a definition that assumes the basic primacy of political 
variables in determining the degree of security that states and regimes enjoy.  
The matter of degree is indeed a second critical issue in Buzan’s literature. 
Regardless of what provisions, responses or policies are taken, there is always 
only partial chances of success, and thus a partial assurance of security. Buzan 
recognizes this, but treats it as a logical problem and argues that if security is 
conceived as a matter of degree then ‘complicated and objectively unanswerable 
questions arise about how much security is enough.’ 77 This researcher objects 
to that and to such questions being objectively unanswerable. Rather, this study 
embraces the idea of varying degrees of security as a function of perceptions and 
operationalizes it by introducing a distinction between threats and risks. Both 
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terms have similar attributes, in particular: a negative connotation as damaging 
phenomena, the capacity to defy control, ambiguity. At the same time, they also 
have a fundamental difference: risk has much less certainty of expectation and, 
most importantly, the scope of the potential negative impact is unsure. This 
research will employ the term ‘threat’ specifically to define risks that become 
acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and hinder the identity and 
sovereignty of the regime or the functional integrity of regime’s institutions. This 
approach is grounded in the literature on security in the developing states, 
especially that authored by scholars from developing states themselves. For 
instance, scholars concerned with the Middle Eastern region, such as David 
Priess and Mohammed Ayoob, strongly criticised the legitimacy of the state as a 
homogeneous unit of analysis, distancing themselves from the idea of the nation-
state as a unitary actor and focusing instead on state-society relations often in 
opposition with one another.78 Accordingly, they found that GCC rulers, similarly 
to other rulers who have not come into office through a democratic process, 
perceive threats chiefly through the lenses of regime survival. Given how this 
study puts decision-makers’ perceptions as a key object of research, it will work 
by defining full-fledged threats only those risks which develop a clear-cut political 
dimension. This is not to say, however, that only political threats exist: as will be 
detailed later, there can be many dimensions to threats, but they all share a 
political one. In other words, for instance, in the context of the GCC, 
environmental or economic dangers do not become part of the security calculus 
unless they threaten to have political outcomes that affect the survivability of 
states or of governing elites within those states.  
In these definitions, decision-makers are those who operationalize the distinction 
between threats and risks, by assigning or not assigning the political variable to 
a given issue, through the so-called securitization. The core idea of the 
securitization, formulated by Ole Waever, is that security can be analysed as a 
speech act, which brings certain referent objects and threats into existence by 
being uttered as such by securitizing actors.79 While for Waever the constitution 
of referent objects and threats are closely linked to the practice of securitization, 
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and they do not exist independently of their discursive articulation, this thesis will 
employ the securitization theory specifically as one of the tools to differentiate 
between risks and threats, by highlighting relevant speeches by securitizing 
actors. The choice to securitize a risk into a threat may be driven by genuine 
security perceptions as well as by ulterior motives, such as promoting a specific 
narrative for a political agenda. Distinguishing the narrative from genuine 
perceptions will be one of the major objectives of this study and this researcher. 
In order to do so effectively, it will be necessary to entertain a detailed unpacking 
of the key elements shaping security perceptions as analysed by the relevant 
academic literature, which is the scope of the following section.  
 
2.2 Decoding perceptions 
The role of perceptions in states’ behaviour is only partially addressed in the 
literature on international relations and security studies as well as the area 
studies literature. Gregory Gause, one of the few scholars that focused on the 
topic, wrote that: ‘Each state’s behaviour is rooted in perception of both the 
international situation and its own status as a state.’80 This implies that the actual 
threat matters less than the perceived threat in terms of policy-making as studying 
the perceptions held by key actors ‘casts a light on how officials decide which 
issues become securitised and subsequently acted upon’ and thus ‘vital to 
understanding the changing dynamics of Persian Gulf security’.81 At the same 
time Gause also noted that very little literature exists on the topic as ‘there seems 
to be an assumption that the source of greatest threat is obvious to observers or 
subjects.’82 What little literature exists arguably emphasizes the opposite point: 
that the conceptualization of threats is not obvious at all and it is a contingent and 
frequently controversial process. This study defines perceptions as the process 
of apprehending and interpreting an issue in its damaging potential and treats it 
as a dynamic process subject to change over time. How perceptions are formed, 
in particular in contemporary times at the level of the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, 
will be the focus of this section.  
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An important caveat in this regard is that the area literature has recently pointed 
out to the exploitation of security concerns on behalf of GCC rulers. Since the oil 
prices plummeted in 2014, GCC rulers have faced a time of scarce resource 
revenues, the same revenues that are instrumental, in all rentier economies, to 
distribute economic benefits that the population expects to receive from the state. 
Some scholars have advanced the argument that, given the necessity to reform 
away from overreliance on subsidies, regimes have chosen to transform security 
in a tool for accruing political support by hyper-securitizing non-threatening 
issues.83 By highlighting threats, and emphasizing their ability to guarantee 
security, GCC regimes would thus reinforce domestic backing and guarantee 
political quiescence. Authors focusing on sectarianism have argued that by 
amplifying the dangers posed by Iran’s interference in their countries, GCC rulers 
have been able to label their indigenous Shi’a communities as Iran’s ‘fifth column’ 
and therefore ignore and delegitimize their dissent.84 Although this researcher 
acknowledges that heightening security concerns in a population, or rallying 
against a common enemy, are long-standing effective political techniques to 
guarantee quiescence, and are largely in use, this research rejects the argument 
that all threats have been completely ‘manufactured’ in the regimes’ narratives 
for their political agenda.85 Rather the contemporary hyper-securitization is a by-
product of the conjuncture of a unique number of different dangers arising 
contemporarily, and it severely complicates the task to distinguish narratives from 
genuine perceptions. 
Central to the study of threat perceptions is the rationalist approach arguing that 
leaders perceive threat as such because they do not have complete 
information.86 The decision-makers lack a full picture on a potentially damaging 
issue and thus feel compelled to identify it as a threat and react irrationally. The 
emphasis of these rationalist accounts is thus largely on the ability of the ‘sender’ 
of the threatening signals, the source of the perceived threat, in formulating 
credible messages. Yet, actors also have strong incentives to bluff or deceive, to 
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conceal their weaknesses or to exaggerate their capabilities, especially when 
they are entangled in the classic ‘security dilemma’, i.e. they themselves fear 
attack from the target.87 The problem in the rationalist approach is that, with its 
focus on the source of threats and information on intention, it largely neglects the 
role of interpretation of the signals by the targets themselves, which is, instead, 
what constructivists focus on.88 For example, in 1976 Robert Jervis looked at why 
states reacted differently to the same objective external situation and concluded 
that diverging interpretations were the driving factors behind divergent 
reactions.89 Though influenced by structural, systemic realities, interpretation is 
not restrained by them and remains subjective and even irrational. This thesis will 
also give pre-eminence to the target’s interpretation of a danger rather than to 
the intentions of the sender when referring to the decision-makers’ perceptions.  
Mentioning the pre-eminence of the interpretation of a threat by the target also 
entails focusing on the role of socio-cultural factors in shaping the process of 
perceptions formation.90 For example, their identity as Arab-Islamic monarchies 
and tribal societies entails a number of socio-cultural factors in the countries 
object of this study. Another factor impacting the shaping of perception is that of 
collective memory. Alexander Wendt discussed it in the debate surrounding the 
causes of the Bosnian Civil War, highlighting the role the collective Serb historical 
perception played in the conflict.91 This collective memory has emerged in the 
empirical part of this study in several instances, including when a more benign 
perception of Iran’s regional role in Oman is put into correlation with the military 
assistance given by Iran’s Shah to the Omani Sultan during the Dhofar War in 
the 1960s and 1970s, an assistance that was instrumental for the Sultan to quell 
the insurgency and consolidate his reign.92  
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However, beyond systemic or historical elements, contingent factors - such as 
events and actors - also shape threat perceptions.93 While an event cannot be 
the exclusive source of threat, it is often the mechanism that brings the underlying 
threat to the attention of the target.94 Alongside events, also actors, both in 
reference to the senders and to the receivers of the threatening signals, are a 
fundamental element in the context of the shaping of perceptions.95 Senders - i.e. 
the sources of the potential threat -  are central to the formation of the threat 
image because they can represent the embodiment and personification of 
threats, also because often they can be neutralised much more easily than it 
would be to neutralize the actual danger. As mentioned earlier, receivers - i.e. the 
threatened - are even more central, down to the analysis of their individual 
cognition and even emotions.96 Scholars have long explained deviations from 
purely rational behaviours through the tendency of humans towards simplification 
and making assessments consistent with their beliefs as the main instruments to 
make sense of environments that are both uncertain and complex.97 In political 
science, these ‘human factors’, including personality, political cognition and 
socialization into cultural environments, become all the more important as the 
role of individuals becomes more pivotal in polities.98 The importance of keeping 
track of these features is keenly reflected in the nature of Gulf Arab politics where 
the role of leaders is widely understood to be central.99 In the GCC context, where 
all states are highly autocratic and leaders are the final representatives of the 
national interest, foreign and security policies are the domains in which the 
leaders face the least constrains to act according to their own perceptions. 
Gregory Gause went even as far as writing: ‘In the Gulf, the personal is the 
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political, particularly in foreign policy.’100 Policy-making isn’t subject to hard 
bureaucratic scrutiny, nor to the critical review of the press, that addresses a 
scarcely engaged public opinion. Citizens do elect representatives in parliament 
or local assemblies but the constrains that those elected institutions can oppose 
to foreign policy or security decisions is non-existent.101 Therefore it is hard to 
dispute the notion that monarchs of the Gulf enjoy a formidable impact on policy-
making. The fact is exemplified by, for example, the dramatic changes in Qatar’s 
foreign policy produced by Sheikh Hamad al-Khalifa. Ascending to the throne in 
1995, Sheikh Hamad transformed Qatar from the low profile, loyal ally of Saudi 
Arabia the country had been since the 1970s, into a small global player using its 
vast wealth to create a world-class brand and having an autonomous role in high-
level negotiations.102 It is primarily because of how much impact the rulers can 
have that their perceptions are treated as pivotal in this thesis: leaders can 
securitise any given issue, operationalise the distinction between risks and 
threats and determine their prioritization. A particularly interesting case, relevant 
to the former point, is that of perceptions towards the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Qatar versus the United Arab Emirates after 2011, when the Arab Spring erupted 
and Brotherhood-affiliated groups began to emerge, challenge, and obtain power. 
The ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad, a long-standing practitioner of the art of 
international politics, saw it as an opportunity to strengthen Qatar’s regional reach 
via Brotherhood-affiliated local groups, while the de-facto leader of Abu Dhabi103, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy 
Commander of the Armed Forces, a man of military culture, perceived it as a 
threat becoming more powerful and ‘launched a full-fledged attack…against the 
Muslim Brotherhood…locally and regionally’.104 Several scholars have analysed 
																																								 																				
100 Ibid., p. 3 
101 Lewis W Snider. "Comparing the Strength of Nations: The Arab Gulf States and 
Political Change." Comparative Politics 20.4 (1988): pp. 461-484. 
102 Lina Khatib, "Qatar's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism," International Affairs 
89, no. 2 (2013): p.418. 
103 Secret US diplomatic cables from 2009 refer to him as ‘the man who runs the United 
Arab Emirates…[and is]…the key decision maker on national security issues.” 
"Scenesetter for the President's Meeting with Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed,"  
Wikileaks (31 August 2009), 
https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09ABUDHABI862., (accessed 7 
May 2019). 
104 Mazhar al-Zo’by and Birol Başkan, "Discourse and Oppositionality in the Arab 
Spring: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UAE," International Sociology 
(2014): p.2.  
	 	 36	
the roots of such different perceptions in countries very similar from a political, 
geopolitical, social, economic perspective and, frequently, a determining role has 
been attributed to the personal cognition of the leaders.105  
However, in spite of the vast power that GCC rulers enjoy, there is one constrain 
that should be taken into account: maintaining a basis of domestic consensus. In 
that, the level of discretionality GCC leaders choose to embrace in crafting their 
national security agenda is one that generally takes into account their country’s 
structural features, especially when they represent what this study defines as 
‘vulnerabilities’, the topic of the next subsection.  
 
2.3 Vulnerabilities 
Borrowing the definition from Fabien Nathan’s environmental studies, I describe 
vulnerabilities as conditions which determine the incapacity of the state to 
contain, cope with, adapt to and recover from a damaging phenomenon and that 
thus may raise the susceptibility of decision-makers to the impact of said 
phenomenon.106 Nathan characterized vulnerabilities as context-dependent, 
dividing them into physical exposure and insufficient capacities. Undoubtedly, the 
GCC countries can be considered as physically exposed, given their location in 
one of the most unstable and volatile region in the world and given the fact that 
five out of six are small states. As for ‘insufficient capacities’ Nathan categorizes 
them into: physical, legal, organizational, technical, cultural, socio-political and 
socio-economic.107 Something that could be defined as a vulnerability of physical 
capacities, especially poignant in some of the GCC states, is related to their 
armed forces. Amid a number of coups, including some successful ones, taking 
place in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s some GCC regimes have chosen to keep their 
own armed forces fragmented and underskilled to reduce the risks of a military 
takeover. The policy, dubbed ‘coup-proofing’, has been explained in the literature 
by arguing that, in some cases, armies have been kept deliberately below their 
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potential level, several praetorian guards have been created and military budgets 
have been allocated to acquire high-tech kit rather than training and building 
operational capacity.108 This is a clear-cut example of a key vulnerability in the 
face of potential threats for the GCC countries. While acknowledging this and 
other vulnerabilities, this research will especially focus on socio-political and 
socio-economic vulnerabilities, respectively defined as institutionalised lack of 
integration, determining a legitimacy deficit, and systematic discriminations and 
imbalances in the national economies. 
An important reflection to add is that while these vulnerabilities are objective, 
systemic factors, subjective factors generally maintain pre-eminence. Hence, 
while often times structural vulnerabilities inform decision-makers’ perceptions 
and policies, that is not necessarily always the case. At times GCC leaders ignore 
or exploit said vulnerabilities to perpetuate a status quo that preserves their 
hegemonic position as individual leaders in the short-term, despite weakening 
regime’s stability in the long-term. 
 2.3.1 Socio-political vulnerabilities.  
Writing on what they term as ‘Third World’, Azar and Moon emphasized the 
‘software’ side of the security problematique as opposed to the ‘hardware’ side of 
the problem on which traditional Western analyses of security tend to 
concentrate.109 They operationalized the concept of ‘security software’ by 
disaggregating it into three primary components: legitimacy, integration, and 
policy capacity. These scholars argue that not enough time has been available to 
state-makers in MENA countries to develop the intangible ingredients of security, 
including the identification of the people with the state (legitimacy) and of people 
with each other (integration). What Azar and Moon term as integration is referred 
to by Barry Buzan as ‘the variable of sociopolitical cohesiveness’: Buzan also 
accords primary explanatory power to this variable - that he considers defining 
feature in the distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states - and he also relates 
this difference to the time available to states to complete the processes of state 
making and nation building.110 Interestingly, in addition to a country’s historical 
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depth, Buzan also speaks of the importance of states’ founding ideologies. 
Describing the essence of the state, he refers to a triangle whose three points 
are: the physical base of the state (effective sovereignty, international consensus 
on territorial limits); the institutional expression of the state (consensus on political 
rules of the game but also on the scope of state institutions); and the idea of the 
state (implicit social contract and ideological consensus pertaining to a given 
society).111 All three elements are key to determine the strength or weakness of 
a statual entity: a state whose founding ideology isn’t shared, or is contested, is 
automatically weaker and more vulnerable, especially to threats to its own 
identity. This perspective, dubbed the ‘legitimacy approach’, introduces the socio-
political variable in alternative to a more traditional perspective, the ‘institutional 
approach’, which only considered the administrative capability of the state and 








Figure 2.3.1: Difference between the institutional approach and the legitimacy approach. 
The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, objects of this research, often no 
more than a few decades past independence, and usually having socially 
exclusive rather than shared founding ideologies, fit in the description of Buzan’s 
‘weak’ states and are very susceptible regarding their national identity. Therefore, 
the concept of ‘ontological security’ - the need of states to have a distinctive and 
consistent sense of self and to have that sense affirmed by others - appears 
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particularly relevant to Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, as May Darwich points 
out. 113 As opposed to other Arab states, where nationalism was based on ethnic 
elements combined with territorial affinities related to the struggle against 
colonialism, the GCC states were not born out of a struggle for national self-
determination, but under the protection of an external power, and don’t have a 
nationalist tradition to appeal to as intended elsewhere. Instead, gcc monarchs 
have tended to use tribal and religious identities to reinforce their domestic 
legitimacy and thus nationalism is still a highly contested notion.114 For instance, 
when the al-Saud family established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through armed 
conquest over several different tribes, they described the endeavour as a 
religiously-motivated liberation of territory from a perceptibly un-Islamic form of 
governance and quickly adopted a deeply socially exclusive doctrine - as their 
founding ideology.115 The new state lacked a national identity that could fuel what 
Buzan calls ‘the idea of a state’: the ruling family gave its name to the Kingdom, 
becoming a unique national symbol, a process encouraged in the public 
discourse from education to the media. In fact, all the GCC ruling families, though 
at varying degrees, were instrumental in the very foundation of the countries, or, 
as it has been argued, ‘at the heart of the emergent state-building project’.116 
While this strong centralization facilitates a tighter control over narratives on 
national identity and the discourse on ‘legitimacy’ as defined by Azar and Moon, 
the same centralization is an obstacle to ‘integration’, i.e. socio-political 
cohesiveness. In other words, by promoting a strongly vertical system, deep 
polarization and divisions are encouraged at the horizontal level, and the nation-
state becomes overall less resilient to threats. This paradigm is likely to be 
perpetuated until the complicated and costly processes of state and nation 
building are completed.  
Furthermore, these processes do not happen in an international vacuum. The 
impact of international forces, whether military, political, economic, or 
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technological, that have a predominant influence in post-colonial contexts, makes 
a substantial and substantive difference to the fortunes of the state-making 
enterprise and to the security problematique of younger states.117 Therefore, a 
process such as that of globalization, that inevitably makes borders thinner, can 
become particularly dangerous as it increases transnationalism not only of goods, 
people and ideas but also of threats. In particular, in the period under 
consideration here, revolutions, wars and sectarianism have further encouraged 
phenomena of political fragmentation within states.  
  2.3.2 Socio-economic vulnerabilities.  
The socio-political vulnerabilities identified in the previous paragraph, especially 
a lack of integration and of a strong idea-of-a-state, often result in contested 
legitimacy and group fractionalization.118 Over time, a dysfunctional political 
economy revolving around the rentier model has blended with those, crystallising 
major inequalities and imbalances.119 Although data on the GCC countries is 
often outdated or unavailable - and substituted by approximate estimates by 
international organizations or independent firms and researchers - clear trends 
highlighting self-evident dysfunctional conditions can still emerge. While most of 
these vulnerabilities are shared, at the structural level, across the six Gulf 
monarchies, at a more detailed look some indicators present key differences from 
one country to another.  
For instance, on youth unemployment. Notwithstanding the high GDP per capita 
featured in these countries, unemployment rate in the youth group (15 - 25 years 
old, the fastest growing segment in the population) 120 was estimated to be, in 
2012, between 20 and a staggering 27 percent in Oman, Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia, while at around 10 percent in the UAE and Kuwait and at less than 2 
percent in Qatar.121 Indeed, for the sake of research, the GCC countries could be 
divided in two groups: Saudi Arabia/Oman/Bahrain, having lower GDP per capita 
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and higher unemployment levels and the United Arab Emirates/Kuwait/Qatar 
which present the highest GDP per capita and lowest unemployment ratio.122 This 
division mirrors another indicator, the percentage of foreigners in the total 
population: data from 2013 shows that above 70 percent of the total population 
of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar are foreigners, while foreigners 
represent approximately 30, 40 and 50 percent of the population in Saudi Arabia, 
Oman and Bahrain.123 Of course, Saudi Arabia has a population of around million 
people (2015), while the other GCC countries registered between 1.3 million 
people (Bahrain) and 9 million people (the United Arab Emirates) in the same 
year.124 Still some key trends remain the same across the region. First, that 
foreigners have moved to the GCC to work in the private sector, which for 
decades has been utterly dependent on them and is disregarded by nationals, 
around 80 percent of whom works in the public sector.125 The preference for a 
public sector low-demanding job is closely related to a culture of entitlements 
correlated with citizenship: GCC citizens have been entitled to a cradle-to-grave 
welfare in exchange for political quiescence for decades.126 In this sense political 
and economic status are very closely interrelated, as more benefits are granted 
to groups that are closer to the rulers or play a role in their patrimonial politics.  
Patronage networks are formed across specific groups, tribes, or sects, thus 
crystallising socio-political fragmentation within nations. This unequal access to 
opportunities and benefits institutionalizes cleavages among ethno-sectarian 
segments within the social fabric, one of the main socio-political vulnerabilities of 
the GCC countries. This is valid when looking at the sectarian divide in countries 
like Saudi Arabia or Bahrain but also other types of divides such as that between 
citizens and bidoons in Kuwait.  
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By alienating segments of the society, often times knowingly, GCC regimes also 
may fuel the case for their legitimacy deficit with marginalised minorities, thus 
paving the way for the politicisation of internal fault-lines. In its empirical part, this 
thesis will highlight the connection between these different vulnerabilities as well 
as their impact on the process of threat perception at the level of decision-makers.  
 
2.4 Categorizing threats. 
Once an issue has been defined as a threat, categorizing it in a way that 
describes its nature, type and dimensions is the next fundamental exercise for 
any policy-maker in order to orchestrate the most effective and appropriate 
response. It is all-the-more for scholars who set for themselves the objective of 
studying threats and their perceptions. To this end, the researcher has developed 
an original system of threat categorization, one that tries to take into account, 
update and systematize, the findings of the relevant literature, the policy-related 
documents coming from the region and empirical observations. Each threat 
examined in the empirical part of this thesis will be categorised according to this 
original system: this will allow to acknowledge whether a same threat is perceived 
as having, similar causes, dimensions and implications across the six countries 
of the GCC.  
  2.4.1 Widening the perspective. 
The most basic distinction operated in security studies scholarship is that 
between external and internal threats: as it will be made clear later, this simplistic 
categorization may not be entirely fitting in the contemporary reality of the GCC 
countries. While the literature on the security of the ‘Third World’ argued that the 
insecurity from which these states suffer emanates to a substantial degree from 
within their boundaries rather than from outside127, the history of the foreign and 
defence policy of the GCC countries is one that constantly shows consideration 
of two external threats, namely Iraq and Iran, as the two main sources of danger 
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to the monarchies.128 Furthermore, already during the Cold War, within the 
framework of national security, constructivist scholars pointed to the existence of 
ideological threats, that could of be external or internal nature, including with the 
reference to the countries of the MENA region.129 This was the case also for the 
GCC countries, whereby ideology such as Iraq’s pan-Arabism and Iran’s 
Khomeinism, emerged as grave threats with respect to the subversive message 
these ideologies addressed to the GCC’s own population, in the 1960s and 1980s 
respectively.130 These works opened up the scholarly debate to considering the 
existence of threats that weren’t exclusively external or internal in their nature, 
something that indeed applies very well to a region where transnationalism is so 
strong, and security interdependence so solid. However, still threats were only 
predominantly categorised into two dimensions: material and ideational. It was 
only after the Cold War that the most significant turning point in the categorization 
of threats has occurred, with the widening of the perspective away from the 
traditional assumptions.  
The introduction of new types of threats owes particularly to the work of Barry 
Buzan, who distinguished between five types: military threats  - i.e. seizure of 
territory, invasion, occupation - that can be direct or against external interests of 
the state; economic threats – i.e. export or import restrictions, default on debt, 
economic instability - ; societal threats - i.e. damages to domestic stability and 
cohesion ; ecological threats – i.e. environment’s deterioration; political threats – 
such as penetration by a hostile party or ideological competition, that can be 
international and exogenous or structural and endogenous.131 While political and 
military threats had already been more commonly discussed and therefore easier 
to spot and disentangle, economic, societal and ecological threats were 
somehow new concepts and at times harder to identify. Buzan himself pointed 
out the difficulty to determine, for example, the threshold of what is acceptable in 
the economic realm, based on an inherent instability of the liberalised market 
economy, and what is a threat.132 Societal threats can also be ambiguous to 
consider, but substantially relevant to the GCC countries, and all other ‘weak 
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states’, i.e. states with a contested founding ideology or a divisive identity. 
Moreover the long-neglected societal dimension of threat acquired increasingly a 
key relevance, as most of the contemporary conflicts since the 1990s show a 
strong societal element, descending often cases into ethnic conflict and civil wars. 
Civil wars plagued Europe – most noticeably the Balkans -, Africa – Rwanda, 
Congo, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone among others – Asia – i.e. Georgia, 
Chechnya - and have been particularly common in the MENA region – Lebanon 
and Algeria in the recent past, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Iraq still today. Finally, 
while when thinking of possible ecological threats, one often thinks of natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, the term ecological threat is also 
referred to man-made phenomena such as global warming, pollution and 
poisoning.  
To Buzan, any formulation of a security agenda that doesn’t take into account 
these multiple dimensions would be partial and leave the flank of the state 
vulnerable to insecurity. As he points out the ‘five sectors do not operate in 
isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security 
problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a 
strong web of linkage’133. The clearest example, to which Buzan makes 
reference, is the substantial interrelation between military, economic and political 
threats. Military threats can not only put into question the very basic duty of a 
state to exercise the political power effectively, paving the way for political 
enemies, but they also have a heavy impact on the state’s economic security, 
often triggering economic threats. Furthermore, ecological threats can trigger 
societal or economic ones – for example when desertification threatens the 
resources of a country or endangers the livelihood of a community – and societal 
threats can easily spill over into military and political threats. For example, some 
have convincingly argued that a severe drought substantially eroding the 
economic conditions of Syria is to be included in the broad set of factors triggering 
the conflict erupted there in 2011.134 
Since the idea of widening the scope of security has disseminated several 
countries, particularly in the West, reacted in their security strategy documents 
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including many new non-military, soft security threats such as those afore-
mentioned. For example, the 2004 United Nations’ Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reflected this 
widening of the security distinguishing among six clusters of threats, including 
economic and social threats, and mentioning specifically poverty, infectious 
disease and environmental degradation.135 Interestingly, also the studies on the 
defence doctrines of the GCC countries have gone, a few years later, into a 
similar direction.136  
In 2002 Prince Naef bin Ahmed al-Saud, a Colonel in the Saudi Armed Forces 
with responsibilities for the strategic planning in the Kingdom, delineated as 
assets to be protected by Saudi security policy ‘territorial integrity, economic 
wellbeing, cultural values and fundamental beliefs, and the system of 
government.’137 Viewed through Buzan’s lenses, the document warns against 
military, economic, societal and political threats. In addition, the author is 
concerned with both external and internal threats, which he considers closely 
linked, and makes explicit reference to regional stability as a key value of the 
country’s security calculus. For example, it cites the repercussions of Saddam 
Hussein’s possible fall, specifically ‘either a fragmented Iraq or the emergence of 
a new regime in Baghdad committed to redrawing its borders’ as a ‘threat in the 
making’.138 Arguing that change in other countries can impact regional stability, 
the document underlines the security interdependence of the Gulf as a regional 
security sub-complex. It is interesting to also explore the centrality of cultural 
factors - protecting Wahhabi Islam as the source of national identity and 
monarchical legitimacy - as crucial to shaping Saudi (societal) stability, a word 
used almost as a synonym for security. Also quite relevant is the reference to the 
threats to Saudi Arabia’s economic assets, trade routes and offshore oilfields, 
vulnerable because dependent on the safety of the sea. In a 2014 study, so a few 
																																								 																				
135 Kenneth M. Manusama, "The High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and 
Change and the Future Role of the United Nations Security Council." Leiden Journal of 
International Law 18.03 (2005): pp. 605-620. 
136 In the impossibility of accessing Defence White Papers or National Security 
Strategies from the GCC countries, as those are not published, the author has 
researched studies authored by either government or security officials or advisors 
thereof. 
137 Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al-Saud,”Underpinning Saudi National Security Strategy,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, pp. 124-130.  
138 Ibid., p. 126. 
	 	 46	
years after 2011, Nawaf Obaid, a long time special counsellor to Saudi 
ambassadors and the Royal Court, shaped his own suggestions for a new Saudi 
Defence Doctrine.139 Obaid argues that a new defence doctrine for Saudi Arabia 
is made necessary by the decline of Western interventionism and that it should 
focus both on threats to Saudi Arabia - border security, terrorist acts and jihadist 
ideology - and to the wider region, by protecting the country’s international status 
and its strategic partnerships.140 Obaid’s work also includes Iraq and Iran as 
traditional sources military and political threats. Finally Obaid makes a distinction 
between threats emanating from conventional and from asymmetrical warfare, 
i.e. terrorism. Defining the latter as the most important security threat throughout 
the Gulf for the foreseeable future, Obaid describes it as both an endogenous 
threat, related to the economically and socially disenfranchised population prey 
of extremist rhetoric, and an exogenous one, in the form of operations sponsored 
by hostile powers to destabilize GCC governments.141 
Similar documents from the early 2000s related to other GCC countries - such as 
those authored by security officials from the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait - 
unfolded along very similar lines, speaking about defence of the homeland, 
protecting the economic wellbeing, fighting terrorism and conventional military 
threats and preserving domestic and regional political stability.142 In 2017 
Hussein Ibish, senior scholar of a think tank with ties to the UAE leadership, the 
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, authored a document under the title 
“The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy”.143 In the document, he argues 
that the Arab uprisings in 2011 have been a watershed moment in terms of hyper-
securitization. With specific reference to identified threats, the author mentions: 
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the extension of Iran’s regional influence in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon or the 
GCC itself; the domestic or regional empowerment of Islamist groups, such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood; terrorist organizations including al-Qa’ida, Daesh, 
Hezbollah.  
In addition to providing an idea of the security priorities of the GCC countries in 
contemporary times, all of these documents also elaborate, explicitly or implicitly, 
on the growing transnationalism of threats that makes boundaries between 
internal and external threats increasingly blurred, without however offering a 
specific systematization to conceptualize analytically this interrelation. Even the 
area studies literature has only marginally addressed this question. Although, as 
previously described, area experts have provided very comprehensive analyses 
and accounts on the various threats to the GCC, little attention has been 
dedicated to the relations among them and their interconnectedness.144 Often 
times these are presented and analysed as distinct, stand-alone issues. On the 
contrary this study argues that just as conflicts – threats’ endgames - are rarely, 
if ever, attributable to single causes, also threat analyses should look at issues in 
a holistic way and consider the multitude of layers, dimensions and sources for 
each of them.   
 2.4.2 Multi-dimensional, multi-layered. 
Overall, resting on Buzan’s work, and building on policy indications and the 
region-specific studies exposed, there is room to put forward a renewed 
framework on the categorization of threats in the GCC region, with the aim of 
providing a tool for a more systematized yet comprehensive understanding of the 
multi-layered and multi-dimensional threats consolidated after 2011.  
In fact, as Kristian Ulrichsen argued in 2017, the ‘outbreak of the Arab Spring in 
2011 and regional responses to the broader political upheaval across the Middle 
East and North Africa gave urgency to the porous relationship between internal 
and external security’.145 Drawing attention to globalisation as an accelerator of 
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transnationalism, Ulrichsen further argues that the rise of cross-boundaries 
oppositional movements and non-state actors has highlighted how ‘the internal 
and external dimensions of security in the Gulf were interconnected and bound 
together in the 2000s as never before’.146 Reflecting on these circumstances, 
rather than arguing that threats should be categorised only as external or internal, 
it seems more fitting to speak also of intermestic threats. The term intermestic 
has been employed only by a few scholars, including Victor Cha who defines 
intermestic issues as the ‘interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues’.147 
Similarly, this research will speak of three types of threats: external threats, or 
threats originated from external sources that affect the international interests of 
the country; internal threats, or threats that have endogenous roots and affect the 
internal stability of the country; intermestic threats, or threats that have a mixed 
external and internal nature, such as those moved by exogenous motives but 
spreading internally and having domestic implications and, vice versa, those that 
have endogenous stimula but repercussions on the international interests of the 
country. Although scarcely conceptualized, there is a strong relation between the 
identified types of threats. These can be looked at according to a ‘nested boxes’ 
scheme, an image which help conceptualising how they are separated and yet 
interdependent. For example, when an external threat materialises in what Buzan 
calls ‘weak state’, it can easily instigate endogenous instability, that could 
irreversibly expose internal structural weaknesses of the state.  
Each of the three types of threats can then manifest in the five dimensions 
indicated by Buzan: political, military, economic, societal, environmental, 
depending on the object of the threat. Not every threat shows all five – or six – 
dimensions and in specific instances one dimension may well be more obvious 
than the others. As elaborated in the previous section, in the specific context of 
the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, this research argues that each and every threat, 
to be defined as such, has to show a clear-cut political dimension, or, in other 
words, should present a manifest, even if long-term, political danger. This 
dimension has therefore the pre-eminence over the others. However, it is relevant 
to point out that it is increasingly more common for a danger to show multiple 
dimensions. It is impossible, for instance, to rationalize the perception of Iran’s 
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influence in the region exclusively as a political and military threat, overlooking 
the factor of Iran’s potential as an economic competitor.  
 
2.5 Hypothesizing on prioritization. 
Not many scholars have worked on proposing clear and testable hypotheses 
about how states prioritize among and react to different kinds of threats. Walt, 
one of the first authors working extensively on the subject, provides no guidance 
as to how states prioritize among the various threats when arguing that: ‘One 
cannot determine a priori … which sources of threat will be most important in any 
given case; one can say only that all of them are likely to play a role.’148 Since 
then the area literature has found a consensus that, particularly in the GCC, the 
priority is accorded to regime security, but refrained from offering detailed 
assumptions on which type of threats can potentially be more salient in that 
context.149 In his work on identity politics in the region, Barnett also backs away 
from a clear statement about how Middle Eastern states prioritize among different 
kinds of threats, arguing: ‘Far from suggesting the primacy of identity and the 
irrelevance of material forces, I recognize that both are important explanatory 
variables, though with different causal weights at different historical moments.’150 
Except when a state actually brandishes military force against another state, or 
possesses a clear aggregate power advantage and hostile intentions, it might be 
complex to identify the gravest and most imminent threat to a regime. The matter 
becomes less clear in an environment like the contemporary MENA region, where 
threats are multidimensional and emanate simultaneously but from different 
sources.  
One form of guidance, that might be relevant to this multidimensional context, 
comes from Gregory Gause who, focusing on the issue significantly, provides a 
testable hypothesis on which threat is most likely to be perceived as the most 
dangerous to stability, working to prove it with ample historical references.151 With 
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specific reference to Saudi Arabia, Gause considers cases when two types of 
threat, external attack and internal destabilization, happen simultaneously and 
yet are de-linked. He contends that in many instances in recent Gulf history, 
leaders seem to perceive the domestic-destabilization threat as more serious and 
immediate than the classic power-capabilities threat. His reference is that if 
military power considerations dominated Saudi alignment behaviour, one would 
have expected to see Riyadh balancing against Iraq at the outset of the 1980s 
and at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Instead, Saudis balanced against Iran, the 
state exhibiting the greater degree of hostile intentions toward their own regime, 
whether that state had the military power to back that hostility up or not. This to 
the extent that Gulf regimes underestimated the threat of military attack, as, for 
example, Kuwait’s rulers in 1990 did not think that Saddam Hussein aimed at 
militarily occupying their country. He argues that, while both Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait were not comfortable with a victorious Iraq, they both supported Saddam 
Hussein because they had cooperative relations with the Iraqi regime dating back 
to the 1975 Algiers Accord, while after the Islamic revolution relations with Iran 
had degenerated in hostility.152 Even after the end of the war and until the 
invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia continued its alignment with Iraq against Iran, 
despite the relative increase in Iraqi power compared to Iran’s. To prove that, 
Gause highlights that Saudi military expenditures fell from approximately $20 
billion a year in the 1980s to an average of $6 billion a year in the 1990s.153 
Indeed, attempting to compensate for their armies’ limitations, the GCC countries 
have been among the world’s highest spenders in military procurement, and, 
interestingly, spending seem to have followed threat perceptions and can, 
therefore, be used to measure those. Overall, while reference to Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait is frequently used in the region to argue that it should be no surprise 
that Gulf leaders worry about the military power of their neighbours, Gause’s work 
validated the hypothesis that they prioritise domestic threats to regime stability, 
especially if originated abroad, such as abetted by foreign actors. These kind of 
threats as described by Gause are what this study calls intermestic threats. The 
hypothesis is that they are seen as particularly salient and efficacious because of 
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the strength of trans-border political identities and the multitude of transnational 
links that have previously enabled mobilization of people across borders in the 
Gulf region. In examining each threat in the empirical sections of this thesis, this 
researcher will also try to determine if regimes do indeed prioritize intermestic, 
external or internal threats and why.  
 
2.6 Methodology. 
Given that access to data and information can be difficult in the concerned region, 
the researcher has drafted a flexible research strategy, relying on first-hand 
experience in the area studied. The envisioned strategy includes a combination 
of the quantitative and qualitative research methods and the reliance on both 
theoretical knowledge and empirical data.  
Quantitative data of interest will be drawn by statistics and surveys conducted by 
national or international institutions. The measurement of quantitative data can 
be particularly helpful in unpacking the magnitude and details of socio-political 
and socio-economic vulnerabilities in each of the different countries. 
Qualitative data of interest will be deducted from foreign and domestic policies 
analysis, discourse analysis - including social media content - and interviews of 
key informants.  
Conducting analyses on the GCC’s foreign and defence policies in the past has 
traditionally been a problematic effort, given the absence of an open debate 
within these countries about security strategies and the lack of white papers or 
similar documents. The post-2011 assertivism and protagonism of the GCC 
monarchies in the region, from Tunisia to Yemen, can therefore be helpful as it 
provides substantially more material for foreign policy analysis and leaves less to 
speculation. Although documents concerning security policies are not available, 
whenever possible the researcher will keep into consideration leaked official 
documents or diplomatic/political communications. Chiefly, among them, the 
researcher will consider the leaked security documents known as “Riyadh 
Agreements”, which offer a unique window into an official recognition of the 
issues identified as threats after 2011 by the signatory governments.  
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Alongside performing an analysis of foreign and domestic policies, instrumental 
in unpacking the order of prioritization and the shaping of perceptions, the author 
will be conducting an analysis of discourses, including: official statements, 
extracts from speeches and direct or indirect testimonies or key actors within 
decision-makers’ circles available in online and offline publications.   
Finally, the research will also rely on fieldwork, specifically interviews with 
participants who are aware about the decision-making process and leadership 
perceptions in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, 
Qatar. This category includes GCC and non-GCC academics or analysts within 
think tanks - especially those focusing on security, political and economic affairs 
- and, where possible, diplomats and officials from within GCC countries’ political 
institutions, such as local councils, Parliamentary bodies, governmental offices. 
Given the context of heightened security perceptions in the region, interviews will 
be pseudonymised to avoid putting interviewees’ at risk and allow them to speak 
more candidly. The researcher is also aware of the challenge of receiving biased 
testimonies when relying on interviews with primary sources in the region object 
of this study, especially when informants are close to the decision-making circles. 
Acknowledging the sources’ political agenda will therefore be as important as 
distinguishing verifiable information from biased arguments framed into 
politicised narratives. However, it is worth reiterating that rather than on an 
objective assessment of the GCC’s security equation, this thesis focuses on the 
perception of threats at the level of the regimes, in a region with a highly 
centralised decision-making process.  
The data gathered from primary and secondary sources will be then analysed 
through the original theoretical framework drafted by the researcher to measure 
them against the research hypotheses. The literature on area studies will be 
consistently used as a reference to: place the analysis in an historico-political 
context and highlight factors shaping the perceptions as identified in this chapter, 
including those related to identity, culture and systemic features of the countries 
object of the study. This process will be followed in all the six chapters of this 
study’s empirical part, whose core part is revolving around the issues at the 
centre of the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises – namely, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
jihadi organizations and Iran-supported Shi’a groups. The relevance of these 
cases to investigate divergent perceptions across the GCC will be detailed in the 
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following chapter. Then, in all six empirical chapters, the first paragraph will be 
dedicated to measuring the impact of the so-called Arab Spring on the 
leadership’s security perceptions, as a central argument of this thesis is that 
during and after the uprisings is when the fragmentation of the security calculus 
across the GCC regimes has crystallised. The last paragraph will instead be 
dedicated to highlighting which issue has been perceived as a priority threat in 
each country in the period 2011-2017, why, and how it relates to those at the 
centre of the intra-GCC crises. Finally, in the last chapter of the thesis, the 
researcher will summarize the findings of the thesis, both as it pertains to the 
original thereotical notions and paradigms introduced and in terms of the 
evolution of the security calculus and threat perceptions in the six GCC countries, 
highlighting roots and drivers of security perceptions across the Arab monarchies 
















3.0 CHAPTER THREE: THE INTRA-GCC CRISES AND THE THESIS’ CASE 
STUDIES. 
 
One of the main hypotheses of this thesis is that the popular uprisings of 2011 
triggered a watershed series of events that greatly impacted the security 
perceptions of the GCC monarchies. These events, in their national chapters, 
brought to the surface the different socio-political and socio-economic 
vulnerabilities of the individual countries which, interpreted by the leaders’ 
perceptions, accelerated the fragmentation of their security calculus, setting the 
monarchies on a collision course that is extraordinary in the context of the GCC’s 
history.  
In fact, threats and security perceptions are so central to the GCC and intra-GCC 
relations that, as explored thoroughly in this thesis’ literature review, the GCC 
itself is widely regarded as a body created for collective defence against common 
threats.154 The common argument in the relevant literature is that events such as 
the emergence in 1979 of a revolutionary regime in Tehran with expansionist 
intent and the subsequent outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, were 
perceived as threatening the very survival of the GCC monarchies: by coming 
together, the six monarchies wanted to present something of a common front to 
common security needs.155 Academics specialising in area studies have 
therefore often looked at the security of the bloc as inextricably interdependent, 
almost a unitary good named ‘Gulf or GCC security’.156  
Over the years, scholars have also acknowledged some of the limits that 
prevented the GCC from becoming an effective organism for collective security, 
mainly revolving around national sovereignty concerns and mutual mistrust, in 
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particular towards the hegemonic stature of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis the smaller 
monarchies.157 However, the existence of a common perception and prioritization 
of threats among the six members of the bloc has rarely been questioned, 
including in the literature produced in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings, when the GCC states were largely thought to align and balance against 
internal threats coming from the upheavals, specifically those in Bahrain, Oman 
and Saudi Arabia.158  In fact, most of the literature dissecting such impacts argued 
that while at the regional level the GCC countries’ response to the events of 2011 
were markedly divergent, the Council’s members closed ranks in a display of 
shared security priorities to push back against change when protests reached 
their own backyard.159  
As a matter of fact, efforts towards cooperation and integration did accelerate in 
2011 and 2012, but those appeared tactical rather than strategic measures. In 
March 2011 troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, under the umbrella of the 
Peninsula Shield Force, entered Bahrain at the request of the King to quell the 
riots that were threatening the rule of the royal family.160 In November 2012, amid 
years-long hesitations from Kuwait, the six governments signed the GCC Internal 
Security Pact, empowering each GCC country to take legal action, based on its 
own legislation, against citizens, residents, or organized groups that are linked to 
crime, terrorism or dissension in any other GCC state.161 Among other things, the 
Pact specifically calls to: integrate the security apparatuses and operational 
commands during times of disturbances and disasters (Article 10) and  allow 
security forces to enter into the territory of another signatory state - the distance 
based on bilateral agreements between parties - during pursuits of wanted 
individuals (Article 14).162  
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If on one hand these instances speak of a momentum for cooperation and 
coordination, this appears limited to short-term policing, counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorism at the inter-state level, rather than paving the road for 
establishing a full-fledged common security front. The Peninsula Shield 
intervention in Bahrain in 2011, although justified with the 2000 GCC Joint 
Defense Agreement, did not include all of the GCC countries: Kuwait only sent a 
small naval contingent with surveillance tasks, while Oman and Qatar sent only 
two advisors each.163 The 2012 Internal Security Pact, while very robust, is limited 
to domestic security and, by contrast, it highlights how the most substantial 
initiative in cooperative external security, the establishment of a GCC ballistic 
missile defence architecture and early warning system, although encouraged by 
the United States since 1998 and pushed remarkably in 2015, has never seen 
the light.164  
Finally, of particular interest is the idea of upgrading the Council to a Gulf Union, 
circulating among the GCC leaders since the 1980s and brought to the forefront 
again by Saudi Arabia since 2011 as its Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal 
argued that ‘threats of all kinds require the hard works of the GCC countries to 
shift from a current formula of cooperation to a union formula’.165 The proposal 
was supported by Bahrain but met a half-hearted response from the other 
countries, vowing to put it on hold.166 When, in 2013, Saudi Arabia decided to 
discuss the subject again, Oman formally and publicly rejected its participation to 
a potential Union, effectively sinking the idea, to the relief of officials in Qatar and 
Kuwait as well.167 In fact, not only the 2011 turmoil didn’t lead to a deepening of 
GCC integration, it actually led to further divisions within the GCC. 
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The assumption on post-2011 shared threat perceptions in the GCC must in fact 
be questioned in light of the two intra-GCC crises of 2014 and 2017, the gravest 
in the three decades of the Council’s existence, when divergences in the security 
perceptions emerged unequivocally to the public eye.168 It will here be argued, 
specifically, that the unique circumstances represented by these crises also offer 
privileged conditions to observe how GCC security perceptions have been 
impacted by the 2011 uprisings.  
In order to explain and validate the choices made in this thesis as case studies, 
this section will first explore the background of intra-GCC relations, evaluating 
them specifically with reference to the security domain. Secondarily the study will 
delve directly into an analysis of the intra-GCC crises of 2014 and 2017 and their 
disruptive nature, highlighting the reasons and features that make these crises 
unique in GCC history as well as exhaustively pertinent to the main research 
questions of this study. Finally, the last paragraphs will be dedicated to the 
analysis of the Riyadh Agreements, featuring in full as Appendix A, Appendix B 
and Appendix C of this study, which represent rare official written documents 
elaborating on the security perceptions of their signatories. Subsequently, the 
research will delve into the specific demands raised by the anti-Qatar camp in 
2017 and the affiliated blacklists of actors deemed as ‘threatening Gulf security’, 
thus providing further details on the thesis’ case studies. 
3.1 Is the GCC a security community, a security complex, or neither? 
The history of the relations among the six GCC monarchies is abundant with 
instances of cooperation and unity, as well as controversies and divisions. This 
dichotomy can be found even in the circumstances of the very foundation of the 
modern states. When the British forces announced their withdrawal from the 
region ‘East of Suez’ in 1968, the leaders of the small littoral emirates of the Gulf 
– today’s UAE, Bahrain and Qatar - released a communique announcing a 
‘Federation of Arab Emirates’ to ‘take effect from March 30, 1968.’169 Ultimately, 
however, while the seven Trucial States formed the United Arab Emirates, Qatar 
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and Bahrain went separate ways, unable to overcome centuries-old conflictual 
relations and territorial claims.170 Of course, Bahrain and Qatar were not the only 
proto-GCC countries entangled in conflictual relations and issues of contested 
sovereignty.171 Indeed these states are so young that several outstanding border 
issues were resolved only in the 2000s with the 2003 UAE - Oman boundary 
agreement and the finalization of the demarcation agreement on maritime 
borders by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 2000.172 In fact, as Louise Fawcett has 
noted, because the GCC see themselves as young nation-states that only 
recently, historically speaking, obtained their independence, ‘sovereignty was a 
prize to be nurtured, not one to be sacrificed on the altar of a pan-Arab movement, 
or one that extolled the virtues of integration.’173  
Such perspective would be explicative as to why, while the GCC was primarily 
formed as a common defence mechanism, security and defence cooperation 
remained chronically underdeveloped.174 The collective military force named 
Peninsula Shield Forces highlighted a divergence of purposes within the GCC 
since its creation in 1984, with Saudi Arabia and Oman hoping that it would 
emerge as a competent force able to contribute to regional self-defence, and the 
smaller GCC monarchies preferring to rely on the more effective external, 
primarily American, assistance.175 In fact, hesitations to commit to a GCC-wide 
large military standing force have been explained with the concerns that such 
force would likely be led and dominated by Saudi Arabia and could possibly be 
used at some stage to even intimidate and influence the others.176 This fear, in 
turn, pushed individual GCC member states to have security arrangements or 
defence pacts with external actors like the United States or NATO, to balance 
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against Saudi interference, in what Gerd Nonneman calls ‘omni-balancing’.177 
The case of the Peninsula Shield is exemplary of a difficulty to integrate security 
institutions which extends to the failure to establish effective, impactful, 
centralised commands as much as to the failure to integrate defence systems.178 
This poor level of integration in security and defence policies and institutions has 
long been the main arguments against defining the GCC countries a security 
community179, i.e. ‘a group of states sharing values, identities - and agendas - 
tied together by supranational formal and informal links and collective security 
mechanisms, which are sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful 
interaction among the group members.’180  
Such idea has nonetheless been at the centre of a lively debate in the academic 
community. For instance, one of the arguments made was that considering 
foreign policy choices, the GCC can be considered a heterogeneous security 
community.181 This is argued by Christian Koch who, in 2010, wrote that ‘the 
monarchies have moved beyond the minimalist conception of an association - 
based on the lowest common denominator principle - towards a broader and 
more inclusive concept of the GCC as a regional organization coordinating 
strategy and policy’.182 On one hand, the GCC has behaved more often as a 
cohesive group in its alignment with West, its mistrust vis-à-vis its neighbouring 
Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict.183 On the other hand, there have been notable 
exceptions, including Oman‘s good relations with Iran, and Qatar’s de facto 
recognition of the state of Israel in 1996, when an Israeli trade representation 
office was opened in Doha.184 Moreover, the conflictual foreign policies pursued 
by the six GCC countries in the post-Arab Spring era, pitting pro-Islamist directly 
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against anti-Islamist players, definitively challenge the argument of a foreign 
policy coordination as related to the contemporary times.185 In 1998 Gause and 
Barnett had also underlined the potential for the future establishment of an 
identifiable ‘security community’ in the GCC, based on the formation of a ‘khaliji’ 
identity, encouraged by GCC policies on social exchanges building on existing 
socio-cultural links, including a common language, similar social and religious 
customs and traditions and family and tribal kinship.186 However if such ‘shared 
khaliji identity’ could, in theory, provide fertile ground for the development of an 
‘identifiable security community’ it evidently did not represent a compelling case 
towards its development, as it could not prevent of the eruption of the gravest 
political crisis in the history of the GCC, in June 2017, nor facilitate its resolution. 
As a matter of fact even economic integration - underpinned by supranational 
institutions for policy coordination as much as by the introduction of a Customs 
Union in 2002, the proposal for a common market in 2008, the introduction of a 
region-wide electricity grid and common transport and infrastructure projects - did 
not present an unsurmountable obstacle to the economic boycott against Qatar 
in 2017, but rather, as will be explained, an enabling factor. 
All this considered, this researcher rejects the definition of the GCC as a security 
community and joins several other scholars who analyse the entire Persian Gulf 
(the GCC, Yemen, Iraq and Iran) as a sub-complex from the larger MENA 
region.187 In fact, the area studies literature dealing with security issues looks, in 
most cases, at the entire Middle East and North Africa region as a regional 
security complex, i.e., as defined by Barry Buzan, a geographic area in which 
members have intense security interdependence and frequent, positive or 
negative, interactions.188 Some literature even defines specifically GCC security 
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as an extension of Arab national security as a whole, while other area specialists 
look at the Persian Gulf as a stand-alone regional security complex.189 This 
researcher argues that looking at the Persian Gulf region as an independent 
complex would be misleading, because all the Persian Gulf states, individually, 
can be described as members of the larger MENA system. The swiftness with 
which the 2011 uprisings were able to spread from Tunisia all the way to Bahrain 
and Yemen is a primary example of how interconnected is the security of the 
countries of this region. At the same time, arguably, looking at the dynamics in 
the Gulf exclusively as an extension of events taking place in the larger MENA 
system would be a limitation and an analytical hazard. Regional events do tend 
to have serious impacts in the Gulf, including at times tipping the balance of 
issues that are purely domestic, but foor an accurate perspective it is more helpful 
to focus on circumstances in the Persian Gulf itself, where all events tend to have 
swift and measurable impacts, of a consequential nature, on its members and 
thus consider the group of states as a sub-complex of the larger MENA region. 
Several instances show just how intertwined are the security dynamics in the 
Gulf, ranging from the impact of the Iranian revolution or the formation of the GCC 
to the reverberations of the 2003 Iraq war on Iran-GCC relations, to the weight of 
civil wars in Yemen on the policies of Saudi Arabia and Oman.190 
Still, the eruption of the 2014 and 2017 crises is, arguably, evidence that the sub-
regional level of analysis is not sufficient to decode the GCC security perceptions. 
It is thereby here argued that GCC security is not a one-dimensional 
phenomenon but instead a complex matrix of domestic and regional factors each 
playing a distinctive role in formulating the definition, categorisation, perception 
and prioritisation of threats. While acknowledging substantial regional 
commonalities and bonds, this research also intends to fully appreciate the many 
domestic specificities of individual countries. For example, while the six countries 
are all absolute monarchies slowly introducing measures for limited political 
representation, the political system in Kuwait guarantees a much higher degree 
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of representation than in all of the other countries.191 The macro-economic 
indicators in the region have grown across the years even more different, with 
those of Saudi Arabia not comparable to that of Bahrain and those of Qatar not 
comparable to those of Oman.192 From a historical point of view, Oman’s and 
Bahrain’s pre-XVIII century history have a much more international character 
than the history of the other countries.193 The ruling regime in Oman belongs to 
the Ibadi sect, a branch of Islam that cannot be characterised as Sunni or Shi’a, 
and upholds very different principles and costumes than the Saudi 
Wahhabism.194 This thesis will argue that such national specificities are 
structurally relevant and strongly encourage a detailed analysis covering each of 
the six monarchies individually. 
 
3.2 From a Gulf Union to the framentagion of the GCC. 
The debate over  the formation of a Gulf Union is a useful case to exemplify the 
perspective of this thesis on the GCC: arguably, the very fact that the idea of a 
full Union could be ventilated clarifies how strong is the interrelation between the 
GCC member states, but the fact that it never had concrete chances of 
materialising, highlights how these six monarchies would rather remain six 
distinct entities with their own agendas, priorities, policies. This could be a signal 
of the prevalence of state-centric considerations over unity, even in the face of 
threats, or of the lack of ‘common threats’ in their security perceptions. An 
indication validating the latter hypothesis can be drawn from the events after 
2013.  
Indeed, in March 2014, just a few months after the idea of the Gulf Union was 
finally rejected, the first substantial intra-GCC crisis begun, in a contradiction that 
is, once again, archetypical of the region’s history, continuously oscillating 
between unity and division. In this instance, three GCC members, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the UAE, collectively withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, 
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accusing the country of promoting instability and insecurity in the GCC region. 195 
The action was taken in response to an alleged breach on the part of Qatar of a 
comprehensive security agreement dated November 23, 2013, signed by the 
King of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Qatar and witnessed by the Emir of Kuwait.196 
The document, known as the ‘Riyadh Agreement’, which will be thoroughly 
analysed later, is quintessentially a demand that Qatar refrains from any 
controversial policy perceived as negatively impacting the regional status quo. 
The missing GCC ambassadors returned to Doha eight months later, after 
Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani signed a second security agreement, 
known as the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, on November 26, 2014, 
reiterating and reinforcing the points agreed upon in November 2013.197 Both 
Agreements are available in full as Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C of 
this thesis. However, three years after the resolution of this diplomatic crisis, the 
GCC plunged into the most serious internal political crisis in its 36 years of 
existence.  
It all started when, on May 24, Qatar News Agency (QNA) attributed 
controversial, conciliatory statements about Iran, Israel and Hamas to Qatar’s 
Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani.198 The same agency reported a decision 
of Qatar's Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani, to 
withdraw the country’s ambassadors from Saudi, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain and the 
UAE. Qatari officials quickly labelled these as fake news, and argued that QNA 
had been hacked. Qatar’s Ministry of Interior would later report that the source of 
Qatar News Agency’s hack had been traced back to the UAE, confirming hints 
leaked to the press by sources within the United States’ intelligence 
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community.199 Nonetheless, these comments sparked a string of strong 
responses from Saudi and Emirati media, with editorials and articles attacking 
every policy choice made in Doha, especially since 2011.200  
In particular, regional media levelled the accusations against Qatar of funding 
terrorist groups - among which they include the Muslim Brotherhood and 
affiliates, openly supported by Qatar - and colluding with Iran and Iranian-backed 
militias to undermine the stability of the GCC. 201 Such an unprecedented media 
and information offensive, that went as far as attacking the legitimacy of Qatar’s 
Emir, was the early signal of just how unique this crisis was with respect to 
previous ones. The very fact that it was played out in the public arena instead of 
intimate negotiations, signalled that the disputing parties were willing to cross 
what had been previously considered red lines. After weeks of such intense 
media offensive, on June 5th 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt 
announced that they had cut all relations with Qatar and extended a full closure 
against the country.202 The quartet ejected Qatari diplomats, ordered Qatari 
citizens to leave their states within 14 days and halt all land, air and sea traffic 
with Qatar. In the weeks after this initial move, the crisis underwent a significant 
escalation when the quartet issued a list of 13 demands for Qatar to meet within 
10 days in order to resolve the dispute.203  
The demands, from several parts defined ‘draconian’, included: curbing all ties 
except economic ones with Iran; severing all ties with individuals, groups or 
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organisations that have been designated as terrorists by the quartet; shutting 
down Al Jazeera and news outlets that receive Qatar funds; immediately 
terminating any joint military cooperation with Turkey; disclosing and halting all 
contacts with political opposition figures in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and 
Bahrain, handing them over to the country of origin; paying compensation for 
losses caused by Qatar’s policies; consenting to audits for compliance; aligning 
with the other Gulf and Arab countries militarily, politically, socially and 
economically.204 After a July meeting in Cairo, the quartet stated that such list of 
demands simply reiterated what already contained in documents that Qatar had 
signed in 2013 and 2014, namely the Riyadh Agreements.205 While strongly 
calling for dialogue with its fellow GCC neighbours, Qatari leaders expressed firm 
rejection to the demands as soon as they were issued, arguing that those equated 
to ceding its sovereignty, and the crisis plunged into a diplomatic limbo.206  
 
  3.2.1 A different kind of crisis. 
While, as treated earlier, the history of intra-GCC relations is ripe with instances 
of conflictual episodes, the 2017 chapter can be considered the gravest political 
crisis that the organization has ever endured. To begin with, the previous spat of 
2014 saw – in terms of the gravest practical measure – only an eight-months-
long withdrawal of the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha. A 
similar measure had already been taken by Saudi Arabia in 2002, when the Saudi 
ambassador was recalled from Doha for almost six years.207 At that time Saudi 
Arabia had allegedly acted in reaction to Al-Jazeera hosting Saudi dissidents 
critical of the Saudi ruling family and, predominantly, against the background of 
conflictual relations between the Saudi royals and Qatar’s Emir Hamad bin 
Khalifa al-Thani.208 Emir Hamad had ascended to the throne in 1995, toppling his 
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father, who had enjoyed strong relations with Saudi Arabia, in a bloodless coup 
and would be challenged the following year by a counter coup attempt, allegedly 
sponsored and backed by Saudi Arabia.209 The relations between Emir Hamad 
and Saudi Arabia never recovered fully. Leaked recordings of conversations 
between the Emir and Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim with former Libyan 
leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi, dating back to the first decade of the 2000s would 
seem to confirm what Saudi officials had lamented for long: a latent hostility of 
the Qatari government towards the legitimacy of the al-Saud family and the 
Kingdom in its present form.210 In spite of such problematic precedent, however, 
the actual controversies remained confined to bilateral relations, and to the 
diplomatic sphere. The 2017 spat, instead, involved three more countries - United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt. Speculations transpired through the media 
that a military invasion of Qatar was also considered. 211 It also transcended into 
the cybersphere, the regional and international media and public relations, the 
social domain, economic relations tout-court, international politics and regional 
geopolitics. In particular, two major casualties of the 2017 intra-GCC crisis, have 
been the strong social and economic intra-GCC bonds.  
Whereas previous disagreements among GCC leaders had been managed 
through closed-doors meetings, and generally carefully avoiding to involve the 
wider citizenry to preserve the domestic legitimacy of each country’s ruler, this 
standoff largely involved what some even termed an ‘information war’.212 As 
mentioned, trans-regional media such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, the same 
voices that the literature identified as enablers of the creation of a GCC ‘imagined 
community’, engaged since May 2017 in an extensive, vitriolic campaign for 
mutual damnation. Those became some of the major tools in the political dispute, 
that rapidly extended to the public opinions of the countries involved. Hostility was 
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amplified on social media, where citizens engaged directly against one another, 
endorsing the narratives of their governments, in a way that was deeply wounding 
the idea of a ‘khaliji’ community, increasingly replaced by a top-down 
nationalism.213 In addition, the expulsion of Qatari citizens and the introduction of 
restrictions on cross-border movements, posed serious questions on the long-
term impacts of the crisis on the GCC social fabric.214 
On the other hand, the economic dimension of the crisis, i.e. the extension of a 
full-ranging economic closure against one fellow GCC state, doesn’t have a 
precedent in the organization’s history and might as well have effectively derailed 
the henceforth successful process of GCC economic integration.215 The 
measures against Qatar were particularly dramatic given that the country 
depends heavily on the globalised liberal economic order to survive, importing 
over 80 percent of its food consumption and exporting its main resource, 
energy.216 The substantial level of economic integration attained by the GCC thus 
became an enabling context for the offensive, magnifying the effects of the 
economic measures employed. This was, arguably, a significant red line crossed 
and quite an effective way to evidently show to Qatar’s leadership that, in spite 
of its wealth and the political weight acquired through it, the Emirate remains a 
geographically small entity depending on its neighbours to thrive. In particular 
around 40 percent of Qatar’s food imports used to enter the country through the 
land border with Saudi Arabia before the crisis and thus Doha’s leadership had 
to, quickly, resort to contingency plans for avoiding a otherwise impingent food 
crisis.217 Qatar established air bridges from the two nearest willing and able 
providers, Turkey and Iran, for obtaining essential goods.218 In addition, Qatar 
had to re-route its energy exports, whose proceeds cover approximately 70 
percent of government’s revenues, through Iranian and Omani waters, in order 
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to avoid crossing the quartet’s territorial waters.219 In fact, both Oman and Kuwait 
refused to join the anti-Qatar camp and strongly pledged their neutrality in the 
crisis, with Kuwait becoming the major mediator in resolution attempts.220 
Finally, the 2017 crisis had substantial impacts on international and regional 
relations of the involved players and beyond. Due to the geostrategic, economic 
and financial significance of the GCC region, even major international powers 
were compelled to address the case. Indeed, already in the early weeks of the 
crisis, Qatar’s Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani had been 
received by the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the 
Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, who 
declared the European neutrality and pledged their support of the Kuwait-led 
mediation initiative.221 Similarly, other big powers such as Russia, China and 
India, simultaneously dependent on Saudi oil and Qatari gas, refrained from 
taking sides in the dispute and worked to guarantee the free flow of energy.222 
Finally the United States were heavily involved in the spat. The State Department 
and Defence Departments voiced support for de-escalation, to no avail. 223 Then-
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis were 
involved in mediation attempts and even appointed a Special Envoy for the crisis, 
General Anthony Zinni. US President Donald Trump instead supported the Saudi 
and Emirati position publicly and privately even before the crisis was triggered, 
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effectively enabling the hostilities against Qatar, a long-time, staunch US 
partner.224  
At the regional level, actors in the wider MENA became, directly or indirectly, 
involved. Turkey, emerging as a vital ally in safeguarding the Emirate’s food 
security, became also the strongest supporter of Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad 
al-Thani politically, even deploying Turkish troops on Qatari soil to prevent any 
hypothetical military escalation of the crisis.225 The decision highlighted, and 
cemented, the strong political bonds between Ankara and Doha, both supportive 
of political Islam, and institutionalised the agreements for security and defence 
cooperation signed between 2014 and 2016.226 Doha also experienced a 
pragmatic rapprochement with Iran due to Tehran’s willingness to support Qatari 
food security needs and to allow vessels coming from and going to Qatar to transit 
through its waters, providing key options to escape total isolation.227 Already at 
the end of June, Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, took a public political stance 
backing Qatar and declaring the ‘siege’ against it ‘unacceptable’.228 In turn, in 
August of 2017, Qatar’s Foreign Ministry restored full diplomatic relations with 
Iran after a 20-month hiatus that started in January 2016, when Qatar withdrew 
its ambassador in a show of solidarity towards Saudi Arabia, whose Iran-based 
diplomatic facilities had been ransacked.229 Additionally, as a consequence of the 
rising role of the GCC countries in regional geopolitics since after 2011, which 
gained them significant stakes in major Middle Eastern dossiers, as well as strong 
relations with local parties, the Qatar crisis had a very long reach. For instance, 
the quartet received tepid support from several African and Middle Eastern 
countries including, most convincingly, from the Saudi protégé in Yemen, the 
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government of Abd Al Mansour al-Hadi, and the Emirati protégé in Libya, General 
Khalifa Haftar, head of the Eastern government in the embattled country.230 
Crucially, the involvement of regional parties was, as it will be argued later on, a 
sign of how the very issues at stake in the crisis are strictly related to the tectonic 
shifts that have taken place in the entire MENA region after 2011.  
 
3.3 The Riyadh Agreements and the issues at stake. 
As anticipated, in June 2017 the quartet accused Qatar of funding terrorist groups 
and colluding with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to undermine the stability of 
the GCC. 231 In the definition of terrorist groups, the quartet and their state media 
included not only jihadist militias, but also all groups affiliated to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, outlawed or designated as a terrorist organization by the quartet 
countries between 2013 and 2014.232 The second major accusation, that of 
collusion between Qatar and Iranian-backed militias, was initially related by the 
Financial Times to a ransom deal paid by Qatar to free 26 members of a Qatari 
falconry party kidnapped in southern Iraq by an Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia 
known as Kata’eb Hezbollah in April 2017.233 Despite statements by Iraq’s Prime 
Minister Hayder al-Abadi that the sum was received by the Iraqi government, and 
used in the rescue operations, regional government officials insisted that around 
$700m was paid both to Iranian figures and Shi’a militias, and that was a 
manifestation of Qatar’s active collusion with forces aiming at the destabilization 
of the GCC monarchies.234 The quartet later formalised their complains in a list 
of aforementioned demands which were described as points from 2013 and 2014 
Riyadh Agreements (Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C), already signed by 
Qatar.235 The reference to such agreements was arguably not a rhetorical device 
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in a war of words but, rather, a reference to what can be considered a 
documentary cornerstone of contemporary intra-GCC political relations and an 
unmatched written window into the GCC’s divergent security perceptions.  
The documents’ gravity is quickly evident in their language: the words most often, 
almost obsessively, reiterated in the few pages are ‘security’ and ‘stability’. In 
what may be described as an uncommon situation, given the GCC leaders 
reluctance to transparency in their security affairs, the documents - that were 
supposed to remain secret - also define, quite explicitly, what are perceived to be 
security threats by the signatories, in 2013 as in 2017. Indeed, the link of 
continuity between the events of 2014 and of 2017 is hardly disputable: not only 
did the previous spat involve the same actors of the 2017 crisis, the similarity and 
connection between the 2017 list of demands and the Riyadh Agreements is also 
quite striking.  
The 2013 Agreement, signed by the Saudi King and the Qatari Emir and 
witnessed by Kuwait’s leader, laid out three commitments. The first one is to avoid 
‘interference in the internal affairs of the GCC states, whether directly or indirectly, 
[including] not to give asylum/refuge or give nationality to any citizen of the 
Council states that has an activity opposing his country’s regimes, and no support 
for antagonistic media’.236 The point is clearly about preserving political security, 
i.e. regime stability, that can, supposedly, be endangered from outside actors (in 
this case, Qatar) supporting dissidents. Point two and three specifically mention 
avoiding to support the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as opposition groups in 
Yemen ‘that could pose a threat to neighbouring countries’, i.e. Saudi Arabia, the 
proponent of such agreement.237 The idea, expressed in the second point, that 
Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups could ‘threaten the security and stability of 
the Council states through direct security work or through political influence’,238 
is a reference to the concept that in this thesis is termed as intermestic threats. 
Additionally, the relevance of these points becomes self-explanatory if taken in 
the context of the region-wide factional struggle for power, that, since 2011, saw 
																																								 																				




the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other non-state actors, 
including in Yemen.239 
The following document, the 2014 Supplementary Agreement, is even more 
specific.240 The list of signatories is expanded, as it includes: King Abdullah Bin 
Abdel Aziz al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Hamad Bin Eissa al-Khalifa of Bahrain, 
Sheikh Mohamed Bin Rashed al-Maktom, Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler 
of Dubai, Mohamed Bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and Emir 
Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani of Qatar. Tellingly, no Omani official signed the 
agreement, and similarly to what happened in 2017, Oman steered clear from the 
dispute altogether. The Emir of Kuwait did sign it, but was later identified as a 
neutral mediator in the dispute rather than an active signatory.241 The document’s 
incipit reiterated its direct connection to the deal signed one year earlier. It is 
explicitly divided into matters of domestic and foreign policy and its underlying 
idea is that in vulnerable times, Qatar has provided financial, logistic and political 
support (or simply airtime) to individuals or organizations opposing the security 
and stability of the GCC. The proscription to provide tangible or intangible 
support, including financial backing, political protection or media exposure, to any 
‘person or media apparatus that harbours harmful inclinations to any Gulf 
Cooperation Council state’ is repeated multiple times and in multiple variations.242 
The fact that this point appears both in the domestic and foreign affairs sections 
and that there is a specific call to ‘preventing external groups, parties and 
organizations that target the GCC from finding a place inside GCC countries’243, 
speak again of threats perceived as intermestic. Catalogued under the foreign 
policy matters is the call to avoid financial, media or political backing to the Muslim 
Brotherhood as well as groups in Syria, Yemen and ‘any of the sites of 
sedition’.244  Except for the Muslim Brotherhood, no other regional group is 
explicitly defined as hostile in this document, but will be in the context of the 2017 
crisis. These points highlights, one again, the tight interrelation of the regional 
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and domestic levels of security in the contemporary security calculus of the 
signatories. Crucially, a robust emphasis is put in the text on the necessity to 
contributing to the stability and security of Egypt, one of the major dossier of intra-
GCC competition, as the most populous and politically-relevant MENA country. 
In fact while Qatar had supported the 2011 Egyptian uprisings and the Muslim 
Brotherhood government of Mohammad Morsi elected in 2012, both financially 
and through media coverage at Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been 
at the forefront of supporting financially, logistically and politically a military coup 
against the Morsi government and the resulting military regime under Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi.245  
 
  3.3.1 Tentative appeasement. 
The first Riyadh Agreement was signed in 2013, after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa 
al-Thani, who had ruled Qatar since 1995, and had been the main architect of 
Doha’s policy in support of Islamist groups in the region, abdicated in favour of 
his thirty-three-years old son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. Due to its 
timing, the move seemed, also, an exploitation of the opportunity to pressure a 
young Emir into taking the distances from his father’s hyper-active policies. 
Indeed, at a comprehensive read, the agreement’s content can be summarised 
with the demand that Qatar aligned completely with the priorities and 
perspectives of the other GCC regimes, both at the level of domestic politics than 
at regional politics. For instance, it included also several, detailed, 
implementation and monitoring mechanisms, as well as the idea of retaliation in 
case of failure to honour the deals. 
As part of the deal, in 2014 Qatar tried to establish some dialogue with the anti-
Islamist military regime of al-Sisi in Egypt and ejected a number of individuals 
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood from Doha, including seven senior 
figures.246 Among them, there was the Brotherhood’s acting leader, Mahmoud 
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Hussein and Amr Darrag, the Brotherhoods's foreign relations officer, all of them 
relocating to Turkey. Qatar also agreed to soften the tone of Al Jazeera in all 
reports that could damage the GCC regimes’ interests and shut down completely 
Al Jazeera’s affiliate in Egypt, Mubasher Misr.247 In addition to that, since 2014, 
Emir Tamim doubled down on his efforts to align his country's foreign policy with 
that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, chiefly in Syria and Yemen. In Syria, Qatar 
swayed his support most substantially to Saudi-backed opposition factions.248 In 
Yemen, Doha joined the Saudi-led operations launched in March 2015 against 
the rebel force known as Houthis, sympathetic to Iran.249 Qatar also recalled its 
Ambassador from Tehran, in solidarity with Saudi Arabia, that cut ties with Iran 
following attacks on Saudi missions by Iranians protesting the execution by 
Riyadh’s government of the Saudi Shi’a cleric and opposition leader Nimr al-
Nimr.250  
However, as evidenced by the subsequent, and graver, crisis erupted in 2017, 
these policy adjustments were considered inadequate displays of commitment 
towards Saudi and Emirati-led GCC unity. For example, crucially, Qatar never 
joined Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization or cut relations with its members in the region. Additionally, Doha 
continued to host and give a platform to prominent Brotherhood figures such as 
the ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. As 
Qatar’s Foreign Minister often declared, there would be no compelling reason to 
undertake drastic, harsh measures against the Brotherhood, as the organization 
represents no threat to Qatar's security.251 This simple statement, in open 
contrast with the perspectives of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, arguably exposes 
the crux of the issue in the GCC discord: the existence of divergent security 
perceptions within the bloc. This fundamental strategic divergence is, arguably, 
the reason why practical and pragmatic measures taken by Qatar in the period 
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2014-2017 couldn’t prevent the emergence of a fresh intra-GCC crisis that, as 
clarified by the demands issued against Doha, focused around fully aligning with 
the other GCC countries. Among other - more contingent - points, Doha is 
essentially asked - again - to halt all contacts and deny any kind or assistance, 
including media exposure, to actors in opposition to the governments of Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain, designated as terrorists by the quartet. The 
main difference, this time, is that the quartet would issue a specific list of 
individuals and organizations identified as sources of  ‘threats, subversion, and 
the spread of instability’.252 This, so-called, blacklist was first released in June 
2017 and then integrated in July and November of the same year with two more 
lists, and is officially endorsed by all the members of the quartet: Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt. 
 
  3.3.2 The 2017 blacklists 
Analysing the content of the blacklists released in 2017 by the quartet, available 
in this thesis as Appendix D, provides with some useful characteristics to profiling 
the specific type of individuals and organizations that are, supposedly, 
considered hostile by three of the six GCC governments. Undoubtedly, one could 
postulate that such lists can be heavily politicised and the threatening capacity of 
the blacklisted entities or individuals be inflated for an aggressive, rather than 
defensive, political hidden agenda of hyper-securitization. However, arguably, a 
number of factors still make such lists relevant research material. Firstly, given 
that this thesis defines security as, primarily, political stability - i.e. the ability of 
regimes to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity 
against forces of change, which they see as hostile - the politicisation of a given 
issue only reinforces its relevance to this study. Secondarily, it is worth reminding 
that the object of this study are security perceptions and that those are not 
constrained by objectivity, but rather represent the outcome of the process of 
apprehending and interpreting an issue, in which the aggressive and defensive 
																																								 																				
252 The official joint statement can be read at “Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain 
issue statement on lists of designated terrorist organisations, individuals linked with 
Qatar”, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
website, 6 September 2017, 
https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/09-06-2017-UAE-Qatar.aspx 
(accessed 30 January 2018). 
	 	 76	
intents can be easily mixed up. Thirdly, the consistency with which the blacklisted 
names fit into the framework drawn through the Riyadh Agreements, the list of 
demands released in 2017 and some of the leaderships’ discourse as well as 
foreign policy choices, encourages to consider them as worthy of thorough 
analysis. Nonetheless, while the aforementioned elements will be instrumental in 
defining the perimeter of this study, their conceptualization in the security calculus 
of each of the GCC governments will undergo an in-depth scrutiny in the following 
chapters of this thesis, with inputs from the researcher’s fieldwork. Therefore, at 
this stage, our priority is merely to accept those elements’ validity to narrow down 
our case studies. With this in mind, attempting to look at the three lists released 
in 2017 comprehensively, three categories of individuals and organizations 
emerge.253 
The first, large, category is that of political Islamists, namely the Muslim 
Brotherhood and organizations gravitating around its ideology. The quartet stated 
several times that the Muslim Brotherhood had to be considered a terrorist 
group.254 While Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been more ambiguous in their 
treatment of the Brotherhood, the United Arab Emirates government, since 2011, 
jailed dozens of Brotherhood activists and launched an assertive region-wide 
anti-Islamist policy.255 Alongside the international central organization, the 
quartet singled out affiliated entities such as the Qatar-based International Union 
of Muslim Scholars and the International Islamic Council for Da'wah and Relief, 
accused of ‘promoting terrorism’ with the backing of Qatar’s and Turkey’s 
governments.256 Also smaller associated entities such as the Al Karama 
Organization, the Foundation Sheikh Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian 
Services, Corboda Foundation in the United Kingdom, and the Al Islah 
Association, were targeted. As with regards to individuals, among those on the 
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blacklists is a member of the board of trustees of the Al Karama and head of 
Relief International Development of the Qatari Red Crescent, Khaled Nazem 
Diab. A United States’ citizen of Syrian origin, and a supporter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he stands accused by the quartet, the United States and the United 
Nations of funding armed militias in Syria, Yemen, Mauritania, Djibouti and 
Iraq.257 Additionally, dozens of prominent Brotherhood leaders from Egypt, the 
birthplace of the organization, appeared in the lists, including the spiritual leader 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the organizations’ acting general leader, Alsayed Mahmoud 
Ezzat Ibrahim Eissa, and others such as Alaa Ali al-Samahi, Qadri Mohamed 
Fahmy Mahmoud Sheikh and Mohammed Jamal Ahmed Hishmat Abdul Hamid, 
key founder of Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party, the political office of the 
Brotherhood, and member of the party's high committee. Those Egyptian 
nationals were, generally speaking, accused of inciting riots in Egypt during and 
after the 2011 revolution as well as violently opposing the al-Sisi regime. 
Similarly, the Libyan entities in the lists include Islamist figures and militias who 
had been key opponents of the anti-Islamist government of General Khalifa 
Haftar, based in the east of the country and supported by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 
For instance, the lists include the Benghazi Defence Brigades and the Benghazi 
Revolutionaries Shura Council. Militia leaders were also singled out, such as 
Ismail Mohammed Sallabi of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council and 
Abdul Hakim Belhadj, former leader of al-Qa’ida’s Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, 
the Tripoli Military Council and the al Watan party. Ali Mohammed Salabi, Ismail’s 
brother, a Qatar-based preacher close to the Brotherhood, was also blacklisted 
alongside another preacher with ties to Yusuf al-Qaradawi and several Qatari 
foundations, Salem Jaber Omar Ali Sultan Fathallah Jaber, accused of provoking 
armed militias to launch attacks from Tahrir Square in Benghazi. Finally, the 
quartet targeted also the former Mayor of Tripoli, Mahdi al-Harati, who fought in 
the 2011 revolution against Mu’ammar Qaddafi as part of Tripoli Revolutionaries 
Brigade and then in Syria as part of jihadist group Liwa al-Ummah. Several Libyan 
media – al Saraya Media Center Boshra News Agency, Nabaa TV, The Tanasuh 
Foundation for Dawa, Culture, and Media in Libya - accused of spreading 
propaganda for the blacklisted organization, were also added to the lists. The 
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overall accusation for the Libyans blacklisted was that they had received 
substantial financial support from the Qatari authorities to advance the Islamist 
agenda in Libya.  
A second category in the blacklists was that of individuals and organizations 
related to jihadist groups. Many individuals or entities in the lists were accused of 
financing, aiding or providing material support to al-Qa’ida and its associated 
organisations and networks, especially Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra, Yemen’s al-
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Egypt’s al Gama'a al Islamiyya. In 
this category, most of the individuals are of Qatari nationality, including members 
of the royal family, plus a group of Kuwaiti, Yemeni, Egyptian and Jordanian 
nationals. Many of the organizations are Qatari-funded charities, such as Qatar 
Charity and Eid Charity. One of the prominent Kuwaiti names was that of Hamid 
Hamad al-Ali, who allegedly attempted to mediate a reconciliation between the 
leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh, and has travelled to Syria several times 
to meet with Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader Abu Mohammed al Jawlani and Daesh 
leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.258 Among those on the blacklist is also Moyasar Ali 
Musa Abdullah al-Jubouri, dubbed Abu Maria al-Qahtani, a former officer in the 
Iraqi Army who joined Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria as the Grand Mufti and Emir of 
eastern area, and has alleged connections to Daesh in Iraq. 259 Blacklisted by the 
United Nations for his association with al-Qa’ida, the quartet denounced that he 
uses a Qatari passport in his travels. 260 Finally, a noteworthy group in this 
category is that related to Yemen’s AQAP, engaged in fighting against the UAE 
military in the south of the country. The quartet added to the lists three Yemeni 
charities, Al Balagh Charitable Foundation, Al Ihsan Charitable Society, Rahma 
Charitable Organization, accused of carrying on projects in AQAP-occupied 
Hadramout Province, with funds from Qatari organizations such as the Eid 
Charity and Qatar Charity.261 In the lists also appear individuals such as Abdullah 
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al-Yazidi, Ahmed Ali Ahmed Baraoud and Mohammed Bakr al-Dabaa, all 
members of the Hadhrami Domestic Council in AQAP-occupied Mukalla. 
Finally, the third categories of the blacklists is that of Shi’a Islamists, i.e. militias 
allegedly backed by Iran, most prominently represented by Hezbollah, 
designated as a terrorist organization by the GCC in March 2016.262 In this 
category feature most prominently individuals and militias associated with the 
2011 uprisings in Bahrain. Among them, Bahraini national Hassan Ali 
Mohammed Juma Sultan, a Shi’a cleric who obtained his religious studies in Iran 
and has been a leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, as well as Bahrain’s al-Wefaq, 
and was allegedly affiliated in several activities with the Lebanese Hezbollah.263 
He was featured in an audio recording of a phone conversation with Hamad bin 
Khalifah al-Attiyah, special advisor to Qatar’s Emir, seemingly aimed at 
coordinating Qatar’s Bahrain policy and the opposition’s stances.264 Also on the 
list is Mohammed Suleiman Haidar Mohammed al-Haidar, a Qatari businessman 
accused of financing several armed groups active in Bahrain in opposition to the 
ruling family. Many of the Shi’a groups involved in armed struggle against the 
Bahraini royals, such as the Saraya Al Ashtar, the February 14 Youth Coalition, 
the Saraya Al Muqawama (or Resistance Brigades), Hezbollah al-Bahraini, 
Saraya Al Mukhtar, Harakat Ahrar Bahrain, are indeed blacklisted. Those are 
groups radicalised after the failure of the 2011 turmoil in Bahrain, that the 
governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE - and, to some extent, of the 
United States - accuse of receiving funding, support and training for their violent 
actions from Iran.265  
Overall, attempting to look at the three lists and demands released thorough 2017 
comprehensively, and keeping in mind the content of the Riyadh Agreements, 
the blacklisted individuals and entities can be, broadly, divided into three 
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categories: Sunni politicised Islamists, Shi’a groups perceived as Iranian proxies 
and jihadist organizations. Those will be the three case studies of this thesis. 
Fundamentally what already emerges is that the 2011 wave of regional instability, 
reaching the GCC, created a context of heightened security perceptions and 
cemented the overlap between the regional and domestic levels in the security 
calculus of the leaders. The political emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
North Africa after 2012, the establishment of a jihadist statelet in Syria and Iraq 
in 2014 and the expansion of Iran’s geopolitical reach in the region, were all 
treated, strategically, as contingent issues, in this context of heightened 
securitization and, even, considered as consequentially related to the instability 
caused by the 2011 protests wave.  
The chosen timeframe for analysis, from 2011 to 2017, is therefore the most 
appropriate to examine how the security perceptions vary when exogenous and 
endogenous issues interact and overlap against the background of hyper-
securitization. However, arguably, many questions remain about the markedly 
different perspectives of each GCC country, which will be explored in-depth in 
the following six empirical chapters, one per each GCC country. The order of the 
chapters has been established by the researcher for clarity: first Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, then Qatar and, finally, Kuwait and Oman. What will be 
argued is that each GCC country perceived the 2011 protests wave differently as 
their own experience with them were, per se, profoundly different, an element 
that is often overlooked. Such fundamental mismatches are identified by this 
thesis as the contemporary roots of the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises. The 
first paragraph of each empirical chapter will be thus dedicated to analysing the 
impact of the Arab Spring on the leadership’s security perceptions. The three 
following paragraphs will explore the three case studies selected by the 
researcher: Iran-aligned Shi’a proxies, the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated 
Islamist groups, and jihadist organizations, in this order. Hence it will be possible 
to appreciate the nuances of security perceptions of those actors, highlighting 
how and why some issues have been securitised into threats and others into 
risks, and which kind of vulnerabilities might have been leveraged in both cases. 
The last paragraph will instead be dedicated to highlighting which issue has been 
perceived as a priority threat in each country in the period 2011-2017, why, and 
how it relates to those at the centre of the intra-GCC crises. 
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: BAHRAIN. 
 
Under Riyadh’s guidance, Bahrain quickly joined Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
Egypt against Qatar in both intra-GCC crises. However, Bahrain’s motives 
arguably need further examination. On one hand, Bahrain and Qatar have a 
conflictual shared past. Bahrain’s ruling family, the al-Khalifa, ruled over large 
parts of present-day Qatar until they were ousted by the al-Thani tribe, with the 
support of Britain, in the nineteenth century.266 The Bahraini-Qatari rivalry was 
also at the core of both states’ decision not to join the proposed Federation of 
Arab Emirates as members, alongside the Trucial States, or present-day UAE.267 
Territorial disputes, including regarding control over the Hawar islands, marred 
the bilateral relations, especially until they were settled by the International Court 
of Justice in 2001.268 In 1996, Qatar accused Bahrain of participating in a counter-
coup against Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, aimed at restoring the rule of 
his pro-Saudi father.269 However, Qatar-Bahrain relations had actually improved 
in the 2000s, with a number of ambitious joint ventures, including a ‘friendship 
bridge’ linking the two countries, much praised by Bahraini officials as an 
opportunity to overcome critical socio-economic pressures, by involving Bahrain 
in Qatar’s rapid economic growth.270 A US diplomatic cable from 2005, leaked by 
Wikileaks, goes: ‘Although neither the gas pipeline nor the causeway to Qatar 
have entered the implementation stage, the King maintained that relations with 
Qatar are now excellent. He joked that with the completion of the causeway, 
Bahrain would receive Qatar's money and Qatar would get Bahrain's ideas (on 
political reform).’ 271 On the other hand, the events of 2011 represented a 
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formidable watershed for the Bahraini leadership as, lamenting a predatory 
interference from Iran, Manama closed ranks with Saudi Arabia, in a mechanism 
generating an almost symbiotic relationship.272 Much of Bahrain’s budget, 
increasingly under strain due to political instability, became dependent on 
revenues from the Saudi ARAMCO-controlled Abu Saʿfah oil field, and on 
additional financial backing from both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.273 After 2011, 
Bahrain has subscribed to all foreign policy initiatives promoted by Saudi Arabia 
- from the creation of a Gulf Union to the Yemen war - and has consistently toed 
the Saudi line in regional politics.274 Bahrain’s smallness, especially against the 
magnitude of the emerging dangers, was a crucial factor in this development.  
Indeed, when addressing threat and security perceptions in Bahrain a key 
element to acknowledge upfront is that the archipelago Kingdom – which, 
according to a 2010 census, has approximately 1.2 million inhabitants, less than 
half of whom are Bahraini nationals – is the smallest GCC state.275 Its size and 
geostrategic location have historically made Bahrain a consumer rather than a 
producer of security and larger neighbours or international players have 
traditionally competed to extend their influence on the country’s decision-making, 
with profound impacts.276 A second element to underline is that Bahrain has a 
minority rule system, whereby members of a minority socio-political group, the 
Sunni royal family, rule over a different socio-political majority, Shi’a Bahrainis, 
through an authoritarian approach.277 This has pushed the regime to deploy a 
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number of tactics, including targeted coercion and patronage, aimed at 
preserving regime security by preventing cross-societal opposition, that the 
literature has described as a divide-and-rule approach.278 By pitting socio-political 
communities against one another, the regime gains strategic space to navigate 
and manage forces it considers threatening to its stability. 
Against this backdrop, in fact, I will argue that when focusing on the issues at the 
centre of the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises – namely Iran, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and jihadi organizations – leadership perceptions in Bahrain factor 
in primarily the country’s own vulnerabilities at the socio-economic and socio-
political level. The purpose of this chapter is to unpack such perceptions beyond 
the official narrative, and draw conclusions on their roots as well as on the 
fundamental priorities in the security calculus of Bahrain. In order to do so, it will 
be necessary to analyse the narratives and discourses and benchmark them 
against data and factual information about the individual issues as well as the 
vulnerabilities of the archipelago Kingdom. The starting point would be, as in the 
other cases, a closer look at the events of 2011 and their impacts, from the 
viewpoint of Manama.  
 
4.1 Bahrain and the Arab Spring. 
The protests taking place on the long wave of the Arab Spring in Bahrain were 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from those happening in other GCC 
countries. Those protests inscribed themselves in a historical context of similarly 
significant events, gathered substantially more participation in relative terms and 
were more politicised than in any other GCC country.279  
Already in the first major day of protests on February 14, 2011 - dubbed Day of 
Rage and organised on Facebook by a group calling itself “The Youth of the 
February 14th Revolution” - dozens of marches took place in different locations 
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across the country, gathering a total of approximately six thousand people.280 
These demonstrations were patrolled by the police who, when confrontation 
erupted, reacted and killed the first protester.281 Demonstrations and 
confrontations with the security forces took place every following day of the 
month, as demonstrators converged on the interior of a major traffic circle, the 
Pearl Roundabout, and set camp there.282 On the night between February 17 and 
February 18, approximately 100 riot police were sent in a raid on the Roundabout 
and four more demonstrators were killed.283 Following that crackdown - in part at 
the reported urging of the United States, calling for restraint - the government 
pulled security forces back from the Roundabout, as even larger demonstrations, 
at times reportedly gathering up to 100.000 people, continued to be held almost 
on a daily basis.284 A national strike called in solidarity with protesters on February 
20 was joined by almost 80 percent of Bahraini citizens.285 In March protests 
escalated and extended to areas predominantly inhabited by Sunni Bahrainis and 
to locations within reach of the Royal Palace.286 Several counter-protests, 
populated mostly by Sunni loyalists, took place stressing the need to defend the 
regime and, at times, clashed with Shi’a protesters.287 In the meantime part of the 
demonstrators had become openly anti-monarchical, as thousands chanted 
‘Down with the King’.288 On March 13, after the Secretary General of al-Wefaq, 
the main Shi’a opposition party, Sheikh Ali Salman, declared at a press 
conference that the land on which the Bahrain Financial Harbour was built had 
been sold to Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa for one Bahraini Dinar, 
protesters blockaded the financial district of Manama.289 That same day, on 13 
March 2011, the Bahraini King, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, put in a request for 
assistance from the GCC Peninsula Shield Forces. The following day about 1200 
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units from the Saudi Arabia Royal Guard and 800 police officers from the United 
Arab Emirates entered Manama under the umbrella of the Peninsula Shield 
Forces, deployed to guard some of the country’s critical infrastructures, while 
Bahraini forces cracked down on the protests. 290 A handful of military advisors 
arrived from Oman and Qatar and naval formations from Kuwait executed 
reconnaissance and patrolling missions off the Bahraini coast.291 The King 
declared a three-months state of emergency, authorising law enforcement 
agencies to adopt a more forceful approach towards protesters, as they were 
cleared from Pearl Roundabout, with approximately three thousand people 
arrested and 46 people, from both the opposition and the security forces, killed.292 
Among the arrested were Hassan Mushaimaa of the hard-line al-Haq group, a 
London-based dissident who had openly called for regime change, and Ibrahim 
Sharif of the liberal al-Wa’ad party, a Sunni politician advocating for cross-
sectarian cooperation against the regime.293 Hassan Mushaimaa’s Haq, together 
with a fringe Shi’a movement known as Wafa’a and the London-based Bahrain 
Freedom Movement, had announced on the 7th of March 2011, from the Pearl 
Roundabout, the establishment of the “Coalition for the Republic” declaring their 
aim to topple the monarchy in Bahrain and establish a republic.294 Interestingly, 
initially, none of the al-Wefaq leaders, including its leader Sheikh Ali Salman, 
were arrested, and the society had refrained from advocating for the toppling of  
the ruling family. 295 On March 18, the Pearl Monument was demolished, giving 
symbolic closure to the first wave of the Bahraini Arab Spring.  
This first phase of the Bahraini Spring was characterised by two main elements. 
The first was the attempt to work out a political solution through dialogue between 
the leadership and parliamentary groups, and the second was the 
internationalization of the crisis via the GCC intervention and allegations on the 
protesters’ complicity with Iran.  
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During the first phase of the Bahraini Spring, political representatives attempted 
to channel the people’s demands to the government. Already on February 16, 
2011 political figures such as the leader of the al-Wafa’a opposition movement, 
Abdulwahab Hussein, and the Secretary-General of al-Wefaq Sheikh Ali Salman, 
visited the Peal Roundabout where protesters had gathered. The speech given 
by the King that same day, reaffirming the right of Bahrainis to exercise their 
freedom of expression, had raised hopes for a political solution to address the 
protesters’ grievances.296 By that point, the slogans raised during these 
demonstrations included: calls for disbanding the nominated Consultative 
Council; drafting a new constitution giving legislative powers to elected 
parliamentarians; giving executive powers to an elected Prime Minister; releasing 
political prisoners and human rights activists.297 Effectively, while there were 
socio-economic demands, such as providing more jobs and economic 
opportunities, protesters were calling for the creation of a new power-sharing 
mechanism to the detriment of the control of the al-Khalifa royal family, and of the 
privileged access of Sunni Bahrainis to political and economic power in the 
country. A few individuals had encouraged more radical demands: on February 
18, in a sermon broadcasted on the Ahl Albayt television channel, the Bahraini 
Shi’a cleric exiled in Iraq Sheikh Hadi Almadrassi, advocated for Bahrainis to 
remove ‘a corrupt, oppressive and backward ruling family that had been forcefully 
ruling Bahrain’.298  
On the other front, Bahrain’s Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa 
invited those protesters’ representatives considered more moderate to formal 
dialogue. The King pardoned 308 Bahrainis and excluded the Minister of Health, 
the Minister for Housing, the Minister for Electricity and Water Affairs, and the 
Minister for the Council of Ministers’ Affairs, all marred by corruption allegations, 
from the cabinet.299 The latter minister, Sheikh Ahmed al-Khalifa, had come under 
particularly strong criticism since he had been identified, in the so-called 
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Bandargate of 2006, among the key officials actively using gerrymandering to 
disrupt the country’s demographic composition and to undermine the electoral 
performance of the Shi’a political societies, including by paying indigent Shi’a to 
become Sunni and accelerating the naturalization of foreign Sunnis.300 By the 
end of February 2011, the Crown Prince had invited forty representatives from 
political societies, community leaders and social organisations to attend a 
National Dialogue.301 The repression of protests had generated hesitations 
among opposition at the idea of engaging directly with the government, as 
demonstrators increasingly called for the dismissal of the government.302 
Opposition societies, including al-Wefaq, Wa’ad, the National Democratic 
Assemblage, the Nationalist Democratic Society, al-Ikha’ National Society and 
the communist-leaning al-Menbar Progressive Democratic Society, ended up 
putting forward conditions to participate to the Dialogue that included the 
dismissal of the government - especially the all-powerful Prime Minister, in office 
since the country’s independence in 1971, but also officials in the Ministry of 
Defence and Ministry of Interiors and the cabinet - and the establishment of a 
constitutional assembly.303 These became sticking points for both sides, as other 
members in the ruling family, and especially the Prime Minister, undermined the 
Crown Prince’s conciliatory efforts.304 The dominant view within the regime was 
that the Shi’a opposition was attempting to exploit the protest wave to corner the 
leadership into systemic changes to the country’s power structures, that would 
erode the power of the ruling establishment and irreversibly weaken their 
authority.305 As the King requested an intervention from the Peninsula Shield 
forces, encouraged domestically by the Prime Minister and externally by the 
Saudi leadership, the prospect of a negotiated political solution crumbled.  
Against this backdrop, an attempt by the Qatari Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani 
to mediate between the government of Bahrain and opposition parties had taken 
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place behind the scenes, until it was reportedly rejected by the government.306 
The GCC governments had been consistently expressing support and solidarity 
with the Bahraini government since February 2011.307 They had pledged 20 
billion dollars to assist Bahrain and Oman and issued a statement rejecting ‘any 
foreign attempt to tamper with their [Bahrain’s] security’.308 In fact, at that point, 
several Bahraini officials, including from the Bahrain Defence Forces, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, had 
described in separate statements demonstrators as ‘leaders of discord’ or 
‘terrorist plotters’ who conspired on behalf of foreign countries to undermine the 
security and stability of Bahrain.309 Opposition leaders argued that, instead, it was 
the GCC intervention to have internationalised an internal issue, providing the 
pretext for Iran to interfere.310 The Peninsula Shield intervention in Bahrain was 
strongly criticised by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who also protested 
formally with the local Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Bahraini Chargé d’Affaires, and called the UN Secretary General to take an active 
role in the matter.311 The Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, weighted in by stating that the ‘victory of the people of 
Bahrain was inevitable’, underlining that ‘Iran is predicated on defending the 
people and their rights against all dictatorial and egotistical rulers without 
distinguishing between Sunnis and Shi’a’ and specifically condemning Saudi 
Arabia for its intervention.312  
However, the Peninsula Shield intervention effectively ended only the first phase 
of the Bahraini Spring. In June 2011 the King suspended the state of emergency 
and the Peninsula Shield forces begun to gradually leave the country. The 
second phase of the Bahraini Spring had begun, characterised by two main 
trends. On one hand, both protests and the crackdown continued, diluted over 
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the years, as their intensity was inversely proportional in time. Initially, protests 
were more frequent, peaking between the first anniversary of the Spring – 
February 2012 – and the Formula 1 Grand Prix hosted in Manama – in April 
2012.313 On March 9, 2012 over 100.000 people attended a demonstration calling 
for the release of political detainees and chanting against the King, with Sheikh 
Isa Qassim from al-Wefaq as their symbolic leader.314 As the crackdown 
intensified and extended, focusing predominantly on Shi’a opposition, accused 
continuously of harbouring a foreign agenda, protests became less frequent.315 
The Shi’a opposition itself crumbled. Already in April 2011 the government had 
attempted to dissolve al-Wefaq for ‘undertaking activities that harmed social 
peace, national unity, and inciting disrespect for constitutional institutions.’316 
While initially failing to do so, both al-Wefaq and al-Wa’ad were eventually 
disbanded between 2016 and 2017.317 The leader of al-Wefaq, Sheikh Ali 
Salman, was arrested in December 2014, and was handed a life sentence on 
charges of spying for Qatar - interestingly, not Iran - in November 2018, while 
Sheikh Isa Qassim was stripped of his nationality in 2016 and accused to ‘serve 
foreign interests’ and promote ‘sectarianism and violence’.318 Even the civil 
society was thoroughly scrutinised: there were politically-motivated mass firings 
in the public sector as University students and employees of state-owned firms 
were required to sign ‘loyalty oaths’.319 As large protests faded away, dissent 
turned into sporadic acts of violence by radicalised youth, opening the second 
trend of this new phase of the Spring, to be treated in following paragraphs.  
To conceptualise the the Bahraini leadership’s perceptions of the Arab Spring 
protests, it seems necessary to highlight how Bahrain’s socio-political history can 
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be read in alternating cycles of struggles and repression. Only six months before 
the beginning of the protests in February 2011, in the summer of 2010, the 
Bahraini youth, especially but not exclusively Shi’a, had engaged in mass 
protests against socio-economic inequality and socio-political marginalization.320 
Before that, a six-years-long uprising had erupted in 1994, which was cross-
sectarian and characterised by similar demands for reforms of the economy and 
the judicial system, and for civil and political rights.321 Upon his coronation in 
1999, King Hamad offered such a programme of reforms, contained in the 
National Action Charter (NAC), pledging: amnesty for political prisoners, the re-
establishment of Parliament abrogated in 1975, the dissolution of repressive state 
security institutions.322 Arguably, the failure to meet the expectations raised by 
the NAC, endorsed in a subsequent referendum with a 98.4 percent vote, only 
magnified latent discontent.323 Quite symbolically the day that the Bahraini Spring 
started, the 14th of February 2011, was the tenth anniversary of the NAC 
referendum.  
This background sheds a light on how structural socio-economic and socio-
political vulnerabilities can be defined as chronic in the case of Bahrain. It also 
highlights how, while the Bahraini government has framed the protests as 
exogenous - with the sustained narrative of Iran as mastermind of the opposition 
- those have structural, endogenous roots.324 Equally relevant is to highlight the 
regime’s draconian reaction to the protests, and demonization of the opposition, 
described as aiming to ‘polarise the country’ and push it to the ‘brink of the 
sectarian abyss’ or, at best, as an instrument of external actors - first and 
foremost Iran, but also Qatar - with malicious intent. In fact a member of Bahrain’s 
Consultative Council interviewed by the author argued that: ‘While the West 
supported Shi’a protests with the intent of empowering minorities as a way of 
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furthering democracy, the regional agent chosen to carry this international 
agenda, Qatar, pursued its own political goals.’325   
The magnitude and prolonged duration of the Bahraini protests, the presence of 
popular, well-organised, hardline and anti-monarchical opposition groups were 
all significant elements to influence the regime’s hyper-securitised outlook after 
2011. The socio-political and socio-economic contexts and historical 
backgrounds in the small Kingdom can be seen as underpinning a long-standing 
divide-and-rule tactic attributed by scholars to the Bahraini regime, which 
inevitably generated an exclusionary concept of national identity and the 
securitisation of sectarian identities. Finally, as a small state in a volatile and 
conflict-prone region, it would be inadequate to analyse the Bahraini chapter of 
the Arab Spring without taking into account the context in the wider MENA region 
and Bahrain’s central spot in the power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
analysed in the following paragraph. 
 
4.2 Bahrain and the ‘Shi’a threat’. 
Similarly to other countries in the GCC region, but even more so, Bahrain’s 
relations with Iran and the perceptions of Iran’s regional posture, are intrinsically 
related to the government’s relations with its Shi’a citizens. This has been a 
recurrent trope, with bilateral relations slightly improving when the Bahraini Shi’a 
communities were more acquiescent and rapidly deteriorating as the 
communities became more restive.326 Since the 2011 uprising, in fact, Bahrain-
Iran relations have entered a downward spiral. To better dissect this 
consequentiality, and the post-2011 evolutions in the Bahraini leadership’s 
perceptions, a few elements are worth considering, including: zooming in on the 
local Shi’a communities and links with Iran; the historical context of bilateral 
relations, the few instances of functional collaboration, the regionalization of 
domestic politics. 
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Although official data are not available, it is widely suggested by scholars that as 
much as 60 percent of the Bahraini population is Shi’a.327 While a minority of this 
community is thought to be of Persian descent, or Ajam, the majority is reportedly 
Baharna, i.e. descending from indigenous Arab population.328 Bahraini Shi’a 
mostly follow the Ja‘afari School of jurisprudence, characterised by a highly 
hierarchical and structured religious establishment.329 Bahrainis follow several 
religious guides, including Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - who subscribes 
to the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, granting political authority and legitimacy to 
the religious establishment – and Iraq’s Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who instead does 
not adhere to Wilayat al-Faqih.330 While officially there are no Bahraini religious 
guides, Bahrainis follow influential local scholars such as Sheikh Isa Qassim, 
Sheikh Mohamed Mahfouz, Sheikh Abdulla Ghurayfi.331 For decades Bahraini 
Shi’a have conveyed a sense of institutionalised and informal discrimination by 
the government against the community. Shi’a citizens are informally cut off from 
several positions in the public sector, the country’s largest employer, and 
specifically positions within the security sector, generously awarded to 
naturalised Sunni foreigners, in a move thought to be about altering the sectarian 
balance of the country in favour of the Sunnis as much as about creating a 
security sector more prone to repress Shi’a.332 More generally, levels of 
unemployment and underemployment are disproportionally high among Shi’a, in 
a country boasting a 30 percent level of unemployment overall in 2010.333 
Additionally, Shi’a citizens long lamented how obtaining land or social housing or 
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non-basic healthcare, especially in a period of low oil prices, would become 
especially difficult for their community.334  
Beyond socio-economic grievances, even the country’s foundational myth is 
contested, including on a sectarian basis. On one hand, ‘Bahraini Arab Shi’a 
consider themselves the true original inhabitants of Bahrain and surrounding 
smaller islands’ and often present the al-Khalifa as ‘foreign usurpers.’335 On the 
other hand, court-sponsored historians usually describe the al-Khalifa as a 
pacifying force, ending a period of insecurity and instability.336 What is certain is 
that in its rich history, the strategically-located Bahraini archipelago has long been 
contested by Persian and Arab polities.337 Effective territorial control begun to be 
exerted by the Persians with the Safavid Empire in the wake of the Portuguese 
withdrawal from the island in 1602, and lasted until 1717.338 After a string of 
vicissitudes, in 1783 the al-Khalifa tribe, emanating from the Arabian Peninsula, 
conquered the islands from their base in Zubarah, today’s Qatar, with assistance 
from other Arabian tribes.339 However, long-standing Iranian claims to the 
sovereignty of Bahrain perdured and intensified during the British protectorate of 
Bahrain, in 1906 and 1927, and again in the 1950s, when the Iranian Parliament 
passed the Oil Nationalization Act and officially designated Bahrain its fourteenth 
province for the purpose of oilfields’ exploitation (1957).340 The question re-
surfaced ahead of the British withdrawal from the East of Suez and the prospect 
of Bahraini independence in 1971, which the Shah of Iran pragmatically accepted 
after regional negotiations and in light of a United Nations-sanctioned plebiscite 
expressing the locals’ preference for an al-Khalifa rule.341 However, sporadic 
Iranian claims on Bahrain persisted over the years: in 2007 an editorial appearing 
on Kayhan, an Iranian newspaper with ties to the Supreme Leader, rejected the 
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legitimacy of Bahrain’s independence from Iran and two years later Ali Akbar 
Nateq Nuri, working in Khamenei’s office, again publicly argued that Bahrain was 
Iranian territory.342  
A momentous turn of events happened between the 1979 Iranian revolution and 
the 1981 attempted coup d’état in Bahrain. After 1979, Iranian hardliners, such 
as Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani questioned the status quo sanctioned by the Shah 
with regards to Bahrain sovereignty, adding to the Gulf Arab leaders concerns 
that Iran wanted to export the Khomeinist revolution throughout the region.343 In 
fact, such concerns of contagion extended to Saudi Arabia, where the local Shi’a 
community has close ties with that of Bahrain, and it is argued that in the 
aftermath of 1979, Saudi Arabia sped up the construction of the causeway linking 
it to Bahrain ‘so that the Saudi military could quickly reinforce the Bahraini regime 
when necessary.’344 These fears escalated in 1981 when an organisation calling 
itself the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) attempted to overthrow 
the al-Khalifa rule to establish a ‘free Islamic order’.345 The organization was led 
by Hadi al-Mudarrisi, who claimed to be Ayatollah Khomeini’s representative in 
Bahrain, and, according to the Bahraini government, received support and 
training in terms of ideology, leadership, media, logistics and military from the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).346 The IFLB was disbanded with the 
arrest of 73 Gulf Arab nationals, including Bahrainis, Saudis, one Kuwaiti and one 
Omani, but the impact of these events on the decision-makers’ psyche were long-
lasting: the episode consolidated the perception that Iran had initiated an 
asymmetric campaign carried on by penetrating local communities and 
establishing proxies.347 
As a matter of fact, the Bahraini government again accused Iran of being behind 
the protests taking place in the country between 1994 and 1999, as the state 
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television claimed some protest leaders had confessed belonging to a previously 
unknown Iranian proxy named Hezbollah al-Bahraini.348 At that time, allegations 
were also made by the government that the years-long permanence of al-Wefaq 
spiritual leader Sheikh Isa Ahmed Qassim in Qom indicated he was complicit with 
the group.349 When al-Wefaq won 16 out of 40 seats in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections, just as a Shi’a-led government was ascending to power in Iraq, regime 
hardliners started to fear the Shi’a opposition would try to undermine the al-
Khalifa from within the institutions.350 In a press conference, al-Wefaq Secretary-
General Sheikh Ali Salman vowed to the party’s large base to revoke legislation 
limiting manifestations of dissent in the country, including the Law of 
Associations, the Counter-Terrorism Law and the Law of Assembly as well as to 
challenge the division of electoral constituencies, perceived as favouring Sunni 
tribes loyal to the rulers.351 On the other hand, there was at this time a strong 
interest in the Bahraini Shi’a community to participate to the country’s politics 
through its institutional mechanisms, coupled with a declared rejection of the 
Islamic Republic as a model for emulation.352 
Interestingly, the second half of the 2000s was also a period of, short-lived and 
limited, collaboration between Manama and Tehran. In 2008, the two countries 
began negotiations over Iran exporting 1.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas per 
day via an underwater pipeline to Bahrain and a possible $4 billion Bahraini 
investment into Iran’s South Pars gas field.353 In 2010 border negotiations, stalled 
since 1993, resumed in Tehran.354 In June of the same year, Bahrain’s Foreign 
Minister Sheik Khalid stated that Bahraini News Agency reports ‘accusing Tehran 
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of seeking to expand its power and influence in the region’ in no way ‘mirror…our 
keenness on the development of bilateral relations’ and that his government 
‘totally reject[ed]’ the underlying anti-Iranian sentiment.355 It was in this context 
that the first protests reached Bahrain in August 2010 and then the Arab Spring 
erupted in February 2011. 
Ascertaining the exact level of Iranian involvement within Bahrain’s protests is 
problematic and Shi’a activists have long argued that the ruling al-Khalifa family 
exaggerates Iranian influence to tarnish their calls for democratization.356 On the 
other hand the perception that Iran has exploited the protests to extend its 
influence in Bahrain, in a more nuanced approach than the official narrative that 
Iran was the movement’s mastermind suggests, is widespread in both Manama’s 
leadership circle and among some opposition figures.357 These perceptions were 
aroused by a number of factors. Interviewees pointed to the involvement in the 
protests of the Islamic Action group, or Amal, led by former IFLB leader Hadi al-
Modarresi.358 It was also concerning that Hassan Mushaimaa, a member of the 
al-Haq society, told the Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar that if Saudi Arabia 
intervened to defend the al-Khalifa, Iran would step in to support the Bahraini 
opposition.359 Also problematically, in June 2011 Shi’a theologian Mehdi Khalaji, 
while advocating for Iranian support to the opposition, described Sheikh Isa 
Qassim as a ‘religious representative of Khamenei, collecting taxes for the 
Supreme Leader, propagating his religious authority, and encouraging people to 
follow him’ and stressed that Khamenei had described Qassim as ‘a star in the 
sky of Shi’a’.360 As mentioned earlier, Iranian officials did respond very vocally to 
the GCC and Bahraini repression of Shi’a protesters. On their part, a number of 
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Shi’a clerics, identifying themselves as ‘followers of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei 
in Bahrain’ had reportedly wrote to the Supreme Leader in March 2011 soliciting 
his help.361  
Certainly the perceptions of Iran’s malicious intent in the GCC was shared and 
fuelled by Saudi Arabia. Just days before the Peninsula Shield operation, the 
Saudi newspaper al-Jazirah featured a series of articles titled ‘Safavid Iran’s 
plans for the destruction of the Gulf States,’ detailing a sophisticated Iranian 
scheme to exploit anarchy in Bahrain to annex it to the Islamic Republic and 
contextualising it into the narrative of the Shi’a Crescent, i.e. the expansion of 
Iranian influence in Lebanon and Iraq.362 In fact, one of the strongest impact of 
the 2011 uprising on Bahraini politics has been the further consolidation of its 
relations with Saudi Arabia, which has not only become increasingly an economic 
lifeline for Bahrain, but also a major source of policy-making indications.363 For 
instance, on the JCPOA, the Bahraini leadership sided completely with Saudi 
Arabia, emphatically accusing Teheran of using the resources freed by sanctions 
relief to train and fund subversive Shi’a groups to sabotage the ruling regimes in 
both Manama and Riyadh.364  
By 2014, few radicalized groups akin to a low-intensity insurgency-like movement 
had started employing sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against 
the Bahraini security forces. In 2015 Bahrain Public Security Chief Major-General 
Tariq Al-Hassan described a new militia, called Saraya al-Ashtar, stating: ‘There 
are clear similarities between the tactics, techniques and procedures used in 
manufacturing the explosives found in Bahrain and those used by Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards Corps proxy groups, particularly Kata'eb Hezbollah, in Iraq 
and Afghanistan’.365 Saraya al-Ashtar (also known as Al-Ashtar Brigades) is, 
alongside other similar organizations such as Saraya al-Mukhtar, and Saraya al-
Muqawama al-Shabiya, included in the blacklists of terrorist organizations issued 
by the Saudi-led quartet in the context of the 2017 intra-GCC crisis. Its leaders, 
Ahmad Hasan Yusuf and Alsayed Murtadha Majeed Ramadhan Alawi, were both 
designated in 2017 as terrorists by the US State Department, in a statement 
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arguing that they are based in Iran and that the organization is supported and 
funded by the IRGC.366 The Bahraini government has also reported several 
operations, from 2013 onwards, of seizing Iranian-sent weapons.367 These 
weapons have allegedly included explosives, automatic weapons, electric 
detonators, grenades and ammunition.368 Nine attacks have been reported in 
2017 by Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior, allegedly causing seven casualties and 
twenty-four injured among the security forces.369 The perceptions among the 
security officials is that this armed diffuse resistance is part of an Iranian scheme: 
‘The first level involves leveraging Iranian soft power through the establishment 
of cultural centres named Husseiniyat, mosques to disseminate the ideology of 
Wilayat al-Faqih and recruit potential candidates for opposition movements. The 
next level is to strengthen opposition movements, especially their leadership, 
through operational training and further theological study in Iran and then set up 
a network of underground cells responding to the IRGC’.370 
As argued by expert on Bahrain Steve Wright, ‘Iran is seen by the government of 
Bahrain as an external party to domestic politics within the country and one which 
works against developing a common national identity.’371 In other words, Iran is 
seen to exploit the country’s most significant socio-economic and socio-political 
vulnerabilities, inscribed even in its foundational myth, one of sectarian 
disenfranchisement. In sum, after 2011, the Bahraini leadership has perceived 
Iran consistently as a political threat, able and willing to challenge the regime’s 
identity and stability and the integral functioning of the institutions and borders. 
While the economic dimension of the threat may be lacking, as economic 
engagement is minimal, there is a clear (asymmetric) military dimension to this 
																																								 																				
366 “State Department Terrorist Designations of Ahmad Hasan Yusuf and Alsayed 
Murtadha Majeed Ramadhan Alawi,” U.S. Department of State, 17 March 2017. 
367 Michael Knights and Matthew Levitt. "The Evolution of Shia Insurgency in Bahrain." 
Combating Terrorism Center 11.1 (2018). 
368 Ibid. 
369 Ahmad Majidyar, “Bahraini FM says Iran-linked bank sponsored terrorism in island 
kingdom”, Middle East Institute, 4 April 2018, 
https://www.mei.edu/publications/bahraini-fm-says-iran-linked-bank-sponsored-
terrorism-island-kingdom. 
370 Remarks by Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) Field 
Marshal Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa to a delegation of parliamentarians from 
the European Parliament, 2 November 2016, Manama. 
371 Wright, “Iran’s Relations with Bahrain.” p. 79. 
	 	 99	
threat’s perception, allegedly conveyed by underground Bahraini cells intent on 
triggering an anti-monarchical insurgency on behalf of Tehran. 
 
4.3 Bahrain and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
Formed in 1984, al-Minbar is the political arm of a social organization called al-
Islah, running charity, educational, and social programs in Bahrain since 1941.372 
Established under the name Student’s Club by students at the Al-Hedaya Al-
Khalifiya school in Muharraq, a largely Sunni governorate, considered to be their 
stronghold, the Bahraini al-Islah was in fact the forerunner of similar, 
Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the Gulf.373 The group was then renamed 
al-Islah Club in 1948 and al-Islah Society in 1980.374 One of its founders was 
Abdulrahman Al-Jowder, who had studied in Cairo, where he came in contact 
with individuals of the Brotherhood leadership, including leading ideologue 
Hassan al-Banna.375 Interestingly, in a diversion from the typical pattern of 
Brotherhood-affiliated groups in the GCC, the Bahraini al-Minbar was not 
overwhelmingly reliant on professionals or intellectuals from North Africa or the 
Levant in its initial phase. Many of al-Minbar’s members were Bahraini Hawala, 
a socio-political group of Sunni Arabs who migrated to Persia before returning to 
the Arabian Peninsula’s eastern shore.376 As elsewhere in the region, individuals 
from the Hawala group took advantage of their international background, 
gradually rising to be part of the country’s merchant elite. However, as al-Minbar 
society grew and became more entrenched in the national fabric, new members 
tended to be middle-class professionals.377 Additionally, in a pattern common to 
other GCC states, al-Islah members were especially active in institutions and 
bureaucracies concerned with the education portfolio.378  
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However, at least initially, the society’s political traction was meagre. In 1973, 
Abdulrahman Al-Jowder ran in the very first Bahraini parliamentary elections and 
only won 73 votes.379 A turning point for the political profiling of the society was 
the establishment of al-Minbar and their posture vis-à-vis the 1990s Bahraini 
uprisings. Then, the society published a work entitled “This is Our Statement”, 
declaring that the group had no interest in joining the political action taken by 
other opposition forces, thus inaugurating a loyalist trend which has persisted 
since.380 In fact, the group was then permitted to operate, even when other 
political societies where obstructed.381 In 2002, in the first parliamentary elections 
after the NAC constitutional reform, amid a boycott from the Shi’a opposition, al-
Minbar won eight seats in Bahrain's 40-seats House of Representatives, making 
it the biggest group in the chamber.382 Since then, al-Minbar has won seats in 
each parliamentary elections. 
Largely speaking, the group’s political agenda, focusing on social welfare and 
education, has been in support of the monarchy's agenda and is generally 
described by the term loyalist in the relevant academic research or policy 
analyses.383 A member of Bahrain’s Shura interviewed by the author described 
them as highly flexible and politically astute: ‘Differently from Brotherhood 
members in other Gulf nations, the Muslim Brotherhood in Bahrain works with the 
government sharing benefits and achieving important positions in official 
agencies. They traditionally worked with the government also because an 
empowerment of the Shi’a would be very problematic for them.’384 In fact, al-
Minbar’s loyalist position only occasionally has been put into question. For 
instance, the Sunni society cooperated with the Shi’a, Islamist-leaning opposition 
party al-Wefaq, but only temporarily and on well-defined issues. In 2005, both al-
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Minbar and al-Wefaq encouraged land ownership reform, specifically to speed 
up the process of transferring ownership of unclaimed land to families who had 
lived on it for a very long period of consecutive time.385 Beyond the interests-
driven convergence on such pragmatic questions, the interaction between al-
Minbar and al-Wefaq went through heated periods, notably in the aftermath of 
the 2003 Iraq war. Some of the most vocal parliamentarians, such as Muhammad 
Khalid Ibrahim, submitted a motion in 2004 for a resolution in support of Iraq’s 
besieged Sunnis, rejected by al-Wefaq, and accused the Shi’a party to foment 
sectarianism in Bahrain on the encouragement of Iran.386 
In fact, beyond the specific issues, the convergence between the Bahraini 
government and al-Minbar has been grounded in the long-standing socio-political 
gymnastic of Shi’a-Sunni relations in the country. Thorough the years, groups 
such as al-Minbar and the Salafi al-ʾAsalah Society have proven to be highly 
useful allies to the government, providing an avenue of leverage within the Sunni 
community in a context of the sectarian divide-and-rule tactics at times employed 
by the government. In parliament, the support of the Sunni al-Minbar society for 
government policies has been, often, crucial to offset the opposition parties, and 
especially the Shi’a-majority party, al-Wefaq. For example, al-Minbar has 
consistently supported the necessity to respect the role of the fully royally-
appointed Consultative Council (Shura), which has the same authority of the 
elected chamber, the Council of Representatives (Nuwab).387 The convergence 
between al-Minbar and a few, key members of the government specifically, is 
taken as such a sure fact that many believe members of the Bahrain's Royal 
Court and executives from the Islamic bank sector have effectively been 
bankrolling the group.388 Al-Minbar is also closely connected to some members 
of the al-Khalifa family: one of the King’s uncles, ʿIsa bin Muhammad al-Khalifa, 
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a former labour and social affairs Minister, was involved in the early stages of its 
parent society’s establishment, al-ʾIslah, and run it between 1963 and 2013.389 
The convergence between the government and the main Sunni parties, both al-
Minbar and al-‘Asalah, has become particularly salient after the Arab Spring.  ‘In 
2011, 2012, these groups were important and even essential for the mass 
counter-mobilisation that they helped to organise,’ stated Justin Gengler, senior 
researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute of Qatar 
University and long-time expert on Bahrain.390 Indeed, during and after the 2011 
protests al-Minbar’s was a mixture of support for the security forces and criticism 
of government concessions to al-Wefaq.391 In 2011, al-Minbar and al-Asalah 
claimed they created a ‘national unity front to defend Bahraini stability and the al-
Khalifa rule’ and denounced protesters as Iranian agents and the protests as 
‘sectarian, violent and a reflection of terrorism’.392 In January 2012, al-Minbar 
parliamentarian Sheikh Mohammed Khalid took to Twitter to dismiss the 
protestors as ‘traitors’ and as ‘agents of Iran’ and called for violent retribution: ‘If 
you see a traitor crossing the road, you must run them over and keep going,’ he 
tweeted.393 In February 2013, al-Minbar boycotted the National Dialogue to 
protest against the hostile attitude of al-Wefaq and both al-Minbar – and al-
‘Asalah - even criticized the ruling family for responding too softly to Shi’a 
dissent.394 In 2011 even the Doha-based spiritual leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, vocally condemned Bahrain’s protesters, 
denouncing them as motivated by ‘foreign forces’, a clear adherence to the 
Bahraini government narrative of protesters being backed and supported by 
Iran.395 In fact, the government had no major reactions to the ‘widely publicized’ 
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encounters between al-Minbar representatives and al-Qaradawi in Doha.396 Al-
Qaradawi would later be included in the Saudi and Emirati-led bloc’s 2017 
blacklists of Qatar-backed ‘supporters of terrorism’.397  
The amicable approach of the government towards al-Minbar stands in stark 
contrast to the Saudi and Emirati aggressive campaigns against the Brotherhood 
in Egypt and elsewhere, highlighting, as explored in other chapters, a markedly 
different perception. Therefore the years following the Arab Spring, when the 
relations between Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became much closer, to a 
certain extent resembling dependence for Manama, have exposed a new 
conundrum for the ruling family. The conundrum came to the forefront when both 
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization 
in March and November 2014 respectively, amid the background of the 2014 
intra-GCC crisis.398 The strategy of al-Minbar was to highlight the differences 
between themselves and more oppositional Brotherhood-affiliated groups 
elsewhere in the region, a long-standing point in the group’s narrative. 
Immediately, the society’s President declared to the press: ‘All eyes of the voters 
are on us as they say we are the Muslim Brotherhood, which is not right. It is the 
ideology that we follow, but we do not have the organization in Bahrain – neither 
do we support it.’399  In fact, the group is described in the literature as having 
close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Kuwaiti branch and, to a lesser 
extent, Egypt’s.400 Abdulrahman Jowder, one of al-Islah founders, was also a 
founding member of the council for mosques of the Muslim World League and of 
the Kuwait-based Islamic Charitable Organizations, the original nucleus of the 
Kuwaiti Brotherhood-affiliated party.401 However, al-Minbar’s argument seemed 
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to resonate well with the government’s discourse. In March 2014, at a press 
conference in Islamabad, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khaled bin Ahmed al-
Khalifa, commented that his government was not labelling al-Minbar a terrorist 
organization because the group respected the rule of law and had not acted 
against the security of the country, distinguishing between the international 
Muslim Brotherhood organization and its domestic movements.402 His 
statements, while emphasizing Bahrain’s understanding of the Saudi-Emirati 
hawkish strategy towards the Muslim Brotherhood, contradicted the narrative 
coming from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Crucially, later the same day the Minister 
issued a clarification via his official Twitter account which partially contradicted 
his previous words and fell back in line with the Saudi-Emirati narrative: ‘The 
Muslim Brotherhood movement is a global movement with a single approach (…), 
and will be dealt with according to the law of each country and the covenants to 
which it is party.’ 403 Despite this rhetorical teetering, in practice the government 
took steps which also pressured al-Minbar in 2014. Ahead of the parliamentary 
elections that year, an electoral reform was implemented  to redraw the 
boundaries of electoral districts, affecting also the strongholds of the Sunni 
Islamist formations: consequently, al-Minbar only retained one seat in the Council 
of Representatives, down from two in the previous legislature.404  
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Table 4.3: al-Minbar representation in Bahrain’s Council fo Representatives (Nuwab), 
(2002 - 2014) 
 
Al-Minbar was also impacted by a legislation passed in May 2016 attempting to 
separate religion and politics, i.e. banning any preacher from being a member in 
any political society or engage in political activities.405 Although Islamist-leaning 
al-Wefaq was the main target of such legislation, the law also boded poorly for 
al-Minbar and al-‘Asala. Finally, in 2017, a month after Manama and the rest of 
the quartet cut ties with Qatar, Bahrain's Foreign Minister declared: ‘We consider 
the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group and anyone who shows sympathy with 
them will be tried on this basis.’406 While strongly worded, the declaration was not 
conducive to a crackdown of al-Minbar members in Bahrain. Indeed, the fact that 
the statement was given by the Foreign Minister rather than Interior Minister may 
suggest that, like in 2014, the words were addressed to the international affiliates 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than to the domestic organization. On their 
official Twitter account, al-Minbar reacted by reiterating that it is a ‘national 
institution [….] not subject to any external dictates’ and voicing support for the 
state’s efforts to provide security and stability in Bahrain. 407  
By tracing the evolution of al-Minbar’s relations with the Bahraini government, 
especially after 2011, it can be argued that this group isn’t perceived as a threat 
with the capability and intent to undermine the regime’s stability and identity, or 
the integrity of the country’s boundaries and the functionality of its institutions. In 
the face of its priority threat, a Shi’a-led popular uprising, the Bahraini government 
closed ranks with Sunni Islamists, and well-established political groups such as 
al-Minbar, to secure their support against the Shi’a opposition.408 However, 
despite supporting government interests, al-Minbar is still perceived as posing 
certain hazards, what are defined by this thesis as risks, to Bahrain's rulers. One 
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- internal - risk is about their future potential to try and rally a Sunni opposition. A 
Bahraini diplomat interviewed by the author expressed the concern that Sunni 
Islamists could try and leverage their political loyalism by entering the game of 
royal factionalism within Bahrain’s ruling family.409 A member of Bahrain’s Shura 
interviewed by the author stated in 2018: ‘They have their own agenda which 
contradicts national security. But if they want to pursue that they need much 
bigger network politically, which they don’t have.’410 The political game between 
the Bahraini government and the Islamists then has to be contextualised in the 
regional pressures. The Saudi-Emirati efforts to ban the Muslim Brotherhood 
cannot be overlooked by Bahrain, given its increased dependence form the two 
fellow GCC countries. Alienating Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to protect al-Minbar, 
putting into question the investments pledged by those two capitals, vital to the 
Bahraini state budget, could have highly destabilising consequences for regime 
stability. In this context, al-Minbar is at times described as a liability of the kind 
that could be here defined an intermestic risk. 
 
4.4 Bahrain and the ‘jihadi threat’. 
Despite being a very small country, jihadi groups have had some presence and 
activities in Bahrain. In fact, individuals affiliated to both al-Qa’ida, first, and 
Daesh, later, have utilised Bahrain as a base for logistics support to the groups’ 
activities in the wider region.411 However, their focus has been beyond the 
Bahraini borders, with limited activities or plotted activities in the country itself. 
Their local footprint can hardly be disconnected from the much larger weight of 
Bahrain’s problems with sectarianism. These two factors, the intersection with 
the country’s inter-sectarian relations and the extraterritorial focus, have also 
been pivotal in how the regime has perceived the danger emanating from 
jihadism, including after 2011.  
In the aftermath of al-Qa’ida’s attacks in the US, in September 2001, it was 
announced that six Bahrainis were incarcerated at the US naval base in 
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their affiliation with al-Qa’ida.412 The Bahraini 
government subsequently announced that between 2003 and 2012 it had 
uncovered local cells linked to al-Qa’ida, engaged in collecting funds for the group 
as well as training militants to target Western interests, such as the US Navy’s 
Fifth Fleet, stationed in Bahrain.413 Incidentally, their activities and, to a certain 
extent, popularity soared with the escalation of sectarian conflicts in neighbouring 
Iraq and Syria. As upheavals shook the region and the country itself, in 2011 - 
gaining sectarian colours particularly Bahrain - Sunni extremism in general 
seemed to reach a new peak. The Bahraini government stepped up its rhetoric 
against Iran and its proxies in the country and the region, pointing fingers 
specifically at the Shi’a threat and advocating a fight against their activities.414 
‘They [the government] certainly don’t want people to go and fight in Syria, but 
their rhetoric feeds into this recruitment drive’ stated in this regard Toby 
Matthiesen, a research fellow at the University of Cambridge.415  
In fact this hawkish rhetoric resonated in the National Assembly through the 
Salafist al-‘Asalah Islamic Society, whose discourse also includes anti-Shi’a 
sectarian proclamations.416 Already in 2012 the press started reporting on 
delegations of al-‘Asalah Members of Parliament (MPs) heading into Syria to 
provide ‘donations sent by the Bahrainis’ to the Islamist Suqour al-Sham brigade, 
later renamed as Islamic Front.417 One of the group’s prominent MPs, Abdelhalim 
Murad, was accused of traveling into Syria to meet with representatives from 
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Suqur al-Sham and Liwaa Dawud, two radical jihadi, groups and of facilitating the 
passage of hundreds of Bahrainis to go fight against Bashar al-Assad’s forces.418  
In this context, some of the recruits and resources also went into Daesh. In 2016 
it was estimated that over 100 Bahrainis had joined the group. 419 In the same 
year, a local court convicted 24 citizens, with 16 tried in absentia, of forming a 
Bahrain-based Daesh cell and revoked their citizenships.420 The Saudi citizen 
who perpetrated the jihadist attack in the Imam al-Sadiq Shi’a mosque in Kuwait, 
in June 2015, also transited via Bahrain.421 The episode has provided rhetorical 
ammunition for Shi’a opposition group to denounce Sunni extremist sympathies 
among the security sector in Bahrain. Many believed that while Daesh’s traction 
is generally considered feeble with the Bahraini public, an ongoing government 
policy to recruit Sunni police officers from Yemen, Syria, Jordan and Pakistan, 
might have created a more conducive environment for Sunni extremist ideology 
in the security sector.422  
Although a precise number is unavailable, as the government does not release 
figures on the subject, Sunnis of foreign nationalities in Bahrain’s security sector 
are believed to be several thousands.423 In 2014, Major General Tariq al-Hassan, 
the country's chief of public security, published a tweet, then quickly taken down, 
including Daesh symbols and a quote from the Qu’ran.424 The gesture was 
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interpreted as a signal of sympathy for the group.425 In September 2014, Daesh 
released a propaganda video addressed specifically at Bahraini Sunnis, inviting 
them to turn against the monarchy and pledge allegiance to Daesh.426 In the video 
four armed Bahraini militants accused the al-Khalifa family of having ‘inserted 
themselves as gods next to Allah’ by not imposing sharia law in Bahrain and 
joining the Global Coalition against Daesh.427 One of the four militants was 
identified as Mohammed Isa al-Binali, former lieutenant in the Bahraini police 
force.428 His presence was significant not only because of his position in the 
country’s security apparatus, but also because he is a member of the al-Binali 
tribe, a numerous and influential clan, prominent in commerce, with ties to the 
ruling family.429 Another member of the clan, Ali Yousif al-Binali, was killed 
fighting in Syria in May 2014, and their relative Turki al-Binali, became a very 
prominent member of the group.430 Turki al-Binali first joined Daesh in Libya in 
2013 and subsequently joined to the group in Syria, becoming one of the group’s 
top clerics and propagandist. 431 Even before joining the group, al-Binali was 
active as a jihadi propagandist, posting on social media, giving sermons in 
Bahrain, Libya, and Tunisia, protesting outside the American embassy in 
Manama, while waving pictures of Osama Bin Laden and banners of al-Qa’ida.432 
On one hand, several interviewees have expressed concerns about Turki al-
Binali’s messages resonating with Salafists and other Sunnis in Bahrain, 
especially those who dislike the government’s liberal social policies and non-
militaristic response on Shi’a activism, on the other hand they recognised he was 
for a long time allowed to ‘expand his influence in Bahrain and recruit for his 
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cause with little or no interference from the authorities.’433 Eventually al-Binali 
would be among the 24 citizens charged for joining Daesh in 2016 and his 
citizenship would be revoked. However, a Bahraini dissident interviewed by the 
author in London posited the government did not follow up with a comprehensive 
investigation among the Sunni community, out of fear of jeopardizing al-Khalifa’s 
support base, of which the al-Binali family represents a key pillar.434  
Bahrain’s legislative framework against jihadist organizations is in line with 
international standards and yet it has loopholes that have been exploited by these 
groups. For instance, while Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force, there were no public prosecutions of terrorist 
financing in the period from 2011 to 2014.435 The 1956 Charity Fundraising Law 
was amended in 2013 by royal decree, to step up monitoring of terrorism finance 
and related penalties and yet Bahrain’s government has in fact been accused of 
being slow to shut down funding networks.436 In the same year another decree 
provided new tools to the Minister of State for Communications to check extremist 
discourse on social media. However, beyond specific one-off programs, such as 
the workshops and seminars for imams organised by the Ministry of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs, there appears to be no overall strategic messaging campaign to 
counter jihadi narratives and the government begun drafting a National 
Countering Violent Extremism strategy only in 2016.437 A review of textbooks and 
curricula in schools providing Islamic Studies courses has been discussed, but 
with little clarity as to what kind of discourse will be targeted. 438 On the other 
hand, law enforcement instruments have been predominantly deployed against 
members of Shi’a organizations and militias, rather than against Sunni 
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extremists.439 In 2017 military courts were granted the right to try civilians 
accused of threatening state security with a constitutional amendment, but the 
first death sentence, on December 25, condemned only Shi’a militants.440 In fact, 
in 2016, the U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism stated that it 
was complicated to track Bahrain’s progress against the domestic threat of Daesh 
as ‘the Bahraini government often did not publicize details about the arrests or 
convictions of Sunni terrorists’.441 
Bahraini officials have shown an ambiguous attitude in their rhetoric towards 
Bahrainis fighting in Iraq and Syria, especially before the string of attacks in the 
GCC itself, started in 2015. In June 2014, Information Minister Sameera Rajab 
described Daesh fighters on Twitter as bearers of ‘a revolution against the 
injustice and oppression that has reigned over Iraq for more than 10 years’, 
namely that of the Shi’a-led regime.442 Certainly, on the other hand, there is a 
strong determination to prevent the fighters from returning to Bahrain: this was 
highlighted by several members of Bahrain’s Consultative Council (Shura) in a 
meeting with members of the European Parliament in November 2016, as they 
remarked how border security was stepped up after 2015, with plans to introduce 
biometric testing at all ports of entry.443  
To sum up, it could be argued that, before 2015, Sunni jihadi groups were not 
perceived as a full-fledged threat or risk to the Bahraini regime and state, as 
testified by the laissez-faire approach of the authorities towards movements of 
people and resources into Syria and Iraq, as well as the political silence or 
ambiguous rhetorical stances. However, the perceptions of one of those groups, 
Daesh, gradually changed, after the first attacks in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 
2015. Daesh’s rhetoric was unequivocal when they vowed, in one of their videos, 
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to ‘enter Bahrain with blazing guns and behead the King.’444 Most importantly, the 
perception of the danger became more severe as it was realised that the group 
had attracted several among the country’s security forces. In fact, this is 
something that prompted a government source to declare: ‘The threat is real, the 
issue is very serious. These are people from within the security services, from 
the police and the military. We have people who want to turn Bahrain into part of 
the new caliphate. And they see the al-Khalifas as the enemy.’445 Government 
sources in Manama expressed concern about militant jihadists returning to the 
Kingdom to attack key individuals from the ruling monarchy, accused of being too 
aligned with Western powers or state authorities.446 However, the number of such 
sympathisers and the long reach of the regime’s security forces mitigate the 
perceptions of these group’s capabilities. The Bahraini leadership’s perceptions 
of jihadi groups can thus be described, through the lenses of this thesis’ 
framework, as an internal risk, challenging the identity of the regime by attempting 
to gain traction from within the country’s security sector and even political figures. 
While potentially this risk could have a military dimension, the fact that there was 
no full-fledged attack within Bahrain, makes the economic dimension, of deterring 
investment and trade or targeting critical infrastructures, perceived as more 
relevant.447  
 
4.5 Bahrain’s security priorities after 2011.  
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the entire MENA region has witnessed an 
increased polarization, on several levels: beyond the upsurge of sectarianism, 
fuelled by a power fight between Saudi Arabia and Iran, fault lines within the 
Sunni communities have become deeper, through a competition between a pro-
Islamist and an anti-Islamist camp and the advancement of Sunni extremist 
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groups challenging the legitimacy of Islamic hereditary monarchies. These 
regional trends had a profound impact on the security and political agenda of 
Bahrain’s leadership, as much as on their threat perceptions and prioritization. In 
the words of a Bahrain-based senior researcher at the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, ‘The regional context and the timing of events are crucial for a 
small state like Bahrain’.448 In light of these developments, as demonstrated 
above, the Bahraini government has opted for a ‘securitisation of the Shiʿa 
problem’449; has been pushed into re-examining its relations with non-violent 
Islamist groups; has been confronted with the growing traction of jihadist groups 
within the Sunni community, including within the regime’s security sector and 
socio-political base. In other words, regional trends have had strong internal 
repercussions, including on partly eroding the regime’s traditional loyalist base. 
Overall, the Bahraini regime’s security priorities after 2011 could be described in 
two separate phases. The first phase, between the 2011 uprising and the 
disbanding of al-Wefaq in 2016, was one in which the gravest threat perceived 
came from the Shi’a opposition, made even more formidable in regime’s 
perceptions by its intermestic connection to Iran. The second phase, which began 
in 2014 and peaked after 2016, is one in which the regime felt more insulated 
from internal or intermestic threats and focused on strenghtening relations with 
external backers, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including at the risk of 
having to re-examine the composition of its domestic loyalist base. 
The first phase was strongly defined by a divide-and-rule strategy, based on 
sectarianism. Pushed by powerful figures within the ruling family such as the 
Royal Court Minister, Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa, and his brother the Minister of 
Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defense Force, Khalifa bin 
Ahmed al-Khalifa, together known as the ‘Khawalid’, who have also side-lined 
more conciliatory figures such as the Crown Prince, this strategy has effectively 
prevented an inclusive approach towards the Shi’a question.450 Granting political 
concessions to acquiesce the Shi’a opposition, such as providing inclusion in key 
institutions, agreeing to constitutional reforms or more power-sharing 
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mechanisms, would in this view necessarily strengthen the opposition to further 
challenge the regime’s identity. This is the prism through which, it is here argued, 
one should read the hyper-sensitive perceptions of Iran-supported Shi’a dissident 
groups, often indicated by regime’s officials as the gravest threat to Bahrain’s 
security after 2011. However, following to the extensive crackdowns that followed 
the protests and peaked in 2016, according to a former prominent MP in al-Wefaq 
party, ‘the opposition was morally crushed and the regime felt much more 
secure’.451  
The literature on minority rules has argued that creating a unified, inclusive 
national identity through official ideology can often be key for political stability and 
this thesis has identified the lack of socio-political cohesiveness as a major 
vulnerability for states.452 In Bahrain, however, the official discourse, historical 
narratives and ruling ideology have long been exclusive and divisive.453 
Traditionally, national identity was crafted in the image of the ruling dynasty and 
its history, and the Shi’a community developed, in opposition to that, a nativist 
myth and cultural identity.454 This dynamic extends also to symbolic issues such 
as a date to celebrate the National Day: while it officially falls on December 17, 
the day that King Hamad first took the throne, the opposition has long called to 
have it on August 14, the day that Britain officially withdrew from Bahrain.455 The 
geopolitical context, and the intermestic nature of the Shi’a threat in regime’s 
perceptions, are relevant factors to explain this choice to embrace divisiveness 
over a shared national identity. In addition, a scholar on international political 
economy and expert on Bahrain interviewed by the author has argued that one 
other reason might be that the scarcity of energy resources and subsequent 
scarcity of financial wealth has limited the regime’s ability to employ large-scale 
cooptation in exchange for political loyalty, as typical of other rentier 
economies.456 ‘This has historically triggered a competition for resources that has 
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been mutually reinforcing divide-and-rule tactics as a way to strengthen regime’s 
stability’, he concluded.457 Most importantly, a divisive strategy has also 
prevented the establishment of a significant cross-sectarian opposition that would 
overwhelm the regime depriving it of its main ‘otherization’ argument for 
pushback. As Justin Gengler puts is: ‘Until now, the government has succeeded 
in portraying the demands of the Shi‘a and secular opposition as 
unrepresentative of - and even detrimental to - the interests of other citizens by 
raising the spectre of Iranian or Western influence. The last thing Bahrain’s ruling 
family is prepared to do is sit at the negotiating table with both Shi’a and Sunni 
political societies.’458  
However, while as a result of this strategy, ‘the Bahraini opposition is weak and 
demoralised’ as argued to the author by a researcher who worked in the team of 
the Bassiouni report, ‘the regime’s loyalist base is also smaller than before’.459 In 
the past, the unification of the Sunni community behind the leadership has been 
vital to their security calculus. A prospective alienation of Sunni political groups 
or tribes can be therefore problematic for the Bahraini regime, which would see 
the number of its loyalist interlocutors shrink dramatically.460 For this reason the 
Bahraini leadership in 2014 has maintained a cautious approach to reining back 
Sunni Islamist political societies, such as al-Minbar, before acquiescing to the 
pressure from its much-needed regional allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in 
2017. A similar rationale could explain the hesitation to put pressure on large and 
influential tribes such as the al-Binali clan, or, even more problematically, on the 
country’s security services, in order to scout individuals sympathetic to Sunni 
extremism. As the government has been compelled to take a firmer stance on 
both, the core priority of preserving its loyalist base has pushed for the enactment 
of counter-measures. The empowerment of two non-royals Sunni, Adel bin 
Khalifa al-Fadhel and Tariq al-Hasan to two high-profile positions leading the 
National Security Agency and the Public Security Forces respectively, can be 
seen as an attempt to give more stake to other Sunni tribes in critical bodies of 
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the state.461 The hostilities towards Qatar are similarily explained by interviewees 
as strongly motivated by discouraging Qatar’s alleged attempt to financially lure 
members of influential Sunni tribes, traditionally representing the core of the royal 
family’s support base, into relocating to Doha and acquiring Qatari nationality.462 
Finally, according to a former MP affiliated to al-Wefaq, the regime after 2014 has 
looked towards the urban elites, predominantly Sunni but also Shi’a, as a possible 
new loyalist constituency, to play against rural, Islamist-leaning groups.463 
Hoewever, this attempt by the government to re-define its loyalist base while 
strenghtening its traditional core, is not without challenges, that appear 
underestimated by the leadership. The long-standing political-identitarian 
struggle is certainly made more convoluted by a number of socio-economic 
vulnerabilities, largely fuelled by rising unemployment, scarce investment and 
inflation.464 The combination of a stagnating economy with the sheer volume of 
young job-seekers entering the labour market every year is a real challenge. As 
foreign investors are hesitant to inject liquidity in the country, state finances are 
depleted by a combination of high expenses on security and political stability. A 
Shura member interviewed by the author in 2018 said: ‘The 2011 revolts drained 
our budget. In 2014, while other GCC countries accumulated resources thanks 
to high oil prices, Bahrain couldn’t. As prices crashed, we had to start borrowing 
massively and a vicious cycle between high interests and low oil prices was 
generated. As Shura we had to take unpopular decisions.’ 465 While economic 
inequality might be especially evident in the Shi’a areas of the country, these 
challenges are not uniquely damaging to the Shi’a community. In fact several 
members of rural Sunni communities have at one point joined the protests against 
the status quo and have seen their economic opportunities decrease after 
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2011.466 Hence, on one hand the spectre of a cross-sectarian, economically-
motivated dissent as a potential risk cannot be completely disregarded. At the 
same time, containing the strains in the rural areas, might not be simple if those 
strains remain systemic. A former MP from al-Wefaq underlined how ‘Bahrainis 
don’t expect political liberties anymore, but they do expect good governance. The 
government believes they have time and the support of wealthy neighbours to 
address the economic challenges, but they might be underestimating the 
potential impacts of a new economic downturn on their loyalists in the urban 
elites’.467 Relying on backing from regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Kuwait, might be effective in the short-term, but can hardly constitute 
an answer to structural economic dysfunctionalities, i.e. socio-economic 
vulnerabilities, in the long term. In addition to that, as seen with the intra-GCC 
crises, this reliance can reinforce fault lines in the domestic politics and those 
between socio-political communities and state authorities, as regional allies 
attempt to export their strategic and security blueprints into Bahrain. Ultimately, 
in fact, even strictly economic challenges call back into question state-society 
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: SAUDI ARABIA 
 
Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront of the two intra-GCC crises targeting Qatar 
in 2014 and 2017, vocally accusing Qatar of funding ‘terrorist groups’ - among 
them the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliates, openly supported by Qatar - and 
colluding with Iran and Iranian-backed militias to undermine the stability of the 
GCC.468 However, determining whether these positions stem from actual security 
perceptions or rather from the Saudi-Qatari rivalry needs further examination. 
Relations between the two neighbours had already been marred by controversies 
and disagreements long before the two crises. Up until 1995, Qatar was ruled by 
Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, whose approach to regional politics was 
markedly conciliatory towards the pre-eminence of Saudi Arabia, and aligned with 
Riyadh.469 Already under Khalifa’s rule, the influential Crown Prince Hamad bin 
Khalifa had been working to diversify Qatar’s relations in order to create space 
for a foreign policy more independent from the Saudi Kingdom.470 Hence, when 
Emir Hamad took over from his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, Qatar’s 
neighbours were adamant that Khalifa be returned to his position, and Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain allegedly even supported a counter-coup.471 Once the 
counter-coup failed, Emir Hamad consolidated his position and doubled-down on 
devoting his efforts to disenfranchising Qatar from Riyadh’s shadow. In 1996, a 
milestone in this project was the establishment of the global satellite network Al 
Jazeera. While Al Jazeera was founded primarily to boost the state’s soft power, 
it was also a vehicle to undermine Saudi Arabia’s regional leadership: the channel 
started hosting Saudi dissidents and putting into question Saudi policies to the 
point that Riyadh removed its Ambassador from Qatar in 2002 and for six years, 
as a way of pressuring Qatar.472 This was the background against which the Arab 
Spring took place, deepening the divisions between Doha and Riyadh. Amid this 
charged context, it becomes paramount to question how much the initiatives 
against Qatar in 2014 and 2017 have been rooted in threat perceptions and how 
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much they were spurred by a Saudi-Qatari competition for influence in the region. 
In order to assess that, this chapter will begin by looking at the specific impacts 
of the Arab uprisings in Saudi Arabia, to explore how those influenced Saudi 
Arabia’s perceptions of its own socio-political and socio-economic vulnerabilities 
and of the issues object of this thesis, and at the center of the intra-GCC crises. 
It will then proceed to examine those specific issues from Riyadh’s point of view, 
attempting to draw a distinction between the regime’s narrative about them and 
the related security perceptions as measured by the researcher, benchmarked 
against data and factual information. It will then be possible to draw conclusions 
about the evolution of the security calculus in Saudi Arabia after 2011, uncovering 
how, while the sensitivity in the security perceptions towards the issues here 
analysed is real, this is first and foremost spurred and fuelled by vulnerabilities of 
the Saudi state itself. 
 
5.1 Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring 
Protests begun in the Shi’a-majority Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, connected 
to Bahrain via a 25-km bridge, just three days after large-scale protests started 
in Bahrain in February 2011.473 Demonstrations happened in three areas 
specifically, ‘Awamiyya, Qatif and al-Ahsa, encouraged, inspired and, at times, 
coordinated by Shi’a clerics such as the influential scholar Nimr al-Nimr, who 
rallied citizens through sermons openly linking regime legitimacy to political 
reforms.474 On February 24, protests started in ‘Awamiyya demanding the release 
of political prisoners, and in Qatif and Safwa, where protesters called for the 
release of nine ‘forgotten’ Shi’a prisoners, incarcerated sixteen years earlier for 
their alleged membership in Hezbollah al-Hijaz - an organization declaredly 
politically loyal to Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran - and 
involvement in the Khobar Towers bombing.475 However, there were others in the 
Saudi Shi’a community whose priorities revolved even more around political 
reform and representation. In February 2011 a letter entitled “Declaration of 
National Reform” was signed by 119 activists from across the different socio-
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political communities, demanding the establishment of a federal system to give 
greater authority to local governments and of an elected parliament, “National 
Assembly”, eyeing to the institution of a constitutional monarchy.476 When one of 
those signatories, Shi’a cleric Tawfiq al-‘Amir, was arrested in Al Ahsa, a new 
wave of more sustained protests begun.477 In early March, a diverse range of 
youth protest groups coalesced into a movement called the Free Youth Coalition, 
behind demands ranging from ‘the release of political prisoners, an end to 
corruption, the cancellation of all unjustified debts and taxes, the election of a 
consultative council, and the establishment of an independent judiciary’478, and 
calling for a nation-wide “Day of Rage” on March 11. The prospect of nation-wide 
protests, coordinated by youth groups via online fora, which the authorities were 
only partially able to control, raised the level of concern for the regime.479 In 
anticipation of the “Day of Rage”, Saudi authorities released Tawfiq al-‘Amir and 
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud met with some of the Shi’a leaders, 
promising financial packages worth USD 130bn to tackle youth unemployment 
and a rampant housing crisis, all in the attempt to convince them to withdraw 
support from the planned protests.480 In the days leading up to March 11, 
authorities warned via newspapers that those who would go out and protest 
would face lashings and imprisonment.481 Finally, when the day arrived, amid a 
large deployment of security forces, only a few dozen people took the streets, 
and only in al-Ahsa, Safwa, ‘Awamiyya, and Qatif.482  
Interestingly, it was Saudi Arabia’s March 14 intervention via the Peninsula Shield 
Forces to support the Bahraini regime to trigger a new wave of demonstrations. 
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Between the 16th and 18th of March, thousands, especially from youth groups, 
protested in the Eastern Province in solidarity with Bahraini Shi’a, calling for the 
withdrawal of the Peninsula Shield from the country.483 These messages were 
later gathered in a petition signed by 83 clerics from al-Ahsa.484 Shows of 
solidarity included chanting ‘free Bahrain’ and ‘one people, not two people’, ‘in an 
apparent reference to the unity of the Bahraini and Saudi (Eastern Province) 
people.’485 Re-energised in their opposition by the cause of the Bahraini Shi’a, 
protesters continued to organize sporadic rallies in March and April 2011. Not 
even a declaration calling to halt protests signed by 35 more politically-
conservative Shi’a clerics, and negotiated with the governor of Qatif Abdallah al-
Uthman, managed to quell demonstrators.486  
On the contrary, after a period of more sporadic rallies, due to limited concessions 
by the government, an incident in October 2011 in ‘Awamiyya escalated the 
situation, as a gathering descended into an exchange of fire between the police 
and armed protesters, leaving a dozen wounded on both sides.487 After this 
violent incident the Saudi Ministry of Interior released a statement accusing the 
protesters to be acting ‘against the public peace at the behest of a foreign country 
seeking to undermine the security and stability of the homeland in blatant 
interference in national sovereignty’ adding that ‘those people have to clearly 
decide whether their loyalty is to Allah and their homeland or to that state and its 
authority.’488 It was the first time Saudi authorities openly connected the 
demonstrators to a ‘foreign country’, i.e. Iran and, since the Autumn of 2011, the 
regime increasingly framed protesters as insurgents and foreign agents. On their 
part, protesters themselves started to openly question the legitimacy of their 
rulers in Riyadh: responding to the Ministry of Interior’s statement, Nimr al-Nimr 
remarked in a sermon that ‘We are not loyal to other countries or authorities, nor 
are we loyal to this country. What is this country? The regime that oppresses me? 
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The regime that steals my money, sheds my blood, and violates my honor? What 
does a country mean? The regime? The ruling clan? The soil? I don’t know what 
a country means. Loyalty is only to Allah! We have declared, and we reiterate, 
that our loyalty is to Allah, not the Saud clan’.489 On November 23, the burial of 
two protesters killed by the police in earlier demonstrations brought 20.000 
people to the streets of Qatif in the largest demonstration in the Eastern Province 
since the uprising of 1979.490 Demonstrators chanted against the regime and 
even crossed the red line of attacking openly the ruling family by chanting ‘death 
to al-Saud’, as two more people were killed by the police.491 The Grand Mufti ‘Abd 
al-‘Aziz Al al-Shaykh, weighted in, arguing that Qatif protesters were a ‘malicious 
group’ with masters abroad who ‘do not belong to this country.’492 Tensions flared 
up again in early 2012, with the one-year anniversary of the uprising in Bahrain 
approaching on February 14, and erupted in violent clashes after the arrest of 
Nimr al-Nimr in July 2012, as some young activists shifted to attacking 
government buildings and police patrols with Molotov cocktails.493 After two 
months of revamped clashes, in August 2012 seven more quietist religious 
leaders, representing the major Saudi Shi‘a political currents, issued a new 
statement condemning any use of violence and affirming the unquestionable 
loyalty of the Shi‘a community to the government of Saudi Arabia.494 It was not 
the first time that Shi’a notables, judges or clerics had pleaded with the youth 
groups to halt the demonstrations, unsuccessfully. Once again, their statement 
encouraged a slow-down of demonstrations which, however, did not stop. 
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On the contrary, the summer of 2012 saw protests in another area of Saudi 
Arabia, the central region of Qassim.495 Small groups of people started to 
organise sit-ins in front of government buildings, including prisons, Ministry of 
Interior facilities, the governorate’s offices. Similarly to how it begun in the Eastern 
Province, their main demands were about the release of political prisoners. 
Between 2012 and 2013 tens of thousands of small demonstrations were held, 
especially in the conservative city of Buraydah. Recalling the language of the 
Arab Spring, demonstrators chanted ‘The people want to free the prisons’ or ‘The 
people want the implementation of the law’ in reference to legal processes 
considered unfair.496 At times, local mismanagement and corruption, became 
additional focal points of demonstrations.497 Prominent Islamist figures, un-
affiliated with the official clergy and aligned with a Saudi organization close to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Sahwa, started showing their support for people’s 
grievances online. These included reformist cleric Salman al-‘Awda who in March 
2013 shared an open letter to the government in which he wrote: ‘People here, 
like people around the world, have demands, longings and rights, and they will 
not remain silent forever when they are denied all or some of them. When one 
becomes hopeless, you can expect anything from them.’498 To contain possible 
escalations, in Qassim the regime resorted to stepping up control and 
surveillance on the scarcely populated areas and to large-scale arrest 
campaigns.499 While these protests were also significant, the ones in the Eastern 
Province were markedly predominant in the regime’s perceptions, and not only 
because of their magnitude.  
A key impact factor has been the historical and socio-political context in which 
the 2011 protests took place: the Eastern Province has been restive for decades, 
as Saudi Shi’a - estimated at between one and a half and two million people or 
around 10 percent of the citizen population - have long complained of systematic, 
structural discrimination in religious practice, government employment, and 
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business, and overall marginalization.500 Under the Kingdom’s 1992 Basic Law, 
Sunni Islam is enshrined as the source of authority for the state and for the law.501 
Religious edicts, fatwas, impacting all aspects of life in the Kingdom are issued 
by the Council of Senior Scholars, a council gathering high-profile religious 
scholars appointed by the King, which includes representatives of the Sunni 
Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi schools, as well as Hanbalis, but no significant Shi’a 
representation.502 Given the Council of Senior Scholars clerics’ control over the 
religious life, education sector and the judiciary in Saudi Arabia, and their, 
discontinuous but meaningful, influence over politics, this exclusion has long 
translated into discrimination and marginalization in political, economic and social 
terms. Shi’a religiosity has been repressed though arbitrary mosque closures, the 
prohibition of public gatherings and rituals. The Saudi educational system, 
imbued with Wahhabi thought, long tolerated and, at times, promoted anti-
Shi’ism. Shi’a lamented the unfairness of the judicial system, as Shi’a courts’ 
jurisdiction has been traditionally limited both geographically, as they only 
operate as local courts in the Eastern Province, and thematically, as they only 
treat issues of family law. A lack of economic opportunities and viable 
employment options relegated many areas in the oil-rich Eastern Province to 
socio-economic underdevelopment. Shi’a have been underrepresented in or 
excluded from sensitive government agencies, such as the Ministry of Interior, 
the National Guard, and the Ministry of Defense, police forces, the Royal Court, 
cabinet, the diplomatic corp and governorates’ institutions. These 
institutionalised, structural socio-economic inequality and socio-political 
marginalization fit the description of what has been termed in this thesis as 
vulnerabilities. These grievances have been lamented since the 1980s, when the 
local Shi’a communities, then inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, revolted 
against the Sunni ruling family, leaving a long-lasting mark on the Saudi collective 
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memory.503 The 2011 demonstrations, centred around the same issues, were the 
largest witnessed since then. 
A similitude between the late 1970s and 2011, which had a strong impact on the 
regime’s perceptions, was the connection between the Shi’a protests in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain.504 The cooperation and coordination between revolutionary 
oppositional groups active in both countries in the late 1970s, i.e. the 
Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia 
the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), in a way amplified their 
capabilities.505 Thorough the decades, people-to-people links, based on family 
connections, creating the conditions for the existence of close-knit networks, 
were strengthened by the social policies at the GCC level. Fast forward to 2011, 
the umbrella group of the Saudi Shi’a youth, the Coalition for Freedom and 
Justice, including the more revolutionary elements among protesters, not only 
supported openly the Bahraini opposition, but showed clear similitudes with the 
tactics and discourse of the Bahraini February 14 Youth Coalition.506 In both 
cases, the protesters showed no hesitation to question directly the legitimacy of 
the royal families and the state itself. A potential success of the uprising in 
Bahrain was perceived by the Saudi regime as a major boost for its own 
opposition, in a strong domino effect, and hence a threat for the Saudi regime’s 
survival as well as its political influence on Bahrain.507 An indication of the 
importance of Bahrain for Saudi Arabia’s internal stability, is that the decision to 
send troops to Bahrain, under the Peninsula Shield umbrella, was spearheaded 
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by the Minister of Interior Nayef Bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, and not by the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs or Defense.508  
Another important element in the regime’s perceptions was that the Saudi groups 
recognised a symbolic leader, Nimr al-Nimr, a Shi’a cleric just like Ayatollah 
Khomeini before the Islamic Revolution, who openly questioned the foundational 
myth of the Kingdom and its constitutive elements.509 Nimr al-Nimr had a long 
history of connections to Iran and outspoken criticism of the Saudi regime: 
already in the late 1970s he joined the transnational Shi’a movement led by Iraqi-
Iranian cleric Mohammed Mahdi al-Shirazi, which was at the forefront of the 
1980s protests in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.510 In the aftermath of the 
uprisings, al-Nimr went into exile to Iran, where he subsequently became one of 
the key representatives in Saudi Arabia for the movement’s revolutionary political 
leader, Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi.511 Nimr’s popularity soared during the 2009 
incidents, when clashes broke out between pilgrims visiting Shi’a shrines and the 
Baqi cemetery in Medina and members of the regime’s morality police.512 In 
March of that year al-Nimr gave a fiery speech, dubbed “Dignity Speech”, in which 
he lashed out at the regime and warned that the secession of the Eastern 
Province was the only meaningful solution for the Shi’a.513 The connections 
between al-Nimr and Iran were never doubted by the regime, including in 2011.514  
While the logistical or financial support, as well as the political coordination 
alleged by the Saudi regime between Iran and the protesters has not been 
proven, there were strong demonstrations of moral and media support from Iran. 
Protests in Saudi Arabia were widely covered by the Iranian-sponsored Arabic-
language Al Alam channel, Lebanese Hezbollah’s Al Manar, Iraq’s Ahlul Bait 
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TV.515 Similarly, in the late 1970s, Iran had launched Arab-language radio 
programs, such as Radio Tehran, attacking the al-Saud rulers as a ‘corrupt, 
mercenary agent of the United States’ while broadcasting statements by the 
Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula.516 These 
displays of solidarity were largely instrumental for the Saudi regime to confirm the 
external influence over the protest movements, and embrace the rhetoric of Iran’s 
interference in the domestic affairs both of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, as part of 
the Iran Revolutionary Guards’ mission to export the Khomeinist revolution in the 
region.517  
Many have argued that this framing has been employed by the state to de-
legitimize the protesters’ legitimate grievances and to strengthen the loyalty of 
the Sunni majority to the regime, by scaring them of an Iranian takeover of the 
Eastern Province’s oilfields with the help of local Shi’a.518 However, interviews 
with prominent Saudi political commentators, have argued that, from the point of 
view of the Saudi authorities, while Saudi Shi’a communities may have legitimate 
grievances, Iran’s agenda to exploit such grievances to cause instability and 
extend its influence in Saudi Arabia is not in question.519 This concentration of 
factors, and the fact that the events of 2011 brought once again to the surface 
structural socio-political and socio-economic vulnerabilities in the marginalised 
communities of the Eastern Province, arguably explains why the local chapter of 
the Arab Spring would influence the Saudi regime’s security perceptions well 
beyond the year 2011. 
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5.2 Saudi Arabia and the ‘Shi’a threat’. 
There is an abundance of public and private statements from Saudi officials 
identifying Iran as a major threat to the Arab world and the Saudi Kingdom, 
especially after 2011.520 However, the characterizations of such threat by Saudi 
officials have been divergent and even contradictory: what is, exactly, that Iran 
threatens? In a 2014 study, Nawaf Obaid, a long time special counsellor to Saudi 
ambassadors and the Royal Court, wrote that ‘Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as the 
main threat to regional stability’, with a reference to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and a 
special attention to the conflict Yemen, treated separately in the section 
dedicated to defending the ‘homeland’.521 In a closed-door event held in London 
in 2018, a Saudi scholar and Director of a Riyadh-based think tank with ties to 
the Saudi regime argued that ‘Iran is a theocratic system with aspirations over 
the leadership of the Muslim world. The system is led by the IRGC and the 
Supreme Leader, while governments are relatively inconsequential. The 
Supreme Leader is stuck in what he considers an existential fight with the Saudi 
monarchy’.522 In 2016, Prince Sultan Bin Khalid Al-Faisal al-Saud, former 
Commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Counter-Insurgency Special 
Operations Task Force, wrote that ‘serious risks and threats as a result of the 
pervasive and corrosive influence of Iran in our region - and in particular on Saudi 
Arabia - amount to a conventional threat and present a clear danger to our 
national security. (…) This increasing Iranian incursion into other states’ affairs 
directly threatens our own national security’.523 In 2015 then-Foreign Minister 
Adel Jubeir wrote that ‘Iran is the single-most-belligerent-actor in the region’.524 
In 2018 Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman remarked in an interview that 
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‘Iranians, they’re the cause of problems in the Middle East, but they are not a big 
threat to Saudi Arabia. But if you don’t watch it, it could turn into a threat.’525 These 
perspectives show an oscillation between perceiving Iran as an external threat, 
damaging the regional interests of Saudi Arabia and an internal threat, intent on 
destabilising the Kingdom from within. Both views have long co-existed, although 
more emphasis has been historically put on the external category of the threat, 
described ‘both in terms of balance of power and as a transnational ideological 
threat’, as noted by scholar Gregory Gause.526 
Several interviewees recalled to the author how the Islamic Revolution’s leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini wrote and spoke with deep-seated hostility about 
Saudi Arabia, defining the Saudis in his testament as ‘traitors to the two holy 
shrines’, ‘inept and spineless leaders’ and ‘not worthy of being in charge of the 
hajj and Kaaba affairs’.527 This was going to remain a key theme in the bilateral 
relations and a cause of extreme concern for the Saudi rulers, who view their 
guardianship of the holy places as an integral part of their legitimacy mix and 
national identity.528 In Riyadh, Khomeini’s rhetoric is, still today, considered 
fundamental in shaping the ideology of Iran’s clerical class which is, in turn, 
regarded to hold more political power than elected governments.529 Such 
ideological hostility is often described in Saudi strategic discourse as the fuel to 
export the Khomeinist revolution and expand Iran’s geopolitical clout wherever 
there is an opportunity. For instance, Ali Shihabi - Director of the think tank Arabia 
Foundation and a Saudi watcher close to the leadership - wrote: ‘Since 1979, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has seen itself as facing a radical, militaristic and 
expansionist Iran that leverages Shi’a disenfranchisement, local power vacuums 
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and a vast and growing network of well-armed and well-trained proxies to export 
its Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East.’530  
Generally speaking, the impact of historical events surrounding Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution on Saudi collective memory and its leadership’s perceptions, has 
routinely been highlighted in interviews conducted by the author.531 This is 
connected to the fact that in the 1980s the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
established the Office of Liberation Movements with the explicit purpose of 
supporting revolutionary groups in the Gulf, including the Organization of the 
Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah al-Hijaz.532 The Organization of the Islamic 
Revolution was established in 1979 by Shi’a clerics - such as Hassan al-Saffar, 
Tawfiq al-Saif, Jafar al-Shayeb - in the aftermath of a short-lived uprising, violently 
crashed by the Saudi National Guard, which had spread in Saudi Arabia’s 
Eastern Province to protest poor living conditions and religious discrimination.533 
In 1987, a more militant group was formed under the name Hezbollah al-Hijaz: 
receiving training by the IRGC and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it vowed to violently 
overthrow the Saudi rulers and establish an Islamic Republic after the Iranian 
model.534 In the following two years, the group was involved in bombing attacks 
on oil facilities in the Eastern Province, including at Ra's al Ju'aymah, Jubayl, 
Ra’s Tanura, and in targeted assassinations of Saudi security officials pursuing 
members of the organizations abroad.535 Back in the 1980s, as mentioned, 
Tehran also hosted the International Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which 
orchestrated an insurgency attempt in Manama.536 Iran’s ambitions towards 
Bahrain had already been at the center of the Iran-Saudi rivalry after Britain’s 
withdrawal from the Gulf, and yet the two sides had managed to agree to a 
sovereign Bahrain, as Saudi officials made clear to the Shah that any military 
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move against Bahrain would be considered a direct act of aggression against 
Saudi Arabia.537  
When Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the death of Khomeini created the conditions 
for a partial rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two major militant 
groups turned to focusing more on propaganda than political violence.538 Some 
leaders in the Organization for the Islamic Revolution, including Shirazi cleric 
Hassan al-Saffar received an amnesty by the Saudi regime in exchange for the 
abandonment of political activities.539 Other more hardline clerics, such as Nimr 
al-Nimr, rejected the offer. Perhaps also in response to this agreement, in 1996 
the Khobar Towers in the Eastern Province were bombed, killing 19 US soldiers 
and wounding 500 people: while Hezbollah al-Hijaz never claimed responsibility 
for the attack, the Saudi regime has long blamed the organization, launching a 
large-scale crackdown and effectively crippling it.540 From the 1990s onwards, 
Shi’a clerics resorted to non-violent activism including: petitions to the royal 
family, grassroots civil society work, participation in municipal council elections, 
and dialogue with like-minded reformists among liberals and Sunni Islamists.541 
Still, the government would continue to raise questions about their loyalty and 
connections to Tehran.542 Many reformist hopes were encouraged by the 
accession to the throne of King Abdullah in 2005, a royal who had long sponsored 
initiatives aimed at tempering sectarian divisions, such as the establishment of 
the National Dialogue, providing limited representation to the community.543 
Anyways, as practical outcomes from the National Dialogue lagged, the afore-
mentioned 2009 incident in Medina, when Shi’a pilgrims clashed with the morality 
police, turned frustration into outright animosity against the regime.544 
The Saudi authorities reacted to the Medina incident, as recorded by the US State 
Department’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom in 
2010, with arbitrary detentions, mosque closures, the prohibition of public display 
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of Shi’a rituals and gatherings, and restrictive measures on the community.545 
These measures were inflammatory, as they hit at the heart of the central 
grievance for Saudi Shi’a: religious discrimination. A diplomatic cable from the 
US consulate in Dhahran dated November 2010, highlighted the mounting 
frustration, ‘turning to hopelessness and exasperation’ in the Shi’a communities 
of the East.546 The spark of the Arab Spring was sufficient to fully ignite the 
protests. The Saudi regime saw the 2011 Shi’a uprisings in Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia as a re-ignition of the pre-1990s past.547 While Iran’s direct involvement in 
the uprisings remains, as mentioned, to be proven, to a certain extent protesters 
also saw these events in continuity with their past, given how the grievances 
lamented had not significantly changed over the decades.548 These grievances 
could be leveraged by Iran, presenting itself as the patron of disgruntled Shi’a 
minorities in the Arab world.549 From the Saudi point of view Iran has employed 
this rhetoric to expand political influence in the Arab world.  
A Saudi analyst has described this strategy as having been replicated multiple 
times throughout the region following a simple model: the establishment of proxy 
militias and political factions, indoctrinated in Khomeinism, weakening the state 
from within.550 Cited as the most successful instances are Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and the Hasd al-Shabi ( or Popular Mobilization Units, PMU) and political factions 
such as Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Islamic Dawa Party, in 
post-Saddam Iraq.551 Indeed the extension of Iranian influence into the power 
vacuum created in post-2003 Iraq, when the US forces defeated Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and disbanded the Sunni-controlled state in de-ba’athification, 
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is often referred to as a pivotal moment in magnifying the ‘Iranian threat’ and 
reinforcing the myth of a Shi’a transnational polity in the making.552 King Abdullah 
of Jordan then famously described this geopolitical belt connecting Lebanon, 
Syria, Iraq and Iran under the Iranian influence as a Shi’a ‘crescent’.553  Thus it 
was certainly perceived in Riyadh, where the Syrian revolution in 2011 was 
initially seen as a potential opportunity to dislodge Iranian influence in Damascus, 
thus breaking the crescent, and replace it with Sunni forces who had pledged to 
pivot away from Tehran if victorious.554 Similarly, in 2017, under the leadership of 
Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has exerted pressures on Lebanon’s 
Prime Minister Saad Hariri, leader of the Saudi-aligned Sunni formation Future 
Movement, to resign in protest of Iranian influence over Beirut, and has offered 
support to Iraqi political factions, including Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, in 
exchange for their taking the distance from Tehran.555  
Seen from Riyadh the crescent had long resembled as a ‘full moon’, as described 
by a confidant of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in 2016, when taking in 
consideration perceived Iran’s ambitions in Yemen.556 Already around 2003, the 
Shia-aligned Zaydi rebel group known as Houthis had launched an insurgency 
against the Yemeni government, and several policy-makers in the Arabian 
Peninsula alleged that they were encouraged and aided by Iran with arms and 
military instructors in their struggle.557 The following year, in 2008, Qatar 
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negotiated a peace agreement pledging US$300–500 million in reconstruction 
assistance for the Northern Yemeni province of Saada, where the Houthis 
reside.558 Shortly after the accords were signed, fighting resumed and Saudi 
Arabia entered the fray, declaring war on the Houthis. A prominent role was then 
played by the then-Minister of Interior, Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, and his son 
and deputy, Mohammad bin Nayef al-Saud showing that, as a Saudi analyst put 
it in 2011, ‘Yemen is not about foreign policy, it’s about national security’.559 
Ultimately, the Kingdom agreed to an unsatisfactory truce after the Houthis 
resisted months of Saudi airstrikes and land incursions, and infiltrated to the 
Saudi side of the border.560 When a Houthi insurgency revamped after street 
protests toppled the Yemeni regime in 2011, the group conquered large sways of 
Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, in 2014. Then Alireza Zakani, a confidant of 
the Supreme Leader, boasted that ‘three Arab capitals [Beirut, Damascus, and 
Baghdad] have already fallen into Iran’s hands and belong to the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, and Sana’a is the fourth’.561 The following year Saudi Arabia 
launched a new military offensive, with UAE backing, to counter the Houthi 
advance amid mounting allegations of Iranian support.562 According to Nawaf 
Obaid, the Houthis, ‘are looking to expand their regional presence with access to 
the Red Sea and represent a serious strategic as well as physical threat’.563 
According to Ali Shihabi, ‘equipped with Iranian arms and trained by Hezbollah’ 
the Houthis would quickly ‘transform into a new Hezbollah on the Kingdom’s 
southern border’, something which was considered intolerable and had to be pre-
empted.564 
The Iran deal, or JCPOA, was seen through the lenses of this perceived regional 
expansion by Iran. From a Saudi perspective, by lifting comprehensive economic 
sanctions, the agreement provided Iran with more economic resources to be re-
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invested in its regional proxies.565 For this reason, Saudi officials such as Turki 
al-Faisal voiced concerns that regional dossiers had not been discussed in the 
framework of the negotiations, and that GCC states had not been invited at the 
negotiating table.566 The widespread perception was that global powers - first and 
foremost the United States – had ignored GCC concerns, driven by the objective 
of re-creating the 1970s twin pillar policy relaying on both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
as the two regional powers to secure the Gulf, and thus creating an equilibrium 
that would allow the fatigued United States to retrench from the decades-long 
role of security guarantor.567 To respond to this perception, Saudi Arabia 
increasingly took the mission to counter Iran in its hands.568 At the geopolitical 
level, as previously explored, Saudi Arabia assumed a more prominent role in 
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. Domestically, Saudi Arabia decided to hand 
exemplary punishment to those identified by the regime as leaders of the Saudi 
Shi’a revolts and, in January 2016, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr was executed for 
terrorism.569 In response, Iranian mobs stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran 
and the general consulate in the city of Mashhad: blaming Iranian authorities of 
failure in protecting its diplomatic premises, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic 
relations with Iran. Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir commented the decision 
stating: ‘In addition to these acts of aggression, the Iranian regime is smuggling 
weapons and explosives and planting terrorist cells in the region, including the 
Kingdom, to spread turmoil’.570 In fact, in the home town of Nimr al-Nimr, 
‘Awamiyya, fighting between the security forces and small militant groups had 
never fully stopped. In the summer of 2017, just as Mohammad bin Salman 
became Crown Prince, the Saudi authorities launched an operation to reclaim the 
town’s control through the iron fist: in a statement dated August 2017 a 
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government’s spokesman put it as follows: ‘Due to its narrow streets, the al-
Musawara neighbourhood [in ‘Awamiyya] became a haven for terrorists and 
suspicious activities ranging from terrorism and kidnapping to selling drugs and 
weapons.’571  
When analysed through the theoretical framework of this thesis, the Saudi 
regime’s perceptions of Iran and the ‘Shi’a threat’ after 2011, can be described in 
their complexity. That emanating from Iran and Shi’a aligned groups is certainly 
perceived as a full-fledged threat, having the intent and capabilities to damage 
the functional integrity of the Saudi borders and of its institutions, as much as its 
political stability and monarchical identity. It is also perceived as a quintessential 
intermestic threat, originating from abroad but having developed a strong internal 
dimension, threatening the regional interests of the Saudi regime as much as its 
internal priorities. Other than a clear political dimension, this threat is perceived 
in its, asymmetric, military dimension. An economic dimension has been raised 
by two of the interviewees, who highlighted how Iran’s return to the global energy 
market means direct completion for Saudi Arabia, or how Iran’s ambitions on the 
oil resources of the Eastern Province are an integral part of its predatory plans 
for the Arabian Peninsula.572 Interestingly, however, the societal dimension of this 
threat, i.e. the potential for sectarian-flavored disruptions to the Saudi national 
fabric to deepen, has been only marginally raised.  
 
5.3 Saudi Arabia and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
The Saudi regime’s perception of the Muslim Brotherhood varied greatly over the 
decades and as a function of both domestic and regional dynamics, with regime-
Brotherhood relations going from accommodation to competition, and through 
cycles of conflict and reconciliation.573 These oscillations, it is here argued, mirror 
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closely the Saudi leadership’s perceptions of the group in its internal, external or 
intermestic levels. 
Similarly to other GCC countries, the Brotherhood arrived in the Kingdom in the 
1950s and 1960s, introduced by thousands of members fleeing persecution at 
the hands of Arab nationalist regimes in Syria, Egypt, and beyond.574 In the 
Kingdom they joined together in an informally structured movement self-named 
Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya) or Sahwa, which over time became 
heavily contaminated by local Wahhabi tradition. Members of the Brotherhood 
affiliated to the Sahwa were initially useful to the regime to counter the ideological 
threat coming from Arab socialism and nationalism, inspired by Egypt’s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser and developed in the context of the Cold War, at the domestic 
level.575 To this end, they developed cooperative relations also with the Wahhabi 
clerical establishment, whose revivalist ideology had been since the 19th century 
a key ingredient of the national identity mix for the nascent Kingdom and a key 
vehicle of legitimization for its ruling family.576 In fact, representatives of Saudi 
religious institutions enabled Sahwa members to access the education system, 
the media, and organizations engaged in social activities such as camps or 
charities, with their anti-Nasserism messages.577 Cooperation between the state 
and the Sahwa continued until the fall of the Soviet Union and related 
revolutionary Arab movements in early 1990s left Islamists to seem the only 
organized group with the capacity to challenge the regime.578  
The deployment of American troops on Saudi soil, engaged against Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, provided the context for a turning point in the relations 
between the Sahwa and the Saudi regime.579 Sahwa members were critical of 
both the presence of foreign troops on holy Muslim soil and, more generally, the 
regime’s alliance with the United States.580 They launched nation-wide petitions 
and engaged in mobilization across various Saudi regions. The regime reacted 
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through mass arrests and a repression campaign between 1994 and 1995, 
effectively driving the movement to silence and underground residual activities.581 
This ‘Sahwa insurrection’ highlighted the main difference between the movement, 
which clung on political elements and other, non-politicized forms of religiosity, 
for example the quietist Salafis, Wahhabis, Madkhalists.582 When released from 
prison in the late 1990s, some of the Sahwa leaders such as Abdallah al-Hamid 
and Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim engaged again in discourses of political reform.583 
Establishing an unprecedented coalition with liberals and Shi’as, they produced 
petitions and documents in the 2000s calling for the establishment of a 
constitutional monarchy.584 While then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-
Saud tried to engage with the coalition members, then-Interior Minister, Prince 
Nayif bin Abdulaziz, who identified the Brotherhood as the ‘source of all evil in 
the Kingdom’, spearheaded a tough response and new arrest campaigns.585 At 
the same time, the regime enlisted some other Sahwa clerics in the ideological 
fight against al-Qa’ida, who had launched a bombing campaign in the Kingdom 
in the early 2000s. Employing the clerics to undermine al-Qa’ida’s recruitment 
efforts was an effective strategy, given their large traction in the Kingdom.586 The 
movement’s capability to mobilize became apparent in the first municipal 
elections of the Kingdom’s modern history in 2005, when Sahwa-backed 
candidates won with very high percentages in most districts.587 
It was in this context that the Arab Spring took place, putting the Sahwa in a 
potential new collision course with the regime. However, in fact, only a few Sahwa 
figures openly supported calls for reform at the domestic level while most refused 
to back mobilizations.588 The most significant act of support for reformists by a 
number of ‘constitutionalist’ Sahwa clerics was arguably their signature of the 
February 2011 petition “Toward a State of Rights and Institutions”, signed by 
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some liberals and Shi’a clerics as well.589 However, a week later, some of the 
most prominent Sahwa figures, including Nasir al-‘Umar and Sheikh Abd al-
Rahman al-Barrak, publicly condemned political demonstrations as a sign of 
degeneration towards Westernization and disloyalty to the Kingdom.590 
According to a Saudi scholar interviewed by the author in 2019, this ‘reluctance 
to grow into a full-fledged opposition force is embedded into the fibres of the 
Sahwa movement, whose members have for years been co-opted by the regime 
and been embedded into the state, leveraging its resources to grow in power and 
influence.’591 An exception was represented by one of the most popular of Sahwa 
clerics, Salman al-Awda, who not only signed the petitions calling for political 
reforms, but also endorsed the Arab Spring in the region in a book and his 
aforementioned 2013 letter to the government, reiterating the need to reform or 
face public anger.592  
Alongside al-Awda, several Sahwa figures openly supported the revolutions in 
North Africa, as well as in Syria and Yemen, and welcomed the Muslim 
Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, while denouncing the Saudi regime’s 
counter-revolutionary policies.593 In particular, a petition was circulated on social 
media with hashtags such as al-malik la yomathilani (the King does not represent 
me), heavily criticising the Saudi financial and political support for Egyptian 
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.594 Sahwa clerics also joined the social media 
campaign showing the four finger gesture, symbolizing solidarity with the Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters massacred on "Rabaa al-Adawiya" square by the 
Egyptian military in August 2013.595 However, the regime did not step back from 
its anti-Brotherhood policies and, on the contrary, designated the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, but not the Sahwa, as a terrorist organization in March 2014 
alongside Daesh and al-Qa’ida, criminalizing all shows of support for it.596 
According to a Saudi scholar researching Saudi foreign policy, this was a clear 
sign of how the regime at that time perceived the Brotherhood as a threat to its 
external, regional, interests.597  
On the other hand, there were convergences between Sahwa clerics and other 
regime policies, especially as regional politics underwent a sectarian polarization. 
Both supported the crackdown against the opposition in Bahrain and both 
supported the Syrian opposition, as a few Sahwa clerics even organised 
fundraising campaigns for opposition groups in Syria and encouraged Saudis to 
travel and fight.598 Additionally, Sahwa figures who had been critical of Saudi 
policies in Egypt, overwhelmingly supported operations initiated by the new King 
Salman bin Abdulaziz and his son, then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman, against the Houthi rebels, since they took over Yemen's capital Sanaa 
in September 2014. Salman al-Awda strongly justified, in religious terms, the 
Saudi intervention in Yemen to counter Iran in public interviews, on his personal 
website “Islam Online” and to his millions of followers on social media.599 
Prominent preachers Muhammad al-Arifi and Awad al-Qarni also publicly praised 
the King for fighting Iran and Iranian-backed forces in Yemen, whom they 
identified with derogatory terms referring to ethno-historical rivalry - such as 
‘Safawid’, referring to the Safavid Empire - religious rivalry - such as ‘Majus’ 
(Zoroastrians) - and sectarian rivalry - such as ‘Rawafid’ (Rejectionist, a 
derogatory term to indicate Shi’a).600 The ‘Iranian threat’ in all of its dimensions 
was thus successfully employed by the regime to silence Islamist dissent and 
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strengthen Sunni unity around the regime itself against a common external 
menace, similarly to what happened during the Nasser era. Amid this 
background, contemporarily to the launch of the Yemeni operations, Saudi 
Arabia’s then-Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal stated that his government had 
‘no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood.’601 
However, this period of non-confrontation lasted only briefly. In his bid to power, 
then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman launched his all-
encompassing vision for Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, in April 2016. A central 
element was a top-down modernization of the country’s economy away from 
dependence on energy revenues.602 Equally central was a social liberalization 
programme which included, in the course of the following two years, the 
introduction of cinemas, music and entertaining events, the clampdown of the 
religious and morality police - the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention of Vice or muṭṭawwiʿa - and, finally, the end of the ban for women to 
drive.603 As Mohammad bin Salman officially became Saudi Arabia’s Crown 
Prince in June 2017, social liberalization initiatives accelerated and, in parallel, a 
new crackdown on Sahwa clerics was launched. The crisis with Qatar, erupted 
in the same month, provided the context to arrest these clerics accusing them of 
being agents of Qatar, a long-time supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood.604 In 
September 2017, the Crown Prince signed the first round of arrests for twenty 
clerics and religious scholars, including Salman al-Awda and Awad al-Qarni and, 
a year later, state prosecutors asked the death penalty for both.605 Interestingly, 
Mohammad al-Arifi, who publicly backed some of the Prince’s reforms and 
especially his stance towards Qatar, was not imprisoned. Mohammad bin 
Salman’s social reforms should be viewed as a way to engage with the 
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overwhelmingly young Saudi population – of which almost 70% is under 30-
years-old – in the attempt to create a strengthened connection between the youth 
and the regime and reinforce a legitimacy questioned during the Arab uprisings, 
in the hope that socio-economic liberalization would neutralise calls for political 
liberalization.606 In this context, Sahwa clerics’ opposition to social liberalization, 
described as Westernization, could be highly detrimental to regime legitimacy 
among their millions-strong following and, hence, these clerics, especially the 
most popular ones, are perceived as actors in a political threat to the identity and 
stability of the regime.607 While in the years immediately after the Arab uprisings 
the threat was more clearly perceived towards the regional political interests of 
the regime than in its domestic dimension, under the reign of Mohammad bin 
Salman the domestic dimension rose to prominence, inextricably fused with 
Saudi regional policies, in what this thesis’ framework has defined an intermestic 
threat. 
As scholar Guido Steinberg highlighted, the Saudi regime sees the Muslim 
Brotherhood as ‘competing for allegiance among the Gulf populations and 
challenging the religious legitimacy of the Saudi state’.608 Indeed, to contextualise 
the regime’s perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia, it is essential 
to consider a recurring trope in regime-Brotherhood relations: the perceived 
capability of the Sahwa movement to strengthen, through a religious language, 
the legitimacy of state policies and ideology against Arab nationalists, against al-
Qa’ida, or against the ‘Iranian threat’. Conversely, the regime has exerted 
pressures and repression when Sahwa clerics have opposed its policies, 
especially as they have routinely done so on religious grounds, thus weakening 
the state’s legitimacy. This is a sharp contrast with the official Wahhabi 
establishment, whose clerics have almost unequivocally endorsed the regime’s 
policies domestically and internationally.609 On the other hand, the confrontation 
that has been brewing between the regime and the Sahwa since 2011, which has 
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since 2016 increasingly relied on total repression, gives an indication of how the 
regime has been underestimating the possible societal dimension of such 
confrontation and namely the socio-political risk to deepen the fault lines between 
regime supporters and the large number of Sahwa followers.610 
 
5.4 Saudi Arabia and the ‘jihadi threat’. 
The Saudi regime’s perceptions of the threat posed by jihadism evolved 
significantly after the 2011 Arab uprisings, as the apparent rejection of existing 
ruling models in the region interacted with a sectarian-charged political 
environment and war-ridden scenarios to give new impetus to extremism and 
political violence, under the banners of al-Qa’ida and Daesh. From the Saudi 
leadership’s point of view, regional dynamics were as relevant in shaping 
perceptions of this new wave of jihadism as domestic ones, and the historical 
context was crucial.611 
Jihadi extremism posed the first serious challenge of the modern times to the 
Saudi regime in 1979, when a group of around 500 insurgents, led by Juhayman 
bin Sayf al-Otaibi, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, protesting against the al-
Saud’s policies of modernisation and Westernization and asking for their 
overthrow.612  While the Grand Mosque was recaptured in less than the three 
weeks, this event had a profound impact on the regime’s collective memory, as 
it exposed a dilemma that was going to remain crucial for years to come: how to 
reconcile the necessity to ally and align with Western powers, crucial for the 
regime’s security, without alienating a deeply conservative - and, at times, anti-
Western - population.613 At that time, King Khalid bin Abdulaziz al-Saud thought 
that ‘the solution to the religious upheaval was simple: more religion’ and tried to 
reconcile the contradiction by compartmentalising the country’s international 
posture and its domestic life, maintaining its Western allies while giving clerics 
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more power to introduce strictly conservative social policies.614 However, the 
contradictions remained.  
Indeed, a central argument for Osama bin Laden’s call to jihad in 1996 was the 
presence of non-Muslim, US troops in Saudi Arabia, home of the two holy cities, 
during the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, which bin Laden considered unacceptable.615 
Bin Laden leveraged this argument to cultivate Saudi Arabia as a recruitment and 
fundraising ground, establishing al-Qa’ida’s most important support base in terms 
of finances, recruits - including 15 of the 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks 
- and clerical opinions in support of its strategy and actions.616 When the US 
invaded Afghanistan and threatened al-Qa’ida’s headquarters, bin Laden 
formally ordered Saudi fighters in Afghanistan to return to the Kingdom and 
prepare a campaign under the banner of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). That campaign would lead to ‘historically unprecedented levels of 
internal violence’ in Saudi Arabia, with attacks or attempted attacks almost every 
year between 2003 and 2009. 617Arguably, three events were the most significant 
in terms of their long-lasting impact on regime’s perceptions. In November 2003 
two suicide bombers drove an explosives-filled van into the Muhayya residential 
complex. While an operational success, the Muhayya bombing was a political 
failure: given that most victims were Arab and Muslims and the attack happened 
during the month of Ramadan, public opinion shifted firmly against the 
militants.618 In February 2006, a group of militants attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
drive two explosives-laden vehicles into the Abqaiq oil refinery. This was a clear 
indication that AQAP wanted to exploit the regime’s economic vulnerability, its 
dependency on oil revenues.619 Finally, in August 2009, a suicide bomber 
detonated his explosives in the Jeddah Palace of Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, 
then Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs and counter-terrorism chief, 
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while he was receiving well-wishers for Ramadan.620 This was the second 
assassination attempt against Mohammad bin Nayef, and would be followed by 
two other attempts in 2009 and 2010.621 It was also a clear exposure of another 
vulnerability of the regime which, due to its high level of personalisation, could be 
destabilised with a targeted attack on a single high-profile figure.  
As scholar Thomas Hegghammer put it, ‘if Saudi Arabia’s policing of its militant 
Islamist community had been periodically complacent or inefficient in the past, its 
approach changed completely after AQAP turned against the Kingdom’.622 All 
resources were devoted to combating domestic jihadism, with high-level training 
of the security forces and large investments in electronic and technical 
surveillance.623 Saudi security services worked to turn the public’s animosity 
towards the group into cooperation to facilitate its response, carrying out massive 
security crackdowns targeting leaders, operatives and the groups’ resources, 
including in terms of financing, weapons, and infrastructures such as safe houses 
and operational centres.624 Saudi authorities also used the mass media, the 
official religious authorities and the education system to carry on an information 
campaign against al-Qa’ida, by highlighting their Muslim and Arab victims.625 
When Daesh was established in 2014 in Mosul, the group was instantly perceived 
both as a regional and a domestic risk by the Saudi regime.626 Indeed, in 
November 2014 self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi urged its followers 
to launch attacks in Saudi Arabia, ‘the head of the snake and stronghold of 
disease’.627 Relying on the lessons extracted from AQAP’s failures, Daesh 
worked to identify acceptable targets. Attempting to take advantage of the 
unprecedented sectarian hatred that had disseminated throughout the region and 
in the Kingdom, and that was enabled by Saudi Wahhabi preachers, the group 
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targeted predominantly the Shi’a community.628 Given the recent Shi’a uprisings, 
scholars have assessed that Daesh also wanted to provoke a violent reaction 
from the Shi’a community against the Saudi government and ‘ignite a sectarian 
civil war’ in order to thrive in the ensuing chaos and to weaken the functional 
integrity of the Kingdom’s institutions.629 In November 2014 a Daesh cell targeted 
a Shi’a shrine in al-Ahsa governorate.630 In March and May 2015, security patrols 
came under the fire in the suburbs of Riyadh.631 The same month there was a 
suicide attack in the Mosque of Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb in Qatif, killing a total of 
25 people and injuring at least another 120, and an attempted attack at al-Anud 
Mosque, both Shi’a mosques.632 In 2016 there were over 30 attacks. In January, 
four armed men set Saudi ARAMCO’s bus on fire and a suicide bomb attack took 
place in the Imam Rida Mosque, still in the Eastern province.633 In July, during 
the month of Ramadan, a suicide bomber approached one of the most important 
sites of Islam, Prophet Muhammad’s mosque in the city of Medina, another struck 
near the US consulate in Jeddah, and a third one made an attempt on a Shi’a 
mosque in Qatif.634 Recognising this sectarian strategy, the regime reacted 
accordingly: following the May 2015 attack, King Salman dispatched Crown 
Prince Mohamed bin Nayef to Qatif to offer condolences, and referred to Shi’a 
worshippers who had prevented a second attack as ‘martyrs’ and ‘heroes.’635 
Shi’a funerals were broadcasted in full on Saudi television and the attack was 
condemned by several clerics and the Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al-
Sheikh.636 However, sectarian hatred in the public discourse could not be curbed 
so easily and the regime framed Sunni jihadism against Shi’as as a consequence 
not of domestic dynamics, but of regional events, whereby Iranian aggressive 
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expansionism had fuelled Sunni anger and sectarianism.637 In October 2014 
Nawaf Obaid, a long time special counsellor to Saudi ambassadors and the Royal 
Court, wrote in a piece titled A Saudi view on the Islamic State, that: ‘Sunni 
empowerment is the key ingredient needed to defeat Sunni extremism’.638 The 
article blamed Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq and the Bashar al-Assad 
regime in Syria, both under Iranian influence, for brutal and repressive policies 
against the Sunni communities, ‘providing oxygen to the Daesh propaganda 
machine and giving weight to the message that the Sunnis have been 
abandoned.’639  
The fact that this idea is entrenched in the Kingdom is proven by the relative 
popularity of Daesh’s fights in Syria and Iraq that attracted, according to estimates 
by the Ministry of Interior, over 2000 Saudi recruits by 2016.640 Leaked 
documents from the jihadi group on 759 Saudi foreign fighters, joining Daesh 
between 2013 and 2014, have proven that most of these individuals were young 
and not uneducated or poor, with the highest ratio hailing from the central 
conservative province of al-Qassim, where radical preachers enjoyed large 
influence.641 The region, which was already central during AQAP campaigns in 
the 2000s, was also the epicentre of the small Buraydah uprising during 2011, 
which, in the view of Saudi expert Abdullah bin Khaled al-Saud was ‘utilised by 
radical individuals and groups to sow discontent and disgruntlement towards the 
state and any of its symbols.’642 In addition, given that Daesh rejects the idea of 
national borders, the distinction between the regional and domestic fight seemed 
particularly blurred as some of the Saudi foreign fighters, such as Ahmad 
Mohammad Asiri and Sultan bin Bakheit al-Otaibi, were arrested in September 
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2016, upon their return to the Kingdom, for their involvement with a Daesh 
network plotting attacks domestically.643 Per data of the General Intelligence 
Directorate, in 2016 Saudi security forces arrested more than 1,390 suspects 
accused of terrorism, including: 967 Saudi nationals, 154 Yemenis, 76 Syrians, 
45 Egyptians, and 38 Pakistanis.644 According to Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Arabia is a 
target for Daesh due to its authority over Mecca and Medina, epicentre of the 
Islamic life and essential to establish a ‘caliphate’.645 From the Saudi point of 
view, Obaid argued, ‘any successful terrorist attack on either of the two holiest 
sites in Islam would substantially undermine the standing and prestige of the 
Kingdom in the Muslim world as the guardians and servants of the Two Holy 
Mosques. As such, the defence and security of Makkah and Madinah are of 
primordial and vital importance to the Saudi state.’646 Indirectly this validates the 
idea that Daesh’s threat to the Saudi regime is directed to its very identity as a 
regime over-emphasizing its Islamic credentials. 
Indeed, the official religious establishment has condemned Daesh in the semi-
official Saudi press almost weekly, and reiterated the idea that Saudi Arabia is, 
in fact, the true modern version of the first Islamic state ruled by Prophet 
Muhammad.647 On the other hand, Daesh considers Saudi Arabia a failed version 
of the Islamic State, which has sacrificed religious piety at the altar of modernity. 
At the same time, the group has relied on Wahhabi religious treatises, and used 
Wahhabi theological concepts, to mobilize its supporters.648 This exemplifies the 
long-standing contradictions emerged at least since 1979. However, the Saudi 
regime had enacted an ideological counter-offensive already to confront AQAP 
and doubled down on it against Daesh after 2014. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
introduced an obligation for Saudi-based clerics to obtain ministerial approval on 
foreign travel for charitable and proselytization activities, or making media 
appearances.649 Saudi Arabia enhanced its existing programs on counter-
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radicalization and rehabilitation, including the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue to 
counter internet radicalization, as well as its extensive rehabilitation program at 
the Mohammed bin Nayef Counseling and Care Center, and establishing new 
entities to counter extremist propaganda, such as the Global Center for 
Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal).650 Authorities organized seminars that 
refuted violent or extremist ideology and extended public awareness campaigns 
on media, social media, in education and at public events.651 
Beyond these soft tactics, the regime also resorted to a security-heavy approach. 
Technologies for physical border security were upgraded, as much as cyber 
surveillance capabilities.652 Between 2014 and 2016 Saudi Arabia strengthened 
its existing counterterrorism law, establishing a broader definition of terrorism that 
human rights organizations have strongly criticised as a weapon against non-
violent political or social activism as well. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia carried 
out the death penalty for 43 long imprisoned Sunni extremists, mostly associated 
with AQAP’s campaigns in 2000s.653 Saudi Arabia joined the US-led international 
coalition against Daesh, participating in the bombing of Daesh targets, and in 
December 2015 launched the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, 
inviting several Sunni countries to join.654 The Kingdom, along with Italy and the 
United States, co-leads the counter-ISIS Finance Group (CIFG): this was a 
crucial sector as, according to the 2017 US State Department’s Country Report 
on Terrorism, ‘despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of 
terrorism within the Kingdom, some individuals and entities in Saudi Arabia 
probably continue to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist groups’.655 
To address the issue, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority has asked financial 
institutions to implement international standards on anti-money laundering and 
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countering terrorist financing, and penalties for financing terrorism have been 
extended to between three and 15 years’ imprisonment in 2017.656  
Overall, the measures enacted by the Saudi regime were effective in containing 
the jihadist threat both in the early 2000s and in the 2010s. The jihadist groups’ 
traction amongst the Saudi populace was significant, especially with Daesh, but 
not overwhelming. The 2011 uprisings had a key impact on the phenomenon, 
both at the regional level, as they ignited the Syrian civil war and at the domestic 
level, where the Buraydah protests had some reverberations. In the regime’s 
perceptions, the two dimensions were clearly linked, as detailed, among others, 
by Nawaf Obaid, who defined extremism an ‘internal threat’ while at the same 
time detailing connections with conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.657 In this 
context, between 2015 and 2017, jihadist groups were viewed by Saudi leaders 
as a full-fledged threat with a political dimension, as they had the intent and 
capabilities to target the regime’s stability and identity and the functional integrity 
of its borders and institutions. Several interviewees have highlighted how the 
regime’s perceptions of jihadi groups are heavily influenced by the danger posed 
to the safety of individual leadership figures, such as Crown Prince Mohammad 
bin Salman: an assassination of the Prince, given the power concentration in his 
hands, is thought to plunge the Kingdom into political instability.658 The threat was 
also perceived in its military dimension, due to the attacks targeting the security 
forces and the intent on destabilising public security. There was also a strong 
societal dimension, as Daesh attempted to ignite a sectarian conflict within the 
Kingdom. The economic dimension was not irrelevant, as Saudi Arabia was 
compromised in the international financial system for the presence of terrorist 
financiers on its soil.659 While their activities’ span has been short-lived, jihadist 
groups have routinely represented multidimensional threats to the Saudi regime. 
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5.5 Saudi Arabia’s security priorities after 2011.  
In the course of this chapter, it has emerged how all the issues at the centre of 
the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises have been, indeed, perceived as threats with 
a political dimension from the point of view of the Saudi regime, especially in the 
post-2011 context. The Iranian and Shi’a threat in particular is the priority 
concern, followed by Islamism and then jihadi organizations. It has likewise 
emerged that the regime has reacted fiercely to contain these threats, with only 
partial success. At the same time, what really stood out from the analysis so far, 
has been the predominance of the intermestic nature in the perceptions of all the 
dangers examined. This speaks of strong underlying vulnerabilities weakening 
the state from within and creating enabling conditions for exogenous dangers to 
develop an internal dimension. While emerged in the course of the analysis, 
these vulnerabilities, both socio-political and socio-economic ones, deserve 
further scrutiny as arguably stand as the root causes of what May Darwich refers 
to as Saudi Arabia’s ontological insecurity, i.e. the vulnerability of the Saudi 
state’s identity. 660 
Darwich, alongside other scholars, explains this vulnerability looking back at the 
history of the foundation of the Saudi Kingdom.661 The embryonic core of the 
Kingdom was formed when Mohammad Ibn Saud, a ruler from Najd, joined 
Mohammad ’Abd al-Wahab, a co-regionalist religious leader and theologian, to 
establish a political entity in 1732. Between the 19th and 20th century, the army 
led by Ibn Saud slowly but surely expanded its territorial control through military 
annexations, while Mohammad ’Abd al-Wahab’s network of religious preachers, 
diffused thorough the Peninsula, provided religious legitimacy and ideological 
ammunitions to Ibn Saud to entrench such control.662 Ibn Saud annexed the 
Eastern Province, the Hijaz and, finally the southern region of ‘Asir, Najran and 
Jizan. Saudi Arabia’s foundational myth is therefore one of conquest and 
suppression of ensuing grievances as much as of existing regional identities.663 
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Najdi tribal elites were put at the centre of the Kingdom’s emerging power, while 
other tribes were forcefully integrated into the new national entity, simultaneously 
subjugated to the new political authority and co-opted by it through their 
integration in the military sector, primarily Saudi Arabia’s National Guard.664 As 
the conquerors’ ideology, Wahhabism became the dominant ideology, and was 
imposed over the conquered regions as a key ingredient of the new regime’s 
identity.665 Given its fundamentalist views, and its inherent exclusivist nature, 
Wahhabism alienated non-Wahhabi Sunnis and Shi’a, defined as deviant in the 
orthodoxy, in both the Eastern Province, the more liberal Hijaz and the south.666 
While politically repressed, regional identities resisted - and, in some cases, 
became more entrenched - at a socio-cultural level. In the Hijaz, for instance, 
‘communities claimed their superior sophistication and cosmopolitan character to 
differentiate themselves from the Najdi-Wahhabi conquerors’.667 In regions 
distant from the centres of authority, with a relatively homogeneous population 
and the presence of a local elite, such as the Eastern Province and Qassim, 
strong regional identities also fuelled opposition and created the conditions for 
mobilization, including in 2011.668  
This Najdi-Wahhabi power nexus effectively prevented the emergence of a socio-
politically cohesive national identity or the bridging of aforementioned tribal, 
ideological and sectarian fault lines which have divided the Saudi nation from 
within for decades. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Saudi Kings have attempted to 
shape the regime’s self-identity through pan-Islamism.669 In fact King Faisal bin 
Abdulaziz al-Saud, who ruled from 1964 to 1975, was the first Saudi ruler to 
assume the title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and to establish a number 
of national and supranational institutions to promote cooperation in the Muslim 
world under Saudi leadership, such as the Organization of Islamic Conference 
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and the Muslim World League.670 This was also a direct consequence of Saudi 
Arabia’s jurisdiction over the two holiest cities of Islam within its borders, Mecca 
and Medina. Additionally Islam provided legitimacy to a monarchical rule, in the 
midst of a secular and republican pan-Arab wave that swept the region during the 
1950s and 1960s.671 In this context, the year 1979 posed a double challenge to 
the regime’s identity. Iran’s Islamic Revolution undermined the Saudi leadership 
of the entire Muslim world, claiming a stronger authority over the Shi’a 
communities.672 The seizure of the Grand Mosque exemplified how basing 
political authority of a modern state over religious legitimacy offered an easy flank 
to fundamentalist non-state actors to challenge the former based on the latter’s 
integrity, in a pattern bound to repeat itself with al-Qa’ida and Daesh.673 
Prioritizing the threat posed by the actors with the greater capabilities, the Saudi 
regime in the 1980s focused its political response towards Iran. The Wahhabi 
clerical establishment joined in on the political rhetoric to restore a secure self-
identity eroded by another leader’s claim to pan-Islamism, by highlighting the 
distinctiveness of Sunni Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis a demonised ‘Other’, Shi’a Iran.674 
The inevitable sectarian tune of the political operation has, however, reinforced 
the Shi’a sense of marginalization since the 1980s and onwards. A challenge to 
Wahhabism’s fundamentalism as the defining identity of the state came under 
the reign of King Abdallah in the early 2000s, who, as a response to the danger 
emanating from al-Qa’ida, reached out both to the Shi’a and to the Hijazi liberals 
through reformist policies.675 When oil prices surged to unprecedented levels in 
the 2000s, Saudi rulers had vast financial resources at their disposal to 
consolidate and expand their networks of patronage, clientelism and co-optation, 
thus reinforcing their legitimacy, without the support of Wahhabi clerics.676 
However, this also highlighted the discrimination of some Saudi communities with 
a more constrained access to rents.  
For example, tribal groups traditionally less loyalist to the al-Saud were also 
relatively disadvantaged both socially and economically within the Kingdom, 
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including during this period of largesse.677 Overall, tribalism as a form of socio-
political organization of a community was actively inhibited by the state, not only 
to limit the tribes’ capability to mobilise against the regime but also because 
tribalism contradicted some of the core concepts of pan-Islamism, such as that 
of umma.678 As a result of their co-optation in the security forces, in the 2000s 
tribal Saudis have represented an overwhelming percentage of soldiers 
defending Saudi borders in the Yemen wars, as well as fighting jihadi groups 
domestically.679 Tribal communities living in Najran and Jizan have become 
Houthi targets in the 2015 war in Yemen.680 The Saudi regime is aware that these 
pressures could foster opposition, as shown by King Salman’s decisions to pay 
occasional bonus salaries to soldiers serving in the Yemeni operations, as well 
as to employees of the Interior and Defense Ministries and the National Guard, 
and exempt them from subsidies’ cuts promoted by Vision 2030.681 The Saudi 
tribal landscape features over a hundred tribes ranging from several hundreds to 
millions of members, increasingly able to forge networks and reinforce tribal 
identity through new communication technology and media.682 While the tribes 
have so far focused on apolitical sectors of the public life, to avoid reprisals from 
the regime, they have shown capacity to coordinate in local elections.683 Indeed, 
the Saudi regime remains aware and wary of independent tribal organization and 
the tribes’ growing sociopolitical influence as much as of tribalism’s impact on 
national unity.684 This awareness is exemplified, for instance, by the fact that the 
Saudi regime itself has financed cross-border tribes with kinship ties to Saudi 
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Arabia to mobilise against rival governments in Yemen, Syria and Qatar in 
2017.685 
However, sectarianism has been a much greater obstacle than tribalism towards 
building an inclusive Saudi national identity. In 2009 US diplomats in Dhahran 
recorded the Shi’a communities in the Eastern Province as feeling socially, 
religiously, politically and economically discriminated against in a way that 
compromised their ‘sense of Saudi national identity’.686 As previously explored, 
these grievances became real in the calls for secession voiced by Nimr al-Nimr 
in 2009, followed by the 2011 uprisings. To properly contextualise the regime’s 
prioritization of these events, it is paramount to recognise that the Eastern 
Province is where the bulk of Saudi Arabia’s oil resources are located, and oil 
revenues accounted for 49% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP in 2011.687 The Eastern 
Province is also the location of the state-owned energy major ARAMCO, the most 
strategically valuable company of the Kingdom. Three key commercial and 
industrial ports, King Abdul Aziz Ports, Jubail Port and King Fahad Industrial Port, 
are also situated there. This extraordinary concentration of economic value in the 
region, in relation to its relevance for the entire national economy, fundamentally 
impacts the regime’s perceptions of events in the Eastern Province.688 Yet, the 
regime never decided to go beyond short-term securitarian approaches in the 
restive region, and towards long-term solutions of national cohesion that would 
challenge Wahhabi orthodoxy, something which was long believed ‘could fatally 
undermine one of the pillars of al-Saud rule, Wahhabism.’689  
King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, appear to have chosen 
a hybrid strategy, combining a repressive crackdown approach to crush Shi’a 
political dissent - and political dissent in general - with a recalibration of the official 
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discourse away from sectarianism and towards national cohesion and a limited 
engagement of the Shi’a community. A Shi’a businessman interviewed by The 
Economist in 2018 said in these regards: ‘We’re going to be an integral part of 
the Kingdom as full citizens for the first time.’690 Daesh terrorist attacks against 
Shi’a mosques and the realization that enabling sectarianism was abetting the 
penetration of jihadist groups into the Kingdom, certainly played a role, according 
to a French diplomat with a long experience in the Kingdom.691 Shortly after, the 
King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue launched a program to enhance 
national cohesion focused on the Eastern Province under the name Naseej 
(woven fabric).692 In 2016 a Shi’a woman from the Eastern Province whose son 
was killed stopping a suicide bomber at a Shi’a mosque, Kawthar al-Arbash, was 
appointed by the King to the Shura Council.693 Two years later a former member 
of the Qatif municipal council from Awamiyah, Nabih al-Ibrahim, was appointed 
too.694 In 2018 King Salman met in Dhahran with a number of local clerics and 
businessmen, including leading opposition cleric Hassan al-Saffar and Sayyid Ali 
Naser, a Saudi representative of Najaf’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.695 Once 
the 2017 crackdown, and shelling, in Awamiyya was over, the government 
channelled over USD 64 millions to reconstruction, to build new roads, residential 
units, shopping centres and a small hospital.696 In exchange for political 
quiescence, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman is offering top-down 
concessions. This is both instrumental to strengthen the Saudi nation from within 
and coherent with the aforementioned regional strategy to sway Arab Shi’a 
communities away from Iranian influence at home and in neighbouring countries, 
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such as Iraq.697 However, overtures to Saudi Shi’a still appear very limited: a law 
criminalising hate speech and discrimination on the basis of sect, ethnicity, tribal 
background has met resistances in the Shura Council, and no Shi’a has yet been 
appointed to the Council of Senior Scholars, as judges in national courts, or in 
high-ranked positions in the security forces.698  
Indeed, the Crown Prince’s moves to curb the power of the Wahhabi clerical 
establishment and its religious police serve a wider purpose for his regime. 
Mohammad bin Salman’s initiatives for social liberalization are a crucial part of 
his Vision 2030, meant to reinforce the bond between the leadership and an 
exceptionally young population -  with 70% of Saudi nationals being under 30 
years of age - put to test by socio-economic vulnerabilities inherent in Saudi 
Arabia’s political economic model and socio-political vulnerabilities inherent in its 
foundational myth.699 Through a mix of co-optation and coercion, Mohammad bin 
Salman has pushed clerics in the Council of Senior Scholars to approve decrees 
previously regarded as taboos, including the right for women to drive and the right 
to hold non-segregated entertainment events.700 This leadership’s long-term 
objective seems to be to expropriate the Wahhabi establishment of its traditional 
legitimizing role and build a new form of hyper-nationalism, less attached to 
religious ideologies and more inspired by local traditions, tribal folklore and a cult 
of the leadership.701 If the Kingdom’s socio-political vulnerabilities shall be tackled 
through this operation, Saudi Arabia’s future security agenda, even on the issues 
examined in this thesis, will come out significantly impacted, especially on 
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mitigating intermestic risks or threats. However, there are challenges associated 
with this strategy. Firstly, as the Wahhabi religious establishment is sidelined, 
they will also cease to serve as a buffer to deflect blame for failed policies from 
the regime.702 This is particularly the case with the economic policies included in 
Vision 2030 and meant to overcome the socio-economic vulnerabilities of the 
Kingdom, including the overdependence on revenues from energy resourses, the 
high percentage of unemployment among the youth and the inequality of wealth 
distribution. Secondly, there are strongly divisive elements in this hyper-
nationalism - centered on the state, rather than on society - embodied by the 
reinforced totalitarism and repression of dissent. Both trends could, in the long 
run, ignite internal risks into full-fledged threats in the regime’s perceptions. 
Finally, the foreign policy assertiveness that is both justified and encouraged by 
hyper-nationalism could fuel the perceptions of external threats, locking the Saudi 
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6.0 CHAPTER SIX: THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
 
The United Arab Emirates has been at the forefront, together with Saudi Arabia, 
of the pushback against Qatar resulting in the two intra-GCC crises of 2014 and 
2017. After the power succession in Riyadh at the beginning of 2015, Mohammad 
bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince, de facto leader of the UAE, has 
tightened a strategic alliance with Deputy Crown Prince and then Crown Prince 
of Saudi Arabia Mohammad Bin Salman. Such axis, tha major driving force for 
the intra-GCC crises, has consolidated a proactive pattern in foreign and security 
policies, at a regional level, for both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, in which the former, 
despite being a small state by all measures, is as much in the driving seat as the 
latter.703  
It will be here argued that the roots of this assertiveness are to be found in the 
threat perceptions of both countries. In both cases, events in and around the year 
2011 have been pivotal in highlighting perceived or real vulnerabilities. For the 
UAE specifically, changing dynamics and balances of power at the regional level 
have been the focus of attention.704 Iran and its proxies, the Islamist constellation 
and jihadi organizations have been identified in the public rhetoric and political 
narrative and discourse as the sources of multiple threats in the post-2011 
context.705 The purpose of this chapter is to unpack the leadership’s perceptions 
regarding each of these actors or alleged threats, identified by the Riyadh 
Agreements as threats. It will be argued that those are perceived, as per this 
thesis’s definitions, mostly as exogenous risks or threats, although with some 
internal repercussions, especially in the case of non-violent Islamist groups. 
Conclusions will be finally drawn on the roots of such perceptions and the 
fundamental priorities in the security calculus of the UAE, preserving the unity of 
the seven Emirates’ Federation and the UAE’s growing interests vis-à-vis the 
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regional order. In order to test these ideas, it will be necessary to analyse the 
narratives and discourses and benchmark them against data and factual 
information about the individual issues as well as the main socio-political and 
socio-economic vulnerabilities of the seven Emirates. The starting point would 
be, as in the other cases, a closer look at the events of 2011 at a domestic as 
well as regional level, from the UAE’s point of view.  
 
6.1 The UAE and the Arab Spring. 
The UAE did not experience a full chapter of the Arab Spring, and no street 
protests were held in the country.706 However, possibly on the long haul of the 
events in the wider region, some dissent, as well as aspirations for political 
reforms, were voiced in the usually politically quiescent Emirate in the year 2011. 
Mostly met with repression - mixed with some degree of cooptation -  the UAE’s 
experience with those events highlighted where the government’s sensitivities 
lied, i.e. on the issue of political Islam, both domestically and regionally. Arguably, 
these were informed by the belief that the Arab Spring had brought to the surface 
socio-political vulnerabilities related to the contested legitimacy of the political 
order in the Emirates outside Abu Dhabi and Dubai and, particularly, in the wider 
MENA region.  
In February 2011 the UAE government expanded the size of the electorate for 
proposing candidates for the Federal National Council (FNC) - the consultative 
parliamentary body of the UAE - from 6,000 to 12,000 voters.707 Just few days 
later the government announcement was met with a petition addressed to the 
UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan and the members of the 
Supreme Council, the body that includes all rulers of the seven Emirates, asking 
that the FNC be given more authority, including legislative powers and the ability 
to hold officials accountable, and for the introduction of universal suffrage.708 The 
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petition was signed by 133 Emiratis, including academics, former government 
officials and FNC members, journalists and activists.709 Five people among the 
signatories were subsequently arrested in April 2011, charged of ‘publicly 
insulting the UAE's leaders’ under articles 176 and 8 of the UAE Penal Code and 
accused of ‘undermining national security’, sentenced to year-longs 
imprisonment, and then pardoned within 24 hours.710 The five activists included: 
Ahmed Mansoor, an engineer and blogger; Nasser bin Ghaith, an economist and 
university lecturer at Sorbonne Abu Dhabi; online activists Fahad Salim Dalk, 
Ahmed Abdul-Khaleq, and Hassan Ali al-Khamis. Both Ahmed Mansoor and 
Nasser bin Ghaith would then be arrested again between 2015 and 2017 and 
both would be given harsh prison sentences for their criticism of the Emirati 
regime.711 Ahmed Abdul-Khaleq, the only bidun – from Arabic ‘without’, meaning 
without nationality or stateless – hosting a blog on the socio-economic 
discrimination against his community, named Emaraty Bedoon, was arrested and 
subsequently expelled from the country in 2012.712 Despite the state’s 
demonstrative quick reaction, the first petition, that could be considered the 
product of an online activism for political and civil rights going on at least since 
2009, was followed by increased online and offline activities. Several UAE civil 
society organisations, of different socio-political inspiration, published their own 
statements calling for direct elections and for an FNC with full oversight and 
legislative powers. Among those organisations was the Reform and Social 
Guidance Association (al-Islah), an association close to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
advocating for political reforms and more representation, echoing the 
Brotherhood’s traditional political discourse.713  
In July 2011, the government reacted by further enlarging the electoral college to 
129,000 voters: despite the enlargement, however, eligibility criteria for voting 
remained quite restrictive and only just 12 percent of the population resulted 
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eligible.714 Prioritizing its functions of welfare provider, as customary of rentier 
systems, the government also reacted by signing a $2.7 billion agreement to help 
poorer nationals pay off outstanding loans, boosting welfare benefits by up to 20 
percent, and granting huge public sector pay increases, in some cases up to 100 
percent.715 At the same time, the opposition, especially those dissidents with ties 
to al-Islah, continued to be reserved the harshest treatment. In December 2011 
seven of al-Islah’s active members were permanently stripped of their citizenship 
and charged with ‘involvement in actions that pose a threat to national security, 
and connections to organizations and individuals on the terror watch list’, just 
days after the UAE-5 were released.716 The seven included Islamic scholar 
Mohammad ʿAbdul Razzaq al-Siddiq, Ahmed Ghaith al-Suwaidi, ʿAli Hussain al-
Hammadi, Shaheen ʿAbdullah al-Hosani, Hussain Munif ‘Abdullah al-Jabri, 
Hassan al-Jabri, and Ibrahim Hassan al-Marzouqi. The arrests marked only the 
beginning of the crackdown on al-Islah. By the end of 2012, 94 alleged members 
of the group, known as UAE-94, had been arrested, with 69 of them sentenced to 
between 7 and 15 year in prison.717 Among them was Mohammed al-Mansoori, 
the deputy chairman of al-Islah and a former president of the Jurists’ Association. 
Until 2010, he had also been a legal adviser to the government of Ras Al 
Khaimah, one of the seven UAE emirates.718 Another high-profile arrested was 
Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, chairman of al-Islah and cousin of Saud bin Saqr al-
Qasimi, the Emir of the Northern Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah: arrested in April 
2012, he was sentenced in the UAE-94 trial to ten years in prison.719 Given his 
position, al-Qasimi was perceived as a liability for the Abu Dhabi leadership, as 
will further be examined. In short, his arrest underlined a special attention 
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devolved by the regime not only to al-Islah, but specifically to those associated 
with the group in the Northern Emirates. 
Indeed, the perceptions of the government with regards to the political activism 
taking place in 2011 was largely built around the involvement of al-Islah.720 This 
is further evidenced by the narrative employed vis-à-vis the group. For instance, 
commenting the major legal process of 2013 against the UAE-94, state news 
agency WAM focused only on the Islamist group describing it as ‘a secret 
organisation accused of attempting to overthrow the government.’721 While the 
topic of relations between the UAE government and Islamist groups will be 
analysed in-depth in a following section, this angle is also particularly crucial to 
unpack the intersections among vulnerabilities and perceptions around the 
events of 2011.  
The first element to consider is the identity of those embracing political activism. 
On one hand, al-Islah initially sought to work with liberal pro-democracy activists, 
as the Muslim Brotherhood did during the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, marking the 
first time that the secular and Islamist opposition came together in a public 
political undertaking.722 On the other hand, there always remained substantial 
differences among the groups.723 For instance, the liberal activists seemed to 
lose momentum soon after sending off the March 2011 petition. In addition to 
that, they were individually behind the same cause, rather than collectively 
organised in a proper structure.724 This lack of coordination, an element of 
weakness for any opposition movement, was facilitated by the fact that political 
parties or societies are outlawed in the UAE.725 Conversely, al-Islah, 
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characterised as a social NGO, and following the highly centralised and 
hierarchical organizational structure traditional of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates 
around the world, is the oldest, largest and best organised society in the UAE.726 
This longevity, together with the organization’s effective internal structure 
represented significant and risky political capabilities from the government’s point 
of view.727 
The second element to consider is the nature of the grievances and demands 
driving political activism. In these regards there was a major difference between 
liberals and Islamists. One of the main reasons that liberals backed down 
relatively soon, in addition to the coercive response of the authorities, appears to 
be related to the traction of their demands among the wider population. There 
has traditionally been a lack of grassroots support for challenging the state for 
political liberalization in the UAE, where a generous welfare state and general 
positive economic conditions, depending on a network of patronage and 
clientelism with the rulers, discourage dissent.728 In a classic feature of rentier 
systems, citizens rarely resort to challenging their governments, managing their 
rents, unless their stake in those rents are challenged.729 Several sources have 
in fact argued that most Emirati citizens do not support the overhaul of the existing 
UAE political system, in place since before the British protectorate over the 
Emirates, which many believe provides functioning governance.730 The system, 
often referred as ‘majlis-style’ democracy, consists in open courts between 
citizens and community or tribal leaders where citizens can raise concerns or 
make requests: a formula that has been effective in the past, given the small size 
of the UAE’s population.731 In a 2004 leaked diplomatic cable from the US 
Embassy in Abu Dhabi, it is highlighted by US diplomatic officers that even the 
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strongest backers of increased political participation in the UAE frequently refer 
to the need for caution and gradualism in reforms, mainly due to concerns about 
the ‘destabilizing’ effects of direct elections.732 Amid the backdrop of the violence 
which followed the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Levant, the dichotomy 
between the status quo and chaos, strongly promoted by the state’s rhetoric, has 
further consolidated, even at the level of some of the intellectuals who supported 
political liberalisation.733 However this doesn’t negate that, naturally, the ‘majlis-
style’ informal system, in spite of the small size of the population, cannot possibly 
guarantee a comprehensive and truly inclusive opportunity for representation, 
with the poorer strata of the population and the furthest from the loci of power 
being especially neglected. This potentially creates some pockets of discontent 
and a political ground for the Islamists’ rhetoric on wide-ranging political 
participations.734 In fact, Islamist dissidents in the Gulf and their quintessentially 
political grievances, as thoroughly proven by Courtnery Freer in Rentier Islamism: 
The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies, more strongly 
motivated by ideological questions of political legitimacy than by material 
demands, represent an exception to rentier state theory.735 Arguably, it was this 
ideological dimension, together with the organizational capacity, that contributed 
to heighten the perceptions of the UAE government against al-Islah in the context 
of the 2011 activism.  
All these different elements considered, it is worth reiterating the limited nature of 
the dissidence phenomenon in the UAE in 2011. The petitions represented the 
momentum of the events, and no major street protests have taken place in the 
country. The crackdown that the government launched in response may therefore 
appear disproportionate and the fact that it was focused on al-Islah is crucial in 
tying it back to the larger issue of government-Islamists relations. Overall, the 
2011 events represented for the UAE leadership, first and foremost, an 
unwelcomed challenge to the status quo. If such challenge was of a small scale 
at the domestic level, it was thoroughly disruptive at the regional level. In fact, 
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many interviewees underlined that, in 2011, it was on the regional level that the 
Emirati leadership especially focused attention.736 An Emirati diplomat 
interviewed by the author stated: ‘The events of 2011 signalled the regionalization 
of national security for Abu Dhabi. There was a greater emphasis on proactive 
approaches to regional security, and not awaiting threats to reach the UAE’s 
borders or internal space.’737 Regional stability, in the face of the crumbling of the 
familiar status quo, with friendly regimes in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen washed 
away, became a primary concern for the UAE leadership.738 It was particularly 
evident in the UAE’s reaction at events in Bahrain.  
Already a couple of days after the start of the protests in Bahrain, on 18 February 
2011, the then Foreign Minister of the UAE, Shaikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-
Nahyan, expressed support for the Bahraini leadership accusing Iran to infiltrate 
the opposition in Manama, adding: ‘What is happening in Bahrain is going to have 
an impact on all GCC countries, and we must work together from now on’.739 The 
UAE participated in several GCC meetings in the early days of March 2011, and 
Abu Dhabi was the only other member state, beyond Saudi Arabia, to commit 
ground personnel to a Peninsula Shield mission supporting the Bahraini regime’s 
forces. While Saudi Arabia sent approximately 1.200 armoured forces, the UAE 
sent around 800 police officers who remained in the country for months.740 This 
was a significant commitment, especially relative to that of Saudi Arabia, who had 
a vital interest in shutting down protests in Bahrain and who can count on a much 
larger security force. Moreover, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar 
committing 20 billion US dollars to Oman and Bahrain, the two GCC countries 
most affected by socio-economic grievances pushing protests.741 The political, 
military and economic resources committed by Abu Dhabi towards the GCC 
chapters of the Arab Spring, together with the proactive regional policy pursued 
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in its aftermath, examined later, and in light of the small-scale nature of events 
within the UAE itself, are crucial in defining the impact of the 2011 events on the 
security calculus of the UAE leadership. From Abu Dhabi’s viewpoint, the political 
order had shown its vulnerabilities, and these vulnerabilities could be easily 
leveraged by hostile players. 
 
6.2 The UAE and the ‘Shi’a threat’. 
The UAE’s perceptions of Iran and the threats it may pose via Shi’a proxies are 
informed by the history of bilateral engagement as much as by the nature of 
government-Shi’a relations within the Emirates, both conditioned by structural 
socio-political and socio-economic factors. The very limited internal dimension of 
such potential threats have produced multiple perspectives on the ‘Shi’a issue’, 
all contextualised in its external, regional dimension.  
Amid the 1979 Islamic revolution, the leadership in the UAE shared with its 
neighbours some concerns that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s hegemonic 
ambitions would infer on their sovereignty.742 Mirroring the perspective of 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, experiencing unrest from 
their indigenous Shi’a communities in the 1980s, Abu Dhabi feared that Iran 
would encourage Emirati Shi’a to revolt against the government.743 When an 
Iranian religious leader visited Dubai right after the revolution, local authorities 
detained and deported him.744 In spite of this and other small incidents, the 
concerns were quieted when it became evident that the Emirati Shi’a 
communities were not restive against the ruling families or the state. In fact 
already in 1984, the revolutionary regime in Tehran even began building and 
financing religious institutions and charities in the UAE, including the Imam 
Hussein Mosque and an Iranian Hospital, for the sizable Iranian community in 
Dubai.745 For years, imams at the Mosque have even been directly appointed by 
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the Office of Iran’s Supreme Leader.746 While such choices are explained by 
Dubai’s rulers consistently pragmatic approach towards Iran, trust in the loyalty 
of Shi’a citizens to the UAE state is a crucial factor to consider, too. 
Although statistical data from official sources is not available, Shi’a citizens are 
estimated to represent approximately 15 percent of the UAE’s population and live 
predominantly in the Northern Emirates. Emirati Shi’a citizens trace back their 
presence in the country at least since the mid-19th century: most migrated from 
Iran's Khuzistan province and others, to a lesser extent, from Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia and India.747 Over time, governing authorities have pursued political 
strategies to provide these communities with a stake in the regime’s stability, 
pushing a more inclusive attitude towards them.748 For instance, state authorities 
have financed Shi'a mosques, attended Shi'a religious celebrations and engaged 
in a rhetoric to promote, with some success, harmonious Sunni-Shi'a relations.749 
The Emirates’ Islamic studies curriculum is based exclusively on Sunni schools 
of thought, yet not openly discriminatory against Shi’a beliefs.750 While the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs issues unified Friday sermons to Sunni and Shi'a 
mosques alike, preachers of both sects are guaranteed some degree of 
discretionality.751 Overall, while most Emirati Shi'a look to Iranian Ayatollahs in 
Qom as spiritual leaders, and only a fraction to religious authorities in Iraq, their 
national allegiance is generally considered to be to the UAE and many even judge 
Iran’s political regime with hostility.752 Hence, Iran is not considered in a position 
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to upset the UAE’s domestic stability.753 Many interviewees have contrasted the 
status of Emirati Shi'a as included in the national fabric with the institutionalised 
marginalization suffered by Shi’a communities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.754 
Similarly to the outlook in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, however, Shi'a do face some 
unofficial discrimination for positions deemed as sensitive, such as diplomatic 
posts or high-ranking posts within the armed forces and state security.755  
By contrast the level of economic inclusiveness of the communities is, on 
average, high. For example some Shi'a families belong to the country’s rich 
merchant elites and run some of the biggest business conglomerates in Dubai 
such as Alfardan, Al Sayegh, Galadari, and Al Yousuf LLC. Dubai has also 
traditionally provided concrete economic opportunities to its large Iranian 
community, including over half of the 250,000 Iranians residing in the UAE, per 
government estimates.756 Indeed, in 2010, an estimated 8,000 Iranian 
businesses operated in Dubai, with over 400 of them being members of the 
Dubai-based Iranian Business Council.757 These businesses were heavily 
involved into exporting and re-exporting goods with Iran, a very profitable trade 
for the entire UAE and particularly for Dubai. Consequently, they were greatly 
affected by international sanctions imposed by the United States in 2009 and then 
by the European Union in 2012 against Iran as part of punitive measures for 
Tehran’s nuclear programme.758  
However, after 2011 the UAE became less hospitable for the Iranian business 
community, with many experiencing difficulties to buy property, receive loans, 
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and extend residence permits.759 Moreover, as a consequence of Iran’s 
perceived support for the Bahraini opposition during the Arab Spring, the Iranian 
and Lebanese diaspora in the UAE started to be viewed with more suspicion by 
Emirati federal authorities. In July 2013, the Iranian parliament’s national security 
and foreign policy committee said the Emirati government had deported 500 
Iranian nationals that year.760 In addition, around the same time, the UAE 
authorities also expelled thousands of the about 100,000 Lebanese living in the 
country.761 In the same context, increased vigilance was also exercised on 
Emirati Shi’a and they were subject to limited and temporary restrictions, such as 
on hosting an international Shi’a summit.762 However the limited nature of 
restrictions and the fact that monitoring activities were escalated over all national 
communities, once again indicated that the Emirati Shi’a communities were not 
perceived as sources of a specific threat by the leadership. 
The threat was instead long perceived, especially in Abu Dhabi, in Iran’s regional 
activities.763 The - conflictual - incipit of the bilateral relations remains a relevant 
element in these regards. In 1971, just as British forces withdrew from the Trucial 
States, Iran’s Shah occupied three small but strategically located islands in the 
Gulf that were meant to become jointly administered by Iran and the Emirate of 
Sharjah.764 The three islands, Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb, had indeed 
been under Sharjah’s administration during the British protectorate, since the 
1920s. The issue was broader as many Iranians regarded the UAE as an 
illegitimate British creation.765 Since Iran’s capture of the islands, the UAE has 
attempted direct bilateral negotiations as well as bringing the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice and the United Nations, all to no avail.766 The 
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question has remained a cause of friction between the two states over the 
decades, appearing in almost every GCC Communiqués, and still may provide a 
relevant case studies on bilateral relations in contemporary times. In fact, as 
Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2013 expressed the intention to improve 
Tehran’s relations with its neighbours, he promptly suggested to ‘talk to the UAE 
and remove any misunderstanding about the islands’.767 Interestingly the idea 
was dismissed by IRGC’s Major General Mohammad Jafari, arguing that the 
issue was a matter of national security, not up for negotiations.768 This 
disagreement provides a window into the strategic significance of the islands for 
Iran, where Iranian military personnel is stationed, which is widely acknowledged 
in the UAE. Expressing an argument common to several interviewees, a senior 
researcher in an Abu Dhabi-based think tank stated to the author: ‘These islands 
are important for one thing only, their geostrategic position. Look at a map, they 
are Iran’s lock to close the Strait of Hormuz, a major geostrategic asset for a 
wanna-be hegemonic power.’769 Although perennial Iranian threats to close the 
Strait never materialised, Iran’s presence in Abu Musa allows Tehran to control 
a shipping route through which passes a fifth of the world’s oil supplies, while also 
projecting additional protection the major Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, hosting 
energy and military infrastructures.770  
As shown by leaked US diplomatic cables from 2009, the UAE leaders have long 
viewed Iran as a predatory power, and through such lenses they perceived its 
nuclear ambitions, with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan 
describing Iran’s willingness to acquire a nuclear deterrent as an instrument to 
become a superpower and pursue the re-establishment of ‘a Persian empire in 
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the 21st century’ and ‘emirates’ in the Muslim world.771 In the same conversations 
the Crown Prince further stated that Iran had ‘emirates’ equipped with financial 
and military resources in South Lebanon (via Hezbollah) and Gaza (via Hamas) 
and Southern Iraq, ‘sleeper emirates’ in Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of 
Saudi Arabia, and potentially another one in Saada (via the Houthis).772 It was 
clear from Abu Dhabi’s political and military reactions that the 2011 protests in 
Bahrain were perceived in this context. In 2015, it became even clearer to which 
lengths Abu Dhabi was willing to go to counter what they perceived as Iranian 
plans in Yemen. Amid the strengthening of relations between Abu Dhabi’s Crown 
Prince and the Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Salman, entering Riyadh’s palaces 
in 2015, the UAE’s posture against Iran turned more hawkish. The strategic 
alliance joined forces in military operations in Yemen in March 2015, against the 
perceived attempt of Iran to control the country via the Houthis, a rebel force that, 
taking advantage of the post-Arab Spring vacuum of power, between 2014 and 
2015 conquered much of the country including the capital Sanaa.773 While the 
UAE’s military operations initially focused on fighting jihadi groups in the south of 
the country, the government also devoted military and diplomatic resources 
against the Houthis.774 An official from the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
interviewed by the author endorsed the narrative by arguing: ‘The UAE is in 
Yemen because Iran is in Yemen’. 775 
The signing of the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran in July 2015 was 
received amid this background in Abu Dhabi, and in a close alignment with the 
perceptions of the Bahraini and Saudi leadership. In fact, while the UAE Foreign 
Minister al-Nahyan visited Iran days after the nuclear deal, he became a vocal 
opponent of the deal in the following months, arguing that Tehran was exploiting 
the good faith of the international community and the financial resources provided 
by the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions to fund destabilising activities in the 
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region.776 On the first anniversary of the JCPOA signing, the UAE Ambassador 
to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, wrote an article again accusing Iran of creating 
instability in the region, arguing that ‘Iran sees it as an opportunity to increase 
hostilities in the region’.777 The same attitude has been attributed to Sharjah, the 
UAE’s most conservative Emirate, which is often closely aligned with Riyadh on 
Iran-related matters.778 On the contrary, aforementioned economic 
considerations have largely driven a different reaction in Dubai, Iran's most 
important regional trade partner and, to a certain extent in Ras Al Khaimah, also 
entertaining good commercial relations with Iran.779 Viewing Iran through a 
pragmatic commercial lens, Dubai officials believe that it was in their best interest 
to secure their flourishing economic relations through accommodation of Iran 
rather than outright confrontation and the JCPOA, with the removal of 
international nuclear-related sanctions, was deemed useful to that purpose. 
Asked if it was time to lift sanctions against Iran, after the 2013 interim nuclear 
agreement, the ruler of Dubai Shaykh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum stated: 
‘I think so and give Iran a space… Iran is our neighbour and we don’t want any 
problem… everybody will benefit.’ 780  
Considering the numerous elements in the multidimensional relations between 
the UAE and Iran, especially in its most contemporary evolutions, unpacking the 
UAE leadership’s security perceptions vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic and 
systematising them through this thesis’ theoretical framework is a complex 
exercise. Taking into account the views in Abu Dhabi - the capital, the biggest 
and wealthiest Emirate of the federation, in charge of foreign and security policies  
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– and its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed, it is possible to 
argue that Iran is perceived as a threat, but of a quintessentially external nature. 
There is very limited concern that Iran may be challenging the regime’s stability 
from within the Emirates, via the expat or the local Shi’a communities. The 
preoccupation, heightened after the Arab Spring and its aftermath, is with Iran’s 
capability to threaten the stability, identity, borders and functional integrity of the 
regional order.781 Beyond this political dimension, this threat also has a military 
dimension, in the form of direct confrontations between the Houthis – considered 
an Iranian proxy – and the UAE armed forces in Yemen as well as the threat of 
ballistic missiles – allegedly provided by Iran to the Houthis – that may be 
launched against the UAE.782 The scenarios of Iran capturing further UAE islands 
such as Ariana and Zarkooh, claimed as Iranian territories by the Deputy 
Chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy 
Commission in 2016, or of an Iranian strike against US military bases in the UAE 
in retaliation for a US military operation against Iran are, at times, raised.783 
Interestingly, Iran is not often described as a threat to societal stability: it is a 
widely shared idea that alienating Arab Shi’a is a policy choice and societal 
harmony can be repaired by renouncing that choice and enacting inclusive 
policies instead.784 Finally, as viewed from the perspective of the UAE decision-
makers, Iran does not appear to be necessarily considered a threat to domestic 
or international economic interests. On the contrary, better relations with Iran are 
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6.3 The UAE and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
The perceptions of the UAE leadership around the Arab Spring, both at a 
domestic and regional level, were largely impacted by its perceptions of political 
Islam, particularly as embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, 
including al-Islah. The history of the relations between the UAE government and 
the Islamists before 2011 is crucial to highlight the reasons why political Islam 
was the focus of the UAE’s attention in the context of the intra-GCC crises of 
2014 and 2017. At the domestic level, Islamists have been perceived to leverage 
the state’s vulnerabilities in a way that threatened the integrity and functioning of 
the UAE Federation and Abu Dhabi’s undisputed leadership of it. This alleged 
agenda is also perceived as part and parcel of a region-wide strategy, in a full 
overlap between the regional and domestic domains of security. 
Individuals from the Muslim Brotherhood were present within the Emirates even 
prior to the formation of the UAE: in fact, many of the teachers that the rulers of 
the various Emirates recruited for their nascent schooling systems in the 1960s 
were Egyptian Brotherhood members fleeing from anti-Islamist President 
Nasser.786 The society Jamiyyat Al-Islah (Society of Reform) was formed shortly 
after independence, in 1974, and has had some kind of existence in the Emirate 
since.787 It initially received support from some of the UAE leaders, including 
donations from Dubai’s ruler Shaykh Rashid al-Maktoum to build the 
organization’s headquarter in Dubai and branches in Ras al-Khaimah and 
Fujairah, and land from Abu Dhabi’s ruler Shaykh Zayed al-Nahyan.788 This initial 
attitude has been interpreted as a sign of the government’s intent to patronise the 
Islamist group as a bulwark against the ideology of Arab nationalism that, in those 
years, was publicly attacking the legitimacy of the GCC rulers for their alliance 
with the West.789 Indeed, Shaykh Mohammed bin Khalifa al-Maktoum was the 
first Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Society in Dubai. Interestingly, the 
society didn’t initially open branches in Sharjah, which allegedly registered a 
socio-cultural predominance of Arab nationalism and pan-Arab sentiments.790 In 
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these early days, not dissimilarly than what took place in other GCC countries, 
al-Islah focused on social, educational and cultural activities. In 1978 the society 
founded its main publication, itself called al-Islah, through which it disseminated 
conservative Islamic values and calls to defend the Islamic identity against 
cultural contamination both from leftist ideologies such as pan-Arabism and, later, 
Western liberalism.791 In the first decades of its existence, education and socio-
cultural activities were also the focus of Islah’s interactions with the state. Saeed 
Abdullah Salman, a founding member of the society, was the UAE’s first Minister 
for Housing in 1971 and then Ministry of Education and Chancellor of the UAE 
University in 1979.792 Another member, Mohammed Abdel-Rahman al-Bakr, 
became Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs and Endowments in 1977.793 
Crucially, Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, the same person who would then head the 
society and be arrested after 2011, was head of the Curriculum Division in the 
UAE for seven consecutive years, from 1977 to 1983, a position that could impact 
the strategic direction of the education system. From such positions of influence, 
al-Islah managed to have a deep impact, in a conservative direction, on the UAE’s 
educational policy, and, via the students’ unions and the organization of youth 
activities, a large influence on Emirati youth. Ultimately such level of influence, 
together with increasingly politicized Friday sermons, attracted the authorities’ 
attention and concerns since the end of the 1980s, at the same time as the need 
to contrast the pan-Arab leftist ideological challenge had become less pressing.  
In 1994, the UAE government dissolved al-Islah’s Board of Directors and 
replaced its members with government appointees to make it less autonomous, 
while the society’s branches in Dubai and Fujairah, as well as the Guidance 
Society in Ajman, were forced to reduce their domestic and foreign activities.794 
The Ras al-Khaimah branch escaped such provisions due to the protection 
provided by then Emirate’s ruler Saqr al-Qasimi, considered sympathetic to the 
organization.795 The government’s actions stemmed from a series of 
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considerations. The leadership strategy for the country’s development included 
major economic and cultural liberalizations which started to take place since the 
late 1990s, and run contrary to the Brotherhood ideology: the leadership wanted 
to turn the UAE into a modern economy, largely influenced by Western models 
of multiculturalism and globalization. In addition to that, the 1994 crackdown is 
often related to an investigation by Egyptian security services dated early 1990s, 
claiming that donations from Islah’s Committee for Relief and Outside Activities 
had been sent to individuals involved with the Egyptian extremist organization 
Islamic Jihad.796 The prevailing argument in the Emirati media became that al-
Islah had pledged the oath of bay‘a (or loyalty) to the Brotherhood’s General 
Guide in Egypt and so was by used by the international Muslim Brotherhood to 
further its pan-Islamist cause, the establishment of a single Islamic state.797  
Although al-Islah members in the UAE argue that, while they share a similar 
ideology with the Brotherhood in Egypt, they are not directly linked to it, the UAE 
government consistently argued that the two movements are linked financially 
and politically to the international Muslim Brotherhood movement and even 
encouraged from abroad to engage in clandestine activities.798 In particular senior 
members of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, including Crown Prince Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Zayed, since 2004 the de facto leader of the country, and his 
brothers Hamdan bin Zayed (Deputy Prime Minister), and Hazza bin Zayed (State 
Security Department Director) have consistently referred to Islah members as the 
‘standard bearers for an essentially foreign ideology.’799 Additionally, as the UAE 
authorities have long drawn an ideological connection between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and jihadi groups, the crackdown on al-Islah worsened in the early 
2000s, after the 9/11 attacks, when it emerged that two of the nineteen hijackers 
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were Emirati citizens.800 As a result, in the early 2000s, over 250 people linked to 
al-Islah were arrested or removed from their positions within the state institutions 
or bureaucracy, educational institutions or civil society organizations.801 In a 2004 
meeting with US officials, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed noted that 40 Emiratis 
with links to al-Islah had been temporarily removed from the UAE security forces 
and subjected to a form of re-education before being reintegrated.802 In that 
meeting he stated: ‘We are having a (culture) war with the Muslim Brotherhood 
in this country,’ openly referring to the Islamists’ opposition to governmental 
reforms to education, society and economy.803 This opposition worked to fuel 
fears that such changes will threaten the Emirati identity and betray traditional 
Islamic values: by blaming government policies of undermining those, Islamists 
also indirectly undermined one of the elements of the regime’s political legitimacy, 
its Islamic credentials. 
Mohammad bin Zayed, at first sympathetic to political Islam himself but 
subsequently educated in military colleges such as Sandhurst in the United 
Kingdom, is largely thought to have a strong personal hostility against political 
Islam and an inflated perception of their political strength and subversive intent.804 
These insights into the perceptions of one the major source of policy-making in 
the country can be crucial to unpacking the larger issue.  In 2006 he was recorded 
again in a US diplomatic cable stating that ‘if there were an election [in the UAE] 
tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.’805 This consideration 
appears inconsistent with the small numbers of Islah members and sympathisers 
in the country, and only if looking exclusively at the Northern Emirates Islah 
appears to have a more meaningful presence.806 Crucially, the bulk of 
Brotherhood activists and supporters were located there, where economic 
inequality with respect to the other Emirates is stark, and the average per capita 
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GDP is less than a third of that in Abu Dhabi.807 This structural socio-economic 
vulnerability provides political ammunition for al-Islah to argue against the 
effectiveness of Abu Dhabi as the leader of the Federation, even more so that 
the Brotherhood historically takes advantage of political and economic 
inequalities as political arguments ‘stressing a divine mandate to bridge them’.808 
Even more worryingly, as mentioned, was that the Emir of the Northern Emirate 
of Ras al-Khaimah, Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi, has long had links to the 
organization, shielding the local branch from the crackdowns of the 1990s and 
2000s, even when in direct opposition and defiance to Abu Dhabi’s provisions, 
and having contacts with symbols of Islamist movements worldwide.809 
Interestingly, many of the signatories of the 2011 petitions belonged to Ras Al 
Khaimah’s largest tribe.810 These factors arguably amplified Abu Dhabi’s leaders 
already hyper-vigilant perception of al-Islah as targeting the integrity and 
functioning of the UAE Federation and Abu Dhabi’s undisputed leadership of it.  
Such long-standing hostility of the Emirati regime towards the Brotherhood 
mounted between the end of 2011 and 2012, when Brotherhood affiliates tried to 
seize the political opportunities offered by the Arab Spring. As mentioned, al-Islah 
members were involved in the dissidence demonstrations in the UAE itself. Al-
Islah was labeled as a terrorist organization and branches in Dubai, Fujairah and 
Ras Al-Khaimah were effectively dismantled in 2012.811 Attorney General Ali 
Salim al-Tunaiji announced ‘the country’s national security was under threat from 
a group of people with ties to foreign organizations and agendas’, a clear 
reference to the international Muslim Brotherhood.812 The Emirati media, firmly 
under government control, reported that some of those detained had confessed 
that their organization was running an armed wing and had been plotting to take 
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power and establish an Islamist state.813 During the GCC National and Regional 
Security Conference run by the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and 
Energy Studies in January 2012, Dubai police chief General Dahi Khalfan stated: 
‘Allow me to deviate from diplomatic speech; I am a security man. The Muslim 
Brotherhood is a security threat to the Gulf, and is no less dangerous than Iran.’814 
While these positions appear unjustified by the small number of Brotherhood 
sympathisers in the UAE, in the words of an Emirati diplomat: ‘Islah sympathisers 
might be few in the UAE, if compared with Kuwait or Egypt, but they were in 
excellent and influential positions, from where they could easily push their political 
agenda for the region, in coordination with the other groups in the region, such 
as in Egypt and Kuwait.’ 815 The perspective is indeed different when looking at 
the regional picture post-2011, as Brotherhood-affiliates were ascending to 
government in Egypt and Tunisia and enjoying rising popularity and battlefield 
victories in Libya, Syria and Yemen.816 These developments triggered a far-
reaching reaction on behalf of Abu Dhabi, that, since 2013, substantially 
supported on the ground, logistically and financially, the anti-Islamist coalition in 
Libya and the military-led, anti-Islamist government in Egypt both domestically 
and internationally.817 Along with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the UAE generously 
financed the government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, once it ousted the Islamist-led 
government of Mohammed Morsi. In Libya, the UAE developed relations with the 
Zintan Brigades and the Libyan National Army forces under the command of 
General Khalifa Haftar, even assisting militarily in operations against Islamist 
opponents in 2014.818 
Indeed, by considering the unprecedented level of UAE engagement to counter 
Brotherhood expansion regionally, the full-scale response of the UAE 
government to domestic Islamist dissent, the rhetoric coming from the authorities 
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addressing the issue, it is possible to confirm the strict interrelation between the 
domestic and regional level in the security perception of the leadership viewing 
political Islam as a proper intermestic threat. A threat originated from - and linked 
to - the regional Muslim Brotherhood, but with an internal relevance. The threat 
perception has a clear-cut political dimension, as the Brotherhood is treated as 
posing a direct danger to the regime’s stability. While the scarce number of 
supporters in the UAE and the tough repressive response of the government 
would suggest that al-Islah is hardly capable of threatening the existence of the 
state, there are elements to argue that al-Islah is thought to be capable of 
exploiting what could arguably be the country’s main socio-political and socio-
economic vulnerabilities, the unequal balance of power amongst the seven 
Emirates. In addition to the political aspect, the anti-modernization, anti-
globalisation and anti-Westernization stances of al-Islah, add an economic and 
social dimension to the threat perceived. Even a relative empowerment could be 
damaging for the UAE’s globalized economy, in particular for Dubai, whose 
wealth largely depends from its internationalization.819 In an interview with the 
author in London, an Emirati diplomat stated that: ‘The Brotherhood is an 
obstacle to our plans for further economic development in the country’. 820 By 
challenging the modernization pushed by the government in various aspects of 
societal development, the organization is also thought to have the potential, on 
the long term, to disrupt social cohesiveness, by pitting more conservative 
Emiratis against the more globalised local elites. 
 
6.4 The UAE and the ‘jihadi threat’. 
When analysing the Emirati leadership’s perceptions of jihadi organizations, it is 
paramount to make a distinction between the internal and external level of the 
phenomenon. While internally the political dimension seems very limited, and the 
social and economic dimensions more pronounced, externally jihadi groups are 
confronted as a strong threat to the the UAE leadership’s political interests in 
relation to the regional order. 
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The watershed moment clearly appears to be the 9/11 terrorist attacks against 
the United States, a close ally and security provider of the UAE. An American 
expert on GCC affairs, who has long worked close to high-ranking Emirati 
officials, has stated in a 2019 interview with the author: ‘Being close to the US is 
the basis of the UAE’s national security strategy. The events of 9/11 were a true 
shock for the Emirati leadership and they since took a maximalist approach to cut 
any even remote connection between their country and jihadi groups.’821 A 
number of elements triggered a change in the government’s approach: two of the 
nineteen terrorists that perpetrated the attack had Emirati citizenship, more than 
half of the hijackers flew directly out of Dubai to the United States and it emerged 
that the UAE banking system had been used by hijackers to launder funds.822 
These elements risked seriously damaging US-UAE relations, with long-lasting 
potential implications for the UAE’s security. In 2006 the substantial damage to 
the reputation and image of the UAE and in particular Dubai, had meaningful 
economic repercussions when the state-owned DP World had to drop a bid to 
manage terminal operations at six major American ports amid strong opposition 
in the US Congress.823 Subsequently, the perceptions of the Emirati leadership 
vis-à-vis jihadi organizations changed on several fronts including the ideological 
and material aspect, the domestic as well as external dimension. 
At the external, regional level, the UAE exerted efforts to build an image of itself 
as a reliable ally for the United States, especially since the ‘War on Terror’ was 
launched by then American President George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. 
The UAE was the only Arab country to commit troops in Afghanistan in 2011 and 
in 2014 Emirati forces have been taking active part in military operations carried 
out by the US-led international coalition against Daesh in Syria as well as against 
both Daesh and AQAP in southern Yemen in the context of the Saudi-led military 
operations.824 Along with the Yemeni groups trained and funded by the UAE, the 
Emirati military ejected AQAP from the port city of Mukalla in April 2016 and from 
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the coastal towns of Balhaf and Bir Ali in December of the same year. Both UAE 
forces and UAE-backed Yemeni forces conducted counterterrorism operations in 
the whole territory of southern Yemen even after 2016. These military operations 
can be considered substantial relatively to the country’s size and military might, 
and the commitment even more interesting given how nor Afghanistan, Syria or 
Yemen share borders with the UAE. This commitment was frequently explained 
in interviews through the progressive regionalization of the Emirati leadership’s 
perspective on security and the willingness to prevent jihadi groups from 
threatening the stability of the regional political order, especially where favourable 
to the UAE.825 In addition such a proactive policy was also motivated by its 
potential to strengthen relations with the region’s offshore balancer, the US, as 
well as a regional leader, Saudi Arabia, to whom jihadi groups pose a much 
fiercer and pressing threat.826 
By contrast, at the domestic level, the UAE has been consistently assessed as 
not highly vulnerable to the threat of jihadi terrorism.827 Overall, international 
organizations have estimated that the UAE is one of the countries exporting a 
smaller number of foreign fighters to Daesh in Syria and Iraq.828 This is due to a 
strict counterterrorism legislation, a strongly securitarian approach by authorities 
to policing society, an ideological effort to counter jihadi discourse and ideology, 
an economic affluence that discourages self-immolation. Groups such as al-
Qa’ida and its affiliates have long been designated as terrorist entities by the 
UAE, in a list that is periodically updated and since 2014 contains over 80 
organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra, 
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and these group’s affiliates.829 Counterterrorism laws have been particularly strict 
in the country since the early 2000s and have been made even stricter after the 
consolidation of Daesh in 2014.830 Legislation allows extensive degree of 
surveillance to state security forces and harsh precautionary measures including 
jail time for promoting terrorist organizations verbally or in writing, including on 
social media. Since 2014-2015 capital punishment is given for terrorism offences 
while the UAE also passed a law criminalizing hate speech, the defamation of 
religion and discrimination. Such laws have been extensively applied, including 
to pursue cases unrelated to jihadi organizations but against political dissidents 
and activists.831 
Alongside the legal instruments, the Emirati government has been active in 
countering jihadist ideology. The Abu Dhabi ruling family itself has long embraced 
the Sunni Maliki school of thought, substantially different from more 
fundamentalist strands of Islam. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, the federal 
government showed an urgency to openly contrast the more fundamentalist 
interpretations.832 Monitoring activities of mosques, as well as the efforts to 
deliver pre-approved sermons for Friday prayers, were stepped up. A number of 
clerics who were found to deliver sermons inciting violence were sent to re-
education programs.833 Islam teachers and curricula for the Arabic and Islamic 
Studies courses were reformed removing more radical ideas. Political and 
religious authorities, including officials from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Awqaf, Dubai’s ruler and UAE’s 
Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid, the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, 
the Minister of International Cooperation Abdullah bin Zayed have consistently 
condemned extremism, at times almost competing to sponsor ad hoc events or 
initiatives.834 Since 2012 the UAE also hosts a centre for excellence in capacity 
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building programs for countering violent extremism and de-radicalisation 
practices, named Hedayah, which, however, carries on very limited work within 
the Emirates.835 In July 2015, the US and UAE joined forces in establishing the 
Sawab Center, a body within the framework of the Global Coalition against 
Daesh, specialising in countering jihadi propaganda online, particularly on social 
media.836 While the actual effects of these counter-narrative approaches remain 
under-researched, these state-sponsored activities can be particularly relevant in 
countries where social media usage is very high and the Internet in general has 
been proven to be an effective tool for radicalisation.837 
At home, the UAE has never experienced a major attack at the hands of jihadi 
terrorist organizations. Only one episode, allegedly perpetrated by a Daesh-
inspired lone wolf took place in 2014. In December of that year Ala’a Badr 
Abdullah al-Hashimi murdered an American kindergarten teacher in the Al Reem 
shopping center in Abu Dhabi and subsequently attempted to detonate a bomb 
outside the home of an American doctor.838 Two days later, authorities identified 
and arrested her and she was sentenced to the capital punishment. While the 
woman apparently did not have links to terrorist organizations, she was self-
radicalised online through Daesh material. While this was the only episode that 
actually took place, others were prevented by the authorities. A few months after 
this event, al-Hashemi’s husband, Mohammed al-Habashi, was also sentenced 
to life in prison for a string of terrorist offenses, including plotting to blow up Yas 
Marina Circuit and a local IKEA store.839 Overall, according to official data, 2016 
was a very active year in terrorism prosecutions as the Federal Supreme Court’s 
State Security Court heard more than three dozen terrorism-related cases, 
including alleged affiliates of Daesh, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Jabhat 
al-Nusra and Hezbollah, involving both locals and foreigners.840 One of the most 
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relevant cases involved 41 defendants, 38 of whom were Emirati, who received 
sentences ranging from six months to death for forming a terrorist organization 
called Shabab al-Manara, with ties to Daesh and al-Qa’ida, and planning terrorist 
attacks in the UAE.841  
On the other hand, as mentioned, in the aftermath of 9/11 it emerged that terrorist 
groups had used the UAE as a financial transit hub.842 The government’s reaction 
was initially slow and ‘operational capability constraints and political 
considerations’ have been repeatedly cited in US Bureau of Counterterrorism’s 
Country Reports on Terrorism as preventing the government from immediately 
freezing and confiscating terrorists’ assets.843 In particular the implementation of 
the strictest anti-money laundering standards has been evaluated insufficient in 
special circumstances such as in the context of free trade zones, licensed 
exchange houses, hawalas, and trading firms acting as money transmitters. 
Charities have instead been put under the supervision of the authorities, who 
actively work to channel donations through legal charities.844 The UAE over the 
years acquired membership of several international financial intelligence units 
and anti-money laundering units, such as the Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force, the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases 
Unit, and the Coalition’s Counter-Daesh Finance Group. In mid-2017, the Emirati 
authorities considered their record in the matter solid enough to be in a position 
to use this argument as the main one in the narrative around the intra-GCC crisis, 
by publicly and repeatedly accusing Qatar of financing terrorist organizations, 
including but not limited to the Muslim Brotherhood.845 
While all these different aspects are instrumental in unpacking the leadership 
perceptions of jihadi groups in the UAE, it is paramount to keep in mind the low 
vulnerability of the country to actual attacks. For instance, the 2017 Global 
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Terrorism Index has ranked the UAE 112 over 130 countries with regards to its 
vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and such assessment has been relatively 
consistent.846 However, it is equally significant to highlight that the one attack that 
was perpetrated in 2014, still had an impact on driving the perception of terrorism 
as an incumbent risk, in particular with a clear-cut societal and economic 
dimension.847 To the Emirati leaders portraying the country as safe to investors 
and expat talents, both vital in the country’s economic model, is an absolute 
priority. 848 This would explain why the 2015 thwarted plot against the Abu Dhabi 
Grand Prix has received so little media coverage. Given the high societal diversity 
- especially in Dubai and Abu Dhabi where expats represent a stark majority of 
the population – the risk to disrupting societal cohesion is also high. However, 
jihadi groups are confronted with equal proactivity at the regional level, as a threat 
to the stability of the regional order. In fact, in light of the UAE’s political ambitions 
to play an increased regional role, underlined by its proactive policy in North 
Africa, Levant as well as the Arabian Peninsula, it is possible to argue that jihadi 
groups do represent an actual threat to the UAE’s external interests. These 
include political interests in North Africa, military interests in Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen and economic interests established by increased trade and investment 
relations through the region. Finally, the UAE’s involvement in international 
initiatives to contrast jihadi groups in Siria, Iraq and Yemen can be viewed 
through the lenses of strengthening the international political reputation of the 
country, thus gathering substantial political capital vis-à-vis larger and more 
powerful actors. Viewed through the lenses of this thesis’ theoretical framework, 
it is possible to argue that jihadi group are perceived as a pressing internal risk, 
with an economic and social dimension, and as a full-fledged political threat at 
the external level. 
 
6.5 The UAE’s security priorities after 2011. 
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The three issues identified by the Riyadh Agreements as threats to GCC security 
have appeared to be perceived, as per this thesis’s definitions, mostly exogenous 
risks or threats although with some pressing internal impacts, especially in the 
case of non-violent Islamist groups. Through an in-depth analysis as well as 
through the opinions of sources interviewed, it is possible to advance the 
argument that at the roots of these perceptions there are two security priorities: 
preserving the unity of the seven Emirates’ Federation and pursuing the stability 
of the regional order, both political and institutional, in the face of major 
ideological forces sweeping through the region.  
When the United Arab Emirates were formed in 1971, the leaders of the seven 
Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and 
Umm al-Quwain had to overcome numerous challenges for the difficult task of 
unifying the state.849 The Emirates had, and maintained, distinct ruling families, 
descending from different tribes, including the al-Nahyan (Abu Dhabi), the al- 
Maktoum (Dubai), the al-Qasimi (Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah), the al-Nuaimi 
(Ajman), the al-Mu’alla (Umm Al Quwain) and the al-Sharqi (Fujairah). These 
families were not ready to surrender power or autonomy, and it took two decades 
for the military to unify and for Abu Dhabi to become the official capital. 850 For 
instance, while the armies were unified in 1976, Dubai officially joined only in 
1996. While formally the highest constitutional authority in the United Arab 
Emirates, responsible for ratifying almost every decision or policy is the Federal 
Supreme Council, where each ruler has one vote, the actual political weight of 
the seven rulers has been profoundly divergent.851 The inequality in the 
distribution of power is mirrored by the vast inequality in the distribution of wealth. 
In the face of a chronic lack of reliable statistics, which also highlights the 
sensitivity of the issue, regional affairs expert David Roberts has calculated that 
in a period from 2004 to 2014, Abu Dhabi, holding the vast majority of the UAE’s 
oil and gas reserves, accounted for an average of 55.9 percent of the state’s 
GDP, Dubai contributed 28.6 percent, Sharjah 4.7 percent, and the Northern 
Emirates, respectively 1.7 percent Ras al-Khaimah, 1 percent Ajman, 0.6 percent 
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Fujairah, and 0.2 percent Umm al-Quwain.852 With an economy largely 
dependent on energy revenues, it is reasonable to assume different disparities 
also for previous years. Indeed, the Northern Emirates have struggled 
consistently with issues of unemployment as well as water and power outages 
unknown in Abu Dhabi which, in turn, has long been subsidizing them.853 This 
socio-economic inequality may also be one of the biggest vulnerability of the 
Federation. As noted in a leaked 2004 cable by the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi, 
‘poor economic conditions in the Northern Emirates . . . compared to the wealth 
of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, may be a factor in breeding resentment among some 
UAE nationals’.854  
Indeed, in 2011 when, as mentioned, dissent was more widespread in the 
Northern Emirates, the government issued a USD 1.5 billion investment package 
specifically dedicated to the area.855 A senior analyst at the UAE National 
Defence College interviewed by the author in Abu Dhabi in 2018, highlighted how 
the package was mainly intended to tackle potential causes for animosity against 
the capital and therefore, political instability.856 Following to that, according to 
another interviewee, Abu Dhabi increased its outreach to the youth of the 
Northern Emirates to have them employed as staff in the federal institutions, 
including political entities as well as the army and other security forces, where 
nationalism is more naturally strengthened.857 These initiatives were also aimed 
at the further centralization of loyalties towards Abu Dhabi as the leader of the 
Federation. A watershed event in this regard has taken place after the 2008 
global economic collapse: as the crisis caused a major financial downturn in 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi bailed out the fellow Emirate by handing out approximately 10 
billion USD, a move that gave Abu Dhabi clout over Dubai, effectively weakening 
Dubai’s independence in both economic and political matters.858 While on one 
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hand the strong subsidization of the other Emirates in the form of investments 
and the provision of services and employment opportunities undoubtedly ties 
them to Abu Dhabi’s authority, on the other hand it cannot obliterate political 
differences or the existing divergence of interests. 
Both have been long-standing. Already in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, while 
the UAE officially remained neutral, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah And Abu 
Dhabi sided with Iraq and Abu Dhabi, alongside Saudi Arabia, even bankrolled 
Saddam Hussein, whereas Dubai, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain were 
sympathetic to Iran and Dubai even served as a key transit point for war material 
destined for Iran.859 As mentioned, Dubai maintained a pragmatic economic 
engagement with Iran at least until 2008, when it gradually converged on Abu 
Dhabi’s positions.860 The Emirate also had somewhat different approaches to 
political Islam within the state, as emerged in earlier sections.861 Al-Islah garnered 
elite patronage since the 1970s in the northern emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and 
Fujairah, and thanks to this backing, it developed a footprint and influence in 
institutions. As mentioned, Ras al-Khaimah’s ruler even shielded the local al-Islah 
branch from the crackdowns of the 1990s and 2000s and in 1996 he refused to 
carry on the arrest of a high-profile al-Islah member ordered by Abu Dhabi. While 
Shaykh Zayed initially announced the intention to give land to the organization in 
Abu Dhabi, the al-Nahyan ruling family was always wary of allowing another node 
of power emerging, challenging its rule, and developing a societal following. This 
became particularly the case from the mid-2000s when Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Zayed consolidated his power and, with it, a long-lasting project 
to achieve centralization of power. One cannot dismiss upfront the idea, at least 
as a hypothetical scenario, that the Islah-backing Ras al-Khaimah Emir Saqr bin 
Muhammad, passed away in 2010, could have drawn on the popular support of 
the movement in his more conservative Emirate to challenge Abu Dhabi. On the 
other hand, while diverging on Iran, the leadership in Dubai endorses Abu Dhabi’s 
wariness of al-Islah, considered an obstacle for the entrepôt’s socio-economic 
and socio-cultural global identity.862 Finally, several interviewees have stated that 
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intra-Emirates divergences have emerged, behind closed doors, also in the 
context of the Qatar crisis: while Ras al-Khaimah refused to consider the Muslim 
Brotherhood threat grave enough to open a deep intra-GCC crisis, Dubai and 
Fujairah complained about the economic costs of the crisis, given how vessels to 
and from Qatar were prevented from docking at their ports, disputing business 
flows, and how Qatar had consistent investments, subsequently withdrawn, 
especially in Dubai’s real estate sector.863 Further divergences emerged on the 
decision to open a military front in Yemen: while the ruler of Dubai disapproved 
the potential negative impacts on regional stability, the rulers of the Northern 
Emirates complained of not being consulted by Abu Dhabi before committing 
troops to the war, notwithstanding the fact that their citizens have filled the front 
lines and accounted for most of the war deaths.864 In this context, the defection 
in 2018 of a son of the ruler of Fujairah to Qatar brought to the surface the 
suggestion of pushback against Abu Dhabi among the Northern Emirates.865 
These divergences are particularly relevant, in contemporary times, because 
internal cohesion and unity of intent is nothing but fundamental to implement Abu 
Dhabi’s regional strategy, to place the UAE as a proactive and influential actor in 
the volatile and conflictual geopolitics of the MENA. 
It is this volatile and conflictual regional geopolitics that also occupies the central 
stage in the Abu Dhabi’s security calculus. The emergence of Daesh across the 
borders of Syria and Iraq in 2014 represented the first, practical attempt to 
threaten and overcome the centuries-old Westphalian order based on statual 
entities. The MENA region has long struggled with the validity and legitimacy of 
such order, ideologically challenged by pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism as a 
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legacy imposed by European colonial powers in the region.866 This is largely 
applicable, at least in theory, to several GCC states, in particular those 
established under the aegis of Great Britain and without a tradition of national 
sovereignty, such as the United Arab Emirates. It is a structural, inescapable 
socio-political vulnerability, weakening the country’s very foundational myth. The 
question of weak nationalism has, in fact, long featured in the literature on the 
Arabian Peninsula.867 In contemporary times several initiatives have been 
pursued by a number of GCC countries to build or strengthen their population’s 
nationalism, a sign of the increased relevance of the matter. The UAE, in 
particular has been at the forefront of such efforts through a renewed emphasis 
on symbolism, for instance through large-scale exhibition of national sentiment 
during national holidays, the building of new national monuments as well as 
through more traditional nation-building instruments such as conscription. In 2014 
Abu Dhabi has introduced compulsory conscription, requiring men aged 18-30 to 
serve between 9 months and two years, depending on their education level, and 
inaugurated women’s voluntary enrolment for twelve–month terms in 2016.868 
Perhaps it is against this background that the heightened threat perceptions of 
the UAE leadership vis-à-vis transnational political ideologies, contesting the 
state-based model, may be best understood. It is not a case that most of the 
discourse around the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on their goal to further the 
pan-Islamist cause through the establishment of a single Islamic state, or 
Caliphate. In the words of the UAE Foreign Minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed 
Al-Nahyan, ‘the Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in the nation state. It does 
not believe in the sovereignty of the state.’869  
Interestingly, in the UAE a parallel is often drawn between the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Iran’s Khomeinism, calling the Brotherhood a Sunni 
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version of Khomeini's theory of an Islamic State.870 Highlighted similarities include 
particular conservativism in their interpretation of Islamic law, hostility towards 
economic modernization and secularization in particular, anti-Americanism and 
anti-Israel positions.871 Moreover, both the traditional theologies and political 
theories of the Brotherhood and that of Khomeinism are described by their efforts 
to transform religious beliefs into modern political ideologies against more secular 
regimes.872  In particular an Emirati scholar, Director of a Dubai-based think tank, 
highlighted during interviews with the author this state versus non-state 
paradigm. He first made references to both the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi 
organizations, that are often put into correlation in the country. However he 
particularly focused on this ideological conflict when speaking about UAE-Iran 
relations, by arguing: ‘Iran is Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: it has a state, a sub-state 
and a supra-state. The Supreme Leader, Khamenei, presents himself not only as 
a political leader, but also as a representative of God, someone above the human 
law. How do you deal with someone like this? Take, for instance, the 2016 attack 
on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran: while Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, 
and Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani apologised, Khamenei argued that this 
was the manifestation of God’s wrath against the al-Saud, making it impossible 
to deal with the events politically. Even Iran’s intervention in the Syrian civil war 
has been justified through religious arguments, such as the necessity and the 
legitimacy to intervene in another country to defend the Shi’a shrine of Zeynab 
bint Ali located in Damascus. In short, Iran is still driven according to theocratic 
considerations, hostile to the concepts of states and borders.’873 A prominent 
Emirati commentator on current affairs, interviewed by the author via Skype in 
2019 agreed that: ‘Iran is more than a state, it is an ideology which has to expand 
to survive. The UAE is facing an hegemonic power.’ 874 
In light of the analysis provided in this chapter, it is possible to corroborate the 
hypothesis that the Arab Spring impacted strongly the security perceptions of 
leaders and policy-makers in the UAE. Coinciding with power shifts within the 
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state itself, the Arab Spring ushered in a time of heightened threat perceptions 
and more assertive policies to counter those. At the root of the leadership’s 
insecurity, however, there appears to be issues that go beyond its current 
narratives and discourses and have their roots in the country’s socio-political and 
socio-economic vulnerabilities, such as institutionalised intra-Emirates inequality 
or the insufficient coherence and strength of the ideational foundations 





















7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: QATAR. 
 
When looking at contemporary threat perceptions in the Arab monarchies of the 
Gulf, Qatar stands out evidently as a unique case. This exceptionalism arguably 
is the reason why Qatar was the one target of both intra-GCC crises, in 2014 and 
2017. In fact, a detailed review of Qatar’s perceptions of the main issues around 
which the crises were triggered, carried on in this chapter, will highlight how 
Doha’s perspectives have consistently been divergent from that of the other GCC 
countries. These divergences, it is hypothesized in this thesis, are also rooted in 
the different experiences lived by the GCC monarchies during the 2011 Arab 
Spring.  
The first paragraph will analyse Qatar’s experience with the Arab Spring and the 
impacts – or lack thereof - on security perceptions.The Qatari leadership, not 
experiencing any sustained opposition, did not embace the process of hyper-
securitisation that characterised post-2011 policy-making in the Arab monarchies 
of the Gulf.875 Indeed, with one of the smallest and wealthiest population in per 
capita terms in the region, issues such as lack of socio-political cohesion and 
socio-economic imbalances have limited space to escalate.876 Qatar’s stability 
during those turbulent times, will be argued here, highlighted the absence of 
strong socio-economic and socio-political vulnerabilities and fault lines within the 
country.877 That affected the leadership’s perceptions vis-à-vis the actors that 
came out empowered after the Arab Spring and due to the geopolitical reshuffles 
that followed - including the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran and aligned Shi’a groups, 
jihadi organizations - as non full-fledged threats.878 These perceptions will be 
analysed in the three following sections. 
However, if Qatar was shielded from perceiving internal and intermestic threats 
arising after 2011, the intra-GCC crises, and especially that of 2017, rang alarm 
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bells for Qatar’s leadership, perceiving that the country remains vulnerable to 
external threats. Similarly to other small GCC monarchies, the proximity to two 
large neighbours, Saudi Arabia and Iran, has traditionally induced the Qatari 
leadership to perceive what have been defined in this thesis as risks. The 2014 
and 2017 intra-GCC crises saw the risks posed by Saudi Arabia – and its 
revamped alliance with the UAE – becoming acute external threats with multiple 
dimensions. This will be analysed in the final section of this chapter, 
contextualising the leadership’s related perceptions in the country’s history and 
structural features.  
 
7.1 Qatar and the Arab Spring. 
Qatar did not witness meaningful public protests in 2011 nor faced any sustained 
opposition. Subsequently, the regime never perceived an actual challenge to its 
identity, sovereignty or stability in those circumstances. In the words of a Doha-
based professor of international relations interviewed by the author in 2018: 
‘Qatar did not consider the Arab Spring a threat for one moment’.879  
In a population of 2.6 million, only some 250,000 - 300,000 possess Qatari 
citizenship and those enjoy the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
worldwide, estimated at approximately USD 440,000 by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit in 2008.880 A Qatari academic interviewed in Doha put it bluntly: 
‘In Qatar the demographics doesn’t allow for dissent: there are only 300,000 
Qataris, 10 percent of whom is made by the royal family and related clans and 
30 percent of whom is constituted by supporting tribes’.881 Citizens are also 
entitled to a cradle-to-grave generous welfare system including free healthcare 
and education, the assurance of getting a well-paid job in the public sector and 
several subsidies and grants.882 Furthermore the resources at disposal of the 
state for these provisions are so significant that all Qatari citizens, irrespective of 
their ethnic origin or sectarian belonging, have been recipients to some of this 
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largesse.883 No significant economic inequality or active economic 
marginalization – or, as defined in this thesis, socio-economic vulnerabilities – 
appear evident in relation to wealth distribution among Qatari nationals. In fact, 
there is a consensus in the area studies literature that such a favourable 
resources-to-citizens ratio prevents the emergence of meaningful displays of 
political or economic grievances by the majority of citizens.884 Qataris simply have 
too much at stake with their system and, as evidenced by a quick comparison 
with the status of the large community of migrant labourers, too much to loose by 
challenging it. Such wealth is also considered at the root of a significant degree 
of political apathy and lack of democratic aspiration. This was validated, for 
instance, from the results of two separate public opinion polls conducted by Qatar 
University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute revealing that, 
between December 2010 and June 2011, the proportion of Qataris who rated 
living in a democratic country as ‘very important’ dropped from 74 percent to 65 
percent, with a relative decrease of 12 percent.885  
At the same time, the country was not completely insulated from or oblivious to 
the Arab Spring. Encouraged by events in Egypt and Tunisia, a small political 
group named Qataris for Reform emerged in March 2011.886 Around sixty 
Qataris, led by Qatari academic ‘Ali Khalifa al-Kuwari, started meeting once a 
month during ‘Monday Meetings’ to discuss economic and political reform. Out of 
these meetings came a book edited by al-Kuwari and published in 2012 with the 
title Al Sha’hab Yurid Islah fi Qatar…Aidan (The People Want Reform In 
Qatar…Too).887 The book, banned in Qatar, addressed several of the most 
critical issues characterising the authoritarian rule in Qatar, albeit without calling 
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for the overthrow of the regime or the ruling family.888 One of the initial points 
covered in the book was a complain of the lack of freedom of expression and 
press in the country, curtailed by a Press Law with excessively severe penalties 
for journalists, and the regime’s micro-managing of media institutions.889 Another 
major point raised deals with the lack of transparency in the management of the 
public finances and resources, including the fact that final budget accounts, state 
reserves, details of state investments, the size of national debt, are not of public 
domain.890 In relation to that, the author questions, more broadly, the lack of 
popular participation in the decision-making process and public policy choices. 
He also laments a lack of interlocutors, given how Qatari laws do not permit the 
establishment of political bodies, forums for debate, professional syndicates or 
trade unions, or civil society associations with a focus on public affairs.891 Al-
Kuwari finally addressed the demographic and economic imbalances in Qatar. 
While the percentage of citizens in the population fell from 40 percent in 1970 to 
just 12 percent by 2010, their participation in a burgeoning workforce also 
dropped from 14 percent to 6 percent over the same period.892 According to al-
Kuwari this puts Qatar’s national identity in danger in the long term. The complete 
dependence of the country’s economy on the energy revenues is presented as 
similarly destabilising. Finally, the GCC countries’ dependence on foreign powers 
for their security is also singled out as a major concern. This comprehensive 
criticism of the state and the related calls for comprehensive reform, however, 
weren’t seemingly embraced by the wider public in Qatar. This might be largely 
attributed to the apathy generated by wealth, as aforementioned, but also by the 
willingness of the government to at least acknowledge the validity of these points. 
Finally, repression was employed in a handful of cases including that of 
Muhammad al-Ajami, a poet sentenced in 2011 to life imprisonment - pardoned 
in 2016 - for posting a poem allegedly ‘inciting the overthrow of the regime and 
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insulting Emir Hamad’ and of the blogger Sultan al-Khulaifi, detained for one 
month in 2011 for its writings on censorship in Qatar.893 
Overall, Qatar’s government in 2011 had confidence that the country was not 
going to be affected by the wave of popular mobilisation that spread in the 
region.894 In fact, where the other GCC states saw a threat to their regimes’ 
stability, fuelled by the success of upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, Doha’s 
leaders saw an opportunity. Qatari officials reacted to popular protests with 
enthusiasm, and vivid declarations of support for the opposition movements and 
for ‘democracy, dignity and freedom in the Arab world’.895 Al Jazeera, particularly 
in its Arabic version, rode the wave of popular mobilisation, providing a region-
wide platform to anti-regime activists’ testimonies and ideas. Its coverage of 
events in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and, after some initial hesitations, Syria, was 
extensive and openly supportive of the protest movements.896 By contrast, the 
coverage of protests in Bahrain was markedly milder, prompting accusations of 
inconsistencies and hypocrisy.897 However, while Al Jazeera Arabic remained 
hesitant to cover Bahrain, Al Jazeera English produced and broadcasted in 
August 2011 a controversial documentary about the crackdown of protests in the 
island kingdom, titled “Shouting in the Dark”, that was allegedly withdrawn after 
protests by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.898 The intervention of the GCC’s Peninsula 
Shield against opposition groups in Bahrain, to which Qatar participated with two 
advisors, also opened the government to criticism of double-standards.899 
However it is worth noting that the Qatari government had attempted a different 
route, participating to the negotiations between the Manama government and the 
main Shi’a opposition bloc, al-Wefaq, an initiative that would later be denounced 
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by the quartet’s media as an attempt to interfere in Bahraini affairs and destabilise 
the monarchy.900 
In order to shield the government from accusations of hypocrisy and double-
standards, that could weaken international support vital for Doha as well as the 
relations between the rulers and the ruled domestically, the young Emir Tamim 
opened a new season of reforms as a consequence of the 2017 intra-GCC 
crisis.901 Pushing further limited liberalization was deemed valuable to attract 
international support as well as to reinforce the Emir’s domestic legitimacy, 
challenged by the quartet’s initiative against Doha.902 In November 2017, Emir 
Tamim announced that in 2019 Qatar would hold long-promised elections for two-
thirds of the Majilis as-Shura (Consultative Assembly) for the first time in the 
country’s history. Commenting the decision on Qatar’s main outlet The Peninsula, 
Dr. Khalid Al Jaber, Director of the Doha-based think tank Gulf International 
Forum wrote: ‘As Doha has backed causes linked with social justice, democracy, 
equality, and human rights across the Arab world - especially since the 2011 
uprisings - Qataris are now viewing the GCC crisis as an opportunity to make 
internal reforms consistent with its regional and international positions.’903 
Between 2017 and 2018 Qatar also issued new legislations to improve human 
rights standards for its nearly 2 million migrant labour workers, for decades 
lacking many of the most basic rights.904 These legislations include new 
provisions attempting to tackle issues of exploitation, as well as reforms of the 
abusive kafala (sponsorship) system, whereby the government rather than the 
employer would sponsor workers, and raising health and safety standards.905 The 
fact that these reforms were not introduced during 2011 or shortly after, clarifies 
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how they are disconnected from any concerns on behalf of the regime about 
domestic protests in favour of liberalization, on the wave of the Arab Spring. They 
are, instead, closely related to the GCC crisis that, as will be later on explored, 
was first and foremost perceived as challenging the legitimacy of the ruling 
regime and, hence, its stability. In this sense, viewed from Doha, in 2017 Saudi 
Arabia was a more hostile player than Iran. 
 
7.2 Qatar and the ‘Shi’a threat’. 
The post-2011 perceptions of the Qatari leadership vis-à-vis Iran - and the threat 
the Iranian regime may pose via transnational Shi’a groups - are characterised 
by a complex interrelation of different factors, and largely centered around the 
danger Iran poses to Qatar’s regional interests, rather than to the stability, identity 
and sovereignity of the Qatari regime. Viewed through this thesis’ framework, it 
can thus be argued that Iran is mostly perceived in Doha as posing an acute 
external risk, not an existential, political, threat.  
International relations scholar Mehran Kamrava, long based in Doha, in 2018 
defined Iran-Qatar relations as ‘broadly friendly’, and characterised by a ‘no 
dispute approach’ as the two countries have been ‘drawn together by forces of 
circumstance rather than policy preferences’.906 For both of them, he continues, 
the benefits of mutual accommodation have outweighed the costs of 
confrontation. Qatar is one of the few Arab neighbours which Iran sees as a 
potential partner, especially in trade and energy policies. To Qatar, Iran has been 
a key actor in its foreign policy strategy of hedging: employing relations with 
Tehran as a counterweight to Riyadh, while attempting not to antagonizing either 
neighbour.907 The two countries share sovereignty of the largest gas field in the 
world, South Pars/North Dome, the source of most of Qatar’s wealth, which has 
also given Doha the resources to punch above its weight in international 
politics.908 Following to the first deal related to the gas field in 1990, Doha and 
Tehran managed to keep some level of cooperation and in 2008 they even co-
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founded, with Russia, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.909 Maintaining 
working relations with Iran has thus had a strategic value for Qatar, wanting to 
preserve its energy agreement with the Islamic Republic from political 
disagreements. This element also emerges in Qatar’s relations with Iran 
throughout history. 
Prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, relations between the Qatari and Iranian 
monarchies were based on cooperation and the recognition of the Shah regime 
as a factor of stability in the Gulf. The 1970s’  Doha ruler Sheikh Khalifa, closely 
aligned with Riyadh’s positions, remained broadly supportive of the Shah until his 
last days.910 However, aside from the fact that about 70 Qatari Shi’a travelled to 
Qom to express support to Khomeini in March 1979, the revolution did not have 
a destabilising echo in Qatar.911 Still, Qatar remained suspicious of the new 
regime in Tehran and, for instance, sided unequivocally with the UAE on the issue 
of the islands occupied by Tehran, perhaps fearing that Iran might be harbouring 
territorial ambitions against Doha too.912 When, following to the death of Khomeini 
in 1989, Iran’s President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani launched an initiative to 
repair relations with Iran’s Arab neighbours, he was well received in Doha, 
particularly after the ascension to the throne in 1995 of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa 
al-Thani, who, seeking to disenfranchise Qatar from the Saudi shadow, 
accelerated on the hedging strategy towards Iran.913 Subsequently, several high-
level visits were exchanged and Qatar discouraged the US on carrying on a 
military attack against Iran as the nuclear dossier heated up.914 The Emir even 
invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend a GCC meeting in 
Doha in December 2007, annoying other GCC leaders.915 In 2009 Iran’s Defence 
Minister met with the chief of staff in the Qatari Defence Ministry to discuss 
defence and security cooperation, including on combating smuggling and drugs 
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trade, potential joint military exercises and expanding coordination of coast 
guards.916 Although practical initiatives lagged behind, the dialogue always 
remained open. Emir Hamad’s strategy, to turn Qatar into a small power with far-
reaching capabilities in regional diplomacy, while shielding it from its bigger 
neighbours, encouraged the Qatari leadership to preserve dialogue with Tehran 
and even open channels of communication with non-state actors involved in 
regional conflicts, including Sunni factions and, more controversially, Shi’a 
groups with ties to Iran.  
Since 2003, the Shi’a-aligned Zaydi rebel group known as Houthis had launched 
an insurgency against the Yemeni government, and several policy-makers in the 
Arabian Peninsula alleged that they were encouraged and aided by Iran with 
arms and military instructors in their struggle.917 The following year, in 2008, 
Qatar negotiated a peace agreement between the two parties whereby Doha 
pledged over USD 300 million in reconstruction assistance for the Northern 
Yemeni province of Saada, where the Houthis reside.918 Shortly after the accords 
were signed, fighting resumed. Subsequent Qatari mediation efforts, dated 2010, 
were again fruitless and a Houthi insurgency revamped after street protests 
toppled the Yemeni regime in 2011. The group conquered large sways of Yemen, 
including the capital Sanaa, in 2014. To counter this Houthi advance, amid 
mounting allegations of Iranian support, Saudi Arabia launched a military 
offensive, with UAE backing, in 2015.919 Qatar initially eschewed involvement in 
the operations, only to nominally join the Saudi-led coalition, after Saudi 
pressures, in the aftermath of the 2014 intra-GCC crises, to debunk accusations 
of collusion with the Houthis and Iran.920 Yet in December 2017, the UAE Minister 
Responsible for Foreign Affairs argued that ‘Qatari mediation to save the Houthi 
sectarian militia is well documented’ and between December 2017 and May 2018 
two Qatari intelligence officers - Mohammad al-Otaibi and Mohsen al-Karbi - were 
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arrested while crossing into Yemen with the accusation of wanting to mediate on 
behalf of the Houthis.921 While these accusations and arrests may no doubt have 
been influenced by the context of high political hostility, and have been rebuked 
by Qatar, a number of interviewees in Doha spoke about the Houthis as impactful 
players, grounded in the reality of the Yemeni national fabric, and thus 
inescapable interlocutors: part and parcel of the domestic political life rather than 
a threat to stability in the Gulf.922 Another controversial case was related to 
Qatar’s engagement with Lebanese militia, and Iranian client, Hezbollah. In 2008, 
clashes broke out between Hezbollah fighters and soldiers of the Lebanese 
National Army, and Lebanon became close to precipitate in a new civil war.923 
The Qatari Emir received the conflicting parties in Doha, managing to convince 
them to sign the Doha Agreement, which called for a national-unity government 
and granted the Hezbollah-led opposition voting power in the Lebanese 
government.924 Both the political empowerment acknowledged by the agreement 
to Hezbollah and the large investment and aid funds - totalling around USD 300 
million - pledged by Doha as a diplomatic leverage, sparked outrage in Riyadh, 
whose leadership again accused Qatar of supporting Iran’s regional strategy.925 
Fast forward to 2011, Qatar and Hezbollah found themselves on opposite 
trenches in the context of the Syrian civil war during which Qatar unequivocally 
and profusely supported a myriad of groups in the, mostly Sunni, Syrian 
opposition, fighting intensely the forces of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, backed 
by Hezbollah fighters and other Iranian-sent Shi’a militias and under the 
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protection of Russian air force.926 Qatar was back into a – forced – dialogue with 
Hezbollah as a consequence of the 2015 kidnapping of a group of Qatari royals 
in the Iraqi desert by Kata’eb Hezbollah, an Iraqi Shi’a faction, funded and 
supervised by Iran’s Quds Force.927 The hostages became a valuable asset for 
Iran’s Quds Forces leader Qassem Suleimani who sent a Hezbollah intermediary 
to Doha offering their release in exchange for Qatar pressuring some rebel 
groups it sponsored in Syria into a local compromise with Hezbollah.928 In addition 
to accepting to facilitate such deal, Qatar also had to pay around USD 700m to 
secure the release of hostages in April 2017: these sums of money ending up in 
the coffers of Shi’a militias were used by Qatar’s GCC neighbours as evidence of 
Doha’s complicity in dealing with groups accused of destabilising the region.929 
Qatar downsized its level of engagements with regional actors considered 
controversial by other GCC states after the 2014 diplomatic crisis and the 
ascension of the young Emir Tamim bin Hamad, who was already less prone than 
his father to adventurism in the region.930 Emir Tamim rejected the invitation by 
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to a 2015 summit in Tehran and downgraded 
its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic when the Saudi embassy in 
Tehran was attacked in January 2016.931 However, Doha did not sever its 
relations with Iran. For instance in the context of the JCPOA, both in the 2013 ad 
interim version and the 2015 definitive version, the posture adopted by Qatar was 
conciliatory: Khalid al-Attiyah, the former Qatari Foreign Minister, was one of the 
first officials in the region to welcome the nuclear agreement, stating that the deal 
would make the region safer.932 A few weeks after the agreement Qatar even 
spoke in favour of launching a dialogue between Tehran and its Arab 
neighbours.933 Qatar also stepped forward in speeding up economic engagement 
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with Iran: in 2014 the establishment of three joint free trade zones, in Bushehr, 
Doha and Al-Ruwais was announced.934  
In 2017, such pragmatic attitude paid off in the context of the GCC crisis, when 
Qatar was allowed to transit through Iran’s territorial waters for maintaining its 
energy export lines open.935 By attempting to block Qatar’s exports and imports, 
the quartet countries intended to create an economic costs for Qatar’s politics, 
thus potentially tarnishing the leadership’s legitimacy. Iran’s cooperation thus was 
a factor of stability for the regime, its identity and the state’s functional integrity: 
as a result there was no ground to perceive it as a threat, as per this thesis’ 
definitions, in arguably the most vulnerable moment for the Qatari regime since 
2011. Still Doha’s policy of dialogue with Saudi Arabia’s competitor appeared 
entirely pragmatic: Tehran’s support was vital in order to remain solvent to energy 
partners and continue to receive essential energy revenues, but hasn’t led to 
deeper political engagement. As one interviewee working as an advisor to Qatar’s 
Ministry of Defence argued: ‘Before the crisis Qatar-Iran relations were at a barely 
functional level, after the crisis Iran became vital. However, it is out of mutual 
interest not political convergence.’936 On the other hand, maintaining a line of 
dialogue with Iran - that historically never actively threatened the Qatari regime’s 
stability - potentially provides Qatar with a hedging opportunity, in a way that may 
increase its chances to pursue political interests independently from Saudi 
Arabia.937 This is especially true considering that, in Doha, Iran is not perceived 
as having the intent and capabilities to pose the threat perceived by other GCC 
countries: using the local Shi’a population as a leverage against the regime. 
Over the decades, Qatar’s leadership never perceived security concerns with the 
political allegiance of the country’s small Shi’a community, or viewed the 
community as an instrument of a potential intermestic threat orchestrated by Iran: 
‘Iran has supported Shi’a opposition in several GCC countries, but never in Qatar’ 
argued a Doha-based advisor to Qatar’s Ministry of Defence in an April 2018 
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interview with the author, echoing other interviewees.938 First off, Qatari Shi’a are 
estimated to constitute only between 5 and 10 percent of its citizenry.939 Shi’a 
citizens enjoy the same state largesse as other citizens, including a generous 
and comprehensive welfare system, and are guaranteed equal rights by the 
Constitution.940 Generally speaking, it is often noted by local interlocutors that, 
unlike other GCC countries, Shi’a in Qatar are virtually indistinguishable from 
their Sunni co-citizens in appearance and behaviour.941 Like the rest of Qatari 
society, Shi’a are not particularly active politically as generally their political and 
economic situation does not elicit specific demands or grievance: in fact no 
meaningful display of opposition by Shi’a has ever taken place in Qatar.942 Many 
Qatari Shi’a belong to merchant families and they are present in most government 
departments, including in the country’s Consultative Assembly, Ministries, the 
army and educational institutions. However, few of them reach highly senior 
positions.943 Religious discrimination seems to be uncommon: while the majority 
of Qataris, including the royal family, belong to the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam, 
and the public education curriculum is based exclusively on Sunni Islam, Qatari 
Shi’a practice religious rituals freely, and the official religious curriculum is devoid 
of anti-Shi’a propaganda.944  
Sectarian relations have been, at times, under stress, yet mostly in the context of 
intense sectarian-motivated violence in the region. Qatar’s ruling family maintains 
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a good relationship with foreign Shi’a leaders, including Iran’s Supreme 
Leader.945 While most Qatari Shi’a emulate Iraq’s Ayatollah Sistani rather than 
the Iranian Khamenei as marja’iyya, this relaxed attitude on behalf of the 
leadership is per se significant.946 Indeed, when asked about security concerns 
and Iran, Qatari thinkers close to the government all made reference exclusively 
to Tehran’s regional politics and to Syria, where Qatar has been at the forefront 
of the conflict.947 Failure to achieve the desired outcome in Syria, however, would 
hardly lead to political instability for the Qatari regime. One Qatari academic close 
to the government said: ‘Qatar always had stable relations with Iran, treating Iran 
with respect and remaining open to dialogue. Our problem is with Iran’s role in 
the region. Specifically, we have one main dispute: Syria.’948 Another interviewee, 
a professor of international relations based in Doha added: ‘Qatar looks at Iran 
as a challenge, not a threat. There are political differences not an identitarian 
fight.’949 Viewed through this thesis’ framework, it can be argued that, especially 
in the period under consideration here, 2011-2017, Iran has been perceived as 
posing is an acute external risk, putting in danger the political interests of Qatar 
in the region, rather than a threat to the identity, stability and sovereignty of the 
regime. 
 
7. 3 Qatar and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
As Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani often 
declared, there would be no compelling reason to undertake any drastic, harsh 
measure against the Brotherhood, as the organization represents no threat to 
Qatar's security.950 To better situate this idea in the wider context, it would be 
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useful to undertake an overview of the organization’s presence and role in the 
Emirate.  
Until the 1950s, Qatar was a scarcely populated country, with no schools and no 
state institutions or administrative and bureaucratic offices.951 Starting from the 
1960s, the leadership stipulated to import human resources to build the country 
and, subsequently, the first Egyptian Brotherhood members were appointed to 
key positions in the Qatari education sector. Izz al-Din Ibrahim was tasked with 
creating a school syllabus while Abd al-Mu az al-Sattar, close to Hassan al-Banna 
himself, co-authored ‘numerous textbooks for the nascent Qatari school system’ 
and was appointed school inspector and director of Islamic sciences in the 
Ministry of Education.952 In 1961, the Brotherhood ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
took up a teaching position at the Qatari branch of the al-Azhar University.953 
Galvanised by the retreat of pan-Arab nationalism across the region in the early 
1970s, Brotherhood intellectuals and their followers saw their influence increase, 
and finally decided to establish an official organization to oversee the group’s 
activities in Doha in 1975.954 The Qatari Brotherhood was, in the words of scholar 
of political Islam Courtney Freer, ‘an informal organization focused primarily on 
daʿwa (proselytization), intense study of shari'a, organization of sporting 
activities, and integration into the community, attracting young people in particular 
to Brotherhood-sponsored trips, sports, charity, and public lectures.’955 Still this 
body of coordination facilitated to an even greater extent the prevalence of 
Brotherhood members or sympathisers in Qatar’s bureaucracies for decades. 
However, the organization was quite short-lived, as it was officially disbanded in 
1999 after a vote among its members.956 The process of its dissolution, 
characterised by speculations and lack of transparency, culminated into what can 
been defined a full co-optation of the organization by the Qatari state, as 
Brotherhood members continued to be allowed and, at times, encouraged, to 
operate freely.  
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Yet, as David Roberts convincingly argued, it would be far-fetched to state that 
the organization has ideologically influenced contemporary Qatari politics.957 
Indeed, the group’s most meaningful impact on contemporary domestic politics, 
for instance, seemed to be pushing conservative social provisions such as 
limitations to alcohol sales.958 Scholars have argued that the Brotherhood’s 
limited influence on domestic policy-making in Doha is, first and foremost, related 
to its limited traction at the level of the Qatari citizenry, in spite of their outsized 
presence in the education sector. Courtney Freer in her research has confirmed 
that Brotherhood sympathizers, especially publicly identifying as members, 
constitute a small proportion of Qatari society.959 This lack of Brotherhood’s 
penetration in Qatar has been explained by several scholars with the fact that it 
doesn’t have space to perform the welfare functions it undertakes elsewhere in 
the region, as these needs are largely satisfied by the state, in Doha’s archetypal 
rentier system.960 Even if it had wished to challenge the Qatari state, the 
Brotherhood could not exploit socio-political or socio-economic vulnerabilities and 
internal fault lines.  
Rather, the Brotherhood exploited the external fault lines between Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia in terms of religious identity.961 Qatar’s ruling family adheres to the 
Hanbali Islamic school, an interpretation close to Salafi and Wahhabi creeds, and 
prides itself to descend from the same Central Arabian tribal group as 
Wahhabism’s founder, Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab.962 On the other hand, 
this identity represents an extremely tight link to Saudi Arabia.963 The 
Brotherhood could therefore be useful as a counterweight to Wahhabism, as 
supporting the Brotherhood and employing its members was essential to diversify 
Qatar’s religious identity and limit the level of influence that Saudi scholars, jurists 
- and, therefore, rulers - would have exercised on Qatari schools and institutions. 
																																								 																				
957  David Roberts, “Qatar and the Brotherhood”, Survival, 56:4, 2014, pp. 23-32. 
958 “Gloom Grips Qatar’s Arab Riviera after Alcohol Ban,” The Guardian, 21 February 
2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/21/qatar-arab-riviera-gloom-
alcohol-ban. (accessed 14 July 2018).  
959 Freer. “Rentier Islamism in the absence of elections”, p.488 
960 See for instance: Kamrava. Qatar: Small state, big politics; Ulrichsen, Qatar and the 
Arab Spring. 
961 Roberts, “Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood”, p. 89 
962 James Dorsey, “Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia”. 
Working Paper No. 262, 2013. Retrieved from the Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies Website: www.rsis.edu.sg, (accessed 14 July 2018) 
963 This concept is explored in Roberts, “Qatar and the Brotherhood”. 
	 	 211	
A senior researcher at the Doha-based Al Jazeera Center for Studies stated to 
the author: ‘The real reason why al-Qaradawi was given such a big platform on 
Al Jazeera, with his own TV show, is because he could then be a tool to counter-
balance Saudi religious authority. Saudi Arabia, self-indetifying as Qatar’s big 
brother and a voice of leadership in Islam, specifically Wahhabi Islam, would 
otherwise use its religious authority to strongarm Qatar politically as well. 
Additionally, given how substantively more popular has traditionally been the 
Brotherhood ideology vis-à-vis Wahhabism at a regional level, and given how 
extensive and well diffused has been the Brotherhood network, Qatar’s privileged 
relations with Brotherhood scholars also allowed the state to cultivate its standing 
in the wider Middle East, such as in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.’964  
In 2011 Qatar’s Emir, perceiving no threat to his political stability, looked at the 
ousting of old regimes and the rise of new political actors as an opportunity to 
expand his network and influence. Benefitting from consolidated relations with 
the group, the Qatari government reached out directly to personalities connected 
to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, channelling support, 
engaging in a dialogue and building convergences with those who, elected into 
government between late 2011 and 2012, seemed in the position to shape the 
region’s future.965 The Qatari leadership had, for instance, long-standing personal 
connections with Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Brotherhood-linked 
Ennahda party, winning the 2011 elections for the constituent assembly and 
coming second to the 2014 parliamentary elections.966 Ghannouchi’s son-in-law, 
Rafik Abdessalem, who spent years in Doha as the head of research at the Al 
Jazeera Center for Studies, became the country’s Foreign Minister from 2011 to 
2013.967 Qatar pledged loans of USD 1 billion and additional billions in 
investments to the new government, becoming the main supporter of post-
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revolutionary Tunisia.968 Likewise, in Libya, Qatar channelled substantial support 
through the exiled cleric Ali al-Sallabi, a long-term resident of Doha and the son 
of a founding member of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Benghazi.969 
However, the main case of Qatari support for Brotherhood-affiliated movements 
emerging after the Arab Spring was in Egypt. There Doha supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s candidate Mohamed Morsi, elected president in June 2012, 
granting free shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG), promising tens of billions 
of dollars in investment, extending loans of similar magnitude to the Central Bank 
of Egypt to prop up the economy.970 Moreover, Qatar strongly supported the new 
government on the political front by setting up a new Al Jazeera channel covering 
Egyptian politics, in a way favourable to the Morsi government, around the clock, 
known as Mubasher Misr.971 Qatar also nurtured links with the local branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its associates in Syria. To those groups Qatar devolved 
the lion share of the billions spent arming Syrian opposition groups between 2011 
and 2013.972 Doha also supported Brotherhood-affiliated candidates politically, 
such as Ghassan Hitto, who briefly was provisional prime minister of the Syrian 
government-in-exile.973 These elements shed light on how Qatar’s perceptions of 
these political actors changed after 2011 at the regional level, shedding a light on 
the connection with its internal affairs.  
Overall, not only the Brotherhood was never perceived as a threat by the Qatari 
leadership, it was employed over the years – but more intensely in the period 
after the Arab Spring – as a resource and a political instrument, to significantly 
raise Qatar’s profile in regional politics. A small state placed a bet on a region-
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wide rising political network, and though such bets achieved a major seat at the 
table in several key countries in transition. However, Qatar’s momentum was 
short-lived. In July 2013 large-scale rallies triggered a coup d’etat by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt that put General Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi in charge of Egypt.974 Al-Sisi subsequently initiated a crackdown against the 
Brotherhood in Egypt, crushing the group, and since 2014 offered decisive 
support to the UAE to militarily and politically fight the Brotherhood and its 
affiliates in Libya, via their allied militias led by General Khalifa Haftar.975 As Libya 
subsequently plunged into a stagnating status of cyclical conflict, the factions 
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood maintained control over a portion of territory in 
the Western region of the country while seeing their international support 
weakening. In Syria, Russia’s intervention in the war coupled with US’ inertia 
turned into a row of military victories for the Assad regime and its backers, and a 
debacle for the Sunni opposition, in particular that linked to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.976 Only in Tunisia the Ennahda party continued to hold its place in 
the country’s parliamentary democracy. However, as of 2016, and following to a 
widely shared decision in their party Congress, Ennahda formally declared a 
division between religion and politics and the wish to go beyond the Muslim 
Brotherhood model of political Islam.977  
Alongside these regional developments, unfavourable to Doha, its relations with 
the Muslim Brotherhood were also at the center of the intra-GCC crises of 2014 
and 2017. Since 2014, the newly ascended Emir Tamim bin Hamad had to expel 
a number of Brotherhood figures and significantly downsize Doha’s relations with 
Brotherhood affiliates in the region.978 However, as corroborated by all interviews 
conducted in the country, if there is a threat perceived in relation to the 
Brotherhood, it is that stemming from the neighbouring GCC countries, and their 
view of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization instead remains perceived in 
Doha as a legitimate political actor, legitimated by its vast popularity across the 
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region.979 ‘The Muslim Brotherhood, Islah and other affiliates are only hardline 
Islamists until they get power, then they become pragmatists. After 2011 some, 
especially in Abu Dhabi, have pushed the narrative of a connection between the 
Brotherhood and Khomeinism, but this was only a way to discredit Islamists as 
they were gaining popularity. The notion of a Caliphate may be there in both 
cases, but the Brotherhood is much more pragmatic in all countries where they 
are a political force’ argued an advisor to Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
author in 2018.980  
 
7.4 Qatar and the ‘jihadi threat’. 
Dissecting the perceptions of the Qatari leadership of the jihadi threat after 2011 
requires an acknowledgement of the scarce vulnerability of the country to jihadist 
attacks combined with the high vulnerability of the country’s cherished 
international reputation to accusations of ties with the jihadi groups themselves. 
Hence while these groups were not perceived to have the intent or capabilities to 
pose a political threat to the regime, they had the potential to represent pressing 
risks. 
The accusation of funding terrorism has been the central argument in the 
narrative pushed by quartet countries against Doha in the context of the 2017 
crisis.981 This narrative was chosen as the central attack line for two reasons: first 
and foremost, because it would have traction in the Western public opinion, 
traumatised by a string of terrorist attacks between 2014 and 2016 in Europe and 
beyond and, subsequently, on Western governments. Secondly because Qatar 
had already been accused, by international organizations and actors, of 
displaying a lax attitude to confronting terrorism financing. Most notably, in 2014, 
the US Department of Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence, David Cohen, accused Qatar in a public event of having become 
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‘such a permissive terrorist financing environment, that several major Qatar-
based fundraisers act as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising 
networks.’982 These comments echoed concerns expressed over the years by, 
for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose reports often argued 
that Qatar had been slow in publishing the relevant legislation and even slower 
in implementing it. Indeed, in 2008, the IMF reported that terrorist financing was 
criminalized in Qatar ‘in a limited way.’983 
The first robust law criminalizing terror financing, establishing a Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU), and founding a body to check on charities’ operations, the 
Qatari Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA) was passed in Qatar in 2004, 
three years after 9/11.984 The following significant piece of legislation, the 
Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law, was passed in 2010, 
requiring Qatar’s Public Prosecutor to freeze the funds of terrorist organizations 
as designated by the United Nations Security Council.985 However, two years 
later, not a single money laundering charge had been brought before the 
courts.986 In 2013 and 2014, there was a new push on the side of regulations. A 
law was passed on regulating hawalas, and providing regulatory oversight of the 
charitable sector. While formally the Qatari Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
monitored and licensed charities, and required their foreign partners to submit to 
a vetting and licensing process, a loophole guaranteed that charities operating 
from the Qatar Financial Center (QFC) be exempt from the process.987 However, 
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actions taken in the United States in late 2013 spurred Qatar to ramp up its anti-
terror policies. Not only did the US State Department describe Qatar's oversight 
of local donations to foreign organizations as ‘inconsistent’ and the country’s 
legislation as marred by ‘significant gaps’, in December that year the Treasury 
Department added few Qataris to its list of prominent terrorist financers.988 These 
included academic and businessman Abd al-Rahman al-Nuaymi, accused of 
ordering the transfer of nearly USD 600,000 to al-Qa'ida’s branch in Syria, of 
sending over 2 million USD per month to al-Qa’ida in Iraq - which would later 
morph into Daesh - to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and to al-
Shabab in Somalia. The list also included Muhammad `Abd al-Rahman al-
Humayqani, a Yemen-based fundraiser who used his position in the charitable 
community as a cover for funnelling financial support to AQAP.  
Following these reports, and the reputational damage created, Qatar stepped up 
its engagement with international bodies and partners, including in information 
exchange, and issued new laws. In 2014, an independent Charities Commission 
was established, including officials from several ministries as well as stipulating 
the scrutiny by the Qatar Central Bank on overseas transactions.989 That same 
year the Emir approved the Cybercrime Prevention Law, criminalising the use of 
any information network, including websites and social media, to establish 
communications with terrorist organizations, promote terrorist activities or solicit 
or enabling funding.990 Already in 2015 the law was activated when Qatari 
authorities shut down the Madad Ahl al-Sham online fundraising campaign, cited 
by Jabhat al-Nusra in August 2013 as one of the preferred conduits for donations 
intended to the group.991 However, that same year, the US Treasury Department 
added two more Qatari citizens, Abd Al Latif Bin ’Abdallah Salih Muhammad al-
Kawari and Sa’d bin Sa’d Muhammad Shariyan al-Ka’bi, to its list of designated 
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financiers of terrorism, accusing them of raising funds for Jabhat al-Nusra, and 
al-Qa’ida affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan.992 In response to those 
designations, and as the citizens were added to the UN’s al-Qa’ida Sanctions 
List, the Qatari government froze their assets and imposed travel bans on both.993 
While the US State Department continued to argue that entities and individuals 
within Qatar served as a source of financial support for extremist groups, the 
steps taken by the government were significant and Qatar was deemed 
“Compliant or Largely Compliant” in the Second Biennial Update Report of the 
Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (FATF).994 In 2015/2016 
Qatar also reinforced its participation to bilateral and international initiatives to 
combat terrorism: Doha became a full partner in the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS, providing significant support in facilitating U.S. military operations against 
the group, and played an instrumental role in the adoption of the “Doha 
Declaration,” committing the international community to focus on education to 
prevent extremism and crime, and pledging USD 49 million to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to deliver related projects.995 
Several factors may help explain what could be seen as a change of attitude on 
behalf of the Qatari government in its policies around the issue of terrorism 
financing. In particular one factor that seems relevant is the change of leadership 
that took place in Qatar in 2013, when Emir Tamim ascended to the throne. The 
young Emir seemed to have a discontinuous approach to Qatar’s regional policy, 
showing the willingness to scale back Doha’s involvement in regional conflicts.996 
Such involvement, especially in Syria, had gradually included the instrumental 
use of extremist groups to advance political objectives militarily, such as toppling 
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the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. This was a key objective for Qatar’s 
former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa who, consistently with his positions on the Arab 
Spring, in January 2012 became the first Arab leader to support a military 
intervention in Syria against Assad.997 A few months later, the international press 
started to publish news that Qatar, alongside Saudi Arabia, had engaged in 
sending funds and arms to the Free Syrian Army.998 In late 2012 Qatar hosted 
the Syrian opposition meeting where the National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, an umbrella of different opposition 
factions, was established.999 While Qatar favoured the Syrian affiliates to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, these candidates quickly emerged as not politically credible 
or sufficiently influential with on-the-ground opposition groups.1000 Partly also as 
a consequence of this inability to deliver political results, and amid international 
and regional pressures, primary responsibility engagement with the Syrian 
opposition passed from Qatar to Saudi Arabia in April 2013.1001 At the same time, 
individuals in Qatar saw a chance to defeat the Assad regime into the extremist 
Sunni militias, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra.1002 Jabhat al-
Nusra’s leader was even hosted for several interviewes on Al Jazeera and the 
group, regionally regarded as one of the most effective fighting forces in Syria, 
was allegedly engaged by Qatari benefactors as well as officials, who wanted to 
convince it to cut links with al-Qa’ida, something that they did in 2016.1003 As 
local, regional and international dynamics emerged in discouraging Qatar from 
pursuing assertive policies in Syria, including Russia’s intervention in the war and 
																																								 																				
997 Phillips. The battle for Syria. 
998 Martin Chulov, “Qatar crosses the Syrian Rubicon: £63m to buy weapons for the 
rebels” The Guardian, 1 March 2012, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/01/syria-conflict-rebels-qatar-weapons 
(accessed 20 July 2018) 
999 “The Syrian National Coalition: Motivations for its Formation and Building Blocks of 
Success”, Policy Analysis Unit, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 11 
December 2012, 
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The_Syrian_National_Coalition
_Motivations_for_its_Formation_and_Building_Blocks_of_Success.aspx (accessed 20 
July 2018) 
1000 Phillips, "Eyes Bigger than Stomachs”. 
1001 Mariam Karouny, “Saudi edges Qatar to control rebel support.” Reuters, 31 May 
2013 
www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531 
(accessed 20 July 2018) 
1002 David Roberts, “Is Qatar bringing the Nusra Front in from the cold?”, BBC, 6 March 




the 2014 intra-GCC crisis, a string of terrorist attacks in the region, Europe and 
beyond, definitely changed Qatar’s perspective on even critically engaging with 
extremist groups.  
A new momentum in Qatar’s policies on countering extremist groups came 
around to dispel the narrative pushed by the quartet during the 2017 GCC crisis. 
Already in July 2017, one month after the crisis, the Qatari Emir issued a new 
decree broadening the definition of terrorist activities, and creating two national 
terrorism lists with set rules for listing proscribed individuals and groups.1004 The 
two blacklists were published by the Ministry of Interior’s National Counter 
Terrorism Committee in October 2017 and March 2018 respectively.1005 The first 
one included eleven Yemeni citizens associated either with Daesh or al-Qa’ida in 
the Arabian Peninsula, and two Yemeni organizations, including Rahma Charity, 
an organization contained in the blacklists published by the quartet at the eve of 
the 2017 intra-GCC crisis. The second one included eleven Qatari citizens - four 
of whom had been blacklisted by the UN and the quartet - two Saudi citizens, two 
Jordanian citizens - also backlisted by the UN and the quartet - and four 
Egyptians, plus four Qatari, one Yemeni and one Egyptian organizations, all 
charged with financing terrorism. While a few names overlap with the quartet’s 
blacklists, Qatar’s lists did not include key figures associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in Egypt, Qatar or Libya, vocally targeted by the quartet.  
Despite these provisions, the mixed records in Qatar’s past policies to prevent 
terrorism financing, together with the temptations to instrumentally use extremist 
organizations for foreign policy objectives in Syria, suggest that Qatar’s post-
2011 perceptions of jihadi organizations might be better grasped through a 
nuanced approach. First and foremost it is worth noting that terrorist activity has 
historically been very low in Qatar. In fact, the country has been assessed to have 
a very low vulnerability to terrorist attacks: for instance Qatar has repeatedly 
scored around the zero in the Global Terrorism Index measuring vulnerability to 
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terrorism every year between 2014 to 2017.1006 Some of the conditions that 
favoured the rise of domestic terrorism, such as heated inter-sectarian relations 
that have invited attacks by Daesh in Saudi Arabia, are not present in the country. 
Moreover, Qatar’s demographics allows for a comprehensive monitoring of the 
population, backed by an assertive posture adopted by the State Security 
Bureau, the body tasked with preventing and disrupting terrorism-related 
activities. The country has restrictive immigration policies, screening passengers 
in transit as well as conducting extensive vetting and background checks on all 
applicants for work visas.1007 The attractiveness of terrorist groups to Qatari 
citizens has also been relatively low, as unofficial estimates indicate that, for 
instance, only a dozen militants allegedly joined Daesh from Qatar.1008 A senior 
professor of international relations and Gulf studies interviewed by the author in 
2019 argued that ‘Among Qataris there was initially some sympathy for the 
regional, political goals of jihadi organizations, especially in Syria. However, it 
quickly faded away once more information about the cruelty and extreme violence 
of the groups became available.’1009 
All considered, Qatar would seem to be scarcely vulnerable to terrorism, and this 
has largely reflected in the scarce mention of the topic as a domestic threat in 
public discourse and the media. To Qatar, jihadi organizations remain a risk 
rather than a threat capable to damage regime’s stability, and, specifically, an 
external risk. ‘Qatar does not face the same internal security threat from Daesh 
that other regional actors do’ writes, among others, Andrew Hammond in 
2014.1010 This has been validated often by public statements by Qatari officials 
describing Daesh as a threat to the region rather than to their own country.1011 
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When asked about the threat posed by jihadi organizations to their country, Qatari 
sources interviewed by the author in 2018, dismissed it as relatively uncritical.1012 
On the other hand, the suspected ties between high-profile individuals in Qatar 
and extremist groups have damaged the ‘Brand Qatar’.1013 Qatar has carefully 
tried to build an image as an international business hub, and thus both the 
degradation of security in the wider GCC at the hands of jihadi organizations and 
the associations of prominent Qataris as backers of such groups may translate 
into a potential economic risk for Qatar. 
 
7.5 Qatar’s security priorities after 2011 
As a Doha-based senior advisor to Qatar’s Ministry of Defence put it in a 2018 
interview with the author: ‘In 2017, the Qatari leadership perceived a real, full-
fledged security threat of the likes that hadn’t been perceived for a very long time 
in Doha. The intra-GCC crisis and how it was managed reminded them of the 
main challenge for Qatar’s security: that it is a small country, surrounded by big 
neighbours with an expansionist, hegemonic policy’.1014 In fact, there was a 
consensus among Qatari sources interviewed by the author that Qatar’s 
neighbors - first and foremost Saudi Arabia, but also the UAE – emerged, 
between 2014 and 2017, as the main sources of threats in the perceptions of 
Doha’s leadership.  
As analysed thorough this thesis, open competition among the GCC states, and 
a related sense of animosity, worsened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and 
escalated in the following months before erupting into the 2014 intra-GCC crisis. 
Within eight months of young Emir Tamim taking over, in February 2014, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in an open 
display of their irritation with Doha’s policies. Moreover, in Riyadh, Manama and 
Abu Dhabi, there was a strong belief that Father Emir Sheikh Hamad and other 
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powerful family members, such as former Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jassim Bin 
Jabr al-Thani, the architects of Doha’s maverick policies, were still leading the 
country from behind the scenes.1015 Already in 2014, media in the quartet 
countries had hinted at possible escalatory options that included sealing Qatar’s 
only land border, with Saudi Arabia, something that was executed three years 
later.1016 The Doha-based advisor at the Ministry of Defence interviewed by the 
author added that the Qatari military then was prepared for further escalations, 
including on the military front. At that time, according to President Obama’s 
Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and 
Speechwriting, Ben Rhodes, only pressures from the US prevented such 
escalation.1017 To placate its neighbors, Doha signed the Riyadh Agreements via 
Kuwaiti mediation, expelled a few exponents of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
including Amr Darrag, the Egyptian Brotherhoods's foreign relations officer, and 
Gamal Abdul Sattar, the former deputy head of Egypt's religious affairs 
directorate, and scaled back its involvement in regional politics.1018 Although 
Doha didn’t cut relations with the Brotherhood, from its perspective, the 
leadership believed it had made all the necessary compromises to repair relations 
with its neighbours.1019  
When, three years later, a new and much graver crisis erupted, the perception in 
Doha was that its GCC neighbours had taken advantage of an opportunity 
provided by a different White House administration, that of Donald Trump, to 
pursue a much more hostile scheme.1020 In an interview for The Washington Post 
dated February 2018, Qatar's Defence Minister, Khalid bin Mohammad al-
Attiyah, declared that the UAE and Saudi Arabia had intentions to intervene 
militarily against Qatar in June 2017.1021 A year later Saudi King Salman allegedly 
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reiterated the intention to intervene militarily should Qatar acquire the S-400 anti-
aircraft missiles from Russia.1022 The Defence Minister then stated: ‘They have 
tried everything. They tried to provoke the tribes. They used mosques against us. 
Then they tried to get some puppets to bring in and replace our leaders.’1023 
These few sentences sum up and voice the dominant perspective in Doha, that 
the main goal of the crisis was replacing the seating Emir with a more docile 
candidate, who would throw Doha’s financial and political capital behind the 
regional policy choices of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. ‘Saudi Arabia wanted to turn 
Qatar into another Bahrain: a Saudi province with no sovereignity’, stated a senior 
researcher at the Al Jazeera Center for Studies.1024 According to several Qatari 
sources, this was a long-term objective of Saudi Arabia, that attempted to keep 
Qatar in its shadows since the country’s establishment in 1971.  
At that time, overseeing Qatar’s independence was Emir Ahmed bin Ali al-Thani, 
unseated six months later by a candidate from a different branch of the al-Thani 
family, Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani. Emir Khalifa had a conciliatory approach to 
regional politics, seeking to ensure the security of small and militarily weak Qatar 
by aligning closely and comprehensively with its ‘big brother’ Riyadh, i.e. 
‘bandwagoning’.1025 However, already under Khalifa’s rule, the influential Crown 
Prince Hamad bin Khalifa had been working to diversify Qatar’s relations in order 
to create space for a more independent foreign policy, moving from 
‘bandwagoning’ to ‘hedging’.1026 Amid the prospect of an Arab-Iranian détente, 
pursued by Iran’s President Rafsanjani, Hamad agreed to build a pipeline from 
Iran’s Karun mountains to import fresh water to Qatar.1027  In the aftermath of the 
Oslo Accords, Hamad also attempted to upgrade Qatar-Israel relations.1028 Most 
importantly, in 1992, Qatar signed a defence cooperation agreement with the 
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United States that included a transfer of US military personnel from Saudi Arabia 
to Al Udeid Air Base, not far from the royal palace in Doha.1029 That same year, 
border skirmishes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar broke out in Khafus.1030 In 
1995, Hamad took over from his father in a bloodless coup. Qatar’s neighbours 
were adamant at the time that Sheikh Khalifa be returned to his position, acutely 
aware of the challenge represented by Hamad.1031 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
allegedly supported at least one counter coup, enlisting dozens of members from 
the al-Ghufran branch of the al-Murrah tribe, the largest tribe in Qatar and one 
that has both Qatari and Saudi connections, to overthrow the new Emir. 1032  
Once the counter-coup was foiled, Emir Hamad consolidated his position and 
doubled-down on making controversial decisions and devoting his efforts to 
disenfranchising Qatar from Riyadh’s shadow. In 1996, a milestone in this project 
was the establishment of the global satellite network Al Jazeera. While Al Jazeera 
was founded primarily to boost the state’s soft power, it was also a vehicle to 
undermine Saudi Arabia’s regional leadership: the channel started hosting Saudi 
dissidents and putting into question Saudi policies to the point that Riyadh 
removed its Ambassador from Doha in 2002 and for six years as a way of 
pressuring Qatar.1033 Additionally, Hamad was the man behind the idea of 
developing Qatar’s LNG industry and becoming a major energy source for the 
world’s most powerful states, for instance supplying the United Kingdom with 
one-third of its LNG imports and China with one-fifth, among others.1034 Coupled 
with steadily rising oil and gas prices, especially the price boom of the early 
2000s, Doha could rely on huge revenues to invest in strategic assets around the 
world, creating an internationally recognisable brand for Qatar. Financial 
resources were also a key instrument in a diplomatic offensive, dubbed riyal-
politik, that allowed Qatar to broker high-profile deals in the first decade of 2000, 
as well as play out its post-Arab Spring strategy. It is in this context that decision-
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makers in Doha look at the decision to close all land and sea borders between 
Qatar and its neighbours in 2017. 
In fact, it was highly probable that the measures might have prevented Qatar from 
exporting its LNG cargoes, cutting off the main source of revenues for the state, 
in 2016 depending on hydrocarbon revenue for over 70 percent.1035 When, on 
June 5th, vessels flying the Qatari flag, coming from or going to Qatar, were not 
allowed to transit through the UAE’s territorial waters or call at Emirati ports, 
which serve as regional bunkering or re-fueling hubs, Qatar’s energy industry 
risked to be crippled. Only Iran’s willingness to allow transit through its territorial 
waters and Oman’s willingness to welcome vessels in its ports, allowed Qatar to 
preserve its fundamental energy trade. This was also possible due to the political 
posture of the big Asian and European powers depending on Qatari gas, 
including China, Japan and the United Kingdom, keen on avoiding disruptions to 
their supplies.1036 However, the re-routing of energy trade, came with costs that 
had to be sustained by the Qatari state. Similarily, re-arranging imports away from 
the land border with Saudi Arabia, was a challenge. Approximately 80 percent of 
Qatar’s food needs transited through that border and the Qatari government had 
to quickly arrange air-lifting food, as well as other goods, from Turkey and Iran, 
with a significant increase in expenditure.1037 The financial sector was also 
impacted, as banks from the quartet began removing term deposits held in Qatar. 
Three months after the crisis, rating agency Moody’s stated that Qatar had 
injected more than $40bn out of its state reserves to support its economy and 
financial system, and Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, Qatar Investment 
Authority, had liquidated foreign assets for more than USD 20bn, to inject them 
in the domestic banking system.1038 Although, a year later, economic data 
showed the resilience of Qatar’s financial system as well as its domestic 
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economy, with the GDP growing by approximately 2 percent, there is no denying 
that such resilience required diverting financial resources inwards.1039 This was 
perceived as one of the key objectives of the quartet in Doha: by draining the 
surplus in Qatari resources invested in its regional riyal-politik, the quartet aimed 
at downsizing, if not neutralising, Qatar’s role in regional politics.1040 In addition, 
creating economic and financial damage was perceived in Qatar as a way to 
induce members of the al-Thani royal family, heavily invested in international 
business, to support an alternative candidate to the throne or to pressure Emir 
Tamim to comply with the quartet’s demands. 
Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have pushed and supported alternative, more 
accomodating, figures within Qatar’s al-Thani royal family as challengers to the 
throne. Already in June 2017, Abu Dhabi’s The National promoted a little known 
descendent from Emir Sheikh Ahmed Bin Ali, who was deposed in 1972, Sheikh 
Saud Bin Nasser al-Thani as ‘Qatar’s leading opposition figure’.1041 As months 
went by, other royal dissidents were presented as legitimate heirs, most of them 
having strong commercial interests in Saudi Arabia and being willing to publicly 
back the quartet’s measures against Doha, including Sultan bin Suhaim al-Thani 
and Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali al-Thani.1042 The aim was to provide the al-Thani 
royal family - as well as the Qatari population and tribes - with a new leader to 
pledge their loyalty to. As with regards to the royal family, in the beginning, the 
intra-GCC crisis did elicit an internal dispute, with some members recommending 
Qatar’s full acceptance of the quartet’s demands and others advocating 
accepting Iranian protection.1043 A senior professor of international relations and 
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Gulf studies interviewed by the author in 2019 stated that: ‘The al-Thanis used to 
be the most fractious royal family in the GCC so when the crisis erupted there 
was the concrete possibility that a challenger of the Emir would emerge among 
the family. But instead they closed ranks.’1044 While Emir Hamad had a policy of 
keeping his inner family circle tight, including by giving out government positions 
and wealth, Emir Tamim chose a cabinet with the fewest royal family members 
compared to past governments, preferring technocrats, and centralised oversight 
in his office (Diwan).1045 However, despite the divergences, the family by and 
large stood behind Emir Tamim, also encouraged by the strong popular support 
shown towards the Emir, as the crisis triggered an outpouring of ‘rally-round-the-
flag’ nationalism.1046 
While the population was, largely speaking, cohesive in its loyalty to the 
incumbent rulers, the leadership in Doha did perceive a social dimension in the 
threat posed by the intra-GCC crisis, in terms of the attempt to target tribal unity. 
In particular, a red flag was raised after a meeting between leaders of the al-
Murrah tribe, the same clan involved in the 1996 attempted coup, and Saudi 
Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in Jeddah in the summer of 2017.1047 
Tribal leader Sheikh Taleb Bin Lahom Bin Shuraim, who was among those 
meeting the Saudi Crown Prince, later stated in an interview with Dubai-based, 
Saudi-owned outlet Al-Arabiya, that the Qatari authorities had turned Qatar into 
a ‘haven for terrorists and their sponsors’.1048 In a widely circulated video, a Qatari 
royal dissident denounced the Qatari Emir before thousands of tribesmen 
assembled on the Saudi-Qatar border. ‘While the state has largely coopted Qatari 
tribes over the decades, by granting them access to resources and validation of 
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their tribal identity, there was considerable sensitivity in 2017 towards tribal 
groups. The Emir forbade tribes to celebrate Qatar’s National Day divided by clan 
and had them celebrate altogether to provide a show of unity and highlight their 
allegiance to the Qatari state. Given how most tribes in Qatar originally come 
from Saudi Arabia and how many have maintained relations with the Kingdom, 
they were looked upon with suspicion.’1049 Consequently, in September 2017, 55 
members of the al-Murrah tribe were stripped of Qatari citizenship.1050 As an 
extreme measure used to punish disloyalty, the revocation of the citizenship 
highlights how the instrumentalization of cross-border tribes employed as socio-
political ammunition against a government remains perceived as a source of 
serious intermestic risk for the leadership in Qatar. 
In conclusions, the intra-GCC crises, and the initiatives pursued by the quartet 
countries, have been perceived in Doha as a substantial external threat, intended 
to become an intermestic one. The quartet countries, from Doha’s perspective, 
targeted the regime’s stability and identity, as well as the functional integrity of 
the country’s boundaries and its institutions. Politically, the quartet countries 
initiated a campaign intended to damage the image of the Qatari leadership at 
the domestic, regional and international level, by arguing, in international media 
and fora, that Doha was a major supporter of terrorism. They directly challenged 
the regime’s stability and identity, when proposing alternative candidates for the 
throne, while questioning the political and religious legitimacy of the seating Emir, 
as well as his capacity to govern. Sealing all land, sea and air borders with Qatar, 
and cutting all economic and financial relations, also given the level of  integration 
of the GCC economies, they posed a substantial economic threat. Though the 
rumours and intimidations of a possible military invasion, they added a military 
dimension in the perceptions of the Qatari regime, which in fact invested in 2018 
in upgrading its air defences capabilities.1051 Finally, the attempt of involving 
cross-border tribes in the dispute was perceived as adding a social dimension to 
the threat, for its potential to disrupt the national fabric of Qatar. The fact that the 
Qatari population, generally speaking, seemed to remain receptive to the 
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leadership’s message of unity at the most vulnerable moment in contemporary 
politics, was evidence that, similarly to what happened during the 2011 Arab 
uprisings, threats do not easily propagate from the regional to the domestic level 
in Qatar, where socio-economic and socio-political vulnerabilities are, largely 
speaking, contained. On the other hand, the experience of the crisis has 
indoubtedly heightened, for the Doha regime, the perception of geopolitical 
vulnerability to exogenous dangers, viewed as capable to affect the country at a 




















8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: KUWAIT. 
 
Kuwait’s posture in the context of the 2014 and 2017 intra-GCC crises is 
particularly relevant to the theme of this thesis. Rather than aligning with the anti-
Qatar bloc, as mentioned, Kuwait has served as the principal mediator between 
the parties both in 2014 and 2017.1052 In October 2017 Kuwait’s Emir Sabah al-
Ahmad al-Jaber al-Ṣabah declared to the National Assembly, Kuwait’s 
Parliament, that: ‘Contrary to our wishes and hopes, the Gulf crisis has the 
potential of escalating. Therefore, all of us must be fully aware of its potential 
consequences. (…) Any escalation will bring with it an outright call for regional 
and international intervention, which will destroy the security of the Gulf and its 
people.’1053 Kuwait’s hypersensitive position vis-à-vis a possible escalation could 
be explained by dissecting its leadership’s security perceptions on the issues at 
the centre of the crisis, amid the background of the country’s geopolitical profile, 
its history, and the experience with the Arab Spring. 
Kuwait is a small country: in 2018 Kuwait's Central Statistical Bureau estimated 
the country's total population to be 4,226,920 - with immigrants accounting for 
more than 69.5 percent1054 - and a diverse national fabric, including a large Shi’a 
minority of roughly 28 percent of the population.1055 The country borders two of 
the largest players in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and is located very 
proximate to Iran. In its history, Kuwait has suffered repercussions from the 
confrontation between these larger players, or their ambitions, and consistently 
built its security perceptions around them.1056 For instance, according to a Kuwaiti 
professor specialised in sectarianism, ‘The impact of the Iran-Iraq war in Kuwait 
was formidable. In the 1980s it wasn’t rare to see the Shi’a houses with pictures 
of Ayatollah Khomeini on the wall, and the Sunnis’ with pictures of Saddam 
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Hussein.’1057 The most pressing security trauma suffered by the country, 
embedded in its collective memory, has been the invasion by Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq, in 1990.1058 The current Emir was, at the time, in the position of Foreign 
Minister, a capacity in which he served between 1963 and 2003, until he became 
the country’s leader in 2006. A few years earlier, in 1981, he had played a key 
role in the very founding of the GCC, which, as previously discussed, was 
conceived as a defence mechanism against regional threat.1059 This was 
especially so in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran, that triggered 
a string of terrorist attacks within Kuwait.1060 The idea that GCC unity is key to 
confront common challenges, has remained a centrepiece of the Emir’s discourse 
on the most recent crises as well.1061According to several interviewees, the Emir’s 
professional background strongly impacts his security calculus and perception of 
threats.1062 A Kuwaiti historian interviewed in 2019 stated that: ‘Due to his central 
role in the history of regional integration at the level of the Arab Gulf monarchies, 
Emir Sabah has consistently seen GCC unity as a shield from regional instability 
and opposed the institution’s shattering led by a younger generation of 
leaders.’1063 A professor of international relations at Kuwait University stated: 
‘The Emir has remained, at his heart, a diplomat. He believes that fragmentation 
is thoroughly negative for Kuwait and that he could leverage his decades-long 
political experience on the international scene, and the respect that his seniority 
gives him with his counterparts in the region, to mediate the intra-GCC crises.’1064  
In the Riyadh Agreements, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain identified Iran and 
Iran-backed Shi’a actors, jihadi and Islamist groups as forces capable of 
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disrupting regional security. By cutting relations with Qatar over these groups, the 
three GCC states framed the danger posed by those groups as more pressing 
than the insecurity potentially deriving from weakening GCC unity. On the 
contrary, by insisting on finding a compromise and repairing GCC unity, Kuwait 
somehow de-prioritised those three actors as sources of threat. The hypothesis 
here advanced will be that the Kuwaiti regime holds divergent perceptions vis-à-
vis those of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain regarding the degree to which 
the three aforementioned actors represent compelling and pressing security 
threats. These perceptions will be dissected, through the prism of this thesis’ 
theoretical framework, in the three central paragraphs of this chapter, preceded 
by a paragraph looking at the impact of the Arab Spring, the related socio-
economic and socio-political vulnerabilities and how they might inform the 
leadership’s perceptions. In the final paragraph, this chapter will argue that the - 
further - polarization of regional politics, making regional players more 
aggressive, is perceived as the major threat to Kuwait’s security by its leadership.  
 
8.1 Kuwait and the Arab Spring. 
The protests erupted in 2011 in Kuwait cannot be singled out from a much longer 
tradition of political movements meant to counter-balance the power of the royal 
family, sporadically surfacing since the beginning of the 20th century.1065 The 
latest string of political activism can be dated back at least to the ascension of 
Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber to power in 2006.1066 That same year a group of 
Kuwaiti youth started organising public protests calling for the amendment of the 
electoral system, to reduce the number of constituencies from twenty-five to five, 
as they believed that smaller district sizes provided the regime with a better 
chance of corrupting voters to influence the elections’ results.1067 A few hundred 
men and women started gathering - many wearing orange t-shirts and waving 
orange flags, hence the name Orange Movement – in key locations around 
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Kuwait, including Saif Palace.1068 Having put forward an unsuccessful attempt at 
compromising, and in the face of the MPs’ intention to grill the Prime Minister 
Skheikh Nasser Mohammed Al-Sabah, something unprecedented, on the issue, 
the Emir dissolved the Parliament.1069 Government supporters failed to win 
enough seats in the new parliament and the electoral law was changed to reduce 
the number of districts to five. However, allegations of corruption, gerrymandering 
and bribing continued, and crystallised around the figure of the Prime Minister, 
who, in the words of a young Kuwaiti activist, ‘used to conspire with the merchants 
to buy MPs, using the National Assembly to further particular interests upsetting 
the constitutional dynamics on power-sharing in Kuwait’.1070  
MPs attempted to impeach the Prime Minister, staunchly shielded by the Emir, 
six times between 2006 and 2009, when the campaign coalesced around a 
second social movement named Irhal (Leave).1071 Kuwaiti youth groups of liberal 
inspiration, such as Kafi (Enough) and al-Soor al-Khames (Fifth Fence), joined 
the protests since March 2011.1072 Crucially, the corruption suspicions were 
aggravated by the dissatisfaction of citizens with the pace of socio-economic 
development in the country and the deterioration of public services, 
notwithstanding the average high standard of life.1073 In spite of a period of high 
oil prices since the early 2000s, that brought the price of a Kuwaiti oil barrel to 
almost $110 at the beginning of 2011, the building of infrastructures, such as a 
new hospital, had been stalled for several years.1074 Additionally, tens of 
thousands of families had long been on a waiting list for housing services and 
power cuts in some poorer suburbs of the capital were common, even during the 
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was shared also by the Islamist-leaning opposition, including the political society 
close to the Muslim Brotherhood (Hadas), who saw Sheikh Nasser’s government 
as too complacent with the Iranian regime at the expense of Kuwait’s relations 
with other GCC countries.1076 This idea was reinforced by the alignment between 
the government and the MPs representing Kuwait’s Shi’a minority in the National 
Assembly, who were amongst the few supporting Sheikh Nasser in the face of 
opposition. Already in June 2011, Islamist opposition MPs questioned the Prime 
Minister and then entered a motion against his office.1077 The tipping point was a 
scandal in September 2011 where it was alleged that close to $350 million 
(Dh1.28 billion) in public funds had been deposited in personal bank accounts of 
15 MPs to secure their vote on crucial issues, in order for them to push the 
agenda of the ruling al-Sabah family, and the PM was responsible.1078 This was 
the trigger to new, larger, stronger and more sustained protests that we could 
identify as Kuwait’s Arab Spring. 
For three months, hundreds of citizens protested each week outside of the 
National Assembly building and, on the night of November 16, hundreds of 
protestors, led by opposition lawmakers, stormed the building of the National 
Assembly in a brief raid.1079 They called for the fall of the Prime Minister, sang 
the national anthem, and left. It was the climax of the movement, and at least 45 
people were later arrested. Hours after the storming of the Parliament, the Emir 
called an emergency meeting of the cabinet and issued orders to the Ministry of 
Interior and the National Guard to take all necessary measures to confront 
‘attempts to undermine the country's public order’. 1080 After 10 days from the raid, 
the Emir caved in and accepted the resignation of the controversial Prime 
Minister, and its entire cabinet, and called for new elections in 2012.1081  
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Groups of Kuwaiti youth continued to be active during the electoral campaign, 
throwing their support behind candidates who would accept their calls for greater 
political freedom in the country, including the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy and the legalisation of political parties.1082 In this environment, the 
opposition won thirty-five seats in February 2012 and became the majority in the 
National Assembly, an unprecedented circumstance in the history of the 
country.1083 Musallam al-Barrak, one the most prominent leader in the tribal-
Islamist opposition,1084 won more votes than any politician in Kuwait’s history.1085 
However, only four months later, the Constitutional Court declared those 
elections invalid, basing its decision on a technicality, and reinstated the previous 
parliament originally elected in 2009, which included more government 
supporters.1086 The court ruling immediately revamped protests: on June 27, 
2012, tens of thousands of demonstrators took Kuwait City's Erada square and 
subsequently, opposition MPs blocked the work of Parliament boycotting its 
sessions, prompting the Emir to dissolve it in October 2012.1087 Voices spread 
that the Emir intended to amend the electoral law once again, allowing voters to 
vote for one candidate instead of four, a system that would push candidates to 
focus on their own campaigns rather than on building alliances, and which 
ultimately reduced the opportunity for the opposition to become the majority in 
the National Assembly.1088 The rumours triggered two reactions: the creation of 
another political movement, Karamat Watan (Dignity of the Nation) and a fierce 
speech given by Musallam al-Barrak, on October 15, 2012, warning the Emir 
against issuing the decree, considered an authoritarian act.1089 His words, 
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including the famous sentence ‘We will not allow you, your highness,’ brought 
upon al-Barrak a sentence of two years imprisonment for criticising the Emir, in 
breach of Article 54 of the Kuwaiti Constitution which declares the Emir ‘immune 
and inviolable’.1090 Despite the popularity of the speech, the Emir in fact issued a 
decree to change the electoral system to ‘one person, one vote’ his prerogative 
under a state of national emergency, previously declared and largely 
contested.1091 On October 21, 2012 more than 100 protesters were injured as 
police attempted to break up a demonstration that, according to opposition 
leaders, was the largest in Kuwait's history with more than 100,000 people taking 
part.1092 The al-Sabah family council subsequently released a statement in the 
state news agency KUNA's English service reading ‘His Highness the Crown 
Prince, in his capacity as President of the Council, would ... like to assert His 
Highness the Emir's right to be obeyed,’ citing a Koranic verse calling on believers 
to obey the Prophet ‘and those charged with authority among you’.1093 This 
episode significantly scaled back the protests, that moved from the streets to the 
political and judiciary chambers of Kuwait’s institutions. 
Another string of protests took place in Kuwait in 2011, parallel but separate to 
the ones centered on corruption: the protests of the bidoons. Estimated to be 
120,000 bidoons – Arabic for ‘without’– are residents with no citizenship and 
political rights nor access to public services, all granted to Kuwaiti citizens.1094 Up 
until the 1980s the bidoons mostly worked, just as the other Kuwaiti citizens, in 
public sectors, such as energy or security.1095 Their status changed markedly 
after the first Gulf War, in 1991, when the Kuwaiti government adopted policies 
incrementally stripping the bidoons of a number of rights.1096 Since then bidoons 
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do not qualify for government jobs, and are thus often forced to low paid, low 
skilled irregular work in the black market or unemployment.1097 Their lack of 
citizenship status also precludes to them the right to government welfare – 
including free housing, education and healthcare, or to access the conspicuous 
subsidies offered to the citizens.  
On February 19, 2011 a few hundred bidoons protested their second-class status 
in Jahra and Sulaibiya, the northern impoverished periphery of Kuwait City, where 
many bidoons reside.1098 Security forces used water cannons to disperse 
demonstrators, who responded by throwing stones. After the demonstrations, 
approximately thirty people were wounded and fifty were arrested.1099 
Demonstrations continued in March 2011, with marches on the outskirts of Kuwait 
city and in the southern oil city of Ahmadi. The response of the security forces 
became even more heavy-handed: protesters were dispersed with tear gas and 
hundreds of riot police, dozens of armoured vehicles and helicopters were 
deployed to the bidoon areas of Kuwait City.1100 In December 2011 the 
government tried to defuse tensions with some concessions, stating that 
citizenship may be granted to 34,000 out of the estimated 120,000 stateless 
people living in the country.1101 The statement, deemed insufficient, prompted a 
new row of demonstrations, culminating in January 2012 with massive rallies in 
Jahra and Sulaibiya.1102 This time the government resorted to draconian 
measures: the Interior Minister Sheikh Ahmad al-Humud al-Sabah announced 
that the bidoons who took part in the protests might be deported, dismissed from 
the army and the police force, evicted from housing provided by the 
government.1103 Other measures included the confiscation of their only form of 
identification, and the cancellation of their applications for Kuwaiti nationality. 
Since these measures were adopted, the bidoons scaled back their protest 
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movement.1104 A total of around 200 stateless individuals were arrested on 
different charges in the period from 2011 to 2013. Despite some rhetorical 
openings, the government rejected three times the proposal to naturalise a few 
thousands bidoons in the years between 2011 and 2017 and, instead, devised a 
plan to offer some of them Comoros citizenship with residence permits for Kuwait: 
they would not be Kuwaiti citizens but would qualify for free education and 
healthcare.1105  
The events of 2011 uncovered several vulnerabilities impacting political stability 
in Kuwait. On the bidoons, the harsh crackdown on the community together with 
the leadership’s hesitant and inconclusive policy response to those grievances 
arguably exposed the magnitude of the socio-political and socio-economic 
vulnerabilities that they represent for the regime.1106 The bidoons attempted to 
underline their nationalism and allegiance to Kuwait’s Emir, by ‘waving the 
country's flag and clutching pictures of the Emir’ as they protested’, to highlight 
how their struggle was not about insurgency but about the institutionalised lack 
of socio-political inclusiveness and the systematic socio-economic 
inequalities.1107 However, from the regime’s perspective, these demands were 
perceived as dangerous. A Kuwaiti political economist stated: ‘In a country of 1.2 
million citizens, adding around 100,000 citizens, with all the subsidies and welfare 
entitlements, could have a toll on the public finance whose status already pushed 
citizens into the streets, and most importantly alter the delicate balance of the 
national fabric, and political equilibrium in elected institutions. Jahra, an area 
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populated by both bidoons and tribes, is already the largest electoral district in 
the country.’1108  
From the parallel protests taking place around the National Assembly instead, 
what emerged was a constellation of actors, arguably with different interests but 
a common dissatisfaction with the status quo. Royal factionalism played a role, 
as royals marginalised by Emir Sabah, attempted to instrumentalise dissent 
against the Prime Minister in their favour.1109 The youth groups pushed against 
elites corruption, perceived to be at the root of dissatisfactory economic 
development, and against abuse of power, as the royal family was perceived to 
be unfairly manipulating the parliamentary system.1110 Tribal-Islamist groups, led 
by Musallam al-Barrak, instead, were also arguably seeking to accrue more 
power and influence by aligning with the youth.1111 Since the mid-2000s Kuwait’s 
tribal communities, the single youngest and largest group among Kuwaiti 
nationals, had been engaged in an escalation with the government, including via 
their vocal representatives in parliamentary opposition.1112 The events of 2011 
thus aggravated a long-standing, deep fault line – and socio-political vulnerability 
- within Kuwait’s national fabric: that between Hadhar (urban people – those 
whose forefathers lived in Kuwait before the advent of the oil era in 1946) and the 
Badu (tribespeople – immigrants of who were naturalised naturalised between 
1965 and 1981).1113 
In contrast to other scenes from the region, the youth and opposition groups, 
even while storming the Parliament, sang the national anthem, which praises the 
ruling family: Kuwait expert Kristin Diwan explained this with ‘Kuwaiti activists are 
not seeking regime overthrow, rather something even more rare: a genuine 
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constitutional monarchy.1114 All of the interviewees of the author agreed that, for 
all of its shortcomings, the Kuwaiti political system in a way guaranteed its own 
resilience and elections served as effective avenues to channel popular 
grievances.1115 They also remarked that Kuwait was not new to popular 
movements, but, as a government official said, ‘this movement had two key 
features: it was remarkably cross-coalitional, and was partly led by the strongest 
oppositional group in the country, that of tribal Islamists.’1116 These are the key 
elements to bear in mind how the 2011 protests represented a most sensitive 
context, in which vulnerabilities came to the surface for the Kuwaiti regime, and 
the backdrop against which the regime perceived the other issues object of this 
research.  
 
8.2 Kuwait and the ‘Shi’a threat’.  
Similarly to other GCC governments, the Kuwaiti regime’s perceptions of the 
‘Shi’a threat’ are connected to the government’s relations with the local Shi’a 
communities, the historical background of interactions with Iran, the individual 
cognition of the leadership in both countries, and topical events.  
Iran was among the first countries to recognize Kuwait after it gained 
independence in 1961, and Muhammad Reza Shah supported Kuwait as Iraq 
refused to recognize its sovereignty and demanded its annexation.1117 At that 
time, Kuwaiti Shi’a had had their place in the country’s politics for decades 
already: since the establishment of the first elected legislative assembly - or Majlis 
- in 1938, Kuwaiti Shi’a had seated in the institution and represented a politically 
engaged community in Kuwait’s complex semi-democratic system.1118 The Shi’a 
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community in Kuwait includes prominent merchant families owning large 
conglomerates – including Al Kazemi International, Marafie Group and Morad 
Yousuf Behbehani Group – well positioned to claim influence on politics.1119 
Although participating in different political groups - often competing with one 
another - Kuwaiti Shi’a have, largely speaking, adopted common positions in key 
instances.1120 For instance, when the first Majlis was dissolved by Emir Ahmed 
al-Jabir al-Sabah, in 1938, the Shi’a supported the Emir against other Majlis 
members, mostly Sunni Arab notables, who demanded the institutionalization of 
their participation in the decision-making process.1121 Likewise, when the Al 
Sabah family had to confront the rising influence of Arab nationalists, rulers again 
relied on Shi’a elites as a counterweight to the political challenges.1122 Amid this 
non-confrontational environment, a significant shift took place with the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. 
The 1979 revolution came as a shock for Kuwaiti rulers: as a small state, Kuwait 
first tried to navigate the transition from the Shah towards the Islamic regime 
without attracting excessive hostility from Tehran.1123 However, in the aftermath 
of the revolution, a wave of unrest swept Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s 
Shi’a provinces as Tehran backed transnational Shi’a activism, attempting to 
export the revolutionary upheaval across the region.1124 The Kuwaiti Shi’a 
communities split: on one hand merchants, who remained pro-status quo in their 
political activities, on the other hand radical groups, such as the followers of Iraqi 
Shi’a cleric Mohammed Mahdi al-Shirazi, the Shiraziyyun, who perpetrated 
political violence in the country.1125 The authorities reacted harshly, including 
through imprisonment and citizenship revocation.1126 The entire al-Muhri family, 
whose head Abbas al-Muhri had emerged as a community leader for restive Shi’a 
and had been appointed by Ayatollah Khomeini as his representative in Kuwait, 
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was deported to Iran.1127 Relations between the authorities and the Shi’a 
worsened even more with the Iran–Iraq war between 1980 and 1988. The Kuwaiti 
government was fearful still of a revolutionary contagion, as well as of the 
implications of an Iranian territorial occupation of Iraq.1128 Kuwait was hence a 
major supporter of the Iraqi regime, providing about $15 billion in financial 
assistance and aid, and selling US missiles to Baghdad.1129 Iran reacted by 
symmetrical and asymmetrical means. Tehran allegedly supported transnational 
Shi’a groups, such as Islamic Jihad, to carry on attacks in Kuwait, including 
against the US and French embassies, and a tremendously significant attempt 
on the life of the then Emir, Jabir al-Ahmad, in 1985.1130 In the late 1980s, Iranian 
missiles were launched at Kuwaiti targets, including an oil port, and dozens of 
Kuwaiti oil tankers were attacked, pushing Kuwait to expel Iranian diplomats and 
negotiate with international powers the re-flagging of its oil tankers.1131 When Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990, the calculus changed again. This was both because Iran 
stood with Kuwait against its Iraqi foes, and because Kuwaiti Shi’a actively 
participated to rebuke Iraqi forces, calling for the return of the ruling family from 
exile after the liberation of Kuwait.1132 The 1990 invasion had the effect of unifying 
Kuwaitis, including the Shi’a communities, behind the al-Sabah and against an 
external threat.1133  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, relations between Kuwait and Iran under the 
presidency of reformist Mohammad Khatami, entered a constructive phase, 
punctuated by an exchange of bilateral visits and agreements, including the 2003 
security cooperation treaty on smuggling and piracy.1134 In 2007 the two countries 
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established a committee to coordinate cooperation in the political, economic, 
social, security, cultural and scientific arenas.1135 The security landscape at the 
domestic level in Kuwait was stable, although the political scene remained 
heated. In the early 2000s one of the alleged masterminds of the earlier string of 
terrorist attacks in Kuwait, known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, reappeared as 
leader of Kata’eb Hezbollah, the main proxy of Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC)’s elite Qods Force, formed in 2004 to be the Hezbollah of post-
Saddam Iraq and the Gulf.1136 Another group, al-Tahaluf al-Islami al-Watani (the 
Islamic National Alliance), openly identifying as followers of Ayatollah Khomeini 
and Khamenei, emerged to become the most influential Shi’a group in the local 
political arena.1137 The Islamic National Alliance MPs cooperated with other 
parliamentarians in establishing a oppositional block called Kutlat al-‘Amal al-
Shabi (Popular Block) and actively participated in the 2006 Orange Movement, 
which forced the government to reform the electoral system.1138  
Between 2006 and 2008, however, the alignment of Shi’a political groups 
changed again. In 2006, the Emir appointed Sheikh Nasser Mohammed as the 
country’s Prime Minister. A former Ambassador to Iran, Sheikh Nasser had long 
been close to the Shi’a communities as well as key players in Iran.1139 This 
encouraged him to build a coalition with Shi’a political groups, turning them into 
a pro‑government voting group, to offset Sunni and tribal political groups who, 
since the 2008 general elections, had increasingly become oppositional both 
against the government and the Shi’a communities.1140 This alliance with the 
regime was convenient for the Shi’a community, seeking protection from the 
wave of sectarian hostility sweeping the country after a group of Shi’a MPs had 
participated to the commemoration of Hezbollah commander ‘Imad Mughniyya, 
‘a controversial figure largely thought to be the mastermind behind the hijacking 
of two Kuwait Airways flights in the 1980s.’ 1141 Indeed, when the two reformist 
movements Irhal and Karamat Watan organized protests, most of the Shi’a did 
not participate and some even advocated for the authorities to crack down on 
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them.1142 Similarly, while individual Kuwaiti Shi’a, especially young citizens, 
participated in demonstrations of dissent in 2011, the Shi’a MPs have sided with 
the al-Sabah ruling family, even supporting the Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser in 
the various grillings he faced between 2008 and 2011.1143 Kuwaiti Shi’a stood by 
the government and the ruling family at a vulnerable time, at the cost of attracting 
sectarian hostility by other segments of the society.1144 This loyalty, in turn, 
helped inform the perceptions of the leadership on the lack of a Shi’a threat from 
within the country and, therefore, arguably, the leadership’s approach to Iran in 
contemporary times.1145 
Following the election of moderate Hassan Rouhani as Iranian President in June 
2013 and the subsequent signing of the interim nuclear deal, Kuwait tried very 
early-on to revamp its commercial – and political – relations with Iran. Kuwait’s 
Emir Sabah al-Sabah, went on an official visit to Tehran in June 2014, even 
before the JCPOA was signed, meeting with the country’s Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the President. The official news agency of Kuwait 
published a joint statement at the end of the visit defining the positive outcomes 
of the meeting as ‘an important turning point in the relations between the two 
countries’.1146 It was the Emir’s first official visit to Iran since assuming power in 
January 2006, and the first by any Kuwaiti Emir since the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
Kuwait noticeably did not join Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in cutting off diplomatic 
relations with Iran after tensions surged following to the assaults to the Saudi 
diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad that took place amid the Saudi 
execution of the Shi’a cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January 2016.1147 In early 2017 
Kuwait’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Khaled al-Sabah, visited Teheran 
and carried with him a letter from Emir Sabah to President Rouhani that sought 
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to establish the ‘basis for dialogue’ between the GCC and Iran. According to a 
Kuwaiti diplomat, it is to that end that Kuwait exerted efforts to negotiate between 
the warring parties on Yemen: ‘While we are part of the Saudi-led coalition in 
Yemen, our role has been non-combat, but focused on humanitarian aid and 
trying to leverage our good relations with all parties to spur negotiations.’1148 At 
the time of his visit, Sheikh Sabah commented, ‘There is a genuine willingness 
and desire to have normal and fair relations with Iran.’1149 While the economic 
ties between the countries are not strong - according to the Iranian Ambassador 
to Kuwait bilateral trade stood at $400 million in 2015 - the two countries have 
common strategic interests in the energy sector, with Kuwait eager to import gas 
and fresh water from Iran.1150  
However, a string of events between 2015 and 2017 shook this attempted 
rapprochement. In August 2015 Kuwait’s security forces discovered a large 
cache of weapons hidden on a farm in Abdali, at the Kuwait-Iraq borders.1151 
Twenty-six people, all Kuwaiti Shi’a except for one Iranian, were arrested on 
charges of ‘spying for the Islamic republic of Iran and Hezbollah to carry out 
aggressive acts against the State of Kuwait’.1152 Some of these were close to the 
Islamic National Alliance, whose MPs boycotted a parliamentary session in 
protest of the verdict.1153 A similar episode had taken place in 2010, when the 
Kuwaiti Court of First Instance sentenced three individuals for being part of a cell 
working for Iran, an accusation reiterated by Muhammad al-Sabah, the former 
Foreign Minister.1154 After a long process, in the summer of 2017, Kuwait’s 
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Supreme Court confirmed the involvement of Iran’s IRGC and Lebanese 
Hezbollah.1155 The Kuwaiti government expelled fifteen Iranian diplomats and 
submitted a formal letter of protest to the Lebanese government accusing 
Hezbollah of ‘intelligence, coordination of meetings, payment of funds and 
provision of weapons and training on Lebanese territory… with the aim of 
destroying the basic infrastructure of the state of Kuwait.’1156  
Questioned on the impact of the Abdali affair on government-Shi’a relations a 
Kuwaiti government official interviewed by the author stated: ‘The Abdali affair 
has proven the existence of active cells of violent opposition from within the Shi’a 
communities, and has recalled in the leadership memories of the 1980s. 
However, these sporadic episodes cannot eclipse the fact that Kuwaiti Shi’a have 
most often been nationalistic and loyal to the ruling family.’1157 Overall, keeping 
in mind the history of positive interaction between Shi’a MPs and the Kuwaiti 
leadership, the sporadic nature of violent opposition from the fringes of the 
Kuwaiti Shi’a community, and the sustained attempt of engagement by the 
Kuwaiti leadership with the Iranian government, it seems fair to asses that Iran 
has not been perceived after 2011 as a full-fledged threat by the Kuwaiti regime, 
against its identity and stability or the functional integrity of its borders and 
institutions. A Shi’a politician interviewed in Kuwait stated: ‘Iranian-backed Shi’a 
groups are a minority in the community and there is no indication that they are 
perceived as having the intent or the capacity to threaten the regime’s political 
stability. Certainly they don’t have the support of the political leaders of the Shi’a 
communities, the MPs’.1158 The fact that Shi’a communities in Kuwait have 
traditionally played a significant role in the country’s politics, testifies a lack of 
institutionalised marginalisation. A Kuwaiti political analyst interviewed by the 
author in 2018 remarked that: ‘While there is some sectarianism at the social 
level, there is very little at a government level and Shi’a Kuwaitis have held very 
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high-level positions in the country. For instance, Ali al-Mu’min went from being 
the military’s Chief of Staff to being nominated the Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iraq. 
Both are very high-profile, and sensitive positions. Mohammed Abul-Hassan, the 
former Minister of Information, is known to be one of the closest advisors to the 
Emir.’1159 The lack of any significant marginalisation can also be read as the lack 
of a significant socio-political vulnerability, identified in this thesis as a key 
leverage for external threats to morph into intermestic ones, such as, potentially, 
an asymmetrical threat originated or fuelled by Iran. However, the issues of 
clandestine cells, such as the Abdali cell, as well as past instances of sympathies 
for insurgency cannot be eclipsed as well. The politicization of the Shi’a 
population has been long-standing and the communities represent a consistent 
minority. In addition, in the views of a Kuwaiti academic researching sectarian 
violence, ‘the ruling family regards the activities of more extremist Shi’a groups 
as dangerous of inflaming sectarianism in the country, when in fact harmonious 
sectarian relations are considered the lynchpin of the country’s stability.’1160 
Overall, as seen from this thesis’ framework, Iran and the ‘Shi’a threat’ have been 
perceibved by the Kuwaiti leadership in the period 2011-2017 as an acute 
intermestic risk. 
 
8.3 Kuwait and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
In Kuwait, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have existed since when 
individual members of the Egyptian organization escaped from the prosecution 
of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser.1161 Like elsewhere, the Brotherhood 
first established a social arm, Islah, (or the Social Reform Association), in 1951. 
The Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed political support and even financial assistance 
by the government in the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, since it was 
seen as a bulwark against Arab nationalism, that was considered more politically 
threatening.1162 A political branch, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM or 
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Hadas, as it is known in Arabic), was created in 1991. In the aftermath of the 
1990 Iraqi invasion, the Kuwait Brotherhood underwent a period of significant 
change, formally breaking organizational ties with the international Muslim 
Brotherhood over Islamist support for Saddam Hussein.1163 According to a 
Kuwaiti diplomat interviewed by the author, the initiative of cutting ties with the 
international Brotherhood has had a significant impact on the way in which the 
movement is perceived by the Kuwaiti leadership: the movement wanted to show 
respect to the Sabah rulers’ legitimacy and avoid being perceived as more loyal 
to the transnational Brotherhood than to the Emir.1164 At the same time, the 
organization became more focused on reformist positions and, since the 1992 
elections, it formed electoral coalitions with members of the opposition in the 
National Assembly.1165  
Kuwait has thus integrated the indigenous Muslim Brotherhood in its 
parliamentary politics since the 1990s, treating it as any other opposition group 
and countering its reformist stances through political means. In the Assembly, 
Hadas MPs focused initially on issues such as a campaign to proclaim shari'a the 
main source of legislation, the attempt to overturn Kuwait University’s decision to 
ban the wearing of the niqab in laboratories and to introduce gender segregation 
in schools – a measure which passed in 1996 after having been voted down in 
1994.1166 A Kuwaiti historian interviewed in 2019 remarked: ‘Despite 
governments harbouring concern towards some of these measures, the 
Brotherhood historically was not antagonistic vis-à-vis the ruling family, and many 
of its members were granted positions in institutions. For instance in 1976 Islah 
did not protest the dissolution of the Assembly and its chairman Abd al-Aziz al-
Mutawwa was appointed Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs’.1167 
The 2000s marked a significant change in government-Hadas relations. In 2006 
Hadas supported for the first time the more vocal, extra-parliamentary opposition, 
namely the Orange Movement.1168 When the movement managed to obtain new 
elections, Hadas won six seats as part of the 35-member opposition bloc, and 
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the five-district law was passed by a majority opposition parliament.1169 Around 
that time, Islamist groups - both Hadas but also Salafi activist organizations such 
as Hizb al-Ummah – started to acknowledge a convergence of interests with tribal 
communities.1170 Residing on the outer districts of Kuwait, tribes such as the al-
Rashaida, al-Awaem and al-Ajman, were, since the 1960s, looked at, by the 
ruling family, as a counterweight to the more politically sophisticated and 
demanding urban population, in exchange for economic benefits and 
incentives.1171 However, over time, tribes developed a wider political awareness 
and increasingly saw Islamist movements, very active in their outer districts 
through social programmes, as palatable allies.1172 A new generation of tribal 
youth found in these movements a vehicle for upward mobility into politics, while 
the support of tribes guaranteed to Islamist movements a considerable pool of 
votes. 1173 Between 2006 and 2008, young candidates from the tribes, such as 
Jamaan al-Harbash, Muhammad Hayif al-Mutayri or Faysal al-Muslim al-Utaibi 
were elected to the Assembly, all as affiliates of Islamist formations.1174 As a 
reaction to the increasingly vocal nature of tribal-Islamist opposition, the 
government banned the practice of tribal primaries, which were an effective 
system to rally tribal votes on fewer candidates in national elections, triggering 
violent clashes between tribesmen and security forces, and anti-tribal sentiment 
and discourse.1175 However, in the new elections called in 2008, again the tribal-
Islamist coalition gained seats.1176 In that period, the leadership of Musallam al-
Barrak, who in the 2006 elections won a record number of votes, started to 
emerge. 1177 A member of the large and influential al-Mutayr tribe, al-Barrak was 
continuously re-elected from 1999 to 2012.1178 During this time he was affiliated 
with the former Popular Action Bloc and has been active on different fronts as an 
opposition politician, including the Orange Movement. In the post-2008 politically-
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charged context, ‘he slowly became the most vocal politician against the 
corruption and abuse of power of the regime’, as movements such as Irhal, since 
2009, were coalescing forces around tribal-Islamist groups and against the Prime 
Minister.1179 
In fact, in 2011, tribal-Islamist opposition members in the Assembly embarked 
early-on the protesters’ concerns and, in June, questioned the Prime Minister on 
issues ranging from alleged misuse of public funds to harming national security 
and relations with Arab countries by favouring ties with Iran.1180 Some of the most 
prominent Hadas MPs, such as Obaid al-Wasmi, emerged among the protests’ 
leaders, and strongly advocated for a constitutional reform ‘that must lead to 
forming an elected government and a full parliamentary system.’1181 As 
mentioned, when the Constitutional Court reinstated a pro-regime 2009 National 
Assembly and the rumour spread that the Emir wanted to revise the electoral 
laws to a one-person-one-vote system, Musallam al-Barrak gave his fiery speech, 
challenging the Emir itself, and being sentenced to prison.1182 Hadas and other 
opposition blocs subsequently boycotted the following two parliamentary 
elections – in 2012 and 2013 – and even conducted, and lost, a legal fight to undo 
the decree.1183 However, following the Court’s ruling legitimising the one-person-
one-vote new electoral law Hadas was one of the first groups within the 
opposition to decide to break the boycott.1184 One former Hadas MP stated that 
the movement’s representatives met directly with the Emir and ‘tried to be 
conciliatory to secure the general pardon’ of their members imprisoned during the 
Arab Spring.1185 In early 2013, Hadas subscribed to a document drafted by 
Musallam al-Barrak, former Hadas MP Jamaan al-Harbash and and Tariq al-
Mutairi of the liberal Civil Democratic Movement, advocating for expanded 
parliamentary authority, an independent judiciary, and a modified criminal 
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code.1186 This signalled that Hadas’ opposition continued to play by the rulebook 
of Kuwait’s political system: by being embedded into the institutional mechanism, 
‘the movement wanted to avoid being labelled subversive’.1187  
Another contentious moment in the regime-Hadas relations came in the summer 
of 2013, when Kuwait’s government backed the Egyptian military ousting the 
Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi from the Presidency. Hadas members, 
including via the group’s official website and social media channels, were very 
vocal in their condemnation of Egypt’s military and criticising the Sabah rulers for 
their anti-Morsi line.1188 Such reaction prompted opponents of the party to accuse 
Hadas of being subservient to the Brotherhood in Egypt, and scheming against 
the Kuwaiti government through infiltration in government institutions to 
undermine the state from within.1189 This was the traditional accusation levelled 
against the Brotherhood in the GCC and most commonly in the United Arab 
Emirates, the most hostile government to political Islam. Indeed the UAE even 
linked some prominent Kuwaitis to the individuals arrested in Abu Dhabi on 
charge of being Brotherhood members.1190 However, the Kuwaiti government, 
while arresting and deporting Egyptians accused of being Brotherhood members, 
did not take offensive actions against Kuwaiti members of the group.1191 On the 
other hand when, in January 2015, former Hadas MP Mubarak al-Duwailah went 
on TV accusing Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed al-
Nahyan of being ‘against Sunni Islam’, he was arrested on charges of 
endangering ties with an ally and insulting leaders of an allied state and 
sentenced to two years in prison by Kuwait’s Court of Appeals.1192 
At the height of the confrontation between the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and 
the regime, in the end of 2013, Scott Williamson and Nathan Brown wrote in 
Foreign Policy that: ‘There is no sign that the government is treating Hadas as a 
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security threat: just the opposite, in fact, as the movement continues to operate 
openly and vociferously and its leaders evince confidence that it will continue to 
be regarded more as a political nuisance than a security threat.’1193 In fact, when 
Hadas participated to a new march protesting the corruption of key figures of the 
regime, such as Nasser Mohammed al-Sabah, there was no existential retaliation 
from the government against Hadas, even as five members of other opposition 
groups saw their citizenship revoked.1194 Hadas continued to organize and take 
part in smaller protests thorough 2015 against judicial corruption, the 
government’s policy of stripping citizenship, the detention of political 
prisoners.1195 The group’s members were still allowed to compete in the 2016 
general elections in Kuwait, when they fared relatively well.1196  
Year Hadas’ seats in the National Assembly 
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2016 4 
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Hadas’ re-entry into the country’s parliamentary life is illustrative of the peculiar 
history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, where the political and institutional 
reality constrain the perimeter of the group’s political activity. This background 
and the institutional framework have been identified by most interviewees as 
factors strongly influencing the Kuwaiti regime’s perceptions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the period between 2011 and 2017.1197 ‘Although Hadas has 
become undeniably more vocal in the 2010s, the regime has long developed a 
system to handle their political activism through a careful mix of co-optation and 
coercion and, therefore, doesn’t see them as political threat. This explains why 
Kuwaiti repeatedly refused to join Abu Dhabi in terms of designating the Muslim 
Brotherhood a terrorist organization, as the Brotherhood itself is certainly laying 
low after the Qatar crisis of 2017 and the rise in regional anti-Islamist campaigns. 
At the same time, they cannot risk that the local Muslim Brotherhood threatens 
relations with Saudi Arabia, or the UAE’, remarked a Kuwaiti diplomat interviewed 
in 2018.1198 The refusal to provoke hostility in Riyadh or Abu Dhabi might have 
driven the harsh measures taken against al-Duwailah. And yet, there is another 
element to consider that would induce to describe the wider Islamist political 
spectrum as a risk in the contemporary perceptions of the Kuwaiti regime: the 
growing trend to form ever-broader, cross-ideological opposition coalitions. A 
long-time expert on Kuwaiti politics put it as follows: ‘The most important 
challenge for the Kuwaiti regime has long been the groups advocating for a 
devolution of power from the royal family towards elected institutions. However, 
the government can manage individual political forces in parliament, including 
through corruption, or divide-and-rule tactics. But a broad coalition including 
extra-parliamentary forces and tribes, would be a challenge of a whole different 
level.’1199 In consideration of the aforementioned factors, it is possible to state 
that the Kuwaiti regime in the period 2011-2017, perceived the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a risk, rather than a threat. 
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8.4 Kuwait and the ‘jihadi threat’. 
Thorough its modern history, and especially since the surge of al-Qa’ida to 
international prominence after 9/11, Kuwait has witnessed attacks by Sunni jihadi 
groups. In fact, between 2001 and 2005 a dozen terrorist incidents have been 
recorded in the country.1200 In that period, two main groups were active: the Lions 
of the Peninsula Brigades and the Mujahideen of Kuwait. Their activities were 
focused on two issues: using Kuwait as a platform to facilitate jihad in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region as well as in Iraq, and attacking US forces stationed 
in Kuwait or deployed In Iraq since 2003. A network of Kuwaiti smugglers used 
the country as a transit point for operatives traveling to partake in jihad, while 
offering financial support.1201 A contingent of Kuwaitis also fought alongside al-
Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) against the US-led coalition in Iraq and, by November 2005, 
there were 12 Kuwaitis in Guantanamo.1202 Both the Lions of the Peninsula 
Brigades, linked to the Saudi-based al-Haramain Brigades, a subgroup of AQAP 
and the Mujahideen of Kuwait, carried out attacks against Kuwaiti security forces 
and US personnel, and plotted suicide attacks in the country. Kuwaiti authorities 
admitted that a handful personnel among the armed forces of the country had 
joined jihadist groups: in 2002 and 2003 attacks were perpetrated by civil 
servants, in 2005 four men from the Kuwait Army were arrested for planning an 
attack against foreign personnel.1203 The largest arrest campaign took place in 
March 2005, when 25 Kuwaitis and seven bidoons were tried for belonging to the 
Lions of the Peninsula Brigades, and even of plotting a coup against the Kuwaiti 
government.1204 Overall, the reaction of the authorities to this phase was a mix of 
hard security counterterrorism tools, and attacking the ideological base of violent 
extremism, extending warnings to both clerics and charities, accused of 
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indoctrination and illicit financing respectively.1205 The approach succeeded in 
eclipsing the two groups and, for a number of years, jihadism in Kuwait.  
When, between 2014 and 2015, a new jihadi group, Daesh, surged to global and 
regional prominence in neighbouring Iraq and Syria, Kuwait was again at the 
receiving end of violent extremist. In June 2015, a Daesh cell perpetrated an 
attack in the historic Shi’ite Imam Sadiq mosque in Kuwait City. 1206 The attack 
killed 27 people and wounded 227, becoming one of the bloodiest in the country’s 
history. According to a researcher at the Gulf Studies Center and the Arabian 
Peninsula: ‘It became clear that the problem with Sunni extremism persisted and 
proper control and monitoring were lacking.’1207 Seven Kuwaitis, five Saudis, 
three Pakistanis, and thirteen bidoons were charged for the attack.1208 The 
attack’s ringleader was identified as Abdulrahman Sabah Saud, a bidoon man 
who drove the Saudi suicide bomber to the mosque. The cell that carried on the 
attack was declaredly part of the Daesh-affiliated group calling itself Najd 
Province. In spite of the sustained campaign of arrests, in July 2016, the Interior 
Ministry announced that security forces had thwarted ‘three pre-emptive 
operations in Kuwait and abroad that led to derailing a number of [Daesh] plots 
targeting Kuwait’ including a new plot against another Shi’a mosque.1209  
Kuwait, like other regional governments had previously been identified as a target 
in the Deash discourse, branding the Kuwaiti leadership as hostile.1210 Firstly, 
Kuwait is in the international anti-Daesh coalition fighting the group in Syria, and 
hence allied with enemy Western governments.1211 Secondly, Kuwait hosts a 
large Shi’a minority mostly aligned with the government, considered by Daesh 
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infidels and enemies.1212 However, these are features common to other GCC 
governments and yet Kuwait was the only GCC country, other than Saudi Arabia, 
where Daesh was able to finalize an operation. In the words of a government 
official interviewed in 2018: ‘Those are also two countries bordering Iraq via the 
desert: a factor of geographic proximity that represents a strategic opportunity for 
jihadists’.1213 Kuwait is also the third GCC country for number of recruits: 
estimates say that approximately 70 Kuwaitis have joined Daesh in Syria or Iraq, 
as opposed to around 2500 Saudi and over 100 Bahraini.1214 However, other 
estimates, such as those by the Syrian Committee for Human Rights, put the 
number of Kuwaiti fighters in February 2015 at approximately 400.1215 In a 
separate report, local media stated that around 150 of them were bidoons.1216 
There aren’t estimates about the number of fighters that, instead, decided to fight 
directly in Kuwait. There is, however, an indication about online sympathisers: 
according to a study published by the Brookings Institute in January 2015, tracing 
the geographic locations of Daesh supporters on social media, of the 20,000 
accounts analysed, over 300 claimed to be in Kuwait.1217 While in July, a member 
of the National Assembly  presented a bill to criminalize ‘any acts of support or 
affiliation with terrorist organizations,’ with an emphasis on Daesh, the Assembly 
did not pass the bill.1218 
The involvement of a individuals from the bidoon community in Kuwait-based 
jihadi groups, both in the 2000s and 2010s, cannot be ignored. As a marginalized, 
disenfranchised community the bidoons hold serious socio-political and socio-
economic grievances that make them susceptible to the rising influence of Salafi 
and tribal-Islamist currents, often well-rooted in the periphery were the bidoons 
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reside and engaged in distributing financial support.1219 This proximity to centers 
of Sunni radicalization, together with pre-esisting grievances, might have pushed 
them towards jihadi groups. Indeed a member of Daesh, interviewed for a 
psychological study in 2016 declared: ‘if you mean that they were frustrated due 
to an unjust life than yes, it is a main driver to join Daesh…people who are very 
frustrated about the life they are living, like the bidoons in Kuwait, they believe 
that the Islamic State will give them their rights…there were some hadhar but the 
majority around 90 percent were bidoons.’1220 These data have been employed 
by the Kuwaiti government to single out the community and reinforce its long-
standing rhetoric to portray the bidoons as a danger to security.1221 This is part of 
the rationale used to argue against the inclusion of the community in the Kuwaiti 
national fabric via citizenship, even in the face of sustained protests in 2011, in 
turn perpetuating the cycle of disenfranchisement.  
In addition, Daesh and other jihadi groups have received from within Kuwait 
significant financial resources. Indeed, over the past few years, Kuwait has 
emerged as a financing and organizational hub for charities and individuals 
supporting extremist and rebel groups in Syria and Iraq.1222 A number of sources, 
including US governmental agencies and the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), have listed prominent Kuwaitis as financiers of terrorism and included it 
in the list of monitored countries.1223 Particularly problematic is how many 
fundraising campaigns have been organized by politicians or prominent clerics, 
under the cover of humanitarian aid, to channel funds to armed organizations. In 
fact also the three blacklists issued by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
and Bahrain during the Qatar crisis, included several Kuwaitis accused of funding 
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jihadist organisations.1224 One of the prominent Kuwaiti names was that of Hamid 
Hamad al-Ali, who allegedly travelled to Syria to mediate a reconciliation between 
the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani and Daesh leader Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi.1225 Another name is that of Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed 
al-Ajmi, a Kuwaiti-born Salafi cleric who admittedly channelled funds to Jabhat 
al-Nusra, coming from a prominent Kuwaiti tribe that included Kuwait’s former 
Minister of Islamic Affairs.1226 While the same Ministry releases sample sermons 
to be used by the country’s imams, it doesn’t force them to follow the instructions, 
and a number of clerics have employed sectarian-charged discourse, 
sympathetic to Sunni extremism, in mosques. In August 2013, the Kuwaiti 
government canceled the television show of religious scholar Shafi al-Ajmi and 
banned him from giving sermons after he voiced support for jihadist fighters in 
Syria. Both al-Ajmi clerics were designated as terrorist supporters by the US and 
briefly detained, before being released without charge.1227 In addition, while the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor has intensified charity supervision, for 
instance imposing approval for all fundraising campaigns intended for foreign 
beneficiaries, the 2017 Country Report on Terrorism stated that ‘a number of UN-
designated terrorist financiers continued to operate in Kuwait’.1228 
Given all these elements, the perceptions of jihadist groups between 2011 and 
2017 from the perspective of the Kuwaiti government may seem contradictory. 
On one hand, there is a very clear indication in the official rhetoric that jihadi 
groups are a major threat. In fact, when asked in 2016 about which should be 
considered the biggest threat to Kuwait, H.E. Sheikh Sabah al-Khaled al-Sabah, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, stated: 
‘Terrorism has become the most prominent security challenge that we face as 
separate states and as a region (…) Kuwait takes this issue seriously and is an 
active participant in the global anti-Daesh coalition’.1229 A Kuwaiti diplomat 
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interviewed by the author also ranked Daesh as the major threat for the country: 
when asked to elaborate he specified: ‘They can elude our security forces and 
spread violence, so they pose a threat to our people’s security. Also, they target 
mostly Shi’a, with the aim to trigger a reaction from Shi’a militias and ignite a 
sectarian conflict within the country. It is known that around 30 Kuwaitis have 
joined Shi’a extremist groups like Hashd al-Shabi in Iraq.’1230 A 2016 IHS Jane’s 
recent report evaluated that, while Daesh’s ability to establish active cells in 
Kuwait is likely to be constrained, there is an elevated risk of one-off suicide 
attacks, as well as shooting attacks.1231 On the other hand, the hesitancies of the 
regime in the crackdown against charities, radical clerics would not be compatible 
with the perceptions of the issue as an existential threat. It is possibly more 
accurate to describe the regime’s perceptions of jihadism after 2011 as a severe 
risk targeting the country’s functional integrity. The risk has a military dimension, 
as the core technique of the group entails the disruption of a country’s security 
architecture, and an economic dimension as it enhances the risk of doing 
business for international investors in the country. However, it has mostly a strong 
societal dimension, for its sectarian strategy. While the Kuwaiti regime has, at 
times, played a sectarian-flavored political game of divide-and-rule, open conflict 
might structurally disrupt the diverse national fabric. A Kuwaiti academic 
researching sectarianism stated that: ‘The Daesh attack in Kuwait in 2015 had a 
massive impact on sectarian relations which are civil, but delicate. The risk was 
considered so serious that thirty minutes after the attack, the Emir, Sabah al-
Ahmad, visited the scene. In the following days, prayers were held in both Sunni 
and Shi’a mosques to commemorate the dead. The attitude of the authorities was 
effective in making the solidarity of the state felt to Shi’a, but the tension was 
palpable.’1232 The fact that Kuwait passed laws that criminalize hate speeches, 
the defamation of religion and discrimination is arguably testament to how crucial 
is to prevent the burst of a sectarian war, openly advocated by Daesh, in the 
country.1233 Finally, jihadi terrorism appears to be perceived as an intermestic risk 
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- emerged out of the state disintegration, widespread violence and geopolitical 
vacuum characterizing Iraq and Syria, and developing a distinct domestic impact 
- as most interviewees made reference to the intrinsic connection to regional 
events and marginal relevance of domestic factors.1234   
 
8.5 Kuwait’s security priorities after 2011. 
While the analysis of the events beginning in 2011 in Kuwait have, as seen 
previously, exposed some of the country’s internal vulnerabilities - which, in turn, 
heightened the sensitivity on the issues object of this research - the unique 
political system of the country, together with targeted repression, have proven to 
be instruments of resilience to the ruling family and the regime. Interestingly, all 
those interviewed by the author for this research agreed that the regime, although 
acknowledging the internal challenges and their political, economic and societal 
implications, did not deem these challenges to be of priority for its own 
survival.1235 In other words, viewed through the prism of this thesis’ theoretical 
framework, Iran-backed Shi’a groups, the Muslim Brotherhood or jihadi 
organizations were not perceived by the regime as having the intent and 
capabilities to undermine its identity, stability and sovereignty or to the functional 
integrity of the country’s borders or institutions. On the contrary, several 
interviewees have expressed the views that the rising regional tensions were 
treated and considered as security priorities by the Kuwaiti regime.1236 
A small state squeezed among the three major powers of the Persian Gulf, the 
Kuwaiti leadership’s policy-making remains very strongly informed by the Iraqi 
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invasion of 1990 and hyper-sensitive to being dragged in regional confrontations, 
through a policy of calculated neutrality, ‘tilting towards but never wholly siding 
with whatever power seemed most useful, while keeping channels of 
communication open with all parties.’1237 This balancing has traditionally been for 
external purposes as well as for internal equilibrium: with a diverse national fabric, 
and citizens hailing originally from all around the region, Kuwait has traditionally 
been exposed to reverberations of regional events, and related deepening of 
internal rifts and fault lines, as previously explored.  
The importance of internal balancing is arguably enshrined also in Kuwait’s 
foundational myth, featuring the country’s origins as a merchant port, founded by 
tribes from the Najd, and attracting merchant families from Iran, Bahrain, eastern 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq who jointly selected their leadership, built the institutions 
of the country, and protected the emirate from invasion.1238 This myth, based on 
the idea of Kuwait as a consensual monarchy, underpinned by cooperation 
between merchant families of different ethnic origins and sectarian belonging, is 
certainly simplistic, but still routinely employed in the narratives about the 
regime’s political behaviour.1239 A possible explanation is that, in the face of a 
potential external threat, the radicalization of one specific community, supporting 
the external challenger, would fatally weaken the small country. In this scenario, 
external threats, originated exogenously, could morph into intermestic ones. 
Hence, a confrontation between Iran and the Gulf Arab states could not only turn 
Kuwait into a potential target but, in theory, also radicalize part of its Shi’a 
communities. As for Iraq, while Kuwait has made efforts to normalize relations, 
and committed to provide much-needed support to the country’s re-building, this 
support has been also been defined as an ‘insurance policy’ to discourage Iraq 
from predatory intent.1240 Given the diversity of the Sunni political camp in Kuwait, 
the polarization within the GCC, exemplified by the Qatar crisis, could also have 
a dangerous divisive effect. Beyond that, the Kuwaiti regime also looks at this 
crisis with the concern of becoming engulfed by it, as the increasingly muscular 
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axis between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has already exerted pressures on the 
Kuwaiti leadership for support of their policies. An academic researching 
sectarianism at Kuwait University put it bluntly: ‘After 2011, Saudi Arabia has 
deprived Bahrain of its sovereignty, we don’t want to become another 
Bahrain.’1241 Middle East scholar Neil Partrick wrote in 2018: ‘Visiting Kuwait 
earlier this year I found a palpable edginess about Saudi Arabia, an ostensible 
friend, threatening another Gulf Arab state, Qatar, highlighting Kuwait’s own 
vulnerability to the larger regional power. (…) Saudi Arabia would obviously 
prefer to get Kuwait onside vis-à-vis Qatar, rather than maintain the sub-
Nasserite “positively neutral” stance it takes on all regional conflicts.’1242 In fact, 
Kuwait maintains working relations with Iran, Qatar and Turkey, all perceived to 
be rival actors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
An expert on Kuwaiti politics interviewed by the author in 2018 highlighted that: 
‘There is real concern that if a succession was to take place in the current 
polarised regional environment, regional powers could try to exploit the infighting 
in the royal family to influence the leadership contest and, in turn, affect Kuwait’s 
behaviour in their favour’.1243 Given the senior age of Emir Sabah, born in 1929, 
a leadership change might happen soon in Kuwait, amid intensified infighting over 
succession.1244 While the 1962 constitution stipulates that the legitimate ruler 
should be a descendant of the emirate’s founder, Mubarak al-Sabah, in practice 
power alternated between the descendants of Mubarak’s sons, Salem and 
Jaber.1245 However, when Emir Sabah from the Jaber branch ascended to the 
throne in 2006, he named his brother, Nawaf al-Ahmed al-Sabah, as his heir, and 
his nephew, Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmed al-Sabah, as Prime Minister, side-
lining the Salem branch.1246 Considering the old age of Nawaf al-Ahmed, born in 
1931, younger princes are still competing for succeeding him, including former 
Prime Minister, heavily contested in 2011, Nasser al-Mohammed, former Deputy 
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Prime Minister Ahmed al-Fahd al-Sabah, and the Emir’s son and current Minister 
of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah. In 
particular, as the spat between Nasser al-Mohammed and Ahmed al-Fahd al-
Sabah - and their respective supporters, Kuwaiti Shi’a and tribal-Islamist groups 
- became very public, between 2011 and 2014, it ‘caused great friction in Kuwait 
and culminated in Sheikh Ahmad going into exile in 2015. The situation has 
calmed down (…) but the presence in exile of such a senior and ambitious 
contender for succession provides an inroad for potential future interference.’1247 
Crucially, the National Assembly will have to approve the Crown Prince 
designated, or select another successor from among three alternatives submitted 
by the Emir.1248 This provision, on one hand, represent an important mechanism 
for providing popular legitimacy to the candidate but, on the other hand, can 
potentially create avenues for external and internal interferences and 
manipulation of the process. 
This acute perception of external threats by the regime, and their prioritization, is 
exemplified by the surge in defence and security agreements signed since 2016 
by Kuwait. In January 2016 NATO inaugurated the NATO-Kuwait Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative Regional Center.1249 In 2018 Kuwait announced that 
construction was almost completed for the largest US military airport in the Middle 
East.1250 In the same year, the UK negotiated to station a small but permanent 
group of armed forces in Kuwait.1251 A few months later news surfaced of Kuwait 
signing a protocol to boost defence industry cooperation with China and an 
agreement to strengthen military cooperation with Turkey.1252 The regime has 
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been very active in attempting to invigorate ties to major military powers, in order 
to address its geopolitical vulnerabilities as a small state. 
On the other hand, if geopolitical vulnerabilities and external threats have been 
prioritised, the prominence given to the other, internal, vulnerabilities, clearly 
emerging in 2011, remains questionable. Despite having been a major flashpoint 
for political mobilisation, corruption remained relatively untackled and, in 2018, 
Kuwait ranked 78 of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, scoring an unimpressive 41 out of 100 in terms of the 
perception of public sector corruption.1253 Ostensibly, there was no major change 
in the socio-political and socio-economic marginalization lamented by the 
bidoons.1254 Finally, the frequent cycles of elections and parliament dissolution, if 
persisting, risk eroding the citizens’ confidence in the Kuwaiti political system, 
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9.0 CHAPTER NINE: OMAN  
 
When asked about Oman’s posture vis-à-vis the 2017 intra-GCC crisis and the 
issues identified in the Riyadh Agreements as its triggers, an Omani government 
official interviewed by the author in April 2018 said: ‘Oman finds the positions in 
Saudi and UAE impossible to agree with.’1256 Oman officially declared a neutral 
stance in the crisis, keeping lines of dialogue open with all parties. However, 
interestingly, Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Sa’id sent his State Minister responsible 
for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin ‘Alawi bin ‘Abdullah, to visit the Qatari Emir in Doha 
on the same day that the crisis erupted.1257 Oman also stepped forward as a vital 
economic partner to Qatar. Following the decision of the UAE to deny entry to its 
ports of Jebel Ali and Fujairah, the regional refuelling and bunkering hub, Oman 
opened up the use of its ports, especially Salalah and Sohar, for exporters selling 
goods to Qatar and to Qatari ships exporting liquefied natural gas.1258 Transiting 
through Iranian and Omani waters, was essential for Qatar to avoid the quartet’s 
territorial waters.1259 Oman's national carrier, Oman Air, launched additional 
flights to Qatar, as direct flights between Qatar and the four countries involved in 
the boycott were suspended, turning Muscat Airport in a regional hub for 
Qataris.1260 According to Oman’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, from June 
to September 2017, ‘the exchange of products between Oman and Qatar has 
more than tripled while transactions between the two countries soared by 2,000 
percent, reflecting hundreds of millions of dollars in trade’.1261 This included re-
exported goods, a key sector for Oman, to which one the pillars of the economic 
diversification’s strategy is trying to become a logistical hub of the region.1262 The 
																																								 																				
1256 Interview of the author with an Omani government official, Muscat, 24 April 2018. 
1257 “Oman's foreign minister on a private trip to Qatar” Times of Oman, 6 June 2017, 
http://timesofoman.com/article/110636/Oman/Oman%27s-foreign-minister-on-a-
private-trip-to-Qatar, (accessed 20 July 2017) 
1258 Cafiero and Karasik, “Kuwait, Oman, and the Qatar Crisis”. 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 Dominic Dudley, “A Winner Emerges From The Qatar Crisis: Oman's National 
Airline” Forbes, 8 June 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2017/06/08/oman-air-takes-advantage-of-
qatar-crisis, (accessed 20 July 2017) 
1261 Qatar-Oman trade volume increases, The Peninsula, 10 September 2017, 
https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/10/09/2017/Qatar-Oman-trade-volume-
increases  (accessed 19 January 2018) 
1262 A comprehensive overview of the latest strategy is offered in The National Program 
for Enhancing Economic Diversification (TANFEEDH Handbook), published by the 
	 	 266	
increased trade volume however also included the sale of Oman-produced goods 
- including food, consumer goods and construction materials – another significant 
element for a country that is in need to increase the percentage of the non-oil 
related activities’ contribution to its GDP as well as creating non-oil related 
jobs.1263  
Unquestionably, the economic and financial motives of Oman’s position in the 
2017 spat have been paramount, given how the Sultanate’s economy has been 
severely weakened by the 2014 collapse of oil prices.1264 However, the political 
motives are also worth highlighting. Facilitating de-escalation between Qatar and 
its opponents would be in accordance with declared foreign policy objectives 
under Sultan Qaboos, and the traditional prioritisation of regional stability, a 
behaviour often ascribed to small states by the literature of international 
relations.1265 Additionally, standing by Qatar, even if not openly, might also be a 
way to safeguard Muscat’s own right to an independent foreign policy. Oman has 
rarely prioritised GCC unity in its foreign policy, as Muscat has rarely seen eye-
to-eye with security priorities of other GCC countries.1266 Arguably, this instance 
is no different, but at a more sensitive juncture.  
In fact, when analysing Oman’s threat perceptions after 2011, it is crucial to 
highlight that its Head of state, Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Sa’id, who has ruled 
since 1970, is class 1940 and in poor health, has no direct heir and has refused 
to name a successor. The uncertainty over what will happen in the Sultanate after 
his departure can be objectively identified as the country’s main socio-political 
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vulnerability.1267 Even more so considering how the Sultan has deployed a 
strategy to become the embodiment of the very national identity of the Sultanate: 
for instance, Oman’s National Day is still celebrated on the Sultan’s birthday, an 
extremely powerful symbolism. In addition, given how tightly the Sultan has 
centralised responsibilities in his hands – he also serves as Prime Minister, 
Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, as well as overseeing all aspects of the 
country’s finance – it is uncertain how effectively can decision-making happen 
without his direct involvement. This is an omni-present factor in the security 
calculus of the Sultanate. 
This chapter first explores the most impactful events in the contemporary security 
thinking of the Sultanate, the Omani chapter of the Arab Spring, a pressure test 
when key vulnerabilities emerged. The following three paragraphs unpack the 
Sultanate’s contemporary security perceptions on the three issues of Iran and the 
Shi’a groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi organizations, uncovering how 
these are not perceived by the leadership as existential threats or as leveraging 
the country’s key vulnerabilities. On the other hand, in the final paragraph it will 
be argued that the focus of the Omani leadership is on external threats in the 
form of regional instability, even above the very serious economic challenges 
affecting the country.  
 
9.1 Oman and the Arab Spring. 
When the Arab Spring spread to the GCC, Oman had already been witnessing 
small scale displays of dissent: since the mid-2000s young educated Omanis 
took to online forums to call for a greater say in the decision-making process and, 
in 2010, intellectuals and human rights activists submitted an online petition to 
the Sultan denouncing corruption among top regime officials and calling for a new 
constitution with increased parliamentary authority.1268 Furthermore, in 2010 the 
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country had witnessed rallies by hundreds of teachers calling for higher pensions 
and more frequent promotions.1269 However, as it had been the case in the rest 
of the region, the Arab Spring worked as a trigger, a push factor that sparked a 
movement under the name of Green Marches.1270  
In February 2011, young Omanis started to organise rallies through the Internet 
and a couple of hundred citizens started to protest corruption, the rising prices of 
basic goods, asking for larger allowances for water, electricity and housing, and 
higher wages.1271 The first instances of such Marches, taking place in Muscat, 
culminated with Omanis delivering a petition to the Diwan of the Royal Court, 
addressed to the Sultan himself.1272 The fact that the petition, whose content will 
be analysed further on, addressed directly the Sultan with requests for 
assistance, alongside the presence of banners acclaiming Sultan Qaboos during 
the demonstrations, were signs of the protesters’ loyalty to the Sultan himself, 
who was at that time exempted from the accusation of corruption laid against 
government Ministers. Prominent Omani activist Habiba al-Hinai declared in 
2014: ‘The past ten years, the Sultan was a bit far away. He disappeared—and 
this is when the corruption built up. [The demonstrators] didn’t want to change 
the Sultan, but rather wanted to see more restrictions placed on the ruling 
élite.’1273 In the following days protests and sit-ins spread across the country: to 
Dhofar, in the south, Sur, and Sohar, site of highest industry concentration in 
Oman, in the north. In Sohar demonstrations centred around the lack of jobs, and 
gradually became more sustained as protesters looted administrative buildings 
attracting the first robust response by the security forces, culminating in the death 
of a citizen.1274 Then, on March 1st 2011, the army moved into Sohar to clear the 
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protesters’ blockade of the port. While groups supporting the government began 
to stage demonstrations of loyalty in Muscat, anti-government demonstrations 
around the country appeared to be growing in size, with even official sources 
suggesting that 10,000 were now protesting in Salalah and 5,000 in Sur.1275 Amid 
the continuation of sustained protesting, the government launched a new 
crackdown in Sohar at the end of March, issuing the first arrest warrants for some 
of the protesters. As March went by, despite some concessions made by the 
Sultan, which are explored in more detail below, protests were still ongoing both 
in Sohar and Salalah. Between April and May, the government ordered new 
crackdowns in both location, escalating into violent clashes, including the 
deployment of the army, arrests and the use of overwhelming force.1276 Such 
response drove protests into a limbo: while sustained mobilizations calling for 
political reforms would start again in the summer of 2012, and sporadic protests 
and strikes persisted for years, the first, most acute chapter of the Omani Arab 
Spring, gathering tens of thousands of citizens, could be considered closed.1277 
The first consideration to make of the events of 2011 would be about the actors 
involved. Those included many different groups in society: from educated public 
sectors employees, to industrial workers and, mainly, students and teachers, who 
head-started the rallies.1278 There was in fact no defining trait among protesters, 
that would reconnect them to a single specific group, such as a disgruntled 
minority, nor was there coordination among the different groups protesting.1279 It 
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was of interest that one of the largest-scale protests - allegedly gathering up to 
10,000 people - took place in the southern centre of Salahah, the epicentre of a 
long-lasting leftist insurgency, followed by the Dhofar war.1280 There in 1965 a 
youth group, inspired by the wave of Marxist-Leninist ideology sweeping through 
the Arab world, formed the Dhofar Liberation Front. Their ideological and political 
struggle, descending into a years-long armed rebellion, was openly hostile to the 
institution of the Sultanate and strongly pushed for an alternative system for 
Oman.1281 When in 2011 some of the protesters in Salalah chanted ‘the one who 
forgets the 1970s should think of the grandchildren of the free men’ it was an 
explicit reference to the Dhofar war.1282 However, in spite of this heavy historical 
legacy, the overall lack of violence in the protests and the nature of the protesters’ 
demands didn’t offer signs of an insurgent project. One of the main reasons could 
be that, generally speaking, their demands, as will be later seen in details, lacked 
an ideological dimension. Additionally, even though many in Oman strongly claim 
that the United Arab Emirates lent financial support to protesters - especially in 
Sohar where several cars carrying Emirati plates were allegedly spotted during 
the protests -  in the words of an Omani government official ‘this didn’t drive 
people alone, nor did it invalidate people’s economic concerns.’1283 In other 
words, if, on one hand, the official narrative was that protesters were under 
foreign influence, this might have been a political tactic to discredit them, and was 
most often described as a marginal motive in private conversations.1284  
In reality, there were no signs that overthrowing the regime was on the protesters’ 
agenda, especially at the inception of the protest movement. On March 1st, 
protesters in Sohar issued a public statement regretting the violence and 
publically apologizing to the Sultan while stating: ‘We have confidence in the 
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Sultan that he will respond to our demands.’1285 As Marc Valeri highlighted: ‘The 
now famous “The people wants the fall of the regime” (al-sha‘ab yurid isqat al-
nizam) was re-appropriated in Oman and diverted into “The people wants the 
reform (islah) of the regime” or “The people wants the fall of the corruption, (isqat 
al-fasad)”.’1286 The protests had the characteristics of a fully domestic 
phenomenon centred around socio-economic – and at times highly localised – 
grievances. The fact that Omanis openly acknowledged the legitimacy of the 
Sultan in addressing these grievances remains one of the main distinctive 
features of the Omani spring’s inception. In turn, although a security-intense 
response to the protests was definitely deployed from April 2011 onwards, with 
legal provisions tightened to criminalise critical opinions and gatherings and the 
power of the police greatly expanded, the Sultan also opted for engaging with 
protesters’ demands, by granting limited concessions.1287  
A key demand of the protesters was related to unemployment, one of the main 
economic vulnerabilities of the country.1288 The Sultanate in fact shares with 
Bahrain the highest jobless rate among the six Gulf Cooperation Council states: 
in 2011 unemployment was approximately at 15 percent, and youth 
unemployment was even worse, running at over 39 percent.1289 In fact, Oman is 
facing, like the rest of the region, a youth bulge, and has not been able to create 
sufficient jobs to absorb these new entrants to the workforce either in the private 
sector or in the bloated public sector. While the rentier system, common across 
the GCC, pushes Omanis to a low-demanding job in the public sector – and a 
generous welfare system – most jobs in the private sector go to expatriates. This 
happens not only due to the fewer costs associated to employing a foreigner but, 
often, also due to the weaknesses in the Omani education system: only 6.2 
percent of Omanis have an undergraduate degree, and even educated Omani 
are not necessarily equipped with the skills sought by employers in the private 
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sector.1290 This is the context in which the protesters demanded higher wages 
and larger government subsidies, and the opening of a second state-run 
university.1291 In this sense, even the most political demands were focused on 
quintessentially economic matters, centred on the misappropriation of public 
funds and corruption that generated inequality between the elites and ordinary 
people. A majority of protesters asked for the firing of National Economy Minister 
Ahmad Bin Abdul Makki, who was seen as especially corrupt, and other officials, 
for the same reason. They further petitioned to form an administratively and 
legally independent authority, from among the Majlis As-Shura members to 
combat corruption, and authorise them to questioning and auditing ministers’ 
policies, ‘particularly those related to the economy and education’.1292 The 
petition also included widening the powers of the Majlis As-Shura at the expense 
of the many state institutions, holding members of security services accountable, 
strengthening judiciary independence, allowing more freedom of expression.1293  
On February 27, the government began responding to the petitioners. One of the 
first measures taken was increasing the minimum salary by 43 percent, the 
establishment of a monthly allowance for individuals registered as job seekers 
and to create 50,000 new public sector jobs.1294 In a move reflective of the 
heightened security perceptions triggered by the events, most of those were 
created in the security forces.1295 Monthly stipends for students, military and 
security staff were increased, the Social Insurance Pension was raised by 100 
percent and pensions were increased by 50 percent. This was followed by a 
cabinet reshuffle: long-serving ministers widely perceived as embodying 
corruption – such as ‘Ali al Ma‘amari, the Minister for the Royal Office; Ahmed 
Makki, the Minister for National Economy; and Maqbool al-Sultan, the Minister for 
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Commerce and Industry were replaced by members of the Majlis As-Shura.1296 
In March, the Sultan announced more wide-ranging reforms, which remained only 
partially implemented, such as the creation of a National Audit Committee 
tackling corruption, to build a second public university, to give the Majlis As-Shura 
some legislative and regulatory powers and to make the Public Prosecution 
Department more autonomous.1297 In less than a month, the Sultan issued more 
than 40 decrees and edicts at a pace that was unprecedented in his four decades 
of ruling.1298 One of the significant responses was to attempt to engage in 
consultations with the protesters via intermediaries. This was particularly the 
strategy in the restive Dhofari region where a prominent tribal figure, belonging 
to one of the biggest of region’s tribes, Sheikh Mustahail bin Ahmed al-Maashani, 
received dozens of protesters in his majlis.1299 Tribal leaders had been co-opted 
for decades by the Omani regime through financial concessions or prestigious 
appointments, but the al-Maashani tribe had an even higher profile. Significantly, 
as part of the strategy to win over the tribes, intermarriage between the al-
Maashani tribe, to which the Sultan’s mother belongs, and the royal al-Sa’id 
family was particularly encouraged in the aftermath of the Dhofar war and Sheikh 
Mustahail himself is in fact the Sultan’s uncle.1300  
Overall, the government’s response to the protests - a mix of confrontation, co-
optation and engagement – seems to be directly correlated to the protesters’ 
overall hesitation, with few exceptions, to question the legitimacy of Sultan 
Qaboos or calling for the overthrow of the regime. Protesters also showed a lack 
of organizational skills or political leadership, and most civil society organizations 
remained absent: these elements also may have contributed to a more moderate 
perception of their threatening capabilities.1301 According to interviewees both 
inside and outside government, after an initial shock characterised by the 
																																								 																				
1296 Sunil K. Vaidya, “Sultan Qaboos Reshuffles Oman Cabinet,” Gulf News, 26 
February 2011, http://gulf- news.com/news/gulf/oman/sultan-qaboos-reshuf es-oman-
cabinet-1.768277. (accessed 21 May 2018) 
1297 Said. “The future of reform in Oman”. 
1298 al Hashimi, ‘The Omani Spring: towards the break of a new dawn’.  
1299 Interviews with an Omani diplomat (Rome, 14 May 2018) a senior advisor at 
Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (London, 19 April 2018) a government official and 
member of the royal family (Muscat, 24 April 2018), an Omani professor of political 
science (Muscat, 25 April 2018) included the assessment that such majlis had an 
impact over protesters in Salalah. 
1300 Ibid.  
1301 al Hashimi, ‘The Omani Spring: towards the break of a new dawn’, p. 6 
	 	 274	
unknown of the protests’ magnitude, the events of 2011 were not perceived as 
an existential threat by the regime, but rather as a stress test. While these 
protests highlighted key socio-economic vulnerabilities in the Sultanate, the 
regime’s threat perceptions were assuaged by its ability to contain the political 
ramifications of dissent. This, as will be detailed later, remained a priority even 
over managing socio-economic expectations and interacted unexpectedly with 
the perception of the intra-GCC crises and related issues. 
 
9.2 Oman and the ‘Shi’a threat’. 
Oman’s perceptions of Iran are affected by a number of factors - including the 
Sultanate’s socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic features and the 
leadership’s ideology - and are grounded in the history of bilateral relations 
between Muscat and Iran. The historiography of the Sultanate, as embraced by 
scholars close to the regime itself, underlines how, when Sultan Qaboos became 
Oman’s ruler, he launched efforts to strengthen relations with the outside world 
and particularly with the country’s neighbours, in order to define the borders of 
the Sultanate.1302 In this context, Iran was the first neighbouring power to sign a 
border agreement with Muscat in 1972.1303 Furthermore, Sultan Qaboos’ reign 
begun in the midst of a leftist revolution in the southern province of Dhofar and, 
in order to quell the fight, the Sultan actively sought support from Britain as well 
as regional powers. Among those, Iranian assistance - including logistics, 
weaponry and at least 3000 men - proved to be truly instrumental to turn the tide 
to the advantage of the Sultan.1304 Therefore, in diametrical opposition to the 
experience inscribed in the collective memory of other GCC countries, Iran 
represents for the incumbent regime a force supporting its stability rather than 
aiming at destabilization.  
In spite of few incidents of territorial waters’ intrusion by the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards, the bilateral relations were preserved after the Islamic revolution in 
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1979.1305 While Ayatollah Khomeini was threatening to overthrow the GCC 
regimes and export his revolution on the other side of the Gulf, he reportedly 
reassured the Omani regime that all existing agreements would be honoured.1306 
Sultan Qaboos was also firmly convinced of that. In 1984 he warned other GCC 
leaders that ‘here in Muscat we do not believe it to be in the interest of security 
in the Gulf that Iran feels we intend to establish an Arab military pact that will 
always be hostile to it, or we are about to form a joint force, whose main task is 
to fight Iran.’1307 Oman has consistently opposed any plan for military actions 
against Iran, deeming the fallout from such actions to be profoundly de-stabilising 
and, therefore, a tremendous risk for its security.1308 Even when Iran was directly 
fighting an Arab nation, Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries 
supported Saddam Hussein, Oman wanted to act as a mediator.1309 In the 1990s, 
Oman contributed to facilitating dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia, who 
had cut bilateral relations in 1988.1310 In the same period, Sultan Qaboos was 
passing messages to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami on behalf of the US 
President Bill Clinton.1311  
Since then, the Omani leadership has facilitated communication repeatedly 
between the US and Iran, including, noticeably, to reach the 2015 nuclear 
agreement, the JCPOA. In 2011, then US Secretary of State John Kerry met with 
Sultan Qaboos secretly to discuss US-Iran direct talks and, in July of 2012, the 
first meeting between the parties was held in Muscat. The talks progressed while 
Oman continued to pass messages between the parties and facilitate the 
process. Finally, the ad interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was signed 
in November 2013 and the final version of the JCPOA was approved in July 2015. 
These diplomatic efforts are both an indication of Oman’s inclusive vision in the 
Gulf, of its willingness to hedge towards Iran to balance against Saudi power and 
of its attempt to gather political capital to become a valuable player even to global 
																																								 																				
1305 Gawdat Bahgat. "Security in the Gulf: The View from Oman." Security Dialogue 
30.4 (1999): pp. 445-458. 
1306 Jones and Ridout. A history of modern Oman, p. 166. 
1307 Quoted in Kechichian, Oman and the World, p. 104 
1308 Interview with Omani diplomat, Rome, 14 May 2018.  
1309 Basma Mubarak Said, “Oman, Iranian Rapprochement and a GCC Union,” Al 
Jazeera Centre for Studies, 6 May 2014. 
1310 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Oman's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century”, Middle 
East Policy Council, Spring 2010, Volume XVII, Number 1. 
1311 Hanna Kozlowska, “Who is the Shadowy Sultan that Shepherded the Nuclear Deal 
with Iran?,” Foreign Policy, 26 November 2013, (accessed 28 May 2018). 
	 	 276	
powers. Tellingly Oman pursued such diplomatic efforts in spite of the several 
implications it could have on its position within the GCC, especially given that the 
talks were kept secret, including from its GCC partners and especially from those, 
such as Saudi Arabia, who were of the opinion that such deal would have 
provided Iran with new financial resources for what they perceived as Tehran’s 
destabilizing regional policy.1312  On the contrary, Yusuf bin ‘Alawi, the Omani 
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, has even stated that a nuclear-armed 
Iran might not be de-stabilizing for the region.1313  
In particular, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were adamant that Iran had stoked up the 
flames of the Shi’a protesting against their regimes in 2011, and that Iran was 
supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the Houthi rebels in Yemen 
to advance its influence at the detriment of its Arab neighbours.1314 While Oman 
sided with the GCC governments during the uprisings, Muscat chose to stay 
neutral in the Syrian conflict – where Saudi Arabia and Qatar were involved in 
supporting the opposition to the regime – and refused to join the Saudi-led military 
campaign against the Houthis started in 2015, exerting efforts for informal 
negotiations between all Yemeni actors, including the Houthis.1315 Oman 
maintained its Yemen policy even amid political pressure from Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, leading the military operations in the country.1316 Muscar further carried 
on a sensitive balancing act in the context of the Syrian crisis, never breaking 
diplomatic relations with the Assad regime, hosting its Foreign Affairs Minister 
repeatedly, and yet also hosting representatives of the Syrian opposition.1317 
Oman subsequently supported the April 2018 airstrikes by the US, France and 
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the United Kingdom as retribution for the use of chemical weapons by the 
regime.1318  
A major factor explaining Oman’s perceptions of Iran lies in the lack of socio-
political vulnerabilities that make other GCC prone to perceive an Iran-backed 
‘Shi’a threat’. The Omani Shi’a communities’ interaction with the wider Omani 
society and the leadership has generally been non-confrontational.1319 There are 
no known official estimates of the number of Shi'a in Oman, as the government 
doesn’t publish statistics on religious affiliation. However, academic studies have 
argued that Shi’a citizens represent approximately five percent of the population 
in Oman, are divided into three main linguistically and ethnically diverse groups: 
the Lawatiyya, the Baharna, and the ‘Ajam.1320 A key element to consider is the 
centrality of Shi’a merchants and intellectuals in the Sultan’s early efforts of 
nation-building, aimed at creating a stable political authority amid a context of 
fragmentation, whereby the country’s different socio-political communities had 
been living either separated from one another or in conflict with each other.1321 
To co-opt the Shi’a communities for the nation-building project, the Sultan 
employed a policy of inclusion, that would give these communities a stake into 
the stability of the regime itself. Therefore, generally speaking, Shi’a citizens 
identify themselves as Omanis and are integrated in the Sultanate’s religious, 
political and economic life. The members of the Lawatiyya, considered the main 
Shi’a community, who trace their origin to India, run big commercial 
conglomerates, such as W. J. Towell Group, and hold sizable shares in key 
economic bodies such as the National Bank of Oman and Petroleum 
Development Oman.1322 Members of the family have held senior positions in the 
government, including posts as cabinet ministers and in the Diwan of the Royal 
Court.1323  Some of the Baharna families, who are instead original of Bahrain, 
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Iraq, and eastern Saudi Arabia, also hold significant influence. A notable Baharna 
is Asim al-Jamali who became the country’s first Minister of Health and later 
served as Prime Minister, and another one is Ahmed Bin Abdul Nabi Makki, the 
powerful and controversial Minister of Economy.1324 The third Shi’a group, the 
‘Ajam, trace their origins to ancient Persia and, despite being well assimilated into 
the Omani society, are in less prominent positions.1325  
Because of this policy of creating vested interests in regime stability for the Shi’a 
minorities, as well as the small number of citizens identifying as Shi’a, 
transnational Shi’a groups have failed to elicit substantial support in Oman.1326 
For instance, there is no local branch affiliated or associated to Hezbollah in the 
Sultanate. Other international Shi’a movements, strong in the wider Gulf, such as 
the Dawa and Shirazi groups, don’t have much traction with Omani Shi’a. 
Speaking to US diplomats in 2008, Amr al-Rashdi, then Director of Religious 
Affairs at the the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs, defined Iran’s 
influence over Omani Shi’a a matter of ‘low level concern’, including because 
most follow Iraq-based Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani rather than Iranian Ayatollahs for 
religious or juridical guidance.1327 Despite this, the communities’ activities are still 
on the radar of the country’s internal security services, monitoring foreign Shi’a 
leaders traveling to Oman during religious festivals to ensure that they do not 
promote political agendas. However, overall, Oman’s susceptibility to the 
perceived threat of Iranian meddling is very limited. As an additional side note, 
possibly given their relative positive economic status, the 2011 protests in Oman 
were not centred on grievances specific to Oman’s Shi’a communities, nor 
included a Shi’a-specific movement.1328 This was a very visible difference vis-à-
vis, for instance, protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which on the other hand 
showed a deep fault line within the national fabric and, arguably, a socio-political 
vulnerability of the respective nation-states. 
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In terms of Oman’s key vulnerabilities, the socio-economic ones, Iran was even 
defined, in interviews taken by the author, as a potential source of stability. An 
Omani professor of international relations interviewed in Muscat in April 2018 
said: ‘Iran can be a crucial and much-needed economic partner for Oman.’1329 An 
Omani researcher working at a market research firm argued that ‘reintegrating 
the Islamic Republic into the international community after a decades-long 
embargo, could potentially open up a huge market for exporting Omani goods or 
international products via Oman’.1330 Becoming a regional logistic hub was 
indeed identified in several state development plans, including the 9th Five-Year 
Development Plan (2016-2020) and the National Program for Enhancing 
Economic Diversification (Tanfeedh), as a major goal in Oman’s strategies for 
diversification and growth, to address its significant economic challenges.1331 For 
the economic diversification program to succeed, maintaining good relations with 
its large neighbour is important to Oman. According to an Omani economist and 
researcher at a market research firm, the unfreezing of Iran’s assets would have 
provided capital for Iranian investments in the Omani economy, where joint 
ventures would have created employment opportunities as well as spur the 
private sectors in both rentier states.1332 Iran is also an important energy partner 
for Oman, as both countries share some major oil and natural gas fields, like the 
off-shore Hengham oilfield or the Henjam/Bukha gas field, jointly developed since 
2006.1333 Moreover, Oman shares with Iran control over the strategic Strait of 
Hormuz, through which 17 billion barrels of oil - 20 percent of global volume - are 
transported every day.1334 To keep the Strait safe and open for navigation, Oman 
has to cooperate with Iran, and has done so since 1995, with several agreements 
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inked regarding smuggling, border intelligence sharing and joint exercises.1335 
Furthermore, in 2014 Oman and Iran agreed regarding the construction of a 
pipeline providing Oman with convenient Iranian gas to cover its energy needs 
and, potentially, re-export towards India.1336 All of these economic opportunities, 
explored in an intense exchange of visits after the signing of the deal, would be 
beneficial for the vulnerable economic development of the Sultanate, where the 
real risk to stability was perceived in 2011. 
Oman’s history of engagement with Iran and Iranian regional policy, the shared 
political and economic interests and the absence of a deep sectarian fault line in 
the country, are sufficient elements to argue that Oman does not perceive Iran 
as a threat as defined by this study, i.e. as a force willing and able to pose an 
existential danger to the regime’s stability and identity, or the functional integrity 
of the country’s boundaries and its institutions. The period 2011-2017, under 
consideration in this study, maked no exception. This perception was confirmed 
in a series of interviews conducted by the author, including with a senior advisor 
to Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an Omani government official, who 
argued that Iran never showed intent to challenge the fundamental structures of 
sovereignty in the Sultanate.1337 As Omani scholar Basma Mubarak Said argued 
in 2014, Iran ‘has never posed a threat to Oman’s internal stability or undermined 
its national unity’ and, on the contrary, Oman sees regional confrontation with 
Iran as a direct threat to the internal stability and security of the country, two 
elements she identifies as ‘the key determinant dictating the Sultanate’s foreign 
policies and its criteria for distinguishing enemies from friends’.1338 
 
9.3 Oman and the ‘Islamist threat’. 
The area studies literature has traditionally described the influence and presence 
of Sunni Islamist organizations in Oman, chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood, as more 
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limited than in other GCC countries such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.1339 In the 
country, many argue that this is related to the group's Sunni roots and the fact 
that Sunnis are not a majority in Oman.1340 However, it would seem even more 
relevant to consider it a direct consequence from two crackdowns operated by 
the government against Islamist groups in the past. In addition, any analysis of 
government-Islamist relations in Oman cannot overlook the historical context of 
the long existential fight between the Ibadi Imamate and the Sultanate.1341  
In the spring of 1994, Omani authorities interrogated roughly 430 people, arrested 
over 300 and tried about 130, most of them from within the Omani Sunni 
community. Those who were tried, were charged for joining a ‘subversive group, 
conspiring to damage the Sultanate's national unity and misusing the Islamic 
faith’.1342 This large-scale arrest were reported to have been triggered by a public 
letter accusing the Omani government of being too much influenced by the West 
for letting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and other Israeli officials visit the 
Sultanate.1343 Interpreting the letter as an attack against the Sultan’s legitimacy 
on grounds of religious ideology, the state's apparatus perceived the operations 
as a threat to the stability of the regime.1344 The heavy-handed response was an 
indication of said perceptions, fuelled, according to a senior advisor to Oman’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by two factors: that members of said organizations 
occupied positions within the state’s bureaucracy, that the group was believed by 
the authorities to have a cohesive, semi-institutionalised internal structure.1345 
The arrested included mid-ranking officials, such as a former Omani ambassador 
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to the United States, Muhammad al-Rasi, a former air-force commander, Talib 
Biram and two Undersecretaries, Khamis Mubarak al-Khayumi (undersecretary 
for industry) and Musallim Salim (undersecretary for fisheries).1346 The arrest of 
Muhammad al-Ghazali, a religious leader from a wealthy family in Oman's 
southernmost Dhofar governorate, is noteworthy as he belongs to the same 
family of one of the founders of the Dhofar Liberation Front.1347 In the statement 
then released by Oman's Information Ministry, the group was accused to be 
‘linked organizationally and financially with foreign parties.’1348 According to the 
perspective of a government official, those individuals were members of an 
Omani branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, connected and affiliated with the 
‘global mother organization in Egypt and similar groups in other Arab and GCC 
countries, mostly Saudi Arabia’.1349 The sentences given by the State Security 
Court was of imprisonment ranging from three to 15 years for almost all of those 
arrested and tried, while two received death sentences.1350 However, Sultan 
Qaboos later commuted the death sentences into life imprisonment and, a year 
later, in November 1995, signed an amnesty freeing all those arrested in the 
context of the investigation.  
A new and potentially more significant incident took place ten years later. In 
January 2005, it was reported that around 100 people had been arrested by the 
Omani authorities for being involved in a ‘religious extremist’ plot and ‘an attempt 
to form an organization to tamper with national security.’1351 Among those 
arrested were military officers and civil servants, Islamic scholars, preachers and 
University professors, including several individuals identifying as belonging to the 
Ibadi sect. Allegedly, the group was plotting terrorist attacks against the Muscat 
cultural festival, an event that had infuriated a number of Islamists, who 
considered it a violation of Islamic values.1352 The individuals arrested were 
connected to the discovery of a cache of weapons in a truck that included 
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‘computers, cameras, a GPS system, about 40 Kalashnikov rifles, revolvers, 
maps of Oman, about 35 books dealing with military training, explosives and how 
to face interrogations, as well as a large quantity of ammunition.’1353 In the spring 
of 2005, the government stated that, ‘after the investigation, 31 people had been 
arrested and charged for conspiring in secret meetings; establishing, joining or 
financing a militia with several small cells functioning in different parts of the 
country called the al-Bashaer group; plotting to take over the country’s energy 
fields; trading and smuggling weapons illegally; spreading the organization's 
message through indoctrination’.1354 The accused confessed to some of the 
charges while denying their intent to overthrow the government and claiming that 
their intention were to spread Ibadi jurisprudence and teachings and to fight 
deviance from the faith as a result of external influence.1355 On May 2, 2005, six 
defendants, identified as masterminds of the movement, received 20-year 
sentences; 12 were sentenced to ten years imprisonment, another 12 for seven 
years and one for one year in prison as he was acquitted of seeking to overthrow 
the regime, and only sentenced for holding weapons without a license.1356 All 31 
were pardoned by Sultan Qaboos a month later. According to a scholar expert in 
Omani history, the dominant sentiment among members of the regime was 
consistent with the state’s narrative: that one of the main goals of the organization 
was to forcefully topple the regime and restore the Imamate ruling in Oman.1357 
Crucially, most of the accused were in fact from the region around Nizwa, the 
historical capital of the Omani Imamate and the epicentre of the conflict between 
the Sultanate and the Imamate in the 1950s, located in the country’s conservative 
interior region.  
The Imamate was a millenary institution ruling over the Omani interior since 
around the year 750, led by Ibadi imams – who had spiritual and temporal 
authority over their territories – and whose political theory ‘rigorously 
																																								 																				
1353 N. Janardhan, “Islamists Stay Clear of Terrorism in Oman,” Jamestown 
Foundation, 9 March 2006. 
1354 Ibid. 
1355 Baabood, “Islamism in the Gulf region”, p. 69 
1356 “Oman sentences members of secret group between one to 20 years”, Kuwait 
News Agency (KUNA), 2 May 2005, 
https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1563531&language=en (accessed 
25 May 2018) 
1357 Interview of the author with an Abu Dhabi –based expert on Oman, email, 20 April 
2018 
	 	 284	
excluded…any notion of a hereditary Imamate,’ though it tended, in specific 
periods, to slip into into ‘dynastic power’.1358 Between the 1850s and the 1950s, 
amid rising tensions for political and religious authority, the Imamate co-existed 
with the reign of Sultan Qaboos’ father, Sultan Said bin Taimur, who ruled mostly 
over the coastal areas of today’s Oman. In 1954, open conflict erupted between 
Imam Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai and Sultan Said bin Taimur Al Said, the casus belli 
being over the right to the energy revenues for oil fields in contested territory.1359 
It is worth noting how a sizable part of the literature produced on these historical 
events, thoroughly embraced by the narrative of the modern Sultanate, has 
characterized the Imamate fighting as a ‘rebellion’ or an ‘insurgency’, despite the 
fact that the Imam and the Sultan were, in fact, simply rival claimants to ruling 
authority.1360 As the Imamate forces were initially quickly defeated by the Sultan’s 
forces, with the support of British-led paramilitary groups, Imam Ghalib’s brother, 
Talib bin Ali Al Hinai, retreated to Saudi Arabia. He then formed the Oman 
Liberation Army with financial and training support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
and returned to Oman waging a new phase of the guerrilla in 1957.1361 The Sultan 
was able to prevail only thanks to vigorous British support, which included air 
force, and finally forced the Imamate fighters to surrender their safe haven in the 
mountainous region of Jebel Akhdar only in 1959.1362 The Sultan declared the 
Imamate over and officially extended his control on the country’s interior. 
However, the Imam and few other leaders from the Oman Liberation Army fled 
once again to Saudi Arabia, where they continued to intermittently plot small-
scale operations to destabilise the regime.1363  
The Sultanate and the Imamate represented, as mentioned, also two different 
ruling models: while the Imamate was, at least in its ideology, a fundamentalist 
Islamic semi-theocracy, Sultan Said bin Taimur never aimed at such a strong 
religious legitimacy and in fact turned down the additional title of Imam offered to 
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him by tribal leaders in 1948.1364 Since 1970 Sultan Said’s son, Qaboos, framed 
his reign as primarily focused on – and, to a certain extent, legitimised by - 
bringing social and economic development to Oman, then an underdeveloped 
nation.1365 Scholarly works on Oman have effectively dissected the emphasis in 
the official discourse on the role of the Sultan into triggering and delivering what 
is usually called a time of nahda (renaissance) for Oman, considered a re-birth 
from a comatose past before Sultan Qaboos.1366 This approach made arguably 
more sense that to compete with the Imamate on the grounds of claiming religious 
legitimacy to rule. Still, Sultan Qaboos also embarked on an effort to re-shape 
the religious ingredient of the national identity mix, attempting to enshrine ideas 
of tolerance and moderation as structural features of the domestic and 
international discourse around Omani Ibadi Islam.1367 An Omani diplomat 
interview in Rome by the author claimed that: ‘By promoting ideas of moderation 
relentlessly for four decades through public education, religious indoctrination, 
media discourse and political rhetoric at all levels, Sultan Qaboos almost made 
religious moderation and tolerance elements of the country’s national identity’.1368 
The intent was also to shape an ideological environment that wouldn’t provide 
fertile ground for Islamist groups. By rejecting all extremism and fundamentalism 
as alien to Oman, ‘it is hoped that Islamist groups would have less traction in the 
country’ and, therefore, their capabilities to become a serious threat to the regime 
would be limited.1369 
Overall, there are a number of factors that appear to indicate that Islamists are 
not perceived as an existential threat by the Omani leadership, especially in the 
contemporary times object of this study. First and foremost, it is telling that Sultan 
Qaboos opted for a strategy of co-optation with former dissidents supporters of 
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the Imamate since the inception of his rule. For instance, a nephew of Imam 
Muhammad al-Khalili became Oman’s first Minister of Education while 
descendants from other families of former Imam, such as the Kharusi and Hina’i 
families, told today positions of prestige and responsibility in the state’s structure, 
including in Ministries and security forces.1370 Omanis from the interior regin 
around Nizwa have also held several positions in the security forces, but also in 
the Ministries of Interior, Justice, National Heritage and Culture, as well as at 
Sultan Qaboos University.1371 Another element which seems worth noticing is 
that, while both in 1995 and 2005 there were mass arrests of individuals 
connected to Islamist ideology, and dozens were subsequently sentenced to very 
severe punishments, they were all given amnesty and pardoned in a matter of 
months by the Sultan. Moreover it seems indicative that Salah Soltan - a well-
known Muslim Brotherhood figure close to Yusuf Qaradawi, who held a post in 
the administration of Mohammad Morsi in Egypt – was allowed to live in Oman 
and teach at University level in the years following the first crackdown on 
Islamists, from 1995 to 1998.1372  
With regards to contemporary times, individuals that could be identified as 
Islamists did take part, in small numbers, to the 2011 protests, both in Sohar and 
in Salalah and the influence of underground Muslim Brotherhood cells was 
‘visible’.1373 However, their demands seconded the socio-economic grievances 
of the wider population, adding a generic call for more conservatism in societal 
customs and specific, local issues such as the establishment of Islamic banks in 
the country, a request that the Sultan approved in May 2011.1374 At a regional 
level, when in 2013 Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait supported the military 
coup by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi against the Brotherhood-led government of 
Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, Oman did not take a distinct side but criticized the 
post-coup crackdown on Brotherhood supporters in the country.1375 In an 
interview with the author, an Omani diplomat expressed regret that the Egyptian 
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political space had been so fiercely sealed to non-violent Islamists, citing the 
repression as a potential root cause for further radicalization of the group and 
therefore, political violence.1376 This seems to show an inconsistency with the 
approach of the Sultanate itself, where, as mentioned, two crackdowns were 
carried on Islamist-leaning groups in the 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps the 
contradiction would be resolved if contextualised in the perception that the 
Islamist groups repressed in Oman might not have had, according to the 
interlocutor, the capacity to trigger widespread political violence. Still, An Omani 
journalist interviewed by the author in Muscat in April 2018 remarked how the 
Brotherhood certainly does operate in the country, but in a secretive way given 
that being openly a member of the Brotherhood is a criminal offense and may 
result in being blacklisted from holding public office.1377  
This eclectic approach, mixing gestures and rhetoric of tolerance with instances 
of repression, would indicate that the potential political danger posed by 
Islamism, be it Sunni or Ibadi, has been so far deemed manageable by state 
authorities. Given their limited capabilities, the prospects for Islamist groups to 
become dominant actors in the Sultanate's political, social and religious 
landscapes are relatively dim. Still, should the Islamists join forces with other 
groups and ride a common cause, this could lead to the reopening of old political 
fissures in the country’s politics. Indeed Islamism has the historical legacy and 
the ideological charge to be perceived as having a potential political dimension 
and, given Oman’s high degree of socio-political diversity, a societal dimension. 
Overall, seen through the prism of this thesis’ theoretical framework, Islamists 
may be described as the source of a risk rather than a threat, in the perceptions 
of the Omani regime, including between 2011 and 2017.  
 
9.4 Oman and the ‘jihadi threat’.  
Academics, authors in the area studies literature, international think tanks and 
security consultancy have all published pieces arguing that jihadi terrorism is not 
be an issue of major concern within Oman, both in terms of the numbers of 
Omanis involved in jihadi organizations and in terms of financial or other support 
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coming from the Sultanate.1378 Since 2001, the Omani government has been very 
active in cooperating with the international community on counter-terrorism. This 
included cooperation on training, intelligence sharing, joint patrol operations, 
enforcing international legal frameworks, and countering terrorism financing.1379 
For instance, in 2005 the US diplomatic team in Muscat assessed that: ‘Oman is 
a successful example of cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism’ and ‘Oman 
is inhospitable terrain for would-be terrorist financiers.’1380 Similar assessments 
were consistently confirmed in the US State Department’s Country Terrorism 
Reports from 2005 to 2016, when the report stated that Oman is the GCC 
country’s least at risk of terrorism financing or money laundering.1381 Reasons for 
such assessments include having a stringent banking oversight regime, 
monitoring a small banking and financial community. In 2016 a Royal Decree, 
number 30/2016, has further strengthened the pre-existing legal framework on 
anti-money laundering and combatting terrorism financing by requiring financial 
institutions to screen transactions even for small sums.1382 In addition, there are 
wide-ranging limitations on the operations of Islamic banks and Islamic charities, 
elsewhere often exploited as vehicles for channelling funding to terrorist 
organizations.1383 The hawala, a traditional system for money transfer which is 
routinely used to provide donations to jihadi groups, is officially not permitted, 
although restrictions are not thoroughly enforced.1384  
As a result, there have been very few arrests made in conjunction with terrorism 
financing. One of the most renown has taken place in 2009 when an Omani 
businessman, Ali Abdul Aziz al-Hooti, was sentenced to life in prison for 
channelling funds to a Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Born 
to an Indian mother, al-Hooti’s radicalisation would appear to have consolidated 
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in his visits to Pakistan.1385 Back in Oman, he worked with Lashkar operatives of 
Indian and Pakistani nationality using his businesses as camouflage for funnelling 
funds to jihadists in India and Pakistan. While the operational focus of the group 
appeared to be in the Indian subcontinent, the suspects were also accused of 
having considered multiple terrorist attacks in Oman. 
In fact, no major terrorist incident has been recorded in the country. There were 
a series of individual assaults on westerners residing in Oman between 2003 and 
2004, including a shooting against a British chief executive officer of Muscat 
Private Hospital in September 2004 and against a European tourist in October 
2003.1386 Additionally, an alleged al-Qa’ida cell was broken up in 2002, but the 
fact was very succinctly reported by only few press outlets, and never appeared 
in international reports, details are lacking.1387 Over the years, no Omani national 
has been identified among senior members of al-Qa’ida or its branches and no 
Omani national has ever been held in the Guantanamo Bay prison, the US 
penitentiary for suspected terrorists. As with regards to Daesh, there is no official 
information regarding recruitment in the Sultanate, and estimates vary greatly. 
While in July 2014 Omani journalist Turki al-Balushi estimated that around 200 
Omanis had joined military groups in Syria, a 2015 report by the UK-based 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) 
alleged that no Omanis had joined the group at all.1388 While the latter seems an 
overly optimistic assumption, and no specific number can be claimed with 
confidence, it is also worth noting that a large number of sources, while 
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presenting different number, have agreed on a lower number of Omani recruits 
joining Daesh in relation to other nationalities in the MENA region.1389  
A correlation can be drawn with the aforementioned factor that dominant religious 
narratives in Oman, backed by the government, have striven to enshrine the 
rejection of extremism into the country’s socio-cultural identity. For years, Oman’s 
Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs has conducted advocacy 
campaigns designed to encourage inclusive Islamic practices, including: a 
campaign entitled ‘Islam in Oman’, an interfaith program highlighting 
commonalities between Islam’s sects and between Islam and other religions 
entitled ‘Tolerance, Understanding, Coexistence: Oman’s Message of Islam’; the 
organization of an International Day for Tolerance.1390 In addition to promoting 
counter-extremism programs, the Omani government maintains a tight control on 
the media, as well as the political and religious discourse. While in other GCC 
countries a number of individuals with political and religious authority have been 
known to encourage young people to go fight abroad, the Omani authorities have 
consistently discouraged Omani citizens to participate in regional conflicts, since 
the Afghanistan war.1391 Religious authorities are monitored, when they are not 
directly engaged in the efforts. In 2014 the Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed 
al-Khalili, published a public essay calling on all Muslims to reject extremism, and 
he regularly uses his platform in a popular and widely broadcast weekly television 
program to reiterate similar messages.1392 Omani scholar Khalid Al-Azri argued 
in his 2013 book Social and Gender Inequality in Oman: The Power of Religious 
and Political Tradition that, in fact, this insistence on Ibadism as a doctrine based 
on tolerance and moderation was both instrumental for the Sultan’s identity-
building project and has been used to contrast the danger posed by Wahhabi 
fundamentalism, as perceived by the Sultanate.1393 By the 1970s, Oman had 
been through two civil conflicts, the war against the Imamate and the Dhofari war, 
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and had been attracting immigrants of Omani descents who had emigrated to 
Africa and Asia with the prospects of significant oil-induced economic 
development. It was a racially, linguistically, religiously and culturally diverse and 
potentially conflictual society, who had to be turned into a nation. In these regards 
Al-Azri writes that: ‘The post-1970 Omani state has therefore invented its own 
tradition for its socio-political goals: to unite a divided country, and to ensure 
political legitimacy for an unknown Sultan. […] the Omani government seems to 
have maintained the view that religion is an integrating force in society, since it 
can reinforce shared norms and values and help reduce conflict.’1394 
Against this backdrop, the influence of Wahhabism, Saudi clerics and – by 
extension – the Saudi regime in Oman, was regarded as very problematic by the 
Sultan, especially between the 1980s and the 1990s, to the point that ‘a 
government committee was set up, constituting members from the Ministry of 
Endowment and Islamic Affairs, including members from the Office of Ifta’a, the 
Oman Internal Security, the Ministry of Information, and the Royal Court among 
others. . . . The aims were to find the appropriate methods to enhance Omani 
national identity amongst the youth of the country, to instil in them pride about 
their heritage and of course to combat the growing Wahhabi threat in the coastal 
areas of Oman.’1395 In the official Omani religious and political discourse, 
Wahhabism has become interchangeable with extremism and has continued to 
attract hostility well after the 1990s.  
Amid this context, generally speaking, it can be said that Oman does not display 
the kind of socio-political conditions that can be easily exploited by jihadi 
organizations. A general perception that Oman would have very low vulnerability 
to terrorist attacks by Daesh has also emerged during fieldwork. An expert on 
Oman based in the region interviewed in 2018 said: ‘It is highly unlikely that jihadi 
terrorism can pose a real threat to Oman: the country can benefit from a strong 
intelligence apparatus and the ideology doesn’t have much traction to begin 
with.’1396 An Omani government official said: ‘Here we don’t feel a domestic threat 
and, on the contrary, we are confident to provide an environment discouraging 
extremism. For these reasons we have accepted several detainees from 
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Guantanamo Bay: we don’t fear the contagion and we believe we can assist them 
in reintegrating into society.’1397 During a 2016 meeting with a delegation from 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Mediterranean and Middle East Special 
Group, high level security officers from Oman agreed that, in their view, the main 
security challenge emanating from these terror groups is not that they could take 
roots in the Sultanate and attack it, but that they could use its territory as a transit 
country.1398 
There is a precedent for that: in 2012, several suspected terrorists, identified by 
the government as militants of AQAP, illegally entered southern Oman from 
Yemen.1399 With the country plunged into full-on violence and chaos, after the 
Houthi rebels’ military campaign in 2014 as well as the Saudi-led war in 2015, the 
presence of jihadi organizations such as AQAP and Daesh in the eastern desert 
region of Yemen has significantly increased.1400 The two organizations are known 
to have established training camps in the Hadramawt region, and AQAP even 
holds pockets of territory including, from 2015 to 2016, the port city of Mukalla. 
These dynamics have raised the level of concerns in Oman’s security 
perceptions.1401 Muscat fears a spill-over of Yemen’s instability, and the Omani 
government has deployed additional security forces to the border with Yemen 
and built a 180-mile fence along the border in a bid to prevent to extremist groups 
from using the Sultanate as a haven or transit point.1402 Given how Oman has a 
long coastline, and is strategically located overlooking the Strait of Hormuz and 
in proximity to important maritime trading routes, important security challenges 
for Oman include attacks against international cargos in the Strait.1403 Overall, 
considering the elements highlighted, it may be assessed that, especially 
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between 2011 and 2017, in Oman jihadi organizations are perceived as posing a 
risk rather than a threat capable to damage the regime’s stability and identity or 
the country’s borders and functional integrity, and, specifically, given the 
perceived lack of a domestic relevance, an external risk with a military - though 
asymmetrical – dimension and an economic dimension, given potential attacks 
to the Strait of Hormuz. 
 
9.5 Oman’s security priorities after 2011.  
The three issues identified by the Riyadh Agreements as threats to GCC security 
have appeared to be, through an in-depth analysis as well as through the opinions 
of sources interviewed in the Sultanate, as per this thesis’s definitions, risks rather 
than full-fledged threats in the perceptions of the Omani regime. During the 
several interviews conducted in the Sultanate in 2018, two main issues have 
emerged as substantially more central in the regime’s security agenda after the 
Arab Spring: economic insecurity and political instability in the region. However, 
important nuances emerged in terms of prioritisation. 
Certainly the 2011 protests’ wave left a mark in the Sultanate: government 
initiatives to address youth unemployment as well as pushing economic 
diversification, together with the concerns for low energy prices, have indeed 
been the focus of the public discourse in Oman since.1404 In 2011, the 
government published its highest budget ever – by a margin of 29 percent – to 
cover emergency measures to address protesters’ demands.1405 Half of this 
budget was spent on maintaining government ministries, covering subsidies and 
pensions. With the drastic fall of energy prices in 2014/2015, the outlook for 
Oman, whose state revenues depend for more than 70 percent on energy, 
worsened.1406 The budget deficit skyrocketed to 15.95 percent of the GDP in 
2015, 21.3 percent in 2016 and 12.8 percent in 2017, numbers that, in turn, 
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1406 Lili Mottaghi. "MENA Quarterly Economic Brief: Plunging Oil Prices." Studies, 
World Bank, (2015).  
	 	 294	
plunged Oman’s international credit agencies’ ratings.1407 International bodies, 
including the International Monetary Fund, have consistently asked the Omani 
government to cut back public spending, including by drastically reducing 
subsidies.1408 While some benefits usually destined to public employees have 
been since eliminated and new taxes and fees, for example on 
telecommunications, have been introduced, the government tried to leave 
spending in education, health, housing and training relatively untouched. 1409 The 
decision to avoid sensitive spending cuts, and continue spending to create public 
sectors jobs, while creating further public debt, is related to the concerns of new 
protests.1410 After hiring 50,000 young people in 2011, mainly in the bloated 
security forces, the government in 2017 has been promoting new plans to hire 
25,000 more young Omanis.1411 The government has also extended in scope its 
Omanization policies, first introduced in the 1980s, i.e. the labour policies aimed 
at pushing private sector companies to hire at least a minimum quota of Omani 
nationals in their workforce.1412 In 2018, a six-month visa ban was issued for 
expat works across 87 industries, including media, engineering, marketing and 
sales, accounting and finance, internet technology, insurance, technicians, 
administration and human resources. The Ministry of Manpower has 
subsequently conducted inspections, strictly enforcing regulations which include 
monetary penalties and employers the risk of work permits suspension. 
To spur diversification, which would positively impact job creation, investments 
are a key instrument. The government has focused its investment strategy on the 
northern Al Batinah region - where Sohar, epicentre of the protests, is located - 
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and on the region of Duqm.1413 The major project in Sohar is the deep-sea port 
and related Free Zone, designed to attract foreign investment. However, larger 
projects are underway in Duqm, designated to become a major logistics hub.1414 
Foreign investors have been invited in Duqm, with China planning on investing a 
total of 10 billion USD as part of its One Bel One Road Initiative.1415 Chinese 
capital is particularly significant as the troubled implementation of the JCPOA has 
created serious impediments to Iranian investments in the area, even those who 
had been previously agreed such as the $200 million project by Khodro Industrial 
Group, to build an automotive plant and the joint venture between Omani Al 
Anwar Holdings and Iranian Hormozgan Cement to establish a greenfield cement 
mill.1416 The local population had shown a preference towards Iranian 
investments, concerned that Chinese investors would prefer to employ Chinese 
rather than local Omani staff.1417 In addition, due to its remote geographic 
location, it is uncertain how the major government projects in Duqm would 
significantly contribute to job creation. Interestingly, in this context, other GCC 
countries have instead had a very limited role as investors in the Sultanate and 
the UAE, in particular, is considered to be tout-court hostile to the development 
of Duqm which might pose a challenge to the pre-eminence of Dubai as the 
logistics hub of the Gulf.1418 The record on investments in the southern region of 
Dhofar is, instead, mixed: on one hand, there has been some investment in 
tourism yet, on the other hand, infrastructural investment is judged by an Omani 
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researcher focusing on economic policy, too slow.1419 The interviewee highlighted 
that significant infrastructural projects in Dhofar, such as the Nizwa – Salalah 
highroad and the cargo railway connecting the Salalah port to the north of the 
country, have been put on hold in 2016 and that, while the port of Salalah 
registered a growth in traffic and revenues in 2015-2017, such growth has been 
slow and the outcome of pre-existing initiatives, and, as previously detailed, the 
positive fallout of the Qatar crisis.1420 
While longer-term plans take shape, overall youth unemployment in Oman has 
worsened, not improved, since 2011.1421 Omani economists interviewed by the 
author have also expressed concerns regarding the level of economic inequality 
in the country, especially in the south, where they assess that economic 
inequality might be conducive to a new wave of political instability.1422 A young 
Omani economist stated: ‘The middle class is shrinking and the gap is now huge 
between simple people and business tycoons, who collude with politicians.’1423 
He finally highlighted that comprehensive reforms on economic liberalization 
would be needed to stabilise the country, alongside onerous and severe 
measures against corruption, but a number of factors have been blocking such 
decisions, including a lack of political will within the elites to take responsibility for 
the possible hardship generated by the reforms. The main priority remains to 
engineer any change gradually and with a tight grip on the possible implications 
for political stability: for this reason, the interviewee continued, there is a strong 
oversight by the Internal Security Services on the diversification programme, 
‘Tanfeedh’. His final conclusion was that while the Omani leadership, at the 
highest level, does perceive economic insecurity as a potential threat to political 
stability, a more urgent and pressing threat is considered to be emanating from 
political instability in the region.  
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A small state in one of the world’s most volatile region, for Oman the regional 
balance has always been a major foreign policy priority. However, in the post-
Arab Spring era this matter has become, arguably, of greater urgency as the 
likelihood of a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran increased.1424 The two 
countries became involved in proxy confrontations on several theatres, from 
Lebanese and Iraqi politics to the battlefield of Syria and, to a certain extent, 
Yemen. In particular the Yemen war represents a major concern not only for 
possible spill-overs perturbing the security of southern Oman, but also because 
in the perceptions of Saudi Arabia the war brings the Iranian-Saudi confrontation 
directly at the Kingdom’s borders, possibly triggering a further, even more direct, 
escalation.1425 In this context, the Omani leadership additionally perceives a 
threat emanating from its immediate neighbours and GCC fellow states, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and the assertive course followed by the 
duo in the years 2015-2017 has been pointed out to be perceived as the main 
threat by several interviewees.1426 In particular the ascension of Mohammad bin 
Salman to the royal palace of Saudi Arabia – in 2015 as Deputy Crown Prince 
and then, after June 2017, as Crown Prince – has given a new and unedited, 
exponentially more assertive, twist to the regional policy of Saudi Arabia. 
Mohammad bin Salman has also built a strategic alliance with the Crown Prince 
of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammad bin Zayed, who is widely regarded with 
suspicion in Muscat.1427  
The historical background for this lingering hostility between Oman and the UAE 
is substantial. Up until the mid-19th century, when the British Empire established 
its protectorates in the Arabian Peninsula, the Sultan had de facto authority over 
today’s Emirates.1428 Even after the division of the territories in two sovereign 
countries, the struggle over territorial sovereignty continued with decades-long 
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open disputes and with occasional small-scale armed confrontations until as late 
as the year 2000.1429 Oman did not open an Embassy in the UAE until 1987, and 
did not send an Ambassador until 1992.1430 Amid this historical context, since 
Mohammad bin Zayed became the UAE’s de facto leader in 2004, there was 
deterioration of the bilateral relations.1431 At the end of 2010, Oman’s state news 
agency reported that its ‘security services uncovered a spying network belonging 
to the state security apparatus of the United Arab Emirates, targeting ... Oman 
and the way its government and military work’ and that an undisclosed number 
of Omani nationals had been arrested, including some who worked for the 
government.1432 Additionally, as mentioned, the narrative pushed by Omani 
authorities has been that the UAE tried to take advantage of the protests in Sohar 
in 2011 by supporting protesters. The UAE’s participation in the Saudi-led war in 
Yemen, focusing on the southern region of al-Mahra, bordering Oman, is 
considered deeply problematic.1433 As Emirati influence in al-Mahra grows, the 
Omani leadership evaluates the possibility that Abu Dhabi will attempt an 
infiltration strategy, similar to what they believe was orchestrated in Sohar, into 
the politically-sensitive region of Dhofar.1434  
The crisis erupted in 2017 between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt 
on one side and Qatar on the other side, brought the issue to a new level. The 
Omani leadership grew increasingly convinced that the true aim of the draconian 
measures taken against Qatar was to coerce Doha into aligning fully with the 
quartet’s regional politics, renouncing its independent stances. A senior Omani 
official speaking to the press on condition of anonymity in December 2017 said 
that the dispute was not about Qatar's support for Islamists or Iran, but rather 
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about power and Saudi plans to dominate the Peninsula.1435 As a GCC member 
which has consistently made foreign policy choices that diverge from those of 
Saudi Arabia, and as the Gulf monarchy closest to Iran, Oman might become a 
future target of the same pressure strategy, many in the leadership started to 
believe.1436 Oman’s socio-economic vulnerabilities, as previously exposed, 
create an imbalance of economic power between the Sultanate on one side and 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. The concern of becoming subject to 
overbearing pressure from these two neighbours is, according to an Omani 
journalist specialised on economic and financial affairs, the main reason why 
Oman has been reluctant to rely on their financial support as a relief for its 
embattled finances.1437  
By applying this thesis’ analytical framework, it is possible to describe the Omani 
leadership’s perceptions of political instability in the neighbourhood and the 
region as a serious external threat damaging the Sultanate’s international political 
interests, such as maintaining the regional balance, as well as its international 
economic and security interests, the free and safe circulation in the Strait of 
Hormuz and the potential spill-overs form the Yemen war. Such external threat, 
with a political and military dimension, is however looked at with additional 
concern because of the belief that it could evolve into an intermestic one. This is 
the context in which economic insecurity would acquire, in the regime’s 
perceptions, a political dimension and morph into a full-fledged threat. In fact, the 
regime’s response to the economic imbalances of the country indicate a degree 
of underestimation towards the possibility of a new wave of protests induced by 
economic inequality and socio-economic grievances. The Sultan’s strategy of 
involving exponents of the different socio-political and tribal groups of the 
Sultanate in the management of economic power, thus giving them a stake into 
the regime’s stability, appears to be considered an antidote against the 
consolidation of internal risks into threats. By contrast, Omani officials speaking 
in an international workshop on condition of anonymity have referred that the 
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Omani leadership worries regional powers might have a strategy to pressure the 
leadership itself from within the country, thus gaining political influence on 
Muscat, and that this scenario could unfold in conjunction with the looming 
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10.0 CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1 The security agenda in the GCC monarchies after 2011.  
The main research question that this study has addressed centred around how 
the interpretation of the notions of threat and security evolved after the Arab 
Spring at the level of each of the GCC countries. When studying these realms, 
the GCC is arguably one of the most relevant object of analysis in area studies. 
Indeed the notions of security and threat are so central to this region that they 
have been fundamental to the rationale of the GCC’s establishment and 
existence, and the body itself was formed in the 1980s as a mechanism for 
collective defence against perceived common threats.1439 Over the three decades 
of the GCC’s existence, in spite of the recurrent skirmishes, the presence of a 
common perception and prioritization of threats among the six monarchies has 
rarely been questioned, even after the Arab Spring.1440 In fact, most of the 
literature highlighted that, while at the regional level the GCC countries’ response 
to the events of 2011 were markedly divergent, the Council’s members closed 
ranks in a display of shared security priorities, to push back against change, when 
protests reached their own backyard.1441 To investigate whether these long-held 
assumptions should be reconsidered, this thesis has looked in-depth at the period 
between the Arab Spring (2011) and the second intra-GCC crisis (2017).  
The timeframe for analysis has been chosen primarily because the two intra-GCC 
crises of 2014 and 2017, which have been central to the case studies examined 
in this thesis, have provided a window into the traditionally opaque matters 
related to the GCC countries’ perceptions of threats. Crucially, the two crises 
have represented unprecedented instances of intra-GCC divergences escalating 
into full-blown existential spats for the body.1442 While efforts towards cooperation 
and even integration accelerated immediately after the Arab Spring reached the 
shores of the GCC, between 2011 and 2012, those appeared tactical rather than 
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strategic measures. Indeed, in March 2014, just a few months after the idea of a 
full Gulf Union floated by Saudi Arabia was finally rejected, the first substantial 
intra-GCC crisis begun, in a contradiction that is, once again, archetypical of the 
region’s history, continuously oscillating between unity and division. The 2014 
crisis saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdraw their ambassadors from 
Qatar for eight months. The following crisis, erupted in 2017, featured a political 
boycott and the closure of land, sea and air borders around the Qatari peninsula. 
The gravest crises in the three decades of the Council’s existence, these 
episodes revolved around the content of leaked official documents known as 
“Riyadh Agreements”, whereby Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain - later joined 
by Egypt in a ‘quartet’ - accused Qatar of engaging in policies destabilising ‘Gulf 
security’ with reference to alleged connivance with the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadi 
organizations and Iran-supported Shi’a groups. As Qatar rebuked the 
accusations and challenged many of their basic assumptions, Kuwait and Oman 
declared their neutrality, implicitly refusing to fall in line with the quartet’s 
perspective.1443 These dynamics, it has been argued here, represented, among 
other things, a very public manifestation of divergences in the increasingly 
polarised and conflicting security thinking in the GCC region. Indeed, the crises 
have shattered long-standing assumptions on the GCC and ‘Gulf security’, i.e. 
that the members of this institution, especially when confronted by watershed 
external events, close ranks around shared threat perceptions. If, generally 
speaking, that had been the case in the 1960s and 1970s, during the wave of 
pan-Arab nationalism and socialism, and then with the Iranian revolution and its 
aftermath in the late 1970s and 1980s, and in the 1990s with the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, the Arab Spring broke the trend. 
 
A key consequence of the realizations about the drivers and consequences of 
the intra-GCC crises, has been that the sub-regional level of analysis is not 
sufficient to decode security perceptions in the GCC and the domestic level of 
analysis is necessary. Acknowledging both the steps taken towards increased 
integration in the past decades and the hurdles and setbacks in the timeframe 
studied, this research has treated the GCC as a coherent body in the Persian 




domestic specificities of individual countries, including differences in the macro-
economic socio-economic indicators, in the socio-political cultures and systems. 
Over the years, these national specificities have been increasingly diverging 
rather than converging.1444 The analysis carried out in this study has validated 
that trend, while proving that the popular uprisings of 2011 greatly impacted the 
security perceptions of the GCC monarchies. In particular, it was the unique 
experience that each of the monarchies individually had with the ripple effects of 
the Arab Spring at the domestic level and, most importantly, their specific 
perceptions of those events, that determined decisively the magnitude and nature 
of such impacts. In one example above all, as the one GCC country perceiving 
virtually no domestic repercussions from the 2011 uprisings, Qatar showed no 
intention to join the defensive or securitized positions of the other GCC 
monarchies in the years that followed. Oman and Kuwait, perceiving 
predominantly causes for dissent rather than insurgency, focused their response 
on containing identified root causes for the protests at the domestic level. Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE instead, perceived the protests of 2011 as the result 
of an overlapping of domestic and international forces, whereby hostile external 
actors were at work to leverage grievances of marginalised, ‘otherised’ domestic 
communities. Investigating the factors informing these leadership perceptions, 
this thesis has found that the national chapters of the Arab Spring brought to the 
surface the different socio-political and socio-economic vulnerabilities of the 
individual countries which, interpreted by the political culture and filtered by the 
governing systems, accelerated the polarization of their security calculus, setting 
the monarchies on a collision course. With this in mind, the 2014 and 2017 intra-
GCC crises clearly show symptoms of a crack dating back to 2011 that have 
shattered the axiom of shared security perceptions in the Arab monarchies of the 
Gulf.  
 
These divergences, against the backdrop of the long-standing issue of preserving 
sovereignty from neighbours, impinged significantly on GCC unity, superseded 
by state-centric considerations, even in the face of external threats. Hence, while 
treating the GCC as an intergovernmental organization whose members are kept 
together by historical, social, economic and political bonds, this study has given 
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pre-eminence to their domestic levels. In addition, instead of looking at the GCC 
region as a secluded island, this research has seen the six GCC countries, 
individually, as members of the Persian Gulf geographic entity – formed also by 
Iraq, Iran and Yemen -  and the Persian Gulf as a sub-complex in the larger 
security complex of the MENA region. It is hard to dispute that the Persian Gulf 
states are part of the larger MENA system, tied to it though the transnational 
identity of Islam, long-standing relations at the political level, centuries-long trade 
relations, a history of cultural exchanges and migrations.1445 In fact, the security 
and political trends defining the post-2011 environment in the GCC have 
emerged, in the analysis, as strictly interdependent from the same trends taking 
foot in the wider MENA region. While this is entirely consistent with the long-
standing findings of the area studies literature on the tight interrelation of the 
MENA region, this interdependency has deepened post-2011 for the GCC 
actors.1446 With traditional key regional players from North Africa and the Levant 
weakened and destabilised by the uprisings and subsequent volatility, GCC 
actors have stepped up their regional postures to an unprecedented level of 
proactivity, to fill the vacuum from the perceived retrenchment of the traditional 
off-shore balancer, the United States, from the MENA region. As a consequence, 
they became further embroiled in regional affairs and trends. 
 
As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the entire MENA region 
witnessed both polarization and fragmentation, on several levels.1447 Beyond the 
upsurge of sectarianism, fuelled by a power fight between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
fault lines within the Sunni communities have become deeper, through a 
competition between a pro-Islamist and an anti-Islamist camp and the 
advancement of Sunni jihadist groups challenging the legitimacy of the 
Westphalian order, including vis-à-vis Islamic hereditary monarchies in the GCC. 
These trends, locking regional actors in a zero-sum game, were pivotal in the 
manifestation of further challenges - including civil wars, the empowerment of 
non-state actors, economic volatility and increased geopolitical confrontation 
between states - that rose significantly in the aftermath of 2011. In fact, 
notwithstanding the region’s modern history has provided several instances of 
																																								 																				
1445 Lawson. Constructing International Relations in the Arab World; Al-Suweidi 
(ed.) Arabian Gulf Security: Internal and External Challenges. 
1446 Fawaz (ed.). The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World. 
1447 Ibid. 
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treacherous conjunctures, seldom like after 2011 so many different challenges of 
different types have risen simultaneously on a regional and domestic scale. 
Hence, the timeframe considered in this thesis, between 2011 and 2017, has 
proven the most appropriate to examine how leaderships’ security perceptions 
vary when exogenous and endogenous issues interact and overlap against the 
background of hyper-securitization. Subsequently, new questions emerged 
regarding the existence of a shared prioritization of threats and the interaction of 
endogenous and exogenous dangers when they materialize simultaneously, that 
don’t seem to find answers in the existing body of scholarship.  
 
Inscribing itself in in the modern area studies literature looking at the realm of 
security, in particular that dedicated to investigate the security calculus of the 
Arab monarchies of the Gulf since the formation of the GCC, this study has aimed 
to contribute to the scholarship with an exhaustive analysis of the increasingly 
complex political-security environment hitherto described. Existing studies, while 
they remain valid and applicable to the present, haven’t so far provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the phase started in 2011 in the security thinking of 
each of the six GCC monarchies, especially in a single study. This thesis has 
largely built upon the literature on the politics of security in the GCC since the late 
1980s, while widening theoretical perspectives and enhancing dynamism in 
terms of definitions. With the aim of spurring the academic debate on broadening 
the spectrum of available analytical tools in the study of threat perceptions and 
security calculus in the GCC region, this thesis has developed an original 
theoretical framework. The framework, applied to perform an analysis of threat 
perceptions in each of the six GCC states, has worked specifically on: providing 
a more nuanced definition of key concepts, which introduces a distinction 
between threats and risks, offering a categorization system for threat perceptions 
addressing the emergence of multidimensional, ‘intermestic’ threats, defining the 
structural and contingent factors that inform perceptions, and measuring how 
these impact the process of prioritization. 
 
 
10.2 Rethinking threat analysis 
The objects at the centre of this study, threat perceptions, can be elusive. One of 
the main challenges the author has encountered in this research has been to 
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differentiate between actual perceptions in the state leadership and state-
orchestrated narratives on security threats through the securitization of non-
threatening issues, instrumentally employed for political reasons.1448 Indeed the 
area literature has recently pointed to the exploitation of security concerns on 
behalf of Gulf monarchs. Since the oil prices plummeted in 2014, GCC rulers 
have faced a time of scarcer resource revenues that are instrumental, in rentier 
economies, to distribute economic benefits that the population expects to receive 
from the state.1449 Some scholars have advanced the argument that, given these 
constrains, regimes have chosen to transform security in a tool for accruing 
political support by hyper-securitizing non-threatening issues.1450 By 
exaggerating the level of threats, and emphasizing their ability to guarantee 
security, Gulf regimes would thus reinforce domestic backing and guarantee 
political quiescence. This research has in fact found that, for instance, the ‘Iran 
threat’ is magnified in the public discourse of certain GCC countries, especially 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. At the same time, this is not entirely manufactured, in 
the sense that it genuinely features in the local security discourse and thinking at 
leadership level. This is similar to the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
related Islamist movements in the UAE. Two considerations apply to the analysis 
of these idiosyncrasies. First, that the narratives themselves, even when inflated, 
inevitably influence perceptions. Secondly, that regimes’ perceptions about their 
stability are routinely equated with security in the cognition of local leaders and, 
therefore, these are not necessarily dependent on objective considerations, i.e. 
on the threatening actors’ capabilities or intent. Finally, this research has 
confirmed that the strategy of exaggerating the level of threats, while useful in the 
short term, is problematic in the longer term.1451 Although heightening security 
concerns in a population, or rallying it against a common enemy, have long been 
considered effective political tactics to guarantee quiescence, the magnification 
of sectarian threats and the hyper-securitization of political dissent, on the long 
term, could deepen the socio-political cleavages that constitute the main socio-
																																								 																				
1448 Here the term ‘securitization’ is used as described by Ole Waever in “Securitization 
and Desecuritization”. 
1449 See for instance Gengler, "The Political Economy of Sectarianism in the Gulf." 
1450 See Andreas Krieg. "The Weaponization of Narratives Amid the Gulf Crisis." in 
Krieg (ed) Divided Gulf.  
1451 This is also argued in Malmvig. "Power, identity and securitization in Middle East: 
Regional order after the Arab uprisings." 
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political vulnerability of the GCC countries and increase the countries’ exposure 
to threats.  
In order to address the challenge of differentiating between threats and narratives 
about threats, the author has relied on an eclectic combination of sources in her 
methodology. Security perceptions have been deducted by the researcher 
through a combination of the analysis of these countries’ foreign and domestic 
policies in a historical perspective, a speech analysis of their political and media 
discourse, and an extensive fieldwork conducted in the region, including to gather 
interviews from relevant interlocutors. While gathering interviews, the researcher 
has striven to access a diverse pool of sources, representing different 
perspectives, and has acknowledged the agenda and biases of the interviewees 
whenever appropriate. At the same time, given the focus of the thesis on local 
policy-makers’ perceptions and perspectives, the researcher has chosen to 
interview mostly local sources or sources based in the region. This was 
particularly relevant to the research’s authenticity, given that the data gathered 
has been subsequently analysed and systematised through the thesis’ theoretical 
framework, which is instead also based on non-regional scholarship. This 
framework has contributed to the analysis in three main ways. 
 
The first contribution has been in terms of the definition of the key concepts of 
security, as relevant to the context studied. This approach has confirmed, among 
other things, the conflation of ‘regime security’ with ‘national security’ in the 
regional policy-makers’ perspective, as long established by the area literature.1452  
Security - as perceived by the GCC regimes - has hereby been defined to be 
about the ability of regimes to maintain their independent identity, their functional 
integrity and sovereignty against forces of change, which they see as hostile. This 
is a definition that assumes the basic primacy of political variables in determining 
the degree of security that states and regimes enjoy. Building on Barry Buzan’s 
ideas about the comprehensiveness of the concept of security and his approach 
mixing, loosely, neorealism and constructivism, this thesis has embraced the idea 
of security as a matter of degree and theorised a differentiation between threats 
and risks. The term ‘threat’ has been thus employed specifically to define risks 
																																								 																				
1452 The conflation between regime and national security has been broadly explored, 
including in: Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, "Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East: 
Complex Realism."; Bilgin. Regional Security in the Middle East.  
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that become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions, i.e. dangers 
perceived as having intent and capability to hinder state boundaries, state 
institutions, regime stability or sovereignty.1453 This distinction has proven 
particularly appropriate and useful in the hyper-securitised GCC region. Rejecting 
the uncritical and too frequent use of the term ‘threat’ to indicate dangers of 
various intensity, this research’s use of the threat/risk distinction has allowed for 
a more nuanced description of how dangers are perceived in the different 
countries of the GCC region, and it has enabled the researcher to establish that, 
while there is a general agreement on which dangers have damaging potential 
for regimes’ stability, dangers perceived as full-fledged threats in certain 
countries are viewed merely as risks by leaders of other GCC countries. 
Additionally, this analytical tool has also provided valuable information to 
enhance the understanding of the GCC countries’ regional and international 
relations, given how those are based chiefly upon perceived needs of security 
and threat deterrence.1454 Finally, this nuanced analytical approach paved the 
way for further findings on the process of prioritization, including as a crucial 
element to analyse and, to a certain extent, anticipate, policy actions. 
 
Strictly related to the work on definitions has been the work on developing 
paradigms to systematize the security thinking, by categorizing pre-existing and 
emerging threats as they are perceived by policy-makers in the GCC. In another 
effort to provide a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of threat perceptions, 
this research has employed a system to categorise perceived threats in their 
dimensions and types. The five dimensions employed in this study are in line with 
those indicated by Buzan in the 1990s - political, military, economic, societal -  
depending on the threatened object.1455 In addition, this research has attempted 
to go beyond the distinction between external and internal threats offered by the 
existing literature, by taking into account the increasing multi-dimensionality of 
threats and their intersections, particularly those emerging after 2011.1456 Hence 
this thesis has spoken of three types of threats: external threats, or threats 
																																								 																				
1453 The main inspiration has been: Buzan, People, states and fear. 
1454 The link between foreign relations and security needs has been broadly explored, 
including in: Kamrava, International Politics of the Persian Gulf. 
1455 The main inspiration has been: Buzan, People, states and fear. 
1456 The external/internal distiction is the most common in the literature on regional 
security. See for instance: Koch and Long (eds.) Gulf Security in the Twenty-First 
Century; Al-Suweidi (ed.) Arabian Gulf Security: Internal and External Challenges. 
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originated from external sources that affect the international interests of the 
country; internal threats, or threats that have endogenous roots and affect the 
internal stability of the country; intermestic threats, or threats that have a mixed 
external and internal nature, such as those moved by exogenous motives but 
spreading internally and having domestic implications and, vice versa, those that 
have endogenous stimula but repercussions on the international sphere.1457 This 
category has featured prominently in all six empirical chapters, as findings show 
how every GCC regime is concerned about intermestic risks or intermestic 
threats. This is a validation of the conclusions reached in the area studies 
literature with regards to borders’ porosity in the MENA region, where trans-
border political identities are strong and transnational links have historically been 
able to mobilize people across borders.1458 However, it is interesting to highlight 
how the perceived threats are more often thought to originate in the Persian Gulf 
itself rather than from the wider MENA region, as was the case in the 1960s – 
1990s. As far as the prioritization of threats is concerned, this thesis has found 
that intermestic threats are described in the leaderships’ narratives as the most 
salient threats and given priority.1459 Certainly, all potential dangers of domestic 
destabilization are treated as more serious and immediate than the classic power 
capabilities external menace. However, the research also found that intermestic 
threats can proliferate chiefly by leveraging pre-existing socio-economic and 
socio-political internal vulnerabilities, and these are not at all times acknowledged 
by the regimes, hence they don’t necessarily inform their perceptions as key 
factors. At times GCC leaders ignore or exploit said vulnerabilities to perpetuate 
a status quo that preserves their hegemonic position as individual leaders in the 
short-term, despite weakening state stability in the long-term.  
 
The final contribution of the thesis’ framework has been to uncover the factors 
that more prominently inform the shaping of security perceptions.1460 Systemic or 
																																								 																				
1457 The term intermestic has been employed only by a few scholars, including Victor 
Cha who defines intermestic issues as the ‘interpenetration of foreign and domestic 
issues’. See: Ulrichsen, “Links Between Domestic and Regional Security”, p. 23. 
1458 Regional interconnections are highlighted well in: Gause. The International Relations 
of the Persian Gulf. 
1459 This is similar to what theorised by Gause in "Balancing What? Threat Perception 
and Alliance Choice in the Gulf." 
1460 This effort has relied on several studies on security perceptions, including: Jervis. 
Perception and misperception in international politics; Williams "(In) Security studies, 
reflexive modernization and the risk society."; Hogarth and Goldstein. Judgment and 
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historical socio-cultural factors, including the countries’ socio-political identities 
as Arab-Islamic monarchies and tribal societies, maintain a crucial role. However, 
contingent factors such as events and actors, both the senders and receivers of 
threatening signals, also shape threat perceptions.1461 Senders - i.e. the sources 
of the potential threat -  are central to the formation of the threat image because 
they can represent the embodiment and personification of threats, and because 
they can be neutralised much more easily than it would be to neutralize the actual 
danger. Receivers - i.e. the threatened - are even more central, down to the 
analysis of their individual cognition and even emotions.1462 These ‘human 
factors’, including personality, political cognition and socialization into their own 
cultural environment, have emerged as crucial in the GCC context, where all 
states are autocratic and leaders, who are seen as the final representatives of 
the national interest, face little to no constrains to act according to their own 
perceptions in foreign and security policies.1463 This mechanism has been 
validated in all cases explored, with the partial exception of Kuwait, where the 
National Assembly has been able to have an impact on the leadership’s threat 
perceptions and on foreign and security policies. In the other cases, with varying 
degrees of intensity, ‘human factors’ remain predominant, and it becomes key to 
identify who are the most influential individuals in each regime. It then falls onto 
them to acknowledge or ignore the role of structural vulnerabilities, when 
operationalising the threat images. Bearing in mind that this study describes 
vulnerabilities as conditions thought to determine the incapacity of the state to 
contain, cope with, adapt to and recover from a damaging phenomenon, the 
focus has been on on socio-political and socio-economic vulnerabilities, defining 
the former as an institutionalised low level of socio-political cohesiveness, 
determining a deficit of ruling legitimacy, and the latter as large inequalities, 
imbalances or failures in the national economy.1464 This research has found that 
																																								 																				
decision making: An interdisciplinary reader. Hermann and Hagan, "International 
Decision Making: Leadership Matters". 
1461 Eriksson and Noreen. “Setting the agenda of threats: An explanatory model.”  
1462 Hogarth and Goldstein. Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader. 
1463 Gause. "Understanding the Gulf States."; Davidson, "The UAE, Qatar, and the 
Question of Political Islam." in Krieg, (ed), Divided Gulf. 
1464 The definition of ‘vulnerabilities’ has been inspired by what Fabien Nathan writes in 
his article “Natural Disasters, Vulnerability and Human Security”, in: Brauch at al. 
(eds.), Facing Global Environmental Change. However, with specific reference to the 
regional context studied, the researcher has relied on the literature on Third World 
Security for socio-political vulnerabilities (including Ayoob, The Third World Security 
Predicament; Azar and Moon. "Third world national security: Toward a new conceptual 
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while socio-economic vulnerabilities are by far more frequently leveraged in the 
narratives and discourses, socio-political vulnerabilities do not have a place in 
discourses and narratives and yet feature more prominently in the leaderships’ 
perceptions. This especially emerged in the chapter dedicated to Saudi Arabia: 
while after 2014 socio-economic challenges have featured prominently in the 
state narratives, the country’s much less talked about socio-political 
vulnerabilities – in terms of lack of cohesion, contested legitimacy and frail social 
contract – occupy a markedly stronger position in informing the leadership’s 
perceptions on security. In addition, other vulnerabilities, such as the GCC 
countries’ location in a geopolitically volatile and unstable context, especially 
given the fact that five out of six are small states, and the fragmented and 
underskilled status of their armed and security forces, feature strongly in the 
regimes’ perceptions of external threats. However, the fact that these 
shortcomings of their armed forces is a known consequence of the conscious 
policy of ‘coup-proofing’, highlights how external threats, in most cases, have not 
retained the priority status.1465 
 
10.3 The polarisation of the security agendas 
In the six chapters of this study’s empirical part, the perceptions of policy-makers 
in each of the six GCC countries regarding the issues at the centre of the Riyadh 
Agreements - Iran-aligned Shi’a proxies, the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated 
Islamist groups, jihadist organizations - have been measured and systematized 
through the thesis’ theoretical framework. The aims has been to appreciate the 
nuances of those regimes’ security perceptions, highlighting how and why some 
issues have been securitised into threats and others into risks, and which factors, 
including vulnerabilities, have played a role. Another objective has been to 
establish which issues have been perceived and treated as priority threats in 
each country in the period 2011-2017, why, and how they relate to those at the 
centre of the intra-GCC crises. In addition, the research has highlighted what 
																																								 																				
framework." ) and on the studies on the regional political economy for socio-economic 
vulnerabilities (especially; Held and Ulrichsen, (eds.) The transformation of the Gulf: 
politics, economics and the global order; Hertog. "The sociology of the Gulf rentier 
systems”.) 
1465 The ‘coup-proofing’ policy is examined in: Hertog  “Rentier militaries in the Gulf 
states”. 
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challenges, despite their threatening potential, appear to be underestimated by 
the leadership. 
As with regards to the issues at the centre of the intra-GCC crises, this research 
has shown that, while there is a general agreement on the fact that these actors 
can have damaging potential for regimes’ stability in the region, each leadership 
in the region views these actors’ differently with regards to their own stability and 
security.  
This applied also to the signatories of the Riyadh Agreements - Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Bahrain - whose security thinking has shown divergences. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood, jihadi organizations and Iran-supported Shi’a groups were 
presented as absolute priority threats in the Riyadh Agreements and the 
subsequent public discourse from the top leadership in Riyadh, Manama and Abu 
Dhabi, actors within those countries have shown a much more nuanced 
perspective. The strongest convergence found has been between Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain, where Iran and its proxies are perceived and treated as priority 
threats, with a strong intermestic dimension. Iran is also perceived as a crucial 
danger in the UAE,  where however the threat is perceived as an exogenous and 
external one, targeting the regional interests of the country. As a very small state, 
in Bahrain the domestic component of the ‘Iranian threat’ has been mitigated 
through repression especially after the disbanding of the Shi’a opposition party 
known as al-Wefaq in 2016, while the external dimension has gained more 
prominence afterwards. Indeed after 2014 Bahrain focused on strengthening 
relations with its external backers, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including 
at the risk of having to unconvincingly re-examine relations with Islamist groups 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, perceived in Manama simply as a risk and part 
and parcel of its shrinking domestic loyalist base. Saudi Arabia underwent a 
similar process, albeit one resulting from indigenous security perceptions, after 
the ascension of Mohammad bin Salman to Riyadh’s royal palace in 2015. In the 
Saudi case, Islamism was treated as an actual intermestic threat, as was jihadism 
– which is instead mostly perceived as a risk in the other GCC countries. In fact 
Saudi Arabia after 2015 has shown the most hyper-securitised approach among 
all cases studied, with a totalitarian attitude towards any potential political 
challenge to the royal family, including, for instance, tribalism. This speaks of 
strong underlying vulnerabilities weakening the state from within and creating 
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enabling conditions for exogenous dangers to develop an internal presence – or, 
in other words, of Saudi Arabia’s ontological insecurity, i.e. the vulnerability of the 
Saudi state’s identity. 1466 Matters of ontological insecurity and developing state-
society relations not based on totalitarian tactics remain the most crucial 
questions for the long-term stability in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Similarly, 
the insufficient coherence and strength of the ideational foundations underpinning 
the nation-state are central in the security thinking of the UAE, too. However, 
leaders in Abu Dhabi are mostly focused on the repercussions and implications 
of socio-political vulnerabilities of the entire Westphalian system, highlighted by 
the 2011 uprisings, on the wider MENA region. As with it regards the internal 
coherence of the UAE’s federal system, weakened by institutionalised intra-
Emirates inequality, the possible implications seem to remain underestimated. 
The one threat connecting the local, federal and regional levels in the security 
perceptions of the Abu Dhabi leadership is Islamism, represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and all affiliated movements. The only one of the Riyadh 
Agreements’ issues that is perceived as a full-fledged intermestic threat in Abu 
Dhabi, interestingly Islamism is not viewed necessarily in the same way in other 
Emirates of the UAE federation. In the long term, and in the event of further 
escalation, these divergences of perceptions – both within the UAE and more 
widely within the anti-Qatar camp – albeit limited, might have significant impacts 
on policies.  
Divergences with the anti-Qatar camp’s perspectives on the substance of the 
intra-GCC crises are undoubtedly more substantial in Kuwait and Oman. The 
research has proven that, in both countries, viewed through the prism of this 
thesis’ theoretical framework, Iran-backed Shi’a groups, the Muslim Brotherhood 
or jihadi organizations have not been perceived by the regimes as having the 
intent and capabilities to undermine their identity, stability and sovereignty or the 
functional integrity of the country’s borders or institutions. To Kuwait and Oman 
the actors presented as threats in the Riyadh Agreements are better described 
as risks. In both countries, the local chapters of the Arab Spring have represented 
watershed moments in their security calculus. However, these have been 
regarded as endogenous phenomena, highlighting socio-economic 
vulnerabilities with socio-political implications, such as the perceived high level of 
																																								 																				
1466 Darwich, “The Ontological (In)security of Similarity”. 
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corruption in Kuwait and the rampant economic inequalities in Oman. The unique 
semi-democratic political system in Kuwait, in particular, seems to have had a 
role in mitigating the Kuwaiti leadership’s security perceptions with regards to 
endogenous political risks. For both countries, the security priorities instead 
revolve around the possible escalation of regional instability. As two small states 
in one of the world’s most volatile region, regional balance has always been a 
major foreign policy priority for both Kuwait and Oman. However, in the post-Arab 
Spring era this matter has become of greater urgency as the likelihood of regional 
conflicts increased. The difference between the two is that for Kuwaiti policy-
makers, still affected by the memories of Iraq’s 1990s invasion, active regional 
balancing also serves needs of internal equilibrium: with a diverse national fabric, 
and citizens hailing originally from all around the region, Kuwait has traditionally 
been exposed to reverberations of regional events, and related deepening of 
internal rifts and fault lines. In other words, the potential for external issues to 
morph into intermestic ones is regarded as substantial, with marginalised 
communities such that of bidoons, under strict observation. In Oman, instead, 
Sultan Qaboos’ strategy of involving exponents of the different socio-political and 
tribal groups of the Sultanate in the management of economic power, thus giving 
them a stake into the regime’s stability, appears to be considered an antidote 
against the consolidation of an internal dimension to exogenous dangers. This 
has apparently induced Oman to underestimate the threatening potential of 
socio-economic vulnerabilities, while political instability in the neighbourhood is 
prioritised as a serious external threat damaging the Sultanate’s international 
political interests, such as maintaining the regional balance, as well as its 
international economic and security interests, the free and safe circulation in the 
Strait of Hormuz and the potential spill-overs form the Yemen war. Another 
flashpoint that is similarly crucial for both Kuwait and Oman is with regards to the 
succession of the two senior leaders, Sultan Qaboos and Emir Sabah. In 
particular this research has found that there is concern about the possibility that 
regional powers could try and exploit domestic royal factionalism to influence the 
leadership contest or leverage the temporary weakness of the countries to extend 
their own influence.  
Indeed, one of the main findings of this research is that GCC countries 
increasingly started to look at one another as sources of salient threats to stability. 
In addition to the anti-Qatar camp opening hostilities against Qatar with this 
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motive, and Kuwait and Oman worried about how their sovereignty might be 
impinged in the regional conflictual environment, Qatar emerged as the country 
whose priority threat is represented by other GCC players, especially after 2014. 
In fact, the intra-GCC crises, and the initiatives pursued by the quartet countries, 
have been perceived in Doha as a substantial external threat, intended to 
become an intermestic one. The quartet countries, from Doha’s perspective, 
targeted the regime’s stability and identity, though an international campaign to 
de-legitimise the Qatari regime and proposing alternative candidates for the 
throne, as well as the functional integrity of the country’s boundaries and its 
institutions, by sealing all land, sea and air borders with Qatar, and cutting all 
economic and financial relations. The fact that the Qatari population seemed to 
remain receptive to the leadership’s message of unity at the most vulnerable 
moment in contemporary politics, was evidence that, similarly to what happened 
during the 2011 Arab uprisings, threats do not easily propagate from the regional 
to the domestic level in Qatar, where socio-economic and socio-political 
vulnerabilities are, largely speaking, contained. For the same reason, jihadi 
groups, Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran and its 
proxies are not perceived as threats in Qatar. A partial exception is represented 
by Iran, which does feature in the security calculus of the Qatari leadership, but 
as an external risk rather than a threat, and one mitigated after the 2017 intra-
GCC crisis when Tehran extended some assistance to Doha. 
Overall, what has emerged from this research is that GCC security is not a one-
dimensional phenomenon but instead a complex matrix of domestic and regional 
factors each playing a distinctive role in formulating the definition, categorisation, 
perception and prioritisation of threats. While acknowledging substantial regional 
commonalities and bonds, the many domestic specificities of individual GCC 
countries - including the diversity of the national fabrics, historical factors, political 
systems, religious identities, individual leaders, macroeconomic indicators – play 
a crucial role in their security agendas. The comparative analysis of threat 
perceptions has validated a strong correlation between security dynamics and 
country-specific socio-economic and socio-political features. The discrepancies 
in these features are already wide and should they diverge, the risk is that 
regional countries might have increasingly more often contrasting opinions on 
what constitutes a priority to safeguard Gulf security, with implications for the very 
notion of it. It might be more functional, in light of these factors, to definitely 
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overcome the idea of the GCC region as a security community. However this 
research has also highlighted, once again, the interdependence of security in the 
region. This encourages to look at the region, in future analyses, through the 
approaches outlined in the theoretical paradigm of the regional security complex.  
This interdependence and interconnectedness, while playing a pejorative role in 
the hyper-securitization of local politics, are arguably fuelled by global trends of 
globalization and internationalization which are insidious to contain or rewind. In 
fact, the GCC countries themselves have, in these same years, become 
increasingly more embedded in the international system as a globally strategic 
region. Noticeably, the GCC countries are home to approximately the 40% of 
world’s proven crude oil reserves and 23% of proven natural gas reserves.1467 
These are key not only to the supplies of Europe but, particularly, to those of Asia, 
to the point that, according to International Energy Agency estimates, the stability 
of the global economy is and will remain dependent on a secure flow of oil from 
the GCC. 1468 The GCC countries also border the strategic waterways of the Red 
Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, making the GCC a leading international trading 
hub. Hence the region, despite changing dynamics, will likely remain central to 
geopolitical and security calculations at a global level. Insulating themselves from 
global or regional trends, will thus become increasingly challenging for regimes 
in the GCC. Forcing this process may well have unintended and drastic 
consequences, to the point of inducing the balkanisation of the Persian Gulf. 
  
																																								 																				
1467 US Energy Information Administration, International energy statistics, (proven reserves as of 
2019) http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6  
1468 International Energy Agency, Executive summary, World Energy Outlook, Paris, 2012, p. 1, 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2012/#d.en.26099 
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APPENDIX D: The blacklists issued by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and 
Egypt in 2017 
The June 2017 list. 
 
Entities: 
1. Qatar Volunteer Center - Qatar 
2. Doha Apple Company (Internet and Technology Support Company) - Qatar 
3. Qatar Charity - Qatar 
4. Sheikh Eid al-Thani Charity Foundation (Eid Charity) - Qatar 
5. Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services - Qatar 
6. Saraya Defend Benghazi - Libya 
7. Saraya al-Ashtar - Bahrain 
8. February 14 Coalition - Bahrain 
9. The Resistance Brigades - Bahrain 
10. Hezbollah al-Bahraini - Bahrain 
11. Saraya al-Mukhtar - Bahrain 
12. Harakat Ahrar Bahrain - Bahrain  
 
Individuals: 
1. Khalifa Mohammed Turki al-Subaie  
2. Abdelmalek Mohammed Yousef Abdel Salam  
3. Ashraf Mohammed Yusuf Othman Abdel Salam  
4. Ibrahim Eissa Al-Hajji Mohammed Al-Baker  
5. Abdulaziz bin Khalifa al-Attiyah  
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6. Salem Hassan Khalifa Rashid al-Kuwari  
7. Abdullah Ghanem Muslim al-Khawar  
8. Saad bin Saad Mohammed al-Kaabi  
9. Abdullatif bin Abdullah al-Kuwari  
10. Mohammed Saeed Bin Helwan al-Sakhtari  
11. Abdul Rahman bin Omair al-Nuaimi  
12. Abdul Wahab Mohammed Abdul Rahman al-Hmeikani  
13. Khalifa bin Mohammed al-Rabban  
14. Abdullah Bin Khalid al-Thani  
15. Abdul Rahim Ahmad al-Haram  
16. Hajjaj bin Fahad Hajjaj Mohammed al-Ajmi  
17. Mubarak Mohammed al-Ajji  
18. Jaber bin Nasser al-Marri  
19. Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi  
20. Mohammed Jassim al-Sulaiti  
21. Ali bin Abdullah al-Suwaidi  
22. Hashem Saleh Abdullah al-Awadhi  
23. Ali Mohammed Mohammed al-Salabi  
24. Abdelhakim Belhadj  
25. Mahdi Harati  
26. Ismail Muhammad Mohammed al-Salabi  
27. Al-Sadiq Abdulrahman Ali al-Ghuraini  
28. Hamad Abdullah Al-Futtais al-Marri  
29. Mohamed Ahmed Shawky Islambouli  
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30. Tariq Abdelmagoud Ibrahim al-Zomor  
31. Mohamed Abdelmaksoud Mohamed Afifi  
32. Mohamed el-Saghir Abdel Rahim Mohamed  
33. Wajdi Abdelhamid Mohamed Ghoneim  
34. Hassan Ahmed Hassan Mohammed Al Dokki Al Houti  
35. Hakem al-Humaidi al-Mutairi  
36. Abdullah Mohammed Sulaiman al-Moheiseni  
37. Hamed Abdullah Ahmed al-Ali  
38. Ayman Ahmed Abdel Ghani Hassanein  
39. Assem Abdel-Maged Mohamed Madi  
40. Yahya Aqil Salman Aqeel  
41. Mohamed Hamada el-Sayed Ibrahim  
42. Abdel Rahman Mohamed Shokry Abdel Rahman  
43. Hussein Mohamed Reza Ibrahim Youssef  
44. Ahmed Abdelhafif Mahmoud Abdelhady 
45. Muslim Fouad Tafran  
46. Ayman Mahmoud Sadeq Rifat  
47. Mohamed Saad Abdel-Naim Ahmed  
48. Mohamed Saad Abdel Muttalib Abdo Al-Razaki  
49. Ahmed Fouad Ahmed Gad Beltagy  
50. Ahmed Ragab Ragab Soliman  
51. Karim Mohamed Mohamed Abdel Aziz  
52. Ali Zaki Mohammed Ali  
53. Naji Ibrahim Ezzouli  
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54. Shehata Fathi Hafez Mohammed Suleiman  
55. Muhammad Muharram Fahmi Abu Zeid  
56. Amr Abdel Nasser Abdelhak Abdel-Barry  
57. Ali Hassan Ibrahim Abdel-Zaher  
58. Murtada Majeed al-Sindi  
59. Ahmed Al-Hassan al-Daski  
 
The July 2017 list 
 
Entities: 
1. Al Balagh Charitable Foundation, Yemen. 
2. Al Ihsan Charitable Society,  Yemen. 
3. Rahma Charitable Organisation, Yemen. 
4. Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, Libya. 
5. Al Saraya Media Centre,  Libya. 
6. Boshra News Agency , Libya. 
7. Rafallah Sahati Brigade,  Libya. 
8. Nabaa TV,  Libya. 
9. Tanasuh Foundation for Dawa, Culture and Media, Libya. 
 
 Individuals: 
1. Khalid Saeed Al Bounein. 
2. Shaqer Jummah Al Shahwani. 
3. Saleh bin Ahmed Al Ghanim. 
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4. Hamid Hamad Hamid Al Ali. 
5. Abdullah Mohammed Al Yazidi. 
6. Ahmed Ali Ahmed Baraoud. 
7. Mohammed Bakr Al Dabaa. 
8. Al Saadi Abdullah Ibrahim Bukhazem. 
9. Ahmed Abd Al Jaleel Al Hasnawi. 
 
The November 2017 list. 
Entities 
1. The International Islamic Council "Massaa'". 
2. World Union of Muslim Scholars. 
 
Individuals 
1. Khaled Nazem Diab 
2. Salem Jaber Omar Ali Sultan Fathallah Jaber 
3. Moyasar Ali Musa Abdullah Jubouri 
4. Mohammed Ali Saeed Atm 
5. Hassan Ali Mohammed Juma Sultan 
6. Mohammed Suleiman Haidar Mohammed Al-Haydar 
7. Mohammed Jamal Ahmed Hishmat Abdul Hamid 
8. Alsayed Mahmoud Ezzat Ibrahim Eissa 
9. Yahya Alsayed Ibrahim Mohamed Moussa 
10. Qadri Mohamed Fahmy Mahmoud Al-Sheikh 
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